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7th Circuit affirms summary judgment for repossession company, holds property-retrieval fee is not subject to FDCPA
On October 31, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a third-party repossession company and an auto lender, holding that a fee that the repossession company required to process personal items left in a repossessed car did not constitute an impermissible demand for repayment under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, after a consumer fell behind on her auto payments, the third-party company repossessed her vehicle on behalf of the auto lender. The repossession company, according to the consumer, demanded a $100 payment in order to retrieve personal property she had left in the car. The consumer sued the company and the lender arguing that the retrieval fee was an impermissible debt collection in violation of the FDCPA. In response, the repossession company and the lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the fee was an administrative handling fee that the lender had agreed to pay to the repossession company—not a fee assessed to the consumer. The lower court agreed.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit determined that the documentary evidence showed that the $100 fee was an administrative fee that the lender agreed to pay to the repossession company, stating “[t]here is no way on this record to view the handling fee as some sort of masked demand for principal payment to [the lender].” The appellate court concluded the consumer did not establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether the repossession company demanded the $100 payment on behalf of the lender and, therefore, affirmed summary judgment in favor of the repossession company and the lender.
Court grants class certification to consumers alleging law firm collection letters violated FDCPA
On October 31, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted class certification for a group of debtors in three states who alleged that the debt collection letters they received that were printed on law firm letterhead violated the FDCPA by falsely implying attorneys reviewed the underlying debts. The debt collector argued against certification because not all of the recipients of the letter at issue had consumer debts covered by the FDCPA, arguing “that there is no administratively feasible way to ascertain class members without doing individualized fact-finding.” The court disagreed, finding the plaintiff met the burden of demonstrating class members can be identified. Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff’s proposed methodology would rely on the business unit that sent the letters, as well as information in the debt collector’s records, to determine which accounts are covered by the FDCPA. Because the plaintiff “demonstrated an administratively feasible and reliable method for identifying class members,” the court granted class certification.
Debt collector settles for $9 million over allegedly illegal calling practices
On October 30, a third-party debt collector and its affiliates (defendants) entered into a stipulated final judgment in the Superior Court of California to settle a consumer protection lawsuit brought by the state of California over allegedly illegal debt collection calling practices. According to a press release issued by the Los Angeles County District Attorney, the defendants allegedly violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the FDCPA, and the TCPA by calling consumers with “excessive frequency,” continuing to call consumers even after being advised that they had reached the wrong number, and using a “predictive dialer” to place calls to consumers’ cell phones without their consent. By entering into the judgment, the defendants—who have not admitted to the allegations in the complaint—will, among other things, (i) pay $1 million in monetary relief; (ii) pay an $8 million civil penalty; (iii) maintain records of calls and complaints; (iv) conduct compliance training for employees responsible for outbound debt collection calls; and (v) conduct an annual third-party audit to ensure compliance with the settlement.
District Court rejects motion to dismiss robocall claims, says predictive dialer is autodialer
On October 30, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied a company’s motion to dismiss allegations that it violated the TCPA when it used a predictive dialer to try to collect a debt from the plaintiff. According to the opinion, the plaintiff alleged the company called him repeatedly without permission in an attempt to collect a debt using a predictive dialer. The company moved to dismiss because the plaintiff did not allege that the company used an autodialer with the ability to dial random or sequential phone numbers, which the company argued was required by the TCPA. The court found that a predictive dialer is an autodialer under the TCPA even if it does not generate random or sequential numbers. This conclusion was based on a 2003 FCC ruling, which stated that predictive dialers are autodialers “even if the device does not dial random or sequentially generated numbers.” The court further noted that the decision reached by the D.C. Circuit in ACA International v. FCC—which set aside the FCC’s 2015 interpretation of an autodialer as unreasonably expansive—did not invalidate the FCC’s 2003 order. (See previous Buckley Sandler Special Alert on ACA International here.) Based on this analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiff had established the three elements necessary to allege a TCPA violation.
9th Circuit denies petition for en banc rehearing of TCPA action against gym
On October 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit denied a California gym’s petition for a rehearing en banc of the court’s September decision reviving a TCPA putative class action. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the appeals court vacated a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the gym, concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the text system used by the gym—which stores numbers and dials them automatically to send the messages—qualified as an “autodialer” under the TCPA. Notably, in vacating the summary judgment order, the 9th Circuit performed its own review of the statutory definition of an autodialer in the TCPA, because the recent D.C. Circuit opinion in ACA International v. FCC (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert) set aside the FCC’s definition. Through this review, the appeals court concluded that the TCPA defined an autodialer broadly as “equipment which has the capacity—(i) to store numbers to be called, or (ii) to produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator—and to dial such numbers automatically (even if the system must be turned on or triggered by a person).”
Bankruptcy judge approves Lehman’s motion to add indemnity claims against mortgage sellers
It has been reported that during a hearing on October 29, a judge for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.’s motion to amend and extend indemnification claims brought against mortgage sellers, allowing Lehman to include an additional $2.45 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) allowed claims from settlements reached earlier this year. As previously reported by InfoBytes, these claims had not yet accrued when the original order was entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024. Lehman’s prior claims addressed indemnification claims held against roughly 3,000 counterparties involving more than 11,000 mortgage loans related to litigation settlements reached with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
According to the report, the judge stated her decision to allow the amendments will not delay litigation, nor abridge defendants’ rights, as discovery has not yet commenced. The judge’s decision further requires the parties to reach an agreement concerning an alternative dispute resolution regarding the claims.
Colorado appeals court holds second collection letter violated state debt collection law
On October 18, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a debt collector’s second collection letter violated the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (CFDCPA) requirement for proper notification of the consumer’s right to dispute and request validation of the debt, reversing the lower court’s ruling. According to the opinion, a consumer filed a complaint against the debt collector alleging the two letters she received violated the CFDCPA, and the lower court disagreed, granting summary judgment in favor of the debt collector. Upon review, the appeals court determined that the first letter contained all the disclosures required under the CFDCPA but that the debt collector’s second letter, which prominently used the bold and capitalized phrase "we cannot help you unless you call," overshadowed or contradicted the statutorily required disclosures made by the company in the first letter. Specifically, the court concluded that the second letter, which arrived within the thirty-day statutory period initiated by the first letter, was “capable of being reasonably interpreted by the least sophisticated consumer as changing the manner in which the consumer was required by law to dispute the debt” and is therefore deceptive or misleading in violation of the CFDCPA.
7th Circuit: Courts, not arbiters, decide class arbitration questions
On October 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held that the availability of class or collective arbitration within an employment agreement is a threshold “question of arbitrability” that must be decided by a court. According to the opinion, an employee filed class and collection action claims against her employer for wage and hour violations. The district court compelled arbitration pursuant to an agreement between the employee and her employer but struck as unlawful a waiver clause that forbid class or collective arbitration of any claim. The case proceeded to arbitration and the arbitrator issued an award of over $10 million in damages to the employee and the other 174 claimants who had opted-in to the arbitration proceeding. The employer appealed the award, arguing that the waiver of collective arbitration provision was valid, rendering the collective arbitration in violation of the employment agreement.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court, pointing to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, which upheld the validity of similar provisions. (Epic held that “an arbitration agreement does not violate the National Labor Relations Act when it requires plaintiffs to pursue employment-related claims in single claimant arbitrations.”). The plaintiff also argued, however, that despite the presence of the waiver, the arbitration agreement still permitted collective arbitration. This left open the question of who interprets the agreement to determine whether collection arbitration applies—the arbitrator or the court. The 7th Circuit found for the latter, concluding that the availability of class or collective arbitration is a threshold question of arbitrability and therefore a district court, and not the arbitrator should decide its permissibility.
District Court denies arbitration bid, rules clauses signed by borrowers are invalid
On October 18, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied a motion to compel arbitration, holding that an arbitration clause was invalid under the “effective vindication” exception to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). According to the opinion, borrowers received several loans from an online payday lender, incorporated under tribal law, which charged usurious, triple-digit interest rates on the loans. Per the terms of the loan agreements, the borrowers consented to binding arbitration for any disputes and agreed per the choice-of-law provision that tribal law applied, effectively waiving any protections they might have enjoyed under federal and state law. The lender moved to arbitrate, which the borrowers opposed, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the “effective vindication” exception to arbitration because it implicitly waives a consumer’s state and federal statutory rights. The district court agreed, finding that the arbitration clause operated as a prospective waiver of most federal statutory remedies. The court found that while the FAA gives parties the freedom to structure arbitration agreements as they choose, that freedom does not extend to a substantive waiver of federally protected statutory rights. The lender also argued that the arbitrator, rather than the court, should decide if the agreement’s choice-of-law provision was invalid. The court disagreed, ruling that questions of arbitrability are for the courts to decide, not the arbitrators. Finally, the lender asked to sever the choice-of-law provision of the arbitration agreement. The court rejected such an approach, holding that when the “offending provisions” of an arbitration agreement “go to the essence of the contract,” they cannot be severed.
District Court rejects request for attorneys’ fees in dismissed CFPB debt collection suit
On October 19, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio entered an order rejecting a request that the CFPB pay $1.2 million in attorney’s fees after the Bureau lost its debt collection lawsuit, finding no evidence of bad faith. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court entered judgment against the Bureau on all counts after ruling that the agency failed to meet its burden to show that the debt collectors mislead consumers when it sent demand letters on law firm letterhead even though the attorneys at the firm were not meaningfully involved in preparing those letters.
According to the opinion, the law firm argued that it was entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act because, among other things, it suffered reputation harm and expended significant resources in its defense. Furthermore, the law firm claimed that the Bureau knew or should have known its claims were meritless. But the court decided otherwise, pointing to the advisory jury’s findings that the law firm’s debt collection letters to some consumers were “false, deceptive, or misleading” and acknowledging the Bureau’s reliance on expert testimony and its survival of summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings. The court found that even if the litigation was “an overreach based on facts, or that the Bureau was attempting to expand consumer protection laws past their useful purpose,” there is no evidence to suggest the suit was targeted or in bad faith.