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State AGs sue to block Biden's SAVE Plan for student loan forgiveness
On April 1, 10 state attorneys general filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas against President Biden, the Secretary of Education, and the Department of Education seeking to block the enactment of the SAVE Plan. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the SAVE Plan was an income-driven repayment plan, intended to calculate payments based on a borrower’s income and family size, rather than the loan balance, and forgave balances after several years since repayment. According to the complaint, the government released a rule for the new SAVE Plan intended to eliminate at least $156 billion in student debt as the second step in a three-part loan forgiveness initiative. The first step involved an attempt to cancel $430 billion in student loans under the HEROES Act, which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in Biden v. Nebraska.
The SAVE Plan assumed $430 billion in loans would be forgiven beforehand, but after the Supreme Court's decision, the defendants allegedly did not revise the cost estimate in anticipation of overturning the case. This oversight led to a significant underestimation of the SAVE Plan's true cost; plaintiffs alleged.
Plaintiffs further claimed that the SAVE Plan was written before the Supreme Court's ruling in Biden v. Nebraska and thus included outdated statements of confidence in the defendants' authority to pursue debt relief. The rule would take effect on July 1, but defendants allegedly have already started forgiving loans for some individuals before this date. The complaint alleged that on February 21, the Department of Education forgave the debt of 153,000 borrowers, which the state attorneys general claimed violated Biden v. Nebraska.
Plaintiffs brought claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, contending that the Department of Education exceeded its authority under the Higher Education Act of 1965 by issuing the rule and that the rule would be arbitrary and capricious since defendants failed to account for the full cost of the rule.
Trade groups sue Colorado Attorney General to block enforcement of law limiting out-of-state bank charges on consumer credit
On March 25, three trade groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, against the Colorado Attorney General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code to prevent enforcement of Section 3 of House Bill 23-1229, which was signed into law last year to limit out-of-state bank charges on consumer credit (the “Act”). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Act amended the state’s Uniform Consumer Credit Code to opt out of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) provision that allowed state-chartered banks to charge the interest allowed by the state where they are located, regardless of the location of the borrower and regardless of conflicting out-of-state law. The Act would go into effect on July 1.
According to the complaint, the Act “far exceed[s]” the authority Congress granted Colorado under DIDMCA and would be deemed “invalid on its face.” Plaintiffs alleged that Colorado ignored the federal definition of where a loan was deemed to be “made,” imposing “its state interest-rate caps on any ‘consumer credit transaction[] in’ Colorado,” including “any loan to a Colorado consumer by any state-chartered bank that advertises on the internet in Colorado.” Plaintiffs further alleged that the Act’s opt out “is preempted by DIDMCA and violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by attempting to expand the federally granted opt-out right to loans not actually ‘made in’ Colorado under federal law,” and “violates the Commerce Clause because it will impede the flow of interstate commerce and subject state-chartered banks to inconsistent obligations across different states.” The Plaintiffs also alleged that Colorado’s stated goal of combatting “predatory, payday-style lending” will not be accomplished through the opt out, as plaintiffs’ members are not payday lenders and offer “a wide variety of useful, familiar, everyday credit products” that “are provided at a range of rate and fee options, which sometimes—to account for credit risk—are above Colorado’s rate and fee caps, but within the rate caps allowed by DIDMCA.” Furthermore, plaintiffs warn that the Act “will prevent Plaintiffs’ members from offering these mainstream products to many Colorado consumers,” while “national banks will still offer these very same loan products to Colorado residents at interest rates in excess of Colorado’s interest-rate and fee caps.” Plaintiffs urged the court to issue a ruling stating that the Act “is void with respect to loans not ‘made in’ Colorado as defined by applicable federal law” and to enjoin Colorado from enforcing or implementing the Act with respect to those loans.
Trusts are covered persons subject to the CFPA, 3rd Circuit upholds CFPB FDCPA case
On March 19, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed an opinion remanding a case between the CFPB and defendant statutory trusts to the District Court. After issuing a civil investigative demand in 2014, the CFPB initiated an enforcement action in September 2017 against a collection of 15 Delaware statutory trusts that furnished over 800,000 private loans and their debt collector for, among other things, allegedly filing lawsuits against consumers for private student loan debt that they could not prove was owed or was outside the applicable statute of limitations (covered by InfoBytes here). Then, early last year, the parties settled and asked the court to enter a consent judgment, which was denied (covered by InfoBytes here).
The 3rd Circuit addressed two questions: (i) whether the trusts are covered persons subject to the CFPA; and (ii) whether the CFPB was required to ratify the underlying action that questioned a constitutional deficiency within the Bureau. On the statutory issue, the court found that the trusts fell within the purview of the CFPA because trusts “engage” in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service, specifically student loan servicing and debt collection, as explicitly stated in the trust agreements each trust entered. Regarding the constitutional question, the defendants argued that the Bureau needed to ratify the underlying suit because it was initiated while the agency head was improperly insulated, and since the Bureau ratified it after the statute of limitations had run, the suit was untimely. The court disagreed and found that the defendants’ analysis of the here-and-now injury “doesn’t go far enough,” therefore the CFPB did not need to ratify this action before the statute of limitations had run because the impermissible insulation provision does not, on its own, cause harm.
Alabama judge finds the Corporate Transparency Act unconstitutional, DOJ quickly appeals
On March 1, the federal district court in the Northern District of Alabama entered a final declaratory judgment concluding that the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) is unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, including a non-profit small business association consisting of more than 60,000 small business members as well as an individual small business owner, sued the Treasury Department, Secretary Janet Yellen, and FinCEN Acting Director Himamauli Das in their official capacities, alleging that the CTA’s mandatory disclosure requirements violate the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments and exceed Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.
Corporations, LLCs, or other similar entities that are either “(i) created by the filing of a document with a secretary of state… or (ii) formed under the law of a foreign country and registered to do business in the United States” are required to provide certain beneficial ownership information, as well as disclose any related changes to FinCEN under the CTA, excluding exempt entities. The CTA was passed in 2021 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act and required most entities incorporated under state law to disclose beneficial ownership information to FinCEN to prevent financial crimes often committed through shell corporations. In September 2022, FinCEN issued a final rule implementing the CTA, which went into effect on January 1 of this year, and required currently existing entities and five million new entities formed each year from 2025 to 2034 to disclose the identity and information of any “beneficial owner” to FinCEN (see Orrick Insight here).
According to the court, the CTA exceeds the Constitution’s limits on Congress’s power and does not have a strong enough connection to any of Congress’s listed powers to be considered a necessary or appropriate way to reach Congress’s policy objectives. The court rejected the government’s claims that the CTA is covered by various constitutional provisions, including the Commerce Clause, Taxing Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause, and Congress’s powers related to foreign affairs and national security.
The judgment permanently enjoined the Department of the Treasury and FinCEN from enforcing the CTA against the plaintiffs and as a result they are not required to report beneficial ownership information to FinCEN at this time. The order does not ban enforcement of the CTA and its beneficial ownership disclosure requirements to FinCEN generally.
On March 11, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit after U.S. District Judge Liles C. Burke’s March 1 ruling.
SEC rejects petition to amend the “no admit/no deny policy”
On January 30, the SEC rejected a nonprofit’s 2018 rulemaking petition that requested an amendment to Rule 202.5(e) under Commission Rule of Procedure 192(a), which outlines the terms for the Commission's acceptance of settlements in enforcement actions. Specifically, the rule prohibits settlements imposing sanctions if a defendant can publicly deny the Commission's allegations.
The rejection letter emphasizes the SEC’s authority to investigate securities law violations and initiate enforcement actions, saying that considering the request “could undermine confidence in the Commission’s enforcement program.” The SEC highlights its reliance on consent judgments and the contractual nature of settlements, as well as the potential implications of the proposed amendment on the SEC’s settlement process, adding that “it could undermine confidence in the Commission’s enforcement program.” SEC Chair Gary Gensler said in a statement supporting the decision that “a settlement that allows the denial of wrongdoing undermines the value provided by the recitation of the facts, and it muddies the message to the public.”
The Commission has decided not to amend Rule 202.5(e), affirming that the rule is a valid exercise of its authority in pursuing enforcement actions and settling cases. The policy allows the SEC to retain the option of seeking legal remedies if a defendant publicly denies allegations after settling. The letter also emphasizes that the constitutional and statutory arguments presented in the petition lack merit and conflict with established legal precedent regarding the waiver of rights in civil settlements. The Commission underscores the importance of the “no-deny” provision in preserving its ability to challenge public denials in court and rejects the notion that settling defendants can later deny allegations without consequence.
District Court denies stay of CFPB case against lender
On January 12, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied a defendant-mortgage lender’s motion to stay a case filed by the CFPB. The defendant argued that judicial economy—the preservation of the court’s time and resources—favored the stay because the defendant’s pending motion to dismiss is premised on the same constitutional issue addressing the CFPB’s funding structure now before the Supreme Court (see continuing InfoBytes coverage here and here). In opposition, the CFPB argued that the Supreme Court may take months to issue a ruling, the public interest in enforcement of consumer protection laws, and the failure to show how an adverse ruling in the Supreme Court case would definitively result in dismissal of this case.
The District Court sided with the CFPB, stating that as of now, the CFPB “is a valid agency that is entitled to enforce the consumer financial laws.” With the stay denied, the court will now consider the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Title lender reaches settlement with Pennsylvania AG
On January 10, Pennsylvania AG Michelle Henry announced a settlement with a national auto title lending company, resolving alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and the Loan Interest and Protection Law (LIPL). According to the settlement, since 2016, the lender made thousands of vehicle title loans to Pennsylvania residents, with interest rates exceeding 100 percent without the necessary license required by the Consumer Discount Company Act.
The AG also noted that some of the loans resulted from leads that they bought from third parties who purported to have physical offices in Pennsylvania, when in fact, neither the lender nor its lead generators were in Pennsylvania. The AG also said that most Pennsylvania-based borrowers drove to one of the lender’s Delaware locations. Nonetheless, the AG said, “Pennsylvania usury laws apply because [the lender] collected money from Pennsylvania consumers and repossessed vehicles in Pennsylvania.” In the settlement, the lender denies all allegations of unlawful conduct, including the assertion that it knowingly acquired leads from third parties leading to loans for Pennsylvania residents. The lender explained its position that until the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rendered its opinion in another matter in January 2022, it held a “good faith and reasonable belief” based on then-existing law, particularly the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, that its operations were lawful.
Among other things, the settlement (i) requires the lender to pay $2.2 million in consumer restitution; (ii) requires the lender to cancel approximately $3.7 million in existing loans; (iii) enjoins and prohibits the lender from violating the LIPL; and (iv) requires the lender to return any repossessed vehicles at no charge and refund consumers of all repossession fees previously charged.
NY state court granted decision to continue its new check cashing fee methodology
On December 7, the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a motion to dismiss a challenge made to NYDFS’s check cashing regulation and ruled in favor of NYDFS. As previously covered in InfoBytes, the January regulation’s methodology capped the maximum percentage check cashing fee for most check types (social security, unemployment, emergency relief, veterans’ benefits) at 2.2 percent or $1, whichever is greater, and eliminated automatic fee increases based on CPI every year that had been in place since 2005.
Shortly after the rule took effect in June, several plaintiffs sued NYDFS alleging that the amended regulation was arbitrary and capricious, violated the purpose of the banking law, and was an unconstitutional property deprivation. The NY Supreme Court found that the amended regulation had a rational basis and was supported by the administrative record. Because NYDFS neither violated the NY state banking law nor the Administrative Procedures Act, the court further declared that the “amended regulation did not constitute a deprivation of property in the absence of either procedural or substantive due process.” Because the court dismissed the petition entirely in NYDFS’s favor, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction as merely “academic.”
Supreme Court hears oral argument in case challenging SEC ALJ use
On November 29, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the SEC’s request to appeal the 5th Circuit’s decision in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 5th Circuit held that the SEC’s in-house adjudication of a petitioners’ case violated their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and relied on unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. At oral argument, Justice Kavanaugh stated in his questioning of Principal Deputy Solicitor General Brian Fletcher (representing the SEC) that given the severity of the potential outcome of cases, the SEC’s decision-making process fully being carried out in-house could be “problematic,” and that it “doesn’t seem like a neutral process.” Meanwhile, Fletcher mentioned that the boundaries and “outer edges” of the public rights doctrine can be “fuzzy.” Justices’ questions also centered around Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission—a Supreme Court case that held that “Congress does not violate the Seventh Amendment when it authorizes an agency to impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings to enforce a federal statute.”
District Court grants payday lender's motion to stay CFPB case pending Supreme Court decision
On November 3, the U.S. District Court of Nevada granted a payday lender’s motion to stay a case brought by the CFPB, pending a SCOTUS’s decision in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (see InfoBytes here and here). The CFPB issued a civil investigative demand (CID) in late 2022 to the lender, as part of an investigation into its lending practices. The lender complied with the CID initially, but later requested a stay due to the impending SCOTUS decision regarding the constitutionality of the CFPB’s funding structure, which could impact the CFPB’s enforcement authority. Although the CFPB opposed the stay by arguing that the extensive delay could hinder its ability to investigate the lender, the court granted the lender’s motion, in line with other district courts that have faced similar issues.