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5th Circuit remands shareholders’ net worth sweep claims to lower court
On March 4, a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, sent a shareholders’ suit back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen, in which the Supreme Court, relying on its decision in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, held that FHFA’s leadership structure was unconstitutional because it only allowed the president to fire the FHFA director for cause. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) In Collins, the Supreme Court reviewed the 5th Circuit’s en banc decision stemming from a 2016 lawsuit brought by a group of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) shareholders against the U.S. Treasury Department and FHFA, in which shareholders claimed that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Recovery Act), which created the agency, violated the separation of powers principal because it only allowed the president to fire the FHFA director “for cause.” The shareholders also alleged that FHFA acted outside its statutory authority when it adopted a third amendment to the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, which replaced a fixed-rate dividend formula with a variable one requiring the GSEs to pay quarterly dividends equal to their entire net worth minus a specified capital reserve amount to the Treasury Department (known as the “net worth sweep”). (Covered by InfoBytes here.) At the time, while the en banc appellate court reaffirmed its earlier decision that FHFA’s structure violated the Constitution’s separation of powers requirements, nine of the judges concluded that the appropriate remedy should be severance of the for-cause provision, not prospective relief invalidating the net worth sweep, stating that “the Shareholders’ ongoing injury, if indeed there is one, is remedied by a declaration that the ‘for cause’ restriction is declared removed. We go no further.”
The split Supreme Court had affirmed the 5th Circuit’s en banc decision regarding the FHFA’s structure, but left intact the net worth sweep and remanded the case to the appellate court to determine “what remedy, if any, the shareholders are entitled to receive on their constitutional claim.” Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote for the majority, stated that “[a]lthough the statute unconstitutionally limited the President’s authority to remove the confirmed Directors, there was no constitutional defect in the statutorily prescribed method of appointment to that office. As a result, there is no reason to regard any of the actions taken by the FHFA in relation to the third amendment as void.”
On remand, the en banc 5th Circuit majority ordered the district court to decide whether the shareholders suffered compensable harm from the unconstitutional removal provision, observing that the Supreme Court left open the possibility that the unconstitutional restriction on the President’s power to remove the FHFA director could have inflicted compensable harm. Noting that the Supreme Court had sketched “possible causes and consequences of such harm along with the Federal Defendants’ denial of any such harm,” the majority stressed that “it became clear” during oral argument that “the prudent course is to remand to the district court to fulfill the Supreme Court’s remand order.”
However, five of the appellate judges dissented from the majority decision on the grounds that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision precluded the 5th Circuit from deciding the harm issue, pointing out that the appellate court could “easily do so in light of [its] previous conclusion that ‘the President, acting through the Secretary of the Treasury, could have stopped [the Net Worth Sweep] but did not.’” The dissenting judges noted that because the shareholders failed to point to sufficient facts to cast doubt on the 5th Circuit’s previous decision, the appellate court “should modify the district court’s judgment by granting declaratory relief in the Plaintiff’s favor, stating that the ‘for cause’ removal provision as to the Director of the FHFA is unconstitutional. In all other respects, we should affirm.”
District Court preliminarily approves $4.75 million data breach settlement
On March 3, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas preliminarily approved a $4.75 million class action settlement resolving claims between a pharmacy benefits manager and consumers in six different proposed class actions filed in Texas and California. The court also conditionally certified a nationwide settlement class and a California settlement subclass. According to the memorandum in support of the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, plaintiffs claimed the company acted negligently by failing to implement reasonable safeguards for protecting customers’ personally identifiable information and preventing a 2021 data breach, which exposed their sensitive, protected health information. The plaintiffs also alleged that the company breached California privacy and consumer protection laws. If the settlement is granted final approval, the company will be required to create a $4.75 million settlement, and “develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security program that is reasonably designed to protect the security, integrity and confidentiality” of customers’ personal data. The company may also be responsible for a portion of attorneys’ fees, costs, and service awards.
9th Circuit affirms dismissal of investors’ data breach disclosures suit
On March 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a class action suit for failure to state a claim, concluding that investors had failed to adequately allege that statements about the defendant company’s cybersecurity practices in the company’s 2018 Form 10-K amounted to securities fraud. The plaintiffs asserted that certain statements, including statements that the company maintained “a comprehensive security program,” “were misleading because they created the impression that [the company] implemented the data security best practices described in those statements no later than 2016, when in fact, the company did not implement those practices until later.” The plaintiffs argued that based on these statements, “a reasonable investor could have concluded that any data security improvements [the company] described would have been put in place in response to the two public hacks [the company] had experienced in the past, one in 2013 and one in 2016.” The 9th Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the company had misled investors into believing that it had made data security improvements specifically in response to the 2013 and 2016 data breaches and had “plead no facts supporting a reasonable inference that either of those hacks was a prominent enough milestone in company history that the average investor would be led to believe every data security improvement directly followed them.”
The plaintiffs further alleged that other statements in the 10-K were misleading because they “created the impression that it was unlikely [the company] had suffered an undetected data breach in the past, when in reality it was somewhat likely.” The appellate court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and noted that “these statements would not give an ordinary investor reason to believe that [the company] was asserting that the risk that an undetected breach had occurred was particularly high or low, or that it had changed over time.” The 9th Circuit further agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs had failed to specifically allege that the company acted with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, or engage in “deliberate recklessness.”
9th Circuit affirms judgment for defendant in FCRA suit
On March 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal in favor of a consumer reporting agency (defendant). The suit accused the defendant of violating the FCRA by failing to disclose certain information about a consumer. The plaintiffs were originally part of a class action alleging FCRA disclosure violations against the defendant, but that case was dismissed. Instead of appealing the suit, three plaintiffs brought a separate proposed class action. The defendant removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss based on a failure to state a claim. Though the case was again dismissed, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint. In their First Amended Complaint, the plaintiffs argued that under the FCRA, the disclosures they received from the defendant did not include, among other things: (i) behavioral data; (ii) “soft inquiries” not initiated by the consumer; (iii) the identity of parties procuring consumer reports; and (iv) the date on which employment data was reported. The district court found that the defendant was not obligated to include the behavioral data in its disclosure since the information alleged to have not been disclosed was not part of the consumer’s “file” under the FCRA and was not information that was or might be furnished in a consumer report.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit noted that “none of the information [the plaintiffs] contend [the defendant] failed to disclose is of the type that has been included in a consumer report in the past or is planned to be included in such a report in the future.” The appellate court also noted that “the date employment dates were reported can have no ‘bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal, characteristics, or mode of living.’” Since the district court found that the data that the consumers alleged the defendants failed to include in its disclosures is actually not subject to disclosure under the FCRA, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
District Court rules apps’ terms of service hyperlinks were clear and conspicuous
On February 23, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled that parties must arbitrate class claims concerning alleged fraudulent transactions on app users’ accounts. Plaintiffs—users of the defendants’ mobile payment platform who claimed that third parties fraudulently withdrew funds from their app accounts—alleged that the defendants’ inadequate dispute resolution process “improperly places the burden on the user to prove that a disputed transaction was unauthorized” in violation of the EFTA and N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349. Defendants, however, countered that the plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate any disputes related to their app accounts, and moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint. The court analyzed the applicable sign-up flows and ruled that in signing up for the apps, users agreed to unambiguous terms of service, which included an arbitration agreement presented in a clickable hyperlinked URL. The court rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that a reasonably prudent smartphone user would not think to click on the terms of service hyperlink, stating that the hyperlink for both apps provided reasonably clear and conspicuous interfaces. The court further found that the claims were subject to arbitration because plaintiffs’ specifically assented to the arbitration provisions and that the parties’ agreed to present any question of arbitrability to an arbitrator.
4th Circuit reviews whether borrowers’ letters are QWRs under REPSA
On February 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s dismissal of claims related to whether letters sent by plaintiff borrowers to a defendant loan servicer constituted qualified written requests (QWRs) under RESPA or Regulation X that would require the defendant to stop sending adverse information about accounts to credit reporting agencies. According to the opinion, one of the plaintiffs wrote to the defendant asking to have his records corrected after noticing his credit reports reflected purported overdue home loan payments that were allegedly affecting his employment after his employer expressed concerns about the credit report. The plaintiff noted a discrepancy between the amount he was allegedly behind on his mortgage payment and included a copy of the credit report his employer received, his account number, the ID number of the agent with whom he spoke on the phone, and requested that the error be corrected. However, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant continued to report adverse loan information. The other named plaintiff allegedly fell behind on her loan payments, and the defendant began reporting adverse information to the credit reporting agencies. She later applied for a loan modification, which was not finalized due to the existence of a lien by a solar panel company. The plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant challenging the existence of “title issues” and asked for her dispute to be investigated and corrected. The parties ultimately finalized a loan modification, but in the interim, the defendant continued reporting adverse information. The plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that despite sending QWRs, the defendant continued to report adverse information on their loans to credit reporting agencies; however, the district court dismissed the claims.
On appeal, the 4th Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the first plaintiff’s claim, holding that the plaintiff’s letter was a QWR subject to RESPA because it contained sufficient details to identify his account and indicate why he believed the credit reporting was in error. In particular, the court noted that the letter constituted a QWR because it did not rely solely on the alleged phone call “as the basis for the description of the problem,” but also detailed conflicting balance information received from the defendant and the credit reporting service. The dissenting judge wrote that this plaintiff’s letter was not a QWR because it failed to identify the possible error and did not provide a statement of reasons for believing the unidentified error existed.
With respect to the other named plaintiff’s claim, the court affirmed dismissal because the letter did not qualify as a QWR. The court explained that the content of the plaintiff’s letter failed to satisfy the requirements of a valid QWR, finding that “correspondence limited to the dispute of contractual issues that do not relate to the servicing of the loan, such as loan modification applications, do not qualify as QWRs.”
District Court grants motion to dismiss in privacy suit
On February 17, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware granted a motion to dismiss a putative class action suit for lack of Article III standing, in which plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated their privacy rights by intercepting and recording mouse clicks and other website visit information. According to the memorandum opinion, the plaintiffs alleged defendant’s recording of that information violated, among other things, the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) and the Federal Wiretap Act. In finding the plaintiffs’ failed to plead a concrete injury, the district court found while the “[p]laintiffs have a legally cognizable interest in controlling their personal information and that intrusion upon that interest would amount to a concrete injury[,]” they failed to identify how any of their personal information was implicated in the complaint. The court explained: “[p]laintiffs fail to explain how either [the defendants] possession of anonymized, non-personal data regarding their browsing activities on [the defendant’s] website harms their privacy interests in any way.” The district court also noted that the plaintiffs did not make any allegations to suggest a risk of imminent or substantial future harm.
11th Circuit affirms $7.5 million settlement on overdraft appeal
On February 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s class certification and approval of a $7.5 million settlement, which resolved allegations that, after merging with another national bank, the former bank (defendant) improperly assessed and collected overdraft fees. According to the opinion, a customer accused the bank of “high-to-low” posting that restructured customers’ debit transactions so that high value debits posted before low value ones, increasing the chance of overdrafts. After the defendant merged with the national bank in 2012, the national bank agreed to the $7.5 million settlement to resolve the claims. A class member (interested party-appellant) appealed the order. The interested party-appellant claimed “that the court abused its discretion by finding that the settlement class’s representative … adequately represented her (and her proposed subclass’s) interests and that the settlement class’s claims were typical of hers (and her proposed subclass’s).”
The 11th Circuit disagreed and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff classes “suffered identical injuries” based on the defendant’s alleged high-to-low restructuring practices. Additionally, the appellate court found that “[t]he district court didn’t abuse its discretion by finding [the settlement class’s representative’s] claims were typical of those of the class.” The court also found that “[t]he district court could reasonably conclude that any difference in the value of the plaintiffs’ claims was too speculative or too small to create a fundamental conflict of interest.”
District Court approves $15 million class action settlement over BIPA violations
On February 18, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted preliminary approval of a class action settlement, resolving allegations that a workplace management software company (defendant) violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) by collecting data without providing the requisite disclosures or obtaining informed written consent. According to the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval, the settlement class is comprised of nearly 172,000 Illinois employees who used the defendant’s biometric timekeeping devices at work and whose finger-scan data “was hosted” by the defendant. The defendant denied any violation of BIPA. Under the settlement agreement, the defendant will pay approximately $15 million into a non-reversionary settlement fund, and settlement class members, who need to file a valid claim to receive payment, are expected to receive between $290 and $580 each.
DOJ says Fair Housing Act covers appraisal discrimination
On February 14, the DOJ filed a statement of interest in a lawsuit alleging defendants violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA or the Act) by discriminating on the basis of race in connection to a residential home appraisal. The plaintiffs, a Black couple, sought to refinance their home mortgage, and received an appraisal from the defendants valued at $995,000. However, a few weeks later a second appraiser valued their home at $1,482,500. The plaintiffs alleged that their race factored into the defendants’ low valuation, which violated federal and state law, including the FHA. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the FHA does not apply to residential appraisers, and that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts that make out a prima facie case at this stage of litigation.
In its statement of interest, the DOJ noted that both the agency and HUD share enforcement authority under the FHA, including addressing appraisal discrimination. The DOJ also highlighted Executive Order 13985, which directed federal agencies “to address ‘[o]ngoing legacies of residential segregation and discrimination’–including ‘a persistent undervaluation of properties owned by families of color,’” (issued in 2021 and covered by InfoBytes here), and stated that President Biden also established an interagency task force to, among other things, “‘root out discrimination in the appraisal and homebuying process.’” To illustrate that the FHA applies to residential appraisals and appraisers, the DOJ pointed to the FHA’s text and to caselaw to demonstrate that the statute applies to residential mortgages. “[B]y its plain terms, the Act directly prohibits discrimination by ‘any person or other entity’ engaged in the “apprais[al] of residential real property,” the DOJ stated, adding that the appraisal exemption under Section 3605(c) clarifies that while appraisers may consider relevant and nondiscriminatory factors, they may not discriminate on the basis of protected classes. The DOJ also disagreed with the defendants’ position that under Section 3603 the FHA is not applicable to the subject property, stating that the section referenced by the defendants was only effective until 1968 and that henceforth, “all dwellings are covered by the FHA unless specifically exempted.” Additionally, the DOJ cited caselaw, which “found that proper defendants for appraisal-related discrimination may include not only appraisers, but their employers and the lenders who relied on their valuations.” With respect to the defendants’ prima facie argument, the DOJ contended, among other things, that the FHA “simply requires that Plaintiffs allege a plausible entitlement to relief as a result of Defendants’ ‘discriminatory housing practices.’”