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North Carolina appellate court affirms district court’s decision in debt collection case

Courts Appellate Debt Buyer State Issues North Carolina Debt Collection

Courts

On March 15, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a debt buyer plaintiff and rejected the debtor defendant’s argument that the plaintiff failed to comply with a provision of North Carolina’s Consumer Economic Protection Act (CEPA). According to the order, the defendant appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff in its 2019 suit to renew a default judgment that was entered in 2010 against the defendant. The defendant argued that the default judgment “is void because it was procured by fraud and the clerk lacked jurisdiction to enter the default judgment for various reasons,” and “that Plaintiff’s interest rates on Defendant’s debt violate North Carolina law.” The appellate court noted that the CEPA “did not apply” because the statute requires that, “[p]rior to entry of a default judgment or summary judgment against a debtor in a complaint initiated by a debt buyer, the plaintiff shall file evidence with the court to establish the amount and nature of the debt.” The appellate court noted that although the plaintiff filed its original complaint against the defendant in August 2009, this CEPA provision did not take effect until October 1, 2009, and therefore only applies to “foreclosures initiated, debt collection activities undertaken, and actions filed on or after that date.” The defendant argued that the plaintiff was still required to comply with the CEPA provision because the plaintiff filed its motion for a default judgment in February 2010—after the effective date of the CEPA provision. But the appellate court determined that the plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment “was part of prosecuting its ‘action filed’ and was not a ‘debt collection activity’ within the meaning of the Act.”