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  • District Court concludes communications transmitter can be liable under the TCPA

    Courts

    On February 13, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada rejected a cloud communication company’s motion to dismiss a TCPA class action. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs’ alleged the company “collaborated as to the development, implementation, and maintenance of [a] telemarketing text message program,” which was used by a theater production company to send text messages without prior consent in violation of the TCPA and the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA). The company moved to dismiss the claims, arguing, among other things, that it was not liable under the TCPA because it was a “transmitter” and not an “initiator” of communications. Citing the FCC’s previous determination that, under certain circumstances transmitters may be held liable under the TCPA, the court rejected this argument, concluding that the company took steps necessary to send the automated messages and that its “alleged involvement was to an extent that [it] could be considered to have initiated the contact.” Moreover, the court determined the plaintiff sufficiently alleged injury under the TCPA, concluding that violations of privacy and injury to the “quiet use and enjoyment of [a] cellular telephone” are consistent with the purpose of the TCPA. The court did dismiss the plaintiff’s NDTPA claims, however, holding that the transaction did not involve the sale or lease of goods or services as the law requires.

    Courts TCPA State Issues Standing Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security FCC

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  • District Court moves puppy financing action forward

    Courts

    On January 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota denied two financing companies’ (collectively, “defendants”) motions to dismiss an action alleging the defendants violated the Consumer Leasing Act (CLA), TILA, and a Minnesota law prohibiting usurious contracts through a transaction to purchase a puppy. According to the opinion, the plaintiff financed the purchase of a puppy through the defendants, which allowed her to take possession of the puppy in exchange for 24 monthly payments through an agreement styled as a “Consumer Pet Lease.” The agreement had an APR of 120 percent. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants alleging the companies violated (i) the CLA by failing to disclose the number of payments owed under the agreement prior to execution; (ii) TILA by failing to adequately disclose the finance charge, the APR, and the “total of payments” as required under the Act; and (iii) the state’s usury law cap of 8 percent for personal debt. The defendants moved to dismiss the action challenging the plaintiff’s standing, among other things. The court, rejected the defendants arguments, finding that the consumer adequately alleged injury by stating she “would” have, not “might” have, pursued other funding had the defendants disclosed the actual interest rate. Additionally, the court determined the consumer plausibly alleged a CLA violation because the agreement contains information the plaintiff could view as “conflicting and confusing.” With respect to the TILA claims, the plaintiff argued that, although the agreement is styled as a lease, it is actually a credit sale, and the court rejected one of the defendant’s arguments that it was not a creditor, but rather a servicer not subject to TILA. Lastly, the court held the plaintiff adequately pleaded her state usury claim, but noted the claim’s viability would be better informed by discovery. Accordingly, the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

    Courts TILA CLA Usury State Issues Standing APR Interest Rate

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  • 8th Circuit holds employee failed to plead injuries in FCRA suit against employer, law firm, and credit reporting agency

    Courts

    On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit held that an employee lacked standing to bring claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because she failed to sufficiently plead she suffered injuries. An employee brought a lawsuit against her former employer, a law firm, and a credit reporting agency (defendants) alleging various violations of the FCRA after the employee’s credit report that was obtained as part of the hiring process background check was provided to the employee in response to her records request in a wrongful termination lawsuit she had filed. The district court dismissed the claims against the employer and the law firm and granted judgment on the pleadings for the credit reporting agency. Upon appeal, the 8th Circuit, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert), concluded the former employee lacked Article III standing to bring the claims. The court found that the former employee authorized her employer to obtain the credit report and failed to allege the report was used for unauthorized purposes, therefore there was no intangible injury to her privacy. Additionally, the court determined that the injuries to her “reputational harm, compromised security, and lost time” were “‘naked assertion[s]’ of reputational harm, ‘devoid of further factual enhancement.’” As for claims against the law firm and credit reporting agency, the court found that the injury was too speculative as to the alleged failures to take reasonable measures to dispose of her information. Further, whether the credit reporting agency met all of its statutory obligations to ensure the report was for a permissible purpose was irrelevant, as she suffered no injury because she provided the employer with consent to obtain her credit report.

    Courts FCRA Eighth Circuit Appellate Spokeo Credit Reporting Agency Standing

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  • 2nd Circuit holds NCUA lacks standing to bring derivative suit against two national banks regarding RMBS claims

    Courts

    On August 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held that the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) lacked standing to bring a suit against two national banks on behalf of trusts created by the agency that held residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). According to the opinion, in 2009 and 2010, NCUA took control of five failing credit unions, including ownership of certificates the credit unions held in RMBS trusts. NCUA then transferred the certificates into new trusts and a financial institution was appointed, pursuant to an Indenture Agreement, as Indenture Trustee. NCUA subsequently brought derivative claims on behalf of the trusts against two national banks, trustees of the original RMBS trusts. In affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the claims, the appellate panel found that the NCUA did not have derivative standing to sue on behalf of the trusts because the trusts had granted the right, title, and interest to their assets, including the RMBS trusts, to the Indenture Trustee. The 2nd Circuit reasoned that therefore only the Indenture Trustee possesses the claims, and the NCUA did not have the right to sue on behalf of the Indenture Trustee under the Indenture Agreement.

    Courts Second Circuit Appellate RMBS Standing Securities

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