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Court rules CDC eviction moratorium unconstitutional
On February 25, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that decisions to enact eviction moratoriums rest with the states and that the federal government’s Article I power under the U.S. Constitution to regulate interstate commerce and enact necessary and proper laws to that end “does not include the power” to order all evictions be stopped during the Covid-19 pandemic. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued an eviction moratorium order last September (set to expire March 31), which “generally makes it a crime for a landlord or property owner to evict a ‘covered person’ from a residence” provided certain criteria are met. The CDC’s order grants the DOJ authority to initiate criminal proceedings and allows the imposition of fines up to $500,000. The plaintiffs—owners/managers of residential properties located in Texas—argued that the federal government does not have the authority under Article I to order property owners to not evict specified tenants, and that the decision as to whether an eviction moratorium should be enacted resides with the given state. The CDC countered that Article I afforded it the power to enact a nationwide moratorium, and argued, among other things, that “evictions covered by the CDC order may be rationally viewed as substantially affecting interstate commerce because 15% of changes in residence each year are between States.”
However, the court disagreed stating that the CDC’s “statistic does not readily bear on the effects of the eviction moratorium” at issue, and that moreover, “[i]f statistics like that were enough, Congress could also justify national marriage and divorce laws, as similar incidental effects on interstate commerce exist in that field.” The court determined that the CDC’s eviction moratorium exceeds Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. “The federal government cannot say that it has ever before invoked its power over interstate commerce to impose a residential eviction moratorium,” the court wrote. “It did not do so during the deadly Spanish Flu pandemic. . . .Nor did it invoke such a power during the exigencies of the Great Depression. [] The federal government has not claimed such a power at any point during our Nation’s history until last year.”
The DOJ issued a statement on February 27 announcing its decision to appeal the court’s decision, citing that the court’s order “‘does not extend beyond the particular plaintiffs in that case, and it does not prohibit the application of the CDC’s eviction moratorium to other parties. For other landlords who rent to covered persons, the CDC’s eviction moratorium remains in effect.’”
3rd Circuit: ECOA does not preempt NJ’s common-law doctrine of necessaries in FDCPA case
On March 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that because ECOA does not preempt New Jersey’s common-law doctrine of necessaries (where a spouse is jointly liable for necessary expenses incurred by the other spouse) a defendant debt collector was permitted to send medical debt collection letters to a deceased individual’s spouse without violating the FDCPA. The defendant was retained to collect the deceased spouse’s medical debt and sent collection letters to the plaintiff who maintained she was not responsible for the debt and subsequently filed suit alleging violations of the FDCPA. The defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that the plaintiff owed the debt under New Jersey’s doctrine of necessaries because her deceased spouse incurred the debt for medical treatment. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that the doctrine of necessaries conflicts with the spousal-signature prohibition found in the ECOA.
In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the 3rd Circuit concluded that “ECOA does not preempt the doctrine of necessaries because the debt is ‘incidental credit’ exempt from the prohibition.” According to the 3rd Circuit, the Federal Reserve Board determined that incidental credit is exempt from the § 202.7(d) spousal-signature prohibition because it “refers to extensions of consumer credit. . .(i) [t]hat are not made pursuant to the terms of a credit card account; (ii) [t]hat are not subject to a finance charge. . .and (iii) [t]hat are not payable by agreement in more than four installments.” The 3rd Circuit determined that because the medical debt in question satisfied all three criteria, the spousal-signature prohibition did not apply, and therefore ECOA and its regulations did not conflict with the doctrine of necessaries. Further, the 3rd Circuit held that ECOA focuses “on ensuring the availability of credit rather than the allocation of liability between spouses.”
3rd Circuit: Debt collection letter with invitation to call does not violate FDCPA
On March 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of a defendant debt collection agency after concluding that a letter inviting recipients to call to “eliminate further collection action” did not deceive debtors. The plaintiff brought the putative class action lawsuit under the FDCPA claiming the defendant’s letter deceived debtors by making them think a phone call is a “legally effective” way of ending collection activity. The plaintiff also argued that the letter raised uncertainty about a debtor’s right to dispute a debt in writing. According to the plaintiff, because the letter placed the invitation to call above an acknowledgment that recipients can also respond in writing, debtors were left uncertain about which format to use. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the defendant.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit reasoned that the letter was not deceptive. According to the appellate court, the defendant never said “explicitly or implicitly[] that the phone call would, by law” end collection efforts. Further the letter did not create any confusion about whether a debtor should call or write to exercise their rights. Finally, the court rejected the argument that the order of paragraphs in the letter created confusion.
7th Circuit: “Stress and confusion” not an injury under the FDCPA
On March 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a consumer’s alleged “stress and confusion” did not constitute a concrete and particularized injury under the FDCPA. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant debt collector violated the FDCPA when it directly communicated with her by sending a dunning letter related to unpaid debt even though she had previously notified the original lender that she was represented by counsel and requested that all debt communications cease. The district court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion on the grounds that the debt collector could not have violated the FDCPA “without having actual knowledge of [the consumer’s] cease-communication request.”
On appeal, the 7th Circuit concluded that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked standing. The 7th Circuit held that the consumer’s allegations—that the dunning letter caused her “stress and confusion” and “made her think that ‘her demand had been futile’”—did not amount to a concrete and particularized “injury in fact” necessary to establish Article III standing under the FDCPA. The court further noted that “the state of confusion is not itself an injury”—rather, for the alleged confusion to be concrete, “a plaintiff must have acted ‘to her detriment, on that confusion.’” Here, the consumer pointed only to a statutory violation and “failed to show that receiving [the debt collector’s] dunning letter led her to change her course of action or put her in harm’s way.” Additionally, the appellate court found the consumer’s argument that the dunning letter also “invaded her privacy,” raised for the first time on appeal, unpersuasive because she did not allege that injury in the complaint.
4th Circuit affirms $10 million penalty for appraisal practices
On March 10, a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment that an appraisal practice common before 2009 was unconscionable under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. According to the opinion, a class of borrowers filed a lawsuit against a lender and an appraisal management company, alleging the defendants relayed home value estimates provided by borrowers on their applications to appraisers and allegedly asked appraisers “to take another look” if the appraisal value came in lower than the estimated value. The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that this practice constituted a breach of contract and unconscionable inducement under West Virginia law. Plaintiffs also filed a civil conspiracy claim against the defendants. The district court conditionally certified the class. It ultimately imposed a $9.6 million statutory penalty and awarded class members the appraisal fees paid as damages for breach of contract in an amount totaling nearly $1 million. However, no damages were awarded for conspiracy. The defendants appealed, arguing that summary judgment was wrongfully granted and that the class should not have been certified since individual issues predominated over common ones.
On appeal, the majority determined, among other things, that the acceptability of the challenged practice “shifted dramatically during the class period,” and that “[w]hat started out as a common (though questionable) practice became one that, in short order, was explicitly forbidden.” The majority determined the plaintiffs established their claim for unconscionable inducement, and that it “was unethical for Defendants to attempt to pressure or influence appraisers.” The majority also affirmed the district court’s ruling on the conspiracy claim. However, the appellate court concluded that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and ordered the district court to reexamine whether breach of contract occurred and whether the plaintiffs suffered resulting damages.
The dissenting judge called the majority opinion “startling,” writing that “[t]his is an unjust punishment indeed for a company that followed a practice that was both customary and legal and only later modified to avoid potentially influencing appraisers.”
Non-signatory may not arbitrate privacy claims
On March 9, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied a global technology company’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative consumer privacy class action, ruling that the technology company is not party to a co-defendant telecommunications company’s terms and conditions, which require consumer disputes to be arbitrated. The proposed class alleged that the defendants “engaged in false, deceptive and materially misleading consumer-oriented conduct” in violation of state law “by ‘failing to disclose that its practice of recycling phone numbers linked to SIM cards, and selling those SIM cards to consumers without requiring prior users to manually disassociate their [] IDs from the phone numbers associated with the recycled SIM cards, did not protect the privacy of users’ data and confidential personal information.’” The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration provisions contained in the telecommunications company’s terms and conditions.
The court first reserved its decision on one of the plaintiff’s claims because there was an open question as to whether the plaintiff received a copy of the terms and conditions at the time the plaintiff purchased the SIM card. With respect to the other plaintiff’s sole claims against the technology company, the court ruled that the technology company cannot enforce an agreement to which it is not a party. “This general rule stems from the principle that arbitration is a matter of consent, since ‘no party may be forced to submit a dispute to arbitration that the party did not intend and agree to arbitrate,’” the court said. The court also ruled, among other things, that the plaintiff’s claims “do not allege any interdependent or concerted misconduct by” the defendants, and as such they are not so entangled that the plaintiff must arbitrate his claims against the non-signatory technology company.
9th Circuit: Debt collector can invoke bona fide effort defense in time-barred suit
On March 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA lawsuit, holding that while “strict liability” under the statute applies when a debt collector threatens litigation or files a lawsuit seeking to collect time-barred debt, the debt collector can avoid liability by invoking the bona fide error defense. In the case that gave rise to the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, the plaintiff contested the debt collector’s state court lawsuit, arguing that it was filed outside the four-year statute of limitations applicable to sale-of-goods contract claims. The debt collector countered that Oregon’s six-year statute of limitations for other contract claims applied. After the state court ruled for the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against the defendants alleging violations of Sections 1692e and 1692f of the FDCPA. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because the state statute of limitations was unclear when the defendants attempted to collect the debt.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit disagreed with the district court, concluding that because the “FDCPA takes a strict liability approach to prohibiting misleading and unfair debt collection practices, [] a plaintiff need not plead or prove that a debt collector knew or should have known that the lawsuit was time barred to demonstrate that the debt collector engaged in prohibited conduct.” However, the 9th Circuit held that the defendants may be able to avoid liability through the FDCPA’s affirmative defense for bona fide errors. The appellate court distinguished its holding from a 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case, Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, which held that mistakes about the FDCPA’s meaning are excluded from the bona fide error defense. Instead, the 9th Circuit found that “a mistake about the time-barred status of a debt under state law could qualify as a bona fide error within the meaning of the FDCPA” because it is a mistake of fact and not of law.
Court dismisses credit repair association’s suit against CFPB, FTC
On March 9, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed a credit repair industry association’s challenge against the CFPB and the FTC for exceeding their constitutional authority in promulgating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR). In 2020, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit on behalf of two member companies that were subject to TSR enforcement actions, seeking judgments (i) against the FTC for exceeding “its statutory authority in promulgating the TSR,” (ii) against both agencies on the basis that the TSR, as applied, “is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on protected speech,” and (iii) against both agencies on the basis that the TSR “is underinclusive and not narrowly tailored.” The plaintiff also alleged, among other things, that the Bureau was increasing its application of the TSR by “encouraging consumer reporting agencies not to investigate disputes submitted by credit repair organizations” that are reasonably determined to be “frivolous or irrelevant.” The agencies filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act’s (APA) six-year statute of limitations and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim.
In granting the agencies’ motion to dismiss, the court ruled that the lawsuit was filed far beyond the APA’s six-year statute of limitations as the TSR first appeared in the Federal Register in 1995; thus all procedural attacks on the TSR were time barred. The court also ruled that because sending a civil investigative demand or filing a complaint is not considered “a final agency action,” the plaintiff failed to allege a final agency action taken by the agencies against the plaintiff’s members. Further, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument regarding the Bureau’s position on investigating frivolous or irrelevant disputes, ruling that the Bureau’s April 2020 Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Regulation V in Light of the CARES Act (covered by InfoBytes here) is just “a policy statement that has nothing to do with the TSR at issue in this case and is not a final agency action.”
6th Circuit: Delegation clause in arbitration agreement keeps case out of court
On March 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that a district court “exceeded its authority” when it ruled that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable in a case disputing an allegedly predatory loan. According to the 6th Circuit opinion, the plaintiff claimed she was the victim of an illegal “rent-a-tribe” scheme when she accepted a $1,200 loan with an interest rate exceeding 350 percent from an online lender owned and organized under the laws of a federally recognized Montana tribe. The loan contract the plaintiff signed included a provision stating that “‘any dispute. . .related to this agreement will be resolved through binding arbitration’ under tribal law, subject to review only in tribal court.” The plaintiff filed suit, alleging, among other things, that the arbitration agreement violated Michigan and federal consumer protection laws. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that because the plaintiff agreed to arbitrate issues regarding “the validity, enforceability, or scope” of the arbitration agreement through a “delegation clause,” the court should stay the case and compel arbitration. The district court denied the defendant’s motion, “maintaining that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement ‘has already been litigated, and decided against [the defendant], in a similar case from the 2nd Circuit.’” The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court disregarded the delegation clause.
On remand, the 6th Circuit stated that its decision does not bear on the merits of the case but merely addresses who resolves the plaintiff’s challenges to the arbitration agreement. “It’s not even about whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits. Instead, it’s about who should decide whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits,” the appellate court wrote. Focusing on the delegation clause—which states that the parties agreed that an arbitrator, and not the court, would decide “gateway arbitrability issues”—the appellate court held that “[o]nly a specific challenge to a delegation clause brings arbitrability issues back within the court's province,” which was a challenge that the plaintiff failed to make.
CFPB appeals ruling vacating mandatory disclosures and 30-day credit linking restriction in Prepaid Accounts Rule
On March 1, the CFPB filed a notice to appeal a December 2020 ruling, in which the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. vacated two provisions of the Bureau’s Prepaid Account Rule: (i) the short-form disclosure requirement “to the extent it provides mandatory disclosure clauses”; and (ii) the 30-day credit linking restriction. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court concluded that the Bureau acted outside of its statutory authority by promulgating a short-form disclosure requirement (to the extent it provided for mandatory disclosure clauses). The court noted that it could not “presume—as the Bureau does—that Congress delegated power to the Bureau to issue mandatory disclosure clauses just because Congress did not specifically prohibit them from doing so.” The court further determined that the Bureau also read too much into its general rulemaking authority when it promulgated a mandatory 30-day credit linking restriction under 12 CFR section 1026.61(c)(1)(iii) that limited consumers’ ability to link certain credit cards to their prepaid accounts. The court first determined that neither TILA nor Dodd-Frank vest the Bureau with the authority to promulgate substantive regulations on when consumers can access and use credit linked to prepaid accounts. Second, the court deemed the regulatory provision to be a “substantive regulation banning a consumer’s access to and use of credit” under the disguise of a disclosure, and thus invalid.