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District Court: Pressing the “acknowledge button” is a signature under E-SIGN
On March 31, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment on behalf of a plaintiff consulting firm, ruling that the defendant breached the terms of a binding contract entered into with the plaintiff, which he “signed” by pressing an “acknowledge button” on a Proprietary Information and Assignment of Inventions Agreement (PIIA). According to the court’s memorandum opinion, the case involves a dispute concerning the rights in a software program developed by the defendant while working at the firm. Previously, the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, which declared that the parties had an enforceable contract under which the defendant had assigned his rights in the software program to the plaintiff. At the time, the defendant argued that even though he had pressed the acknowledge button, “he ‘never understood’ nor ‘intended’ himself to be bound by the PIIA[.]” As such, he challenged the plaintiff’s assertion that he had assented to the PIIA. The court disagreed, concluding that evidence established “that the PIIA itself drew an ‘equivalence’ between acknowledging and agreeing,” and that “since there was no separate signature line, nor any instructions or directions to print and sign the PIIA, [defendant] had ‘no reason to think that [plaintiff] expected a more formal acceptance of the’ PIIA than the acknowledgement he provided.” Accordingly, the court concluded that “acknowledging” the PIIA amounted to the defendant’s signature in this context, thus satisfying the E-SIGN Act for purposes of satisfying the statute of frauds and binding the defendant to its terms, which included assigning any of his rights in the software to the plaintiff.
In granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on its breach of contract claim, the court first reiterated its previous position that undisputed evidence showed that the defendant acknowledged the PIIA, that the defendant intended to acknowledge the PIIA, and that acknowledgment constituted a signature for purposes of the E-SIGN Act. The court also determined that the plaintiff carried its burden of proof as to showing the plaintiff breached the PIIA and that the plaintiff was sufficiently damaged by the defendant’s breaches.
CFPB addresses servicers’ obligations to respond to borrower inquiries
On April 4, the CFPB filed an amicus brief in a case on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concerning a mortgage loan servicer allegedly failing to answer multiple inquiries from two separate consumers regarding their loans despite the requirement under Regulation X that servicers respond when a borrower submits a request for information that “states the information the borrower is requesting with respect to the borrower’s mortgage loan.” The plaintiffs filed suit after the defendant servicer declined to provide the information requested, stating that it would not respond “because the issues raised are the same or very closely related to the issues raised” in pending litigation surrounding the mortgages.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, noting that under RESPA, “a mortgage loan servicer only has an obligation to provide a written response to a [qualified written request] that seeks ‘information relating to the servicing of such loan,’” and that the plaintiffs’ inquiries regarding the ownership of their loans and requesting other miscellaneous information did not “trigger[] [the defendant’s] obligations to respond under Regulation X” because a servicer has a ‘duty to respond’ only if a request for information ‘relates to the servicing of the loan.’”
In urging the appellate court to overturn the decision, the Bureau argued that under Section 1024.36 of Regulation X “servicers generally must respond to ‘any written request for information from a borrower’ that seeks ‘information ... with respect to the borrower’s mortgage loan.’” According to the Bureau, although a servicing-related request would fall under this provision, it is just one type of request that seeks information ‘with respect to’ a loan and thereby triggers a servicer’s obligation to respond” under the rules. The Bureau stated that Regulation X broadly requires servicers to respond to requests that seek information “with respect to” a borrower’s mortgage loan, explaining that it “included explicit language to that effect in the 2013 Rule to make clear that the rule created a unified set of requirements such that servicers’ obligations to respond were the same for a qualified written request as for any other information request,” and that it “did not exclude information requests that do not relate to servicing from the scope of § 1024.36.” The Bureau agreed with the plaintiffs that there is “no litigation exception to a servicer's obligation to respond to information requests under Regulation X.” The Bureau further noted in a blog post that,“[a] pending lawsuit does not take away a borrower’s right to a response from their loan servicer under Regulation X.”
District Court dismisses bank from class action on out-of-network ATM fees
On April 4, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted a defendant bank’s motion for summary judgment and denied class certification in an action concerning out-of-network fees charged on purportedly invalid balance inquiries performed at out-of-network (OON) ATM machines. The defendant is a member of two cardholder networks, which permit account holders to access and use OON ATMs. In 2019, plaintiff account holders filed a lawsuit alleging the defendant violated several California state consumer protection laws and breached its deposit account agreements by systematically charging excessive fees. Plaintiffs further alleged the defendant assessed multiple fees if a consumer made a balance inquiry at the same time as a cash withdrawal. The defendant argued in its motion for summary judgment that the deposit agreement was unambiguous and that its assessment of the OON fees for balance inquiries is permitted under the agreement’s express terms. In agreeing with the defendant that no ambiguity existed in the language in the agreement regarding such fees, the court, among other things, also held that language in the agreement providing the defendant and ATM operators discretion to charge or waive fees for use of OON ATMs did not imply that the defendant relied on that contract term in bad faith. The court found that nothing about the use of the word “may” in the phrase “[w]e may also charge you a fee,” necessitates “the conclusion that the bank ‘abuses its power and takes advantage of contractual uncertainty by charging OON Fees when it knows, or should know, of the [alleged] systematic deception occurring at [OON] ATMs resulting in invalid balance inquiries.’”
In its motion, the defendant bank also maintained that the claims against it fail because the plaintiffs failed to follow express reporting and pre-dispute notification procedures outlined in their agreements, which require account holders to review their statements and notify the bank within 60 days of any problems or unauthorized transactions. The court declined to find that the pre-dispute procedures provided an alternative basis for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that it was not clear that plaintiffs’ obligation to provide defendant with notice of unauthorized transactions covered disputed OON ATM fees. The court explained that such fees may not be apparent on the plaintiffs’ billing statements and that “the notice provisions seem to relate to major issues such as fraud and unauthorized or stolen checks” rather than problematic fees.
3rd Circuit confirms adversary proceeding required to discharge student debt in bankruptcy
On March 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA and FCRA case against a student loan servicer and three credit reporting companies for attempting to collect a loan debt after it had been discharged in bankruptcy. After the discharge and completion of his bankruptcy case, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendants violated the FDCPA and the FCRA by attempting to collect student loan debt that had been discharged. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because under Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, student loan debt is presumptively non-dischargeable and the plaintiff had not filed an adversary proceeding to determine otherwise.
On appeal, the plaintiff “argued that he was not required to file an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court to determine the dischargeability of his student loan debt,” and that the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the plaintiff was indigent rebuts “the presumption that his debt was nondischargeable by satisfying the exception in §523(a)(8) for undue hardship.” However, the appellate court held that “a finding of indigence is not the same as an undue hardship determination under §538(a)(8)” and that while the Bankruptcy Code does not require an adversary proceeding to discharge student loan debt, the procedures established in the Bankruptcy Rules do include such a requirement by providing that adversary proceedings include “a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt” and are commenced by serving a summons and complaint on affected creditors. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed dismissal.
District Court approves $90 million settlement in data tracking suit
On March 31, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted final approval to a $90 million class action settlement resolving claims that a social media platform unlawfully tracked consumers’ browsing data. According to the settlement agreement, the defendant obtained and collected data from approximately 124 million platform users in the U.S. who visited websites that displayed the defendant’s “Like” button between April 22, 2010 and September 26, 2011. According to the settlement, in addition to paying a $90 million settlement, the company must delete the data it had collected from users during the class period.
CFPB’s TSR claims against software company to proceed
On April 5, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied a motion to dismiss claims brought by the CFPB alleging violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the California-based software company and its owner (collectively, “defendants”) market and sell credit-repair business software and other tools to credit-repair businesses charging unlawful advance fees to consumers. According to the Bureau, the defendants provide substantial assistance to these businesses and purportedly encourage them to “charge unlawful advance fees” even though, under the TSR, companies that telemarket their services are prohibited from requesting or receiving fees from consumers until consumers are provided with a credit report showing that the promised results have been achieved.
The court was unpersuaded by the defendants’ argument that the Bureau exceeded its authority to pursue enforcement actions against them, claiming the credit-repair businesses that use defendants’ products and services are not “covered persons” under the CFPA, as the businesses “provide only retrospective credit-repair services and thus do not provide prospective consumer financial services under the CFPA.” The court held that the CFPA’s broad purpose and expansive language covers the services provided by the credit-repair businesses to improve or repair consumers’ credit and that such activity is considered “credit counseling” under the CFPA and is therefore a “consumer financial product or service.” The court further held that the credit-repair businesses were “covered persons” based on allegations that they provide consumers’ credit history to help with the approval of a mortgage or auto loan, recognizing that performing analysis relating to the credit history of consumers in connection with a decision regarding a consumer financial product or service is covered by the CFPA. The court also disagreed with the defendants’ argument that they are not “service providers” under the statute, in part, because the defendants “have the capacity to vet and monitor” the credit-repair businesses. The court also was not persuaded that the Credit Repair Organizations Act’s (CROA) provision allowing credit-repair businesses to charge monthly fees supersedes the TSR requirement that such a company cannot collect payment until the promised results have been achieved, holding that the requirements of each are not in conflict and noting that “if a credit repair agency does not qualify as a telemarketer, then it need not comply with the TSR—only the CROA is applicable,” and that nothing in the language of the CROA indicates that the defendants’ activities “may not simultaneously be regulated by the [TSR].”
CFPB’s UDAAP claims to proceed against mortgage lender
On March 31, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia mostly denied motions to dismiss filed by a mortgage lender and four executives (collectively, “defendants”) sued by the CFPB for allegedly engaging in unlawful mortgage lending practices. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau filed a complaint last year against the defendants alleging violations of several federal laws, including TILA and the CFPA. According to the Bureau, (i) unlicensed employees allegedly offered and negotiated mortgage terms; (ii) company policy regularly required consumers to submit documents for verification before receiving a loan estimate; (iii) employees denied consumers credit without issuing an adverse action notice; and (iv) defendants regularly made misrepresentations about, among other things, the availability and cost savings of FHA streamlined refinance loans.
The mortgage lender had argued in its motion to dismiss that neither TILA nor the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act (SAFE Act) required the lender to ensure that its individual employees were licensed under state law. In denying the motions to dismiss, the court disagreed with the lender’s position stating that in order for a mortgage originator to comply with TILA, it must also comply with Bureau requirements set out in Regulation Z, including a requirement that “obligates loan originator organizations to ensure that individual loan originators working for them are licensed or registered as required by state and federal laws.”
The court also concluded that the individual defendants must face claims for allegedly engaging in unfair or deceptive practices. The Bureau contended that the company’s chief compliance officer had warned the individual defendants that certain unlicensed employees were engaging in activities requiring licensure, and that the company’s owners approved the business model that permitted the underlying practices. According to the court, an individual “engages” in a UDAAP violation if the individual “participated directly in the practices or acts or had authority to control them” and “‘had or should have had knowledge or awareness’ of the misconduct.” The court rejected defendants’ arguments that it was improper to adopt this standard, and stated that “the fact that a separate theory of liability exists for substantially assisting a corporate defendant’s UDAAP violations has no bearing on how courts evaluate whether an individual defendant himself engaged in a UDAAP violation.”
While the court allowed the count to continue to the extent that it was based on allegations of unlicensed employees performing duties that would require licensure, it found that the complaint did not support an inference that the individual defendants knew that the employees were engaging in activities to make it appear that they were licensed. The court provided the Bureau an opportunity to replead the count to provide a stronger basis for such an inference.
District Court rejects borrower’s RESPA, TILA mortgage servicing claims
On March 15, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted a defendant mortgage loan servicer’s motion for summary judgment in an action claiming violations of federal law based on alleged defects in the servicing of the plaintiff’s loan. According to the court, after settling similar claims against his two prior loan servicers, the plaintiff sued the companies that own and service his mortgage loan (collectively, defendants) disputing the precise amount of his delinquency and claiming the defendants failed to properly apply his mortgage payments or to respond to his notice of error (NOE). The plaintiff contended, among other things, that the defendants’ response to the NOE, misapplication of payments, and inaccurate periodic mortgage statements breached the terms of the mortgage agreement and violated RESPA, FDCPA, and TILA. In granting summary judgment, the court agreed with the defendants, finding that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was foreclosed by a prior settlement agreement with his former servicer. The court also found that the servicer’s response to plaintiff’s NOE did not violate RESPA because it “fully addressed both ‘errors’ that the plaintiff presented,” and the perceived errors “amounted to confusion about basic arithmetic.” The court emphasized that “[n]othing in RESPA or Regulation X gives borrowers authority to dictate the parameters of a lender’s investigation,” and concluded that the servicer’s investigation and response was sufficient since the servicer provided the documents used to conclude that there was no misapplication of funds and “[e]ven a cursory investigation would have revealed that the specific errors alleged in the NOE did not occur.”
In granting the defendants’ request for summary judgment regarding claims that the plaintiff received five inaccurate mortgage statements in violation of the FDCPA and TILA, the court concluded that the periodic statements contained all the fields required under Regulation Z, and explained that allegations contesting the accuracy of the information contained in the statements did not violate TILA because “12 C.F.R. § 1026.42(d) does nothing to regulate the accuracy of information presented in a periodic statement.” As to the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, which was premised on allegations that plaintiff’s prior servicer misapplied funds which caused defendants to collect amount that plaintiff did not owe, the court found that that the disputed periodic statement was truthful and accurate and that the plaintiff released the defendants of any liability under the FDCPA in his settlement agreement with the prior servicer.
9th Circuit upholds dismissal of wrongful garnishment claims
On March 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of claims based on the FDCPA and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA). According to the memorandum, the complaint alleged that the defendants violated the FDCPA and WCPA when they sought to garnish plaintiff’s wages based a state court judgment that was not yet final. The district court dismissed the FDCPA claim, holding that “at worst, Defendants violated a state court procedural rule—not substantive law—when they applied for the writ of garnishment based on the valid, albeit, not final judgment.” In affirming that dismissal, however, the appellate court noted that “[t]he issue is not whether [the defendant] and [the defendant’s attorney] violated state law but whether they violated the FDCPA.” The 9th Circuit clarified that “[t]he [plaintiff] might have argued that [the defendant] and [the defendant’s attorney] falsely represented the legal status of their debt by implicitly claiming in the garnishment application that the debt was subject to a final judgment. But they [did] not make this argument, so it is waived.” With respect to the WCPA claim, while the district court’s dismissal was based on a determination that the garnishment did not “occur[] in trade or commerce” as required under that statute, the 9th Circuit pointed out that if the garnishment was “a violation of the Washington Collection Agency Act (WCAA), [it] would have established an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce for purposes of the WCPA,” but upheld dismissal because the plaintiff had waived that argument as well.
North Carolina appellate court affirms district court’s decision in debt collection case
On March 15, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a debt buyer plaintiff and rejected the debtor defendant’s argument that the plaintiff failed to comply with a provision of North Carolina’s Consumer Economic Protection Act (CEPA). According to the order, the defendant appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff in its 2019 suit to renew a default judgment that was entered in 2010 against the defendant. The defendant argued that the default judgment “is void because it was procured by fraud and the clerk lacked jurisdiction to enter the default judgment for various reasons,” and “that Plaintiff’s interest rates on Defendant’s debt violate North Carolina law.” The appellate court noted that the CEPA “did not apply” because the statute requires that, “[p]rior to entry of a default judgment or summary judgment against a debtor in a complaint initiated by a debt buyer, the plaintiff shall file evidence with the court to establish the amount and nature of the debt.” The appellate court noted that although the plaintiff filed its original complaint against the defendant in August 2009, this CEPA provision did not take effect until October 1, 2009, and therefore only applies to “foreclosures initiated, debt collection activities undertaken, and actions filed on or after that date.” The defendant argued that the plaintiff was still required to comply with the CEPA provision because the plaintiff filed its motion for a default judgment in February 2010—after the effective date of the CEPA provision. But the appellate court determined that the plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment “was part of prosecuting its ‘action filed’ and was not a ‘debt collection activity’ within the meaning of the Act.”