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  • District Court dismisses TCPA action against ride-sharing company, allows plaintiff to correct deficiencies

    Courts

    On January 16, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted in part and denied in part a ride-sharing company’s motion to dismiss a proposed TCPA class action, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the company is vicariously liable for the sent text messages but that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege the use of an “automatic telephone dialing system” (autodialer). According to the opinion, the plaintiff received two unsolicited text messages from a commercial messaging system instructing him to download the ride-sharing company’s app and providing a link to download the app. The plaintiff filed suit arguing the commercial text system was acting as an agent of the company for the company’s financial benefit and that the texts were sent using an autodialer in violation of the TCPA. The company moved to dismiss the action. With regard to the use of an autodialer, the court agreed with the company, determining that the plaintiff “merely parrots [the] statutory definition of an [autodialer]” and fails to assert facts that could support a reasonable inference that the company used an autodialer to send the texts. As for vicarious liability, the court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the company’s actual authority over the commercial messaging system by asserting the company “instructed its agent or vendor as to the content of the text messages and timing of the sending of the text messages.” The court dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint but allowed 30 days for the plaintiff to amend the deficiencies.

    Courts TCPA Class Action Autodialer

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  • Acting Director Otting says FHFA structure is unconstitutional, will not defend before 5th Circuit

    Courts

    On January 14, acting Director of the FHFA, Joseph Otting, filed a supplemental brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit stating the agency will no longer defend the constitutionality of the FHFA’s structure in the upcoming en banc rehearing. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in July 2018, the 5th Circuit concluded that the FHFA’s single-director structure violates Article II of the Constitution because the director is too insulated from removal by the president. In August, while the agency was still under the leadership of Mel Watt, it petitioned the court for an en banc rehearing, challenging the constitutionality holding. Now, according to the supplemental brief, the FHFA states it “will not defend the constitutionality of [the Housing Economic Recovery Act’s] for-cause removal provision and agrees with the analysis in [the relevant portion] of Treasury’s Supplemental Brief that the provision infringes on the President’s control of executive authority.” The en banc rehearing, which will address the constitutionality issue as well as the plaintiff’s other statutory claims in the case, is scheduled for January 23.

    Courts Fifth Circuit Appellate HERA FHFA Single-Director Structure

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  • District Court certifies class action against lead generator’s payday lending practices

    Courts

    On January 11, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted a motion for class certification in a case challenging a company’s payday lending practices under several Minnesota consumer protection statutes and common law. The plaintiffs filed the proposed class action alleging, among other things, that the company, which generates leads for payday lenders, failed to disclose that it was not licensed in the state, and that the loans may not be legal in Minnesota. The Minnesota Attorney General had notified the company in 2010 and 2012 that it was subject to Minnesota law restricting payday loans and that it was “aiding and abetting lenders that violate Minnesota law.” The court found that the plaintiffs identified “questions of law or fact common to the class that are capable of class-wide resolution,” which “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The court noted that a class action would fairly promote the interests of the class and ensure judicial economy, and that even though the plaintiffs’ proposed method for measuring the amount of damages would require individual inquiry, “it is less consuming than issues requiring individual testimony and will not overwhelm the liability and damages issues capable of class-wide resolution.”

    Courts Payday Lending Class Action State Issues Consumer Lending

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  • 3rd Circuit: Enrollment packet e-signature requires student to arbitrate claims

    Courts

    On January 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that a student (plaintiff) attending an online school (defendant) consented to an arbitration agreement and waiver of jury trial when she electronically signed an enrollment packet. According to the opinion, when the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s lawsuit and compel arbitration, the plaintiff argued that she did not realize the enrollment packet contained an arbitration agreement. She maintained that her e-signature was applied to the agreement without her permission. The lower court, however, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and entered an order to compel arbitration.

    On appeal, the 3rd Circuit agreed with the lower court in a non-precedential decision that her contentions that she was never presented with the agreement and that the defendant had applied an e-signature on file were insufficient to create an issue of material fact. It observed, “[t]he most reasonable inference we can draw from the evidence presented is that [the plaintiff] simply did not read or review the [e]nrollment [p]acket PDF closely before she e-signed it, which will not save her from her obligation to arbitrate.” The 3rd Circuit further noted that Pennsylvania allows electronic signatures as a valid way to register assent, and that a “physical pen and ink signature” is not required.

    Courts Third Circuit Appellate E-Signature Arbitration

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  • 3rd Circuit: Enrollment packet e-signature requires student to arbitrate claims

    Courts

    On January 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that a student (plaintiff) attending an online school (defendant) consented to an arbitration agreement and waiver of jury trial when she electronically signed an enrollment packet. According to the opinion, when the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s lawsuit and compel arbitration, the plaintiff argued that she did not realize the enrollment packet contained an arbitration agreement. She maintained that her e-signature was applied to the agreement without her permission. The lower court, however, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and entered an order to compel arbitration.

    On appeal, the 3rd Circuit agreed with the lower court in a non-precedential decision that her contentions that she was never presented with the agreement and that the defendant had applied an e-signature on file were insufficient to create an issue of material fact. It observed, “[t]he most reasonable inference we can draw from the evidence presented is that [the plaintiff] simply did not read or review the [e]nrollment [p]acket PDF closely before she e-signed it, which will not save her from her obligation to arbitrate.” The 3rd Circuit further noted that Pennsylvania allows electronic signatures as a valid way to register assent, and that a “physical pen and ink signature” is not required.

    Courts Third Circuit Appellate E-Signature Arbitration

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  • District Court dismisses non-borrower action against mortgage servicer

    Courts

    On January 11, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted a mortgage servicer’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit with prejudice brought by a homeowner’s widow alleging violations of, among other claims, TILA, RESPA, and FDCPA, for failing to include a credit-life-insurance provision in the loan note. According to the opinion, the plaintiff sued the mortgage servicer and mortgage originator after her husband passed and the servicer initiated foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff argued that her husband, who was the sole borrower, and the mortgage originator had an oral agreement to include a credit-life-provision in the mortgage loan note but the originator failed to include it. The mortgage servicer moved to dismiss the action arguing, among other things, that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action. Upon review, the court agreed with the mortgage servicer, determining that the plaintiff lacks standing under TILA, RESPA, and the FDCPA because she was neither an “obligor” nor “borrower” on the loan even though she  was identified as a “borrower” on the Deed of Trust. Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiff’s alternative claim that she is a third-party beneficiary with standing to sue under the laws, finding that no valid contract existed as to the credit-life-insurance policy and therefore, the plaintiff could not claim to be a beneficiary of a non-existent contract. The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s other state law and fraud claims, finding she failed to provide sufficient facts to make the claims plausible.

    Courts Foreclosure FDCPA TILA RESPA Mortgage Servicing

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  • 6th Circuit holds elements of Michigan foreclosure process are collection efforts under FDCPA

    Courts

    On January 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that a debt collector should not allow the essential elements of a Michigan foreclosure to proceed after receiving a dispute letter under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, in September 2016, a debt collector sent a notice to a mortgage debtor informing the homeowner it intended to foreclose on the property, and two weeks later it began the Michigan state foreclosure process. After the process began, and within 30 days of receiving the debt collection notice, the mortgage debtor sent a certified dispute letter to the collector, challenging the validity of the debt. After receiving the dispute letter, the debt collector posted a foreclosure notice on the property and published notices in the newspaper. The debt collector never sent the mortgage debtor a verification of the debt. The mortgage debtor filed suit against the debt collector alleging violations of, among other things, the FDCPA. The district court granted summary judgment for the debt collector, holding that as a matter of law, the FDCPA did not require that the debt collector verify the debt and that it had “cease[d] collection of the debt” pursuant to the statute. The mortgage debtor appealed, arguing the district court (i) erred in its decision to end discovery and consider summary judgment, and (ii) erred in its interpretation of the FDCPA and its finding that the collector ceased collection efforts.

    On appeal, the 6th Circuit rejected the mortgage debtor’s arguments that summary judgment was granted while there were outstanding discovery motions, concluding the debtor provided no evidence the debt collector failed to comply with discovery requests and noted that most of the motions were filed after discovery period expired. As for the FDCPA appeal, the court reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that, as a matter of law, the debt collector was required to intervene and stop the foreclosure actions that were put into motion prior to receiving the dispute letter. The appellate court agreed with the debtor that the newspaper advertisement and posted notice are necessary elements of the Michigan foreclosure process and therefore constituted “collection activity” under the FDCPA. Regardless of whether the debt collector personally took any actions after receiving the dispute letter, the appellate court concluded the debt collector had the responsibility to cancel any elements of the Michigan foreclosure process until it obtained sufficient verification of the debt.

    Courts Sixth Circuit Appellate FDCPA State Issues Foreclosure Debt Collection

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  • District Court approves class action settlement over threatening collection letters

    Courts

    On January 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia approved an $861,000 class settlement resolving allegations that a bank violated the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act by falsely threating “legal action” in the collection of foreclosure fees. According to the complaint, the bank, in an attempt to collect foreclosure and attorney’s fees, sent letters to consumers stating “notice of pending litigation,” misrepresenting that a legal proceeding had been filed, when no filings had occurred. The settlement covers any West Virginia automobile or home loan consumer who received one of three specified letters since 2012 and 2013, and awards the plaintiffs’ attorneys one-third of the cash settlement. The three lead plaintiffs will each receive $5,000 “in recognition of service to the class.”

    Courts Debt Collection State Issues Class Action Foreclosure

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  • District Court: FCRA lawsuit passes Spokeo test, survives motion to dismiss

    Courts

    On January 8, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a bank’s motion to dismiss claims that it had obtained a credit report without a permissible purpose, ruling that the allegations rise above a mere procedural violation of the FCRA. According to the opinion, the consumer alleged that the bank accessed her credit report and obtained personal information, including current and past addresses, birth date, employment history, and telephone numbers, without having a personal business relationship, information to suggest the consumer owed the debt, or receiving consent for the release of the report. The bank argued that the consumer’s claim was only a “bare procedural violation” and not a concrete injury in fact as required under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert). However, the court determined that the consumer’s allegation that the invasion of privacy, which occurred when the bank accessed her credit report from a consumer reporting agency without receiving consent and with no legitimate business reason to do so, “adequately alleges a concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.”

    Courts Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security Spokeo Credit Report FCRA

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  • 9th Circuit: Fannie Mae is not a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA

    Courts

    On January 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that Fannie Mae is not a “consumer reporting agency” under the FCRA and therefore is not liable under the law. According to the opinion, homeowners attempted to refinance their current mortgage loan two years after completing a short sale on their prior mortgage. While shopping for the refinance, lenders used Fannie Mae’s Desktop Underwriting (DU) program to determine if the loan would be eligible for purchase by the agency. Three of the eight DU findings showed the loan would be ineligible due to a foreclosure reported for the homeowners within the last seven years, which was not true. The homeowners sued Fannie Mae alleging the agency violated the FCRA for inaccurate reporting. On cross motions for summary judgment, the lower court determined that Fannie Mae was liable under the FCRA for furnishing inaccurate information because the agency “acts as a consumer reporting agency when it licenses DU to lenders.”

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit reviewed whether Fannie Mae was a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA and noted that the agency must “regularly engage[] in . . . the practice of assembling or evaluating” consumer information, which Fannie Mae argues it does not do. Specifically, the agency asserts that it simply provides software that allows lenders to evaluate consumer information. The appeals court agreed, concluding that Fannie Mae created the tool but the person using the tool is the person engaging in the act. The court reasoned, “[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest that Fannie Mae assembles or evaluates consumer information.” Moreover, the court noted, if Fannie Mae were found to be a consumer reporting agency, it would be subject to other FCRA duties to borrowers, which “would contradict Congress’s design for Fannie Mae to operate only in the secondary mortgage market, to deal directly with lenders, and not to deal with borrowers themselves.”

    Courts FCRA Fannie Mae Ninth Circuit Appellate Foreclosure Consumer Reporting Agency

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