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9th Circuit will not rehear interest on escrow preemption decision
On May 16, a panel of three judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit denied the petition for an en banc rehearing of its March decision, which held that a California law that requires a bank to pay interest on escrow funds is not preempted by federal law. In addition to the national bank’s appeal for a rehearing, the OCC notably filed an amicus brief supporting the rehearing, arguing that the court “comprehensively misinterpreted” the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) The panel noted that the full court had been advised of the bank’s petition for rehearing, and no judge had requested a vote on rehearing.
D.C. Circuit rejects challenge to FTC’s 2016 staff letter on soundboard technology
On April 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit dismissed a challenge to a November 2016 FTC staff letter, which announced the FTC would treat calls using soundboard technology as robocalls. According to the D.C. Circuit opinion, the FTC’s 2016 staff letter rescinded a 2009 staff letter, which reached the conclusion that soundboard technology was not subject to robocall regulation. The Soundboard Association filed suit, seeking to enjoin the rescission of the 2009 letter, arguing that the 2016 staff letter violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) by issuing a legislative rule without notice and comment and that it unconstitutionally restricted speech in violation of the First Amendment. The lower court granted summary judgment for the FTC holding that the 2016 letter did not violate the First Amendment and that the letter was an interpretive rule and therefore not subject to the notice and comment requirements of the APA. Upon appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and dismissed the action in its entirety, holding that the 2016 letter was not a “final agency action” and therefore, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the APA.
District Court rules that Federal Reserve Banks are not federal agencies under False Claims Act
On May 9, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act (FCA) against a national bank and its predecessors-in-interest (defendants), which alleged that the defendants presented false information to Federal Reserve Banks (FRBanks) in connection with their applications for loans. The court held that allegations of false or fraudulent claims being presented to the FRBanks cannot form the basis of an FCA action because the FRBanks cannot be characterized as the federal government for purposes of the FCA.
The relators in the action originally brought a whistleblower lawsuit against the bank, alleging that the defendants inaccurately represented their financial condition in order to be eligible to borrow from the FRBanks’ discount window at lower interest rates. By way of background, in order for liability to incur under the FCA, a false or fraudulent claim must be made to the federal government or its agents. Therefore, the court needed to resolve two legal issues: (i) whether FRBanks should be characterized as the government or its agents for purposes of the FCA, and (ii) whether the federal government paid any portion of the loans the defendants received or reimbursed the FRBanks for issuing the loans.
In supporting its conclusion that FRBanks are not government actors, the court reasoned that the Federal Reserve Act (FRA), which created the Federal Reserve districts and FRBanks, did not designate the FRBanks as part of an executive department or agency. The court also noted that although the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Board) is a federal agency, each FRBank operates as a private corporation owned by private stockholders, receives no government appropriations, and generates its own income from interest earned on government securities. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the Board provides only general policy supervision, FRBank employees are not government employees, and FRBanks lack the ability to promulgate regulations and operate independently of the Board and the government.
In resolving the second issue, the court agreed with the defendants’ argument that the bank’s loan requests did not create FCA liability for claims, because the relators did not, and could not, “allege that the [g]overnment either provided any portion of the money loaned to the defendants, or reimbursed [FRBanks] for making the loans.”
Supreme Court says states can legalize sports gambling
On May 14, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which, among other things, bans most states from authorizing sports gambling, violates the 10th Amendment “anticommandeering” principle. The decision results from a lawsuit filed by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and four major professional sports leagues alleging that a 2012 New Jersey state law legalizing sports betting violated PASPA. The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit agreed with the NCAA and New Jersey revised the law in 2014. The new law removed existing bans on sports gambling at horseracing tracks, casinos, and gambling houses in Atlantic City as long as the wagers did not involve New Jersey college teams or a collegiate event in the state. The NCAA filed suit again and the district court, with the 3rd Circuit affirming, held that the revised law violated PASPA. New Jersey appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that PASPA violates the “anticommandeering” principle of the Constitution.
In a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the PASPA provision, which prohibits state authorization of sports gambling, “unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.” The Court rejected the NCAA’s argument that PASPA preempts, not commandeers, state laws that conflict with its provisions, concluding that preemption applies to private actors and the prohibition cannot be understood “as anything other than a direct command to the States.” The Court went on to hold that no provision of PASPA is severable from the anti-authorization provision and, therefore, the entire law should be struck down. The majority acknowledged that the legalization of sports gambling is an important, yet controversial, policy choice but not a choice for the Court to make. “Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.”
11th Circuit holds national bank did not waive arbitration for unnamed plaintiffs
On May 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that a national bank did not waive its right to arbitration with respect to the unnamed plaintiffs in five class actions. The decision stems from multiple class action filings against that bank and over a dozen other banks in 2008 and 2009, alleging unlawful overdraft practices. In late 2009, the actions were consolidated and the bank filed answers to the five complaints, in each answer stating, “[a]bsent members of the putative classes have a contractual obligation to arbitrate any claims they have against [the bank].” The bank originally chose to not move for arbitration against the named class members, but after the Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the bank filed a motion to compel the named plaintiffs to arbitrate. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion. The bank then moved to compel arbitration against the unnamed class members, which the district court denied and the appellate court vacated, holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the arbitration obligations without a class certification. After the district court granted class certification, the bank moved to compel arbitration against the unnamed class members again and the district court denied the motion, holding that the bank “acted inconsistently with its arbitration rights” during the precertification litigation efforts.
In vacating the district court’s decision, the appellate court concluded that the bank had not acted inconsistently with respect to the unnamed plaintiffs and had expressly stated it wished to preserve arbitration rights against those class members when the matter became ripe. The panel vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
7th Circuit affirms RESPA requires actual damages under QWR rules
On April 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a RESPA action because the plaintiff did not properly establish actual damages arising out of her non-receipt of a response to her Qualified Written Request (QWR) to the bank. The opinion explains that the plaintiff’s property was vandalized in 2014 and the bank received insurance money to escrow for repairs. In 2015, the bank released funds for the repairs and subsequently, the plaintiff’s contractor abandoned the job; the property was then vandalized twice more. On September 5, 2015, the plaintiff sent the bank a letter asking about the status of her loan, specifically regarding how insurance money was being handled. The bank sent a response to the letter on September 25, 2015, but the plaintiff alleges she never received the bank’s response and contends the bank’s failure to respond to her QWR caused her emotional distress and contributed to her divorce. The 7th Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff failed to establish how a response to her QWR would have resolved her financial inability to make the required repairs since RESPA does not require the bank to pay money in response to a written request. Moreover, the Appeals Court held that some of the plaintiffs asserted injuries, such as her divorce, are outside the scope of RESPA.
Court holds lenders may not require borrowers to use an affiliated appraisal management company under RESPA; denies class certification
On February 7, a magistrate judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia recommended denial of a motion for class certification in a case alleging that a mortgage lender, an affiliated appraisal management company (AMC), and the individual owner, through trusts, of both the lender and the AMC committed RESPA violations. The plaintiffs alleged that the individual owner received a thing of value, i.e, profit distributions from the AMC, that were generated from the lender’s referrals to the AMC in violation of Section 8(a) of RESPA, notwithstanding the exemption for affiliated business arrangements, (i) because no disclosure of the affiliation was provided to the borrowers, or (ii) because, even when a disclosure was provided, the borrowers were required to use the AMC.
While reviewing whether the class would have standing, the court disagreed with the defendant’s assertion that the affiliated business arrangement exemption under Section 8(c)(4) of RESPA, which generally bans the required use of an affiliate, but permits a lender to impose its choice of an attorney, credit reporting agency, or real estate appraiser to represent the lender’s interest, should be interpreted to permit the mortgage lender’s required use of an affiliated AMC. The defendants argued that allowing a consumer to shop for an appraisal management company would be inconsistent with TILA and Regulation Z, whose official commentary to Section 1026.37(f)(2) lists “appraisal management company fee” as an example of an item that may be disclosed under “services you cannot shop for” in the Good Faith Estimate. The court rejected that assertion, stating that there are multiple settlement services the lender may require the consumer to use which do not run afoul of RESPA or TILA and that Section 8 is only implicated where there is a kickback involved. The court further examined the plain meaning of Section 8(c)(4) and determined that, from a statutory interpretation perspective, an appraiser and an appraisal management company are not “one and the same.”
Additionally, the court disagreed with the defendants argument that the plaintiffs’ payment to the AMC was covered under the exception in Section 8(c)(2) of RESPA because the payment was not a “thing of value” under Section 8(a). In rejecting the defendants’ argument, the court noted the kickback at issue is the profit ultimately paid to the individual owner, not the plaintiffs’ payment to the AMC, and the defendants did not present any authority that the exception applies when the payment is for ownership interest.
The court ultimately recommended the denial of the class certification because plaintiffs did not demonstrate that ascertaining the class was administratively feasible, including the problem of ascertaining which loans were federally related mortgage loan and which were not. The court also concluded that, given the number of individual inquiries in the case, the requirement that common question of law and fact predominate was not satisfied.
D.C. Appeals Court holds that a condominium association may not foreclose on its super-priority lien while leaving the property subject to the first-lien mortgage
On March 1, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a condominium association acting on its six-month super-priority lien for unpaid condominium fees may not perform its foreclosure sale while leaving the property subject to a first deed of trust lien, even if the terms of the sale stated that the condo unit could be sold subject to the first deed of trust. The D.C. Appeals Court was tasked with deciding whether the mortgagee’s first mortgage lien was extinguished by foreclosure of the HOA’s super-lien under D.C. Code § 42-1903.13(a)(2). In the District of Columbia, condominium associations are granted a “super-priority lien” over first mortgage lienholders, which permits an association to collect up to six months of unpaid assessments upon foreclosure on a condominium unit. Foreclosure of a unit extinguishes all liens when the proceeds of the foreclosure sale are insufficient to satisfy them. The D.C. Appeals Court held that a condominium association could not foreclose on its super-priority lien while leaving the property subject to the unsatisfied balance of the first mortgage or first deed of trust.
The D.C. Appeals Court reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the mortgagee and remanded for further proceedings.
District Court grants FTC request for preliminary injunction against mortgage assistance relief operation that allegedly misrepresented material facts to distressed homeowners
On May 8, the FTC announced that the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a preliminary injunction on April 27 at the FTC’s request against a mortgage assistance relief operation and its principals (defendants), prohibiting them from misrepresenting material facts to consumers and imposing an asset freeze and other equitable relief. According to a complaint filed by the FTC on April 12, which sought “temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, disgorgement of ill-gotten monies, and other equitable relief,” the defendants allegedly violated the FTC Act and the Mortgage Assistance Relief Services Rule (Regulation O) in their marketing and sale of mortgage relief services to distressed homeowners.
The FTC claimed in its press release that the defendants “misrepresent[ed] the likelihood of success” of their mortgage payment reduction program and directed “confirmed” consumers to pay thousands of dollars in “closing costs” prior to discussing the defendants’ terms with their loan holders or servicers. Furthermore, the defendants allegedly discouraged consumers from communicating with their mortgage lenders and encouraged consumers to stop payments to their lenders without informing them that their actions could lead to foreclosure or damage their credit ratings.
In granting the preliminary injunction, the court ruled that there was good cause to believe that, unless the defendants continued to be restrained and enjoined by order of the court, “the court’s ability to grant effective final relief in the form of monetary restitution and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains will suffer immediate and irreparable damage from [the] [d]efendants’ transfer, dissipation, or concealment of [a]ssets or business records.” Furthermore, the court found good cause to (i) appoint a temporary receiver; (ii) grant the FTC limited expedited discovery from third-parties related to assets; and (iii) freeze defendants’ assets.
Mortgage servicer must face TCPA allegations after court dismisses other claims
On May 2, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted in part and denied in part a mortgage loan owner and mortgage loan servicer’s motion to dismiss a consumer’s lawsuit alleging various violations of TILA, RESPA, FDCPA, TCPA and certain New York state laws. The court’s decision explains that the mortgage loan owner first initiated foreclosure proceedings against the consumer in 2009, but in August 2013 that action was dismissed and the parties executed a modification agreement. The consumer argues in the amended complaint that the mortgage debt is time-barred based on the six year statute of limitations to enforce the mortgage note, starting the clock with the 2009 foreclosure filing. The consumer alleges that after the statute of limitations expired, the mortgage servicer contacted the consumer by mail and by telephone to collect the mortgage debt, totaling over 600 calls placed by an autodialer and up to four threatening collection letters per month since 2015. The court, however, agreed with the mortgage companies that the execution of the 2013 modification agreement restarted the statute of limitations and therefore, the consumer’s alleged violations of New York state laws and the FDCPA failed because the mortgage debt was not time-barred. The court also held that the consumer failed to plead sufficient facts to support the alleged violations of TILA, RESPA, and New York’s General Business Law. In contrast, the court denied the mortgage servicer’s motion to dismiss the consumer’s claim under the TCPA, holding that the mortgage application signed by the consumer did not clearly consent to contact by an autodialer on his cell phone.