District Court dismisses time-barred mortgage discrimination claims

Courts Redlining Fair Lending Mortgages Consumer Finance Fair Housing Act Disparate Impact

On March 17, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed that claims against a group of mortgage lenders for conduct arising prior to November 2013 were barred under the two-year statute of limitations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Plaintiffs Cobb County, DeKalb County, and Fulton County, Georgia (collectively, “Counties”) alleged that the defendants “engaged in, and continue to engage in, discriminatory schemes that expose borrowers to unreasonable levels of risk; needlessly inflate interest rates, penalties, and fees; generate unauthorized and inflated charges for default related services; and lead to higher foreclosure rates among minority borrowers.” According to the Counties, these alleged practices have caused them to incur financial injury, including foreclosure-related costs, loss of property tax revenue, increased segregation, and organizational harm to County departments and authorities due to the forced reallocation of funds to address harms caused by the defendants’ actions. The Counties filed a complaint on November 20, 2015, asserting three counts related to disparate impact and disparate treatment theories under the FHA. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds, arguing that the Counties’ allegations are time-barred because they are based on allegedly discriminatory conduct occurring before November 20, 2013. Defendants further contended that the Counties could not “allege a ‘continuing violation’ that tolls the statute of limitations for each allegedly discriminatory act until the continuing violation ends because [a plaintiff’s] knowledge of a claim, or reason to have knowledge of a claim, cuts off equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for claims based on a continuing violation, and the Counties knew or should have known of their FHA claims at least as of May 2011.”

The court agreed with the defendants, pointing out that, among other things, there is “copious circumstantial evidence” that the Counties knew or should have known of their claims prior to May 2011, including well publicized allegations against the same defendants for similar conduct, and their retention of outside counsel in 2010 to investigate potential discrimination claims. According to the court, while a reasonable jury could find that the Counties themselves did not know of their claims, the record left no doubt that the outside counsel “knew of the claims prior to the statutory period, or would have known of the claims if he conducted himself with reasonable prudence.” Because the outside counsel’s “knowledge is imputed to his clients, no reasonable jury could find in the Counties’ favor on the statute-of-limitations issue.”