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2nd Circuit affirms dismissal of class action against international bank for alleged AML control misrepresentations
On April 13, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a proposed class action alleging an international bank misrepresented the effectiveness of internal controls to investors, during a time Russian traders were laundering more than $10 billion through the bank. In May 2016, investors filed a class action complaint against the bank alleging securities law violations for touting its compliance efforts while Russian clients were engaging in “mirror trades.” The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to sufficiently allege how the bank misled investors. Specifically, the district court noted that general statements about reputation and compliance amount to “puffery” and are regularly held to be non-actionable. In affirming the district court’s decision, the 2nd Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter. The panel rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on, among other things, a consent order between the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) and the bank (previously covered by InfoBytes here) as evidence the bank was aware of Russian wrongdoing during the time it made its alleged misrepresentations, stating “the consent order thus contradicts the plaintiffs’ argument that the individual defendants were aware of any wrongdoing at the time they made their alleged misrepresentations.”
Bank petitions for rehearing of 9th Circuit preemption decision; OCC to file amicus brief in support of bank
On April 13, a national bank filed a petition for an en banc rehearing of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s March decision, which held that a California law that requires the bank to pay interest on escrow funds is not preempted by federal law. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 9th Circuit held that the Dodd-Frank Act of 2011 (Dodd-Frank) essentially codified the existing National Bank Act (NBA) preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson. The panel cited to Section 1639d(g)(3) of Dodd-Frank, which, according to the opinion, expresses Congress’ view that the type of law at issue does not “prevent or significantly interfere with a national bank’s operations” because the law does not “prevent or significantly interfere” with the national bank’s exercise of its power. Additionally, the 9th Circuit concluded that the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation had no effect on the preemption standard.
In its petition for rehearing, the bank argues that the 9th Circuit’s decision, if allowed to stand, “will create confusion regarding which state laws apply to national banks and restrict the terms on which they may extend credit” because the decision conflicts with previous decisions by the same court, the Supreme Court, and other circuits. The bank also acknowledges the OCC’s intent to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the petition no later than April 23.
8th Circuit reverses district court’s decision, rules plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual damages under RESPA
On April 3, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed a district court’s decision, which granted summary judgement in favor of a consumer (plaintiff) who claimed a mortgage loan servicer violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act (RESPA) and the Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Licensing Act when it failed to adequately respond to his qualified written requests concerning erroneous delinquency allegations. The district court ruled that the plaintiff suffered actual damages of $80 under his RESPA claims when the loan servicer “made minimal effort to investigate the error” and failed to provide the plaintiff with requested information about his loan history since origination. The “pattern or practice” of non-compliance also, in the district court’s view, justified $2000 in statutory damages. The plaintiff also received a separate damage award, attorney’s fees and costs under the Minnesota statute. However, under RESPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate proof of actual damages resulting from a loan servicer’s failure, and the three-judge panel argued that the plaintiff “failed to prove actual damages” because the loan servicer’s “failure to comply with RESPA did not cause [the plaintiff’s] alleged harm.” The panel opined that while the loan servicer failed to (i) conduct an adequate investigation following the plaintiff’s request as to why there was a delinquency for his account, and (ii) failed to provide a complete loan payment history when requested, its failure to comply with RESPA involved pre-2011 payment history for which the plaintiff eventually requested and received the relevant loan payment records at no cost. In fact, the panel stated, the only evidence of actual damages was the $80 the plaintiff spent for bank account records, but that expense concerned a separate dispute about whether the plaintiff missed two payments in 2012 and 2013, which the plaintiff eventually acknowledged that he did, in fact, fail to make. Since the loan servicer did not commit an error with respect to the missed payments, the court concluded that the $80 spent by plaintiff were not the result of the loan servicer’s failure to investigate and provide information related to the pre-2011 payment history. To the contrary, with respect to responding to the plaintiff’s inquiries regarding the missing payments, the loan servicer had “complied with its duties under RESPA.”
Furthermore, the panel stated that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the loan servicer engaged in a “pattern or practice of noncompliance.” The 8th Circuit remanded the case back to the district court with directions to enter judgment in favor of the loan servicer on the RESPA claims and for further proceedings on claims under the Minnesota statute.
Court grants summary judgment to credit reporting agency over FCRA dispute
On April 4, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a consumer reporting agency’s motion for summary judgment, holding that a “firm offer of credit” under the FCRA does not require that an offer based on furnished information result in an enforceable contract. According to the opinion, a consumer filed a putative class action suit alleging that the consumer reporting agency violated the FCRA by providing California residents’ credit report information to two businesses that were not licensed to make consumer loans in California and that offered interest rates which exceed allowable limits under California law. The court disagreed, holding that the FCRA only requires that a prescreened offer not be retracted if the consumer meets the creditor’s pre-selection criteria. Additionally, the court rejected the consumer’s argument that the FCRA also imposes a duty on consumer reporting agencies to separately credential service providers who are given access to the furnished information from their credentialed principals. The court emphasized that “neither the FCRA, nor any case authority addressing the FCRA” imposes this duty.
Student loan servicer seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve dispute concerning preemption of state law
On April 4, a Pennsylvania-based student loan servicer (servicer) that services federal student loans on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education (Department) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Connecticut Department of Banking and its banking commissioner (together, the Connecticut Defendants), and the Department, seeking a judicial determination that the federal Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act) preempts Connecticut law requiring the servicer to disclose certain records containing confidential information about its student loan borrowers to the state, along with data related to borrower complaints, or risk revocation of its state servicer’s license. In addition, the servicer seeks injunctive relief against the Connecticut Defendants to prevent the enforcement of state law in contravention of the Privacy Act and revocation of the servicer’s license.
In support of the injunctive relief sought, the servicer cites several irreparable harms, including (i) the potential termination of its federal loan servicing contract; (ii) the revocation of its license to service, which would adversely affect approximately 100,000 student borrowers in the state, and (iii) the potential impact on loan servicing arrangements that the servicer has with “dozens of private lenders doing business in Connecticut.”
As previously covered in InfoBytes, on March 12 Department Secretary Betsy DeVos published an Interpretation that asserted the position that state “regulation of the servicing of Direct Loans” is preempted because it “impedes uniquely Federal interests,” and state regulation of the servicing of loan under the Federal Family Education Loan Program “is preempted to the extent that it undermines uniform administration of the program.” However, last month—as discussed in InfoBytes—a bipartisan coalition of 30 state Attorneys General released a letter urging Congress to reject Section 493E(d) of the Higher Education Act reauthorization—H.R. 4508, known as the “PROSPER Act”—which would prohibit states from “overseeing, licensing, or addressing certain state law violations by companies that originate, service, or collect on student loans.” The states expressed a concern that, if enacted, the law would preempt state consumer protection laws for student borrowers and constitute “an all-out assault on states’ rights and basic principles of federalism.”
District court rejects motions for summary judgement on FDCPA claims filed by CFPB, debt collection law firm
On April 9, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio rejected motions for partial summary judgment and summary judgment filed respectively by the CFPB and a law firm accused of making false representations regarding attorney involvement in debt collection calls in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Dodd-Frank. As previously discussed in InfoBytes, the CFPB alleged in its complaint that the law firm sent demand letters and made collection calls to consumers that falsely implied that the consumer’s account files had been meaningfully reviewed by an attorney, when, in most cases, no attorney had reviewed the account file. Among other things, the law firm countered that, because its communications truthfully identified it as a law firm and it was acting as a debt collector, these communications were not misleading to the “least sophisticated consumer”—a factor of measurement for analyzing FDCPA violations. The court ruled that “whether the communications at issue are misleading is a question of fact that must be determined by a jury.” The jury trial is set for May 1.
Pennsylvania district court denies payday lender’s transfer request to bankruptcy court
On April 3, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to move an action, filed by a group of online payday lenders (defendants), from Pennsylvania to Texas. The defendants—who filed for bankruptcy in Texas last year—sought to centralize lawsuits referred to by the court as ”rent-a-bank” and “rent-a-tribe” schemes. (See previous InfoBytes coverage on the allegations here.) The defendants argued that the presumption of trying cases related to a bankruptcy proceeding in the court where the proceeding is pending, which is commonly recognized under 28 U.S.C. Section 1412, should apply. The court, however, found that Section 1412’s presumption of transfer does not apply to police and regulatory actions. In support, the district court cited to a Montana federal judge’s decision this past January, which denied a transfer request in a similar suit brought by the CFPB against one of the defendants. In the summary of its findings, the court noted “[s]imply put, Congress has favored the interest of permitting states’ regulatory and police actions to independently proceed over the interest in centering the administration of the defendant’s related bankruptcy proceedings.”
District Court finds that combination of litigation documents is misleading and violates FDCPA
On March 30, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that serving a request for admission in connection with a complaint and a summons on a debtor in a debt collection case constituted misleading communications in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). According to the order, an attorney served a debtor with a request for admission along with a summons to appear in court and a complaint seeking collection of an alleged debt. The request for admission sought acknowledgment that the allegations in the debt collector’s complaint were true. The court found that, as a matter of law, the combination of the documents would confuse an unsophisticated debtor because a debtor would conclude that filing an answer to the complaint was the necessary step to avoid judgment, and not realize that he or she had to do essentially the same thing separately by serving plaintiff’s counsel within thirty days or else admit the underlying allegations. While not at issue in this case, the court noted that it would be inclined to hold that “in order to avoid a violation of the FDCPA, requests for admission should always advise of the consequences of a failure to make a timely response.”
9th Circuit affirms dismissal of claims alleging survey provider violated TCPA
On March 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of a patient satisfaction survey provider (defendant), concluding that a plaintiff's signed enrollment form with her health insurance provider meant she granted “prior express consent” to receive calls from the defendant. According to the opinion, the plaintiff accused the defendant of allegedly violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) when it used an automatic telephone dialing system to repeatedly call her to inquire about the quality of her experience with a network physician. She later challenged the dismissal of her suit, arguing that the calls fell outside the scope of consent. However, in agreeing with the district court’s decision, the three-judge panel held that by providing her phone number on an insurance enrollment form that permitted the insurer to share her information for “quality improvement” and other purposes, the plaintiff had provided the level of consent required by the TCPA to receive calls from the defendant. While the court acknowledged that the plaintiff “could not have known the identity of the specific entity that would ultimately call her,” by authorizing the insurance company “to disclose her phone number for certain purposes, she necessarily authorized someone other than [the insurance company] to make calls for those purposes. Specifically, she authorized calls from entities to which [the insurance company] disclosed her information.” According to the panel, the defendant fell within that category.” The panel also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the calls violated the TCPA because the defendant failed to demonstrate that it called her on the insurance company’s behalf, finding that there is “no statutory or logical basis for imposing such a requirement.”
District Court finds government is not immune from private claims under the FCRA
On March 22, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana denied the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s (DFAS), a federal government agency within the Department of Defense, motion to dismiss a private action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a result of sovereign immunity. The court found that FCRA’s definition of person includes “government or governmental subdivision or agency,” and therefore, waives the United States’ sovereign immunity under FCRA. The court did not agree with DFAS’ position that the terms “government or governmental subdivision or agency” are too broad to constitute a wavier of sovereign immunity. In support of its position, the court cited a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit providing that the FCRA “unequivocally waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from damages for violations under the FCRA.”