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District Court grants in part/denies in part defendant’s motion in RESPA, FDCPA case
Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted in part and denied in part a defendant mortgage servicer’s motion for summary judgment concerning allegations that the defendant improperly foreclosed on plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongfully accused her of failing to remedy her default and therefore violated RESPA and the FDCPA, among other things. Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s summary judgment request as to plaintiff’s RESPA claim because the defendant failed to exercise due diligence. But the court granted defendant’s request for summary judgment regarding plaintiff’s FDCPA claim because plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant acted deceptively.
The plaintiff’s original loan—serviced by a previous servicer—was modified in 2016. But payments again were not made, so the previous servicer notified the plaintiff in December 2018 that it had accelerated the loan’s maturity date and referred the loan to foreclosure. The plaintiff, however, again applied for another modification in early 2019. After telling plaintiff her application was complete, the previous servicer then told the plaintiff, who claimed she inherited the property, that it needed additional documents to prove plaintiff’s successor-in-interest status. Ultimately, the previous servicer did not confirm the modification because the plaintiff did not confirm her successor-in-interest status.
The plaintiff again applied for a loan modification in March 2019, after the previous servicer transferred servicing rights to the defendant, and this modification was denied. She allegedly spoke with one of defendant’s representatives about the denial and indicated that she wished to reapply for a modification. However, the representative advised that she would have to reinstate the mortgage first before any loan modification. The defendant then sent a default letter to plaintiff’s property, which advised that the loan was still in default and needed payment.
The plaintiff submitted at least one additional request for mortgage assistance after the March 2019 modification application. The defendant acknowledged receipt of the request and detailed the documents it needed to process the request. The defendant then followed up in June 2019, stating again that it could not confirm that she was the successor-in-interest on the loan without documentation. A month later the defendant advised the plaintiff again that documents were still missing that were necessary to process her loan assistance request. The loan remained in default thereafter and the defendant foreclosed in August 2019.
In adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied as to the RESPA claim, the district court noted that the defendant possibly should have sought documents, specifically the successor-in-interest documentation from the previous servicer, after the plaintiff submitted an incomplete loan modification application. The court stated that “there is a question of material fact whether [defendant] exercised reasonable diligence in failing to request the successor-in-interest documentation from [the previous servicer].” The court added that “there is a requirement of reasonable diligence, and there is no evidence showing that [defendant] met this standard. Failing to address the regulatory standard creates a question that cannot be resolved on the available information. Thus, there is at least one question of material fact here.”
Regarding plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, the court noted that “there is no evidence of deception in the foreclosure of loan payment process” and that “[p]laintiff has failed to provide any evidence that [defendant] acted dishonestly in requesting additional documentation to complete the loan modification.” The court therefore granted defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the FDCPA claim.
FDIC reinstates SARC as final review in supervisory appeals
On May 17, the FDIC adopted revised Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations to reinstate the Supervision Appeals Review Committee (SARC) as the final level of review in the agency’s supervisory appeals process. The SARC’s restoration appears to eliminate the independent Office of Supervisory Appeals, which was created and staffed in 2021. The Office of Supervisory Appeals was designed to have final authority to resolve appeals by a panel of reviewing officials and be independent from other divisions within the FDIC that have authority to issue material supervisory determinations (covered by InfoBytes here).
According to the revised guidelines, the SARC will include one inside member of the FDIC’s Board of Directors (serving as chairperson); a deputy or special assistant to each of the other inside board members; and the general counsel as a non-voting member. The guidelines provide a list of material supervisory determinations, including CAMELS, IT, trust, and CRA ratings; consumer compliance ratings; loan loss reserve provision determinations; TILA restitutions; and decisions to initiate informal enforcement actions (such as memoranda of understanding).
The guidelines apply to all FDIC-supervised financial institutions, including state nonmember banks, industrial banks, and insured U.S. branches of non-U.S. banks.
While public comments from industry had supported an independent supervisory appeals process, the revised guidelines are posted in final (not draft) form on the FDIC’s website, with the FIL asserting that the guidelines take effect May 17 (before the comment period concludes on June 21). The notice and request for comments was published in the Federal Register on May 20.
9th Circuit: Revived FCRA suit questions reasonableness of furnisher’s investigation
On May 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of a defendant furnisher, stating that it is up to a jury to decide whether the defendant’s “reasonable investigation” into the plaintiff’s dispute complied with the FCRA. After the plaintiff defaulted on both his first and second mortgages, the property was foreclosed and sold. Several years later, the plaintiff tried to purchase another home but was denied a mortgage due to a tradeline on his credit report that showed one of his mortgages as past due with accruing interest and late fees due to missed payments. The plaintiff disputed the debt through the consumer reporting agency (CRA) and provided a citation to the Arizona Anti-Deficiency Statute, which abolished his liability for the reported debt. The CRA then told the defendant about the dispute and provided information about the statutory citation. The defendant originally “updated” the plaintiff’s account to show that the debt was being disputed, but continued to report current and past due balances. Yet after the plaintiff again disputed the validity of his debt, the defendant marked the account as “paid, closed” and changed the balance to $0.
The plaintiff sued, claiming the defendant violated the FCRA by failing to reasonably investigate his dispute and for reporting inaccurate information. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the reports it made were accurate as a matter of law and that the defendant had reasonably investigated the dispute. Moreover, “whether the Arizona anti-deficiency statute rendered [plaintiff’s] debt uncollectible is a legal question, not a factual one,” the district court stated, adding that “the FCRA does not impose on furnishers a duty to investigate legal disputes, only factual inaccuracies.”
The 9th Circuit disagreed, writing that Arizona law required that the plaintiff’s balance be “abolished,” so it was “patently incorrect” for the defendant to report otherwise. In applying Arizona law, the plaintiff had “more than satisfied his burden” of showing inaccurate reporting, the appellate court wrote, explaining that the “situation was no different than a discharge under bankruptcy law, which extinguishes ‘the personal liability of the debtor.’” The 9th Circuit also held that the FCRA does not “categorically exempt legal issues from the investigations that furnishers must conduct.” Pointing out that the “distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘factual’ issues is ambiguous, potentially unworkable, and could invite furnishers to ‘evade their investigation obligation by construing the relevant dispute as a ‘legal’ one,’” the panel referred to an April 2021 amicus brief filed in support of the plaintiff by the CFPB, which argued that the FCRA does not distinguish between legal and factual disputes when it comes to furnishers’ obligations to investigate disputes referred from CRAs. The CFPB recently made a similar argument in an amicus brief filed last month in the 11th Circuit (covered by InfoBytes here). There, the CFPB argued that importing this exemption would run counter to the purposes of FCRA, would create an unworkable standard that would be difficult to implement, and could encourage furnishers to evade their statutory obligations any time they construe the disputes as “legal.”
Holding that there was a “genuine factual dispute about the reasonableness” of the defendant’s investigation, the appellate court ultimately determined that it would “leave it to the jury” to decide whether the defendant’s investigation had been reasonable. “Unless ‘only one conclusion about the conduct’s reasonableness is possible,’ the question is normally inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage,” the appellate court stated. “Here, as is ordinarily the case, this question is best left to the factfinder.”
Connecticut amends banking statutes
On May 17, the Connecticut governor signed S.B. 268, which makes various revisions to state banking statutes. Among other things, the bill establishes that a money transmission license is not transferable or assignable, but a licensee may be acquired under certain circumstances. The bill also establishes that the commissioner cannot approve a state-bank’s loan production office to be established unless the commissioner has considered the out-of-state bank's record of compliance. Additionally, the bill establishes certain definitions, including the meaning of “control”, “control person,” “key individual,” and “passive investor.” The bill is effective October 1.
Florida amends MSB provisions to define “control persons”
On May 12, the Florida governor signed HB 273, which amends provisions related to money services business activities. The bill, among other things, revises provisions related to prohibited activities without a license and other requirements for written contracts between a money transmitter or payment instrument seller and an authorized vendor, and provides requirements for a money transmitter that receives virtual currency, among other things. The bill also establishes that “each money transmitter that receives virtual currency, either directly or through an authorized vendor, for the purpose of transmitting such virtual currency from one person to another location or person must at all times, until the transmission obligation is completed, hold virtual currency of the same type and amount owed or obligated to the other location or person.” The bill is effective January 1, 2023.
5th Circuit rules against SEC’s use of ALJs
On May 18, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the SEC’s in-house adjudication of a petitioners’ case violated their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and relied on unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. The appellate court further determined that SEC administrative law judges (ALJs) are unconstitutionally shielded from removal. In a 2-1 decision, the 5th Circuit vacated the SEC’s judgment against a hedge fund manager and his investment company arising from a case, which accused petitioners of fraud under the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Advisers Act in connection with two hedge funds that held roughly $24 million in assets. According to the SEC, the petitioners had, among other things, inflated the funds’ assets to increase the fees they collected from investors. Petitioners sued in federal court, arguing that the SEC’s proceedings “infringed on various constitutional rights,” but the federal courts refused to issue an injunction claiming they lacked jurisdiction and that petitioners had to continue with the agency’s proceedings. While petitioners’ sought review by the SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Lucia v. SEC, which held that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers” subject to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (covered by InfoBytes here). Following the decision, the SEC assigned petitioners’ proceeding to an ALJ who was properly appointed, “but petitioners chose to waive their right to a new hearing and continued under their original petition to the Commission.” The SEC eventually affirmed findings of liability against the petitioners, and ordered the petitioners to cease and desist from committing further violations and to pay a $300,000 civil penalty. The investment company was also ordered to pay nearly $685,000 in ill-gotten gains, while the hedge fund manager was barred from various securities industry activities.
In vacating the SEC’s judgment, the appellate court determined that the SEC had deprived petitioners of their right to a jury trial by bringing its action in an “administrative forum” instead of filing suit in federal court. While the SEC challenged “that the legal interests at issue in this case vindicate distinctly public rights” and therefore are “appropriately allowed” to be brought in agency proceedings without a jury, the appellate court countered that the SEC’s enforcement action was “akin to traditional actions at law to which the jury-trial right attaches.” Moreover, the 5th Circuit noted that while “the SEC agrees that Congress has given it exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to bring securities fraud enforcement actions within the agency instead of in an Article III court[,] Congress has said nothing at all indicating how the SEC should make that call in any given case.” As such, the 5th Circuit opined that this “total absence of guidance is impermissible under the Constitution.”
Additionally, the 5th Circuit raised concerns about the statutory removal restrictions for SEC ALJs who can only be removed for “good cause” by SEC commissioners (who are removable only for good cause by the president). “Simply put, if the President wanted an SEC ALJ to be removed, at least two layers of for-cause protection stand in the President’s way,” the appellate court concluded. “Thus, SEC ALJs are sufficiently insulated from removal that the President cannot take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The statutory removal restrictions are unconstitutional.”
The dissenting judge disagreed with all three of the majority’s constitutional conclusions, contending that the majority, among other things, misread the Supreme Court’s decisions as to what are and are not “public rights,” and that “Congress’s decision to give prosecutorial authority to the SEC to choose between an Article III court and an administrative proceeding for its enforcement actions does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.” The judge further stated that while the Supreme Court determined in Lucia that ALJs are “inferior officers” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause in Article II, it “expressly declined to decide whether multiple layers of statutory removal restrictions on SEC ALJs violate Article II.” Consequently, the judge concluded that he found “no constitutional violations or any other errors with the administrative proceedings below.”
5th Circuit reverses decision that a portion of a contract was indefinite and unenforceable
On May 18, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to dismiss a suit against a creditor that sold portfolios of delinquent and defaulted debt, ruling that the disputed portion of the contract between the two parties was enforceable.
According to the opinion, the defendant sold portfolios of delinquent accounts to the plaintiff. The plaintiff and the defendant entered a “forward flow” agreement, where the defendant agreed to continue to send the plaintiff accounts during a specific timeline. Under the agreement, the defendant agreed to deliver “additional accounts,” which would be the same quality as the other accounts that had been sold. The parties could not settle on an agreement regarding the pricing for accounts that were submitted under the forward flow agreement, and the defendant sued the plaintiff for breach of contract. A district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, which the plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court found that the district court erred on its decision that the term “additional accounts” was indefinite and therefore unenforceable. The court stated that “[t]aken together, the plain meaning of the word ‘additional,’ the contract’s clear architecture, and various settled principles of interpretation reveal that ‘additional accounts’ refers to all qualifying accounts that accrue quarterly.” The appellate court also noted that it “cannot ignore that this argument was not presented to the district court,” and that it will not speculate on why [the defendant-appellee did not] reached for this low-hanging factual fruit.”
FDIC releases process for MDI designation requests
On May 19, the FDIC released a process for insured institutions or applicants for deposit insurance to submit requests for recognition as a minority depository institution (MDI). As previously covered by InfoBytes, last June the FDIC approved and released an updated Statement of Policy Regarding Minority Depository Institutions to enhance the agency’s efforts to preserve and promote MDIs.
The updated statement of policy details the framework by which the FDIC implements objectives set forth in Section 308 of FIRREA and describes agency initiatives for fulfilling its MDI statutory goals. According to the FDIC, “supervised institutions or applicants for deposit insurance that seek to be recognized as an MDI may submit a written request, signed by a duly authorized officer or representative of the institution or applicant, at any time to the appropriate regional office.” Supervised institutions are also able to submit requests in connection with a merger application or a change in control notice. Requests should contain sufficient information in support of the designation, and the FDIC will send a letter acknowledging recognition of the institution as an MDI if an institution has met the eligibility requirements.
FDIC approves final rule for trust, mortgage servicing account insurance
On May 18, the FDIC published a final rule that amends the deposit insurance regulations for trust accounts and mortgage servicing accounts. According to the FDIC, the final rule is “intended to make the deposit insurance rules easier to understand for depositors and bankers, facilitate more timely insurance determinations for trust accounts in the event of a bank failure, and enhance consistency of insurance coverage for mortgage servicing account deposits.”
The final rule, among other things: (i) establishes updates to the Banker Resources Guide Deposit Insurance Page with the Small Entity Compliance Guide (Community Bank Information) to promote understanding of the regulations; (ii) amends the deposit insurance regulations by merging the revocable and irrevocable trusts categories; (iii) “amends the regulation to expand the current per-borrower coverage of up to $250,000 to include any funds paid into the account to satisfy the principal and interest obligation of the mortgagors to the lender”; and (iv) establishes that certain “depositors within excess of $1.25 million in trusts deposits at a particular IDI may want to make changes given the new coverage limits” effective April 1, 2024.
CFPB affirms states may enforce CFPA and other federal laws
On May 19, the CFPB issued an interpretive rule addressing states’ authority to bring enforcement actions for violations of federal consumer financial protection laws, including the CFPA. Though the Bureau is charged with, among other things, administering, interpreting, and enforcing federal consumer financial laws, a category that includes the CFPA itself, the agency said it is not the only enforcer of these laws. According to the interpretive rule, “states can enforce [federal consumer financial laws] to the full extent authorized under those laws—including against entities that are not covered persons or service providers (and thus not subject to liability under section 1036(a)(1)(A)) and including against national banks and Federal savings associations.”
The interpretive rule establishes:
- States can enforce any provision of the CFPA, which includes making it unlawful for covered persons or service providers to violate any provision of federal consumer financial protection law. This provision covers the CFPA itself, in addition to its 18 enumerated consumer laws and certain other laws, along with any rule or order prescribed by the Bureau under the CFPA, an enumerated consumer law, or pursuant to certain other authorities.
- States can pursue claims and actions against a broad range of entities. The interpretive rule states that “the limitations on the Bureau’s authority in sections 1027 and 1029 generally do not constrain States’ enforcement authority.” States can bring actions against a broader cross-section of companies and individuals.
- States may pursue actions under section 1042 even if the Bureau is pursuing a concurrent enforcement action against the same entity. States are not restricted from bringing enforcement actions in coordination with the Bureau, and may also bring an enforcement action to stop or remediate harm that is not addressed by an action taken by the Bureau against the same entity. “Nothing in the [CFPA] precludes these complementary enforcement activities that serve to protect consumers at both the national and state levels,” the Bureau said in its announcement.
The Bureau stated the interpretive rule is a “part of the CFPB’s expansion of its efforts to support state enforcement activity,” and noted that it “plans to consider other steps to promote state enforcement of federal consumer financial protection law, including ways to facilitate victim redress.”