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OCC Releases Bulletin Outlining BSA Noncompliance Enforcement Process
On February 29, the OCC released Bulletin 2016-6, supplementing information in Bulletin 2007-36, “BSA Enforcement Policy,” and rescinding Bulletin 205-45, “Process for Taking Administrative Enforcement Actions Against Banks Based on BSA Violations.” Applicable to OCC-supervised institutions, the bulletin describes the OCC’s enforcement process for banks’ noncompliance with BSA requirements and dealing with repeated or uncorrected BSA compliance problems. As outlined in the bulletin, this administrative enforcement process is comprised of four distinct parts: (i) notice and opportunity to respond, during which bank management has 15 days to respond to the OCC’s written notice regarding potential noncompliance; (ii) consideration of enforcement actions, when the OCC’s supervisory office and legal department reviews relevant materials and makes a recommendation to the OCC Supervision Review Committee, which then determines whether the OCC should pursue an enforcement action or if the determination should instead be delegated to the Senior Deputy Comptroller; (iii) initiation of BSA enforcement actions, at which point the bank receives the final letter or report of examination, a proposed cease-and-desist order, and notice regarding potential civil money penalties upon approval of the action; and (iv) coordination with other agencies, when the OCC notifies FinCEN of any informal and formal actions taken against the alleged perpetrator, and when the OCC ensures that all suspicious activity reports are filed and coordinated with other appropriate law enforcement agencies.
OCC and FinCEN Assess Civil Money Penalties against Florida-Based Wealth Management Firm for BSA Violations
On February 25, the OCC, in coordination with FinCEN, announced that it took action against a Florida-based wealth management firm and private bank for allegedly violating the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). According to the OCC, the bank failed to maintain an effective BSA/AML compliance program, thus violating its 2010 agreement with the OCC to “revise its policies, procedures, and systems related to the BSA/AML laws and regulations (‘BSA/AML Compliance Program’), and, among other things, address weaknesses with the Bank’s BSA/AML Compliance programs, including a lack of internal controls necessary to ensure effective and timely customer identification, risk assessment, monitoring, validation, and suspicious activity reports (‘SARs’).” Without admitting or denying any wrongdoing, the bank agreed to pay a total of $4 million in civil penalties, with $2.5 million to be paid directly to the OCC and, pursuant to FinCEN’s separately announced civil money penalty, $1.5 to be paid to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
FinCEN Withdraws Findings and Proposed Rulemakings
On February 19, FinCEN withdrew three findings and proposed rulemakings under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. FinCEN determined that the three entities subject to the proposed rulemakings “no longer pose a money laundering threat to the U.S. financial system.” FinCEN withdrew its findings and proposed rulemakings against (i) a Costa Rica-based financial institution; (ii) a Belarus-based financial institution; and (iii) an Andorra-based financial institution. Regarding the Costa Rica-based institution, FinCEN noted that the DOJ “seized [its] accounts and Internet domain names and charged seven of its principals and employees with money laundering;” the institution stopped functioning after such actions were taken. According to FinCEN, the Belarus-based entity, along with its successor, no longer operates as a foreign financial institution and does not operate in a way that poses a threat to the U.S. financial system. Finally, concerning the third entity, FinCEN noted that Andorran authorities assumed control of the management and operations of the entity, arrested its chief executive officer on money laundering charges, and “are in the final stages of implementing a resolution plan that is isolating the assets, liabilities, and clients of [the entity] that raise money laundering concerns.”
FinCEN Updates FATF AML/CFT Deficient Jurisdictions List
On January 19, FinCEN issued an advisory, FIN-2016-A001, to provide financial institutions with guidance on reviewing their obligations and risk-based approaches with respect to certain jurisdictions. According to the advisory, on October 23, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) updated two documents identifying the following: (i) jurisdictions that are either subject to the FATF’s call to apply countermeasures, or to Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) due to their AML/CFT deficiencies; and (ii) jurisdictions with AML/CFT deficiencies. FinCEN’s recently issued advisory summarizes the changes made to the respective lists and reiterates that a financial institution must file a Suspicious Activity Report if it “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that a transaction involves funds derived from illegal activity or that a customer has otherwise engaged in activities indicative of money laundering, terrorist financing, or other violation of federal law or regulation.”
U.S. FinCEN Issues Geographical Targeting Orders Requiring Reporting of High-End Cash Purchases and Buyers of Residential Real Estate in Manhattan and Miami
On January 13, FinCEN issued two Geographical Targeting Orders (GTO) requiring certain U.S. title insurance companies to provide identification for certain “all-cash” buyers of high end real estate, and to report such transactions. One GTO focuses on the Borough of Manhattan in New York City, New York and the other focuses on Miami-Dade County, Florida.
According to FinCEN, natural persons may be purchasing real estate without bank financing and through LLCs or “other opaque structures” in an attempt to hide their assets and identity. FinCEN commented: “Having prioritized anti-money laundering protections on real estate transactions involving lending, FinCEN’s remaining concern is with money laundering vulnerabilities associated with all-cash real estate transactions.” The two GTOS will be effective from March 1, 2016 through August 27, 2016, and will require certain title insurance companies to “record and report to FinCEN the beneficial ownership information of legal entities purchasing certain high-value residential real estate without external financing.”
The GTOs are identical with the exception of the purchase price value applicable to the different locations. For purchases exceeding $3 million in the Borough of Manhattan, or $1 million in Miami-Dad County, that are made by a legal entity (as defined in the GTO), “without a bank loan or other similar form of external financing,” where “the purchase is made, at least in part, using currency or a cashier’s check, a certified check, a traveler’s check, or a money order in any form,” a title insurance company, and any of its subsidiaries and agents, is required to file a Form 8300 within 30 days of closing.
Among other information, the Form 8300 must:
- Contain information about the identity of the individual primarily responsible for representing the Purchaser, including a copy of this individual’s driver’s license, passport, or other similar identifying documentation.
- Contain information about the identity of the Purchaser.
- Contain information about the identity of the Beneficial Owner(s) of the Purchaser. The Covered Business must obtain and record a copy of the Beneficial Owner’s driver’s license, passport, or other similar identifying documentation. A “Beneficial Owner” means each individual who, directly or indirectly, owns 25% or more of the equity interests of the Purchaser.
- If the purchaser involved in the Covered Transaction is a limited liability company, then the Covered Business must provide the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of all its member
This development is consistent with FinCEN’s long-term trend of pushing for greater transparency, exemplified by its pending proposed rule that would mandate enhanced customer due diligence related to beneficial ownership. See prior InfoBytes Alert and our description of the proposed rule.
District Court Denies Motion to Dismiss, Rules Compliance Officers Responsible for AML Program Failures
On January 8, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota ruled that individual officers of financial institutions may be held responsible for ensuring compliance with anti-money laundering laws under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-cv-01518, WL 107940 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016). In May 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s December 2014 complaint against him. The Treasury’s complaint alleged that the defendant failed in his responsibility as the Chief Compliance Officer for an international money transfer company to ensure that “the Company implemented and maintained an effective AML program and complied with its SAR-filing obligations.” The complaint sought a $1 million judgment against the defendant and enjoined him from working for, either directly or indirectly, any “financial institution” as defined in the BSA. In his motion to dismiss, the defendant contended that the Treasury’s complaint should be dismissed because, among other reasons, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a) permits the imposition of a penalty for AML program failures against an entity, not an individual. However, the District Court of Minnesota dismissed the motion, ruling that the BSA’s more general civil penalty provision, § 5321(a)(1), could subject a partner, director, officer, or employee of a domestic financial institution to civil penalties for violations “of any provision of the BSA or its regulations, excluding the specifically excepted provisions.” Judge David Doty further opined, “Because § 5318(h) is not listed as one of those exceptions, the plain language of the statute provides that a civil penalty may be imposed on corporate officers and employees like [the defendant], who was responsible for designing and overseeing [the company's] AML program.” The defendant also challenged the Treasury’s complaint on the bases that (i) the request for injunctive relief was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (ii) FinCEN should not have been permitted to receive and publicly use grand jury information; and (iii) FinCEN violated his due process rights. For various reasons, the District Court declined to decide on such issues or to dismiss materials based on the arguments presented.
FinCEN Assesses Civil Money Penalty Against LA-Based Precious Metals Business for AML Violations
On December 30, FinCEN announced a civil money penalty of $200,000 against a Los Angeles-based precious metals business – a financial institution as defined by the BSA – and its owner and compliance officer. The company and the two individuals admitted to willfully violating federal AML laws by (i) failing to adequately asses its own risk; and (ii) failing to conduct due diligence on its highest-risk customers. Specifically, the business did not have an AML program in place until 2011, five years after the IRS instructed it to establish one. In 2013, IRS examiners found that the company’s recently-established AML program did not ensure compliance with the BSA and, as a result, the company “failed to appropriately assess its money laundering to terrorist financing risks, conducted almost no due diligence on money laundering and terrorist financing, conducted almost no due diligence on many of its highest risk customers, and failed to implement effective procedures to identify red flags or to conduct inquiries when such red flags were present, among other things.” In addition to the civil money penalty, the company and the two individuals agreed that, until 2020, they would: (i) retain an auditor; (ii) provide a comprehensive annual report to FinCEN detailing the implementation of the company’s improved AML program; and (iii) annually provide FinCEN with a copy of the company’s AML training program, certifying attendance and testing results of the program.
FinCEN Settles with Card Club Gaming Establishment for BSA Violations
On December 17, FinCEN announced a $650,000 settlement with a “card club” gaming establishment in California for willfully violating the program and reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The gaming establishment allegedly trained its staff using misleading and inaccurate AML policy, which either failed to provide instructions at all, or provided incorrect instructions regarding the establishment’s obligations and reporting requirements under the BSA. As an example, the establishment “encouraged employees to provide notice to patrons if they were about to conduct a cash transaction that would put them over the $10,000 threshold for the filing of a Currency Transaction Report, thereby possibly encouraging structured transactions.” In addition, since the establishment’s policy did not contain instructions regarding when an employee should file a Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”), it failed to file SARs in 2009 and 2010. Card clubs are gaming facilities that generally host only games involving cards; like casinos, card clubs are defined as financial institutions under the BSA, rendering them subject to FinCEN’s rules and regulatory authority.
FinCEN Announces MOU with China Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center
On December 11, FinCEN announced that Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery and the China Anti-Money Laundering Monitoring and Analysis Center (CAMLMAC) Director-General Luo Yang of the People’s Republic of China signed an MOU “to create a framework to facilitate expanded U.S.-China collaboration, communication, and cooperation between both nations’ financial intelligence units.” As the financial intelligence unit (FIU) for the United States, FinCEN is responsible for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating financial intelligence to law enforcement and other relevant authorities; as the Chinese counterpart to FinCEN, the CAMLMAC has comparable responsibilities to the Chinese government. The recently announced MOU is intended to provide a “mechanism for sharing information on money laundering and the financing of terrorism in order to prevent illicit actors from abusing either country’s financial systems.”
FinCEN Director Highlights the Significance of SAR Filings
On December 9, FinCEN Director Calvery highlighted at a joint FBIIC-FSSCC meeting the role of FinCEN in gathering and analyzing financial intelligence and the value of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) in curtailing malicious cyber activity. Calvery noted the importance of attribution information, such as IP addresses, timestamps, e-mail addresses, and the nature of the suspicious activity, when included in SAR filings, in helping FinCEN and law enforcement agencies deflect cyber-attacks, detect the source of such attacks, and identify members of money laundering networks. “For example, SARs filed by several different financial institutions played a vital role in furthering an investigation where a regional Florida bank had nearly $7 million fraudulently wired out of one of its accounts,” Calvery explained. Calvery emphasized the importance of including cyber-derived information (such as IP addresses and bitcoin wallet addresses) in SAR filings, noting that while less than two percent of filed SARs contain IP addresses, the information is “incredibly important to FinCEN analysts and law enforcement investigators working to combat cyber-crimes.”