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District Court grants MSJ in FCRA case in favor of defendant
Recently, a plaintiff sued under the FCRA, alleging that the defendant debt collector failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into a disputed credit report item. The plaintiff claimed to be a victim of identity theft and contended that an outstanding telephone debt should not have been listed on his credit report. The defendant maintained that it had performed its duties reasonably, relying on information from the phone company for which it acted as a debt collector. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had not provided any evidence to support the claim of an unreasonable investigation by defendant. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the motion for summary judgment, agreeing with the defendant that the plaintiff had failed to provide any substantial evidence regarding how the defendant’s investigation was conducted or why it was unreasonable.
Indiana appellate court finds debt company violated FDCPA and Indiana’s deceptive consumer sales act
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals of Indiana affirmed a state trial court’s decision concluding that the defendant was a debt collector under both the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and the FDCPA when it purchased and collected defaulted debt. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument in its motion for partial summary judgment arguing it was not a debt collector under both statutes because the plaintiff’s debt was owned by it and due to it, and it did not collect debts owed by another. The court reviewed the evidence that the defendant purchased defaulted debt and utilized agencies to contact consumers as its primary business pursuit. The court found the defendant was a “person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or a “debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). It likewise concluded that the defendant was a “debt collector under” the state statute because Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-2(a)(13) incorporated the FDCPA’s definition of debt collector and “[t]he term includes a debt buyer (as defined in IC 24-5-15.5).”
Washington State Attorney General obtains civil penalties against debt collection agency for medical debt collection practices
On March 19, the Washington State Attorney General (AG) obtained an order from the King County Superior Court providing that a debt collection agency must pay civil penalties for allegedly failing to comply with the Washington Collection Agency Act and Consumer Protection Act when collecting medical debts, specifically by failing to provide the required disclosures in its consumer communications. The court found that the debt collection agency sent 82,729 debt collection notices to medical debtors without the necessary disclosures, which included notification of the debtor’s right to request the original or redacted account number assigned to the debt, the date of last payment, and an itemized statement. The notices also did not inform the debtor that the debtor may be eligible for charity care from the hospital or provided contact information for the hospital. According to the AG’s Office, the collection agency “unlawfully collected payments from … patients without providing critical information about their rights when faced with medical debt. By excluding the legally required disclosures about financial assistance in its collection letters, [the collection agency] created barriers that kept patients who likely qualified for financial assistance from learning about and accessing help with their hospital bills.”
The court ordered a civil penalty of $10 per violation for the debt collection agency’s 82,729 alleged violations of the state Consumer Protection Act, totaling $827,290. Additionally, the court ordered the debt collection agency to reimburse the AG’s office for the costs of bringing the case, which is estimated to exceed $400,000 and to update its practices to comply with Washington law. In determining the civil penalty amount, the court found, among other things, that the debt collection agency acted in bad faith by “fail[ing] to take basic compliance steps,” and “fail[ing] to obtain the correct license … maintain an office in the state, and … include the mandatory disclosures on medical and hospital debt.”
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the AG successfully sued the nonprofit health system in early February, entering a consent decree pursuant to which the health system must pay $158 million in patient refunds, debt forgiveness, and AG costs.
Trusts are covered persons subject to the CFPA, 3rd Circuit upholds CFPB FDCPA case
On March 19, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed an opinion remanding a case between the CFPB and defendant statutory trusts to the District Court. After issuing a civil investigative demand in 2014, the CFPB initiated an enforcement action in September 2017 against a collection of 15 Delaware statutory trusts that furnished over 800,000 private loans and their debt collector for, among other things, allegedly filing lawsuits against consumers for private student loan debt that they could not prove was owed or was outside the applicable statute of limitations (covered by InfoBytes here). Then, early last year, the parties settled and asked the court to enter a consent judgment, which was denied (covered by InfoBytes here).
The 3rd Circuit addressed two questions: (i) whether the trusts are covered persons subject to the CFPA; and (ii) whether the CFPB was required to ratify the underlying action that questioned a constitutional deficiency within the Bureau. On the statutory issue, the court found that the trusts fell within the purview of the CFPA because trusts “engage” in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service, specifically student loan servicing and debt collection, as explicitly stated in the trust agreements each trust entered. Regarding the constitutional question, the defendants argued that the Bureau needed to ratify the underlying suit because it was initiated while the agency head was improperly insulated, and since the Bureau ratified it after the statute of limitations had run, the suit was untimely. The court disagreed and found that the defendants’ analysis of the here-and-now injury “doesn’t go far enough,” therefore the CFPB did not need to ratify this action before the statute of limitations had run because the impermissible insulation provision does not, on its own, cause harm.
7th Circuit says plaintiffs should have produced evidence to prove concrete injury
On February 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that while an interruption of self-employment can cause a concrete loss for a plaintiff to sue, that loss must be established by evidence at summary judgment. The loss in question involved a consumer debt in arrears sold by a bank to a debt collection agency. Two individual plaintiffs owing the underlying debt sued the debt collection agency under 15 U.S.C. §1692e of the FDCPA when the debt collection agency attempted to collect on the debt owed without relaying that the bank had not verified the balance of the debt. The judge opined that rather than claiming they had incurred any concrete loss (e.g., a loss of income, payment of funds, etc.), plaintiffs instead filed an affidavit to state that the debt had “interrupted my self-employment” because they were focused on thinking about the debt and spent time working through records to confirm the debt owed. The judge agreed with the plaintiffs’ claim that debt collection efforts can very well cause a delay in receiving self-employment income, which is a “form of loss”; however, the judge also held that plaintiffs must show evidence of injury at the summary judgment stage, as this is the “put up or shut up” stage in litigation. Ultimately, the plaintiffs failed to show any evidence that debt collection efforts caused them concrete harm, other than interrupting a productive day of work.
District Court finds “negative emotions” alone do not establish standing under the FDCPA
Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted a debt collector’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s allegations of injury after receiving one letter that violated the FDCPA did not establish standing. The plaintiff sued the debt collector under Sections 1692e and 1692g of the FDCPA, alleging that the defendant (i) made false and misleading representations, and (ii) continued to collect the debt without proper validation by sending the plaintiff a collection letter with the wrong account number and purporting the plaintiff is personally liable for her deceased husband’s medical debt. The plaintiff asserted her injuries because of receiving the letter included expending time and money to mitigate the risk of future financial harm and fear, anxiety, and stress, which “manifested physically in the form of increased heartrate.”
The court found that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to establish, or for the court to infer, a tangible injury because the plaintiff only stated she lost money without providing additional detail on what that entailed. Additionally, the court relied on the holdings of Courts of Appeals and found that the plaintiff’s alleged emotions of fear, anxiety, and stress alone do not state a cognizable or “particularized, concrete” injury.
District Court dismisses FDCPA class action lawsuit for lack of standing on alleged concrete injuries suffered
On January 31, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed an FDCPA class action lawsuit for lack of standing. According to the order, plaintiff alleged numerous violations of the FDCPA related to two debt collection letters sent to the plaintiff and his girlfriend. In September 2023, a debt collector (defendant) reportedly sent two letters to the plaintiff which allegedly did not contain the requisite information mandated by the FDCPA for communication with consumers, including validation and itemization details. One of the letters purportedly demanded payment by September 29, falling within the 30-day validation period. Additionally, plaintiff asserted that one of the letters was addressed to his girlfriend who bore no responsibility for the debt. Plaintiff claimed two concrete injuries: (i) the letters allegedly strained his relationship with his girlfriend, causing emotional distress; and (ii) due to the omission of critical information in the letters, plaintiff felt confused and uncertain about how to effectively respond.
In considering the plaintiff’s claims, the court discussed the elements required to state a claim for publicity given to private life and examines a specific case where such a claim was rejected by the court. It highlights that for such a claim to succeed, the matter publicized must be highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate public concern. Additionally, mere communication of private information to a single person typically does not constitute publicity, unless it has the potential to become public knowledge. Although Congress explicitly prohibits debt collectors from sharing consumer financial information with third parties, the court noted that it “does not automatically transform every arguable invasion of privacy into an actionable, concrete injury.” Therefore, the plaintiff's injury, as pleaded, was deemed insufficiently concrete for standing purposes. Regarding the second alleged injury, the court argued that confusion alone does not suffice as a concrete injury for standing purposes, and courts have determined that mere confusion or frustration does not qualify as an injury. Additionally, the court compared the case to other cases where plaintiffs had alleged confusion yet had also demonstrated further injuries.
District Court grants defendant MSJ over cross-motions on a dispute on different debt owed amounts
On February 2, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that a plaintiff had standing to bring two FDCPA claims, but remanded the plaintiff’s third claim for lack of standing. The Court also granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement as part of a cross-motion. The plaintiff is an individual suing a debt collection company for allegedly attempting to collect a debt improperly and misrepresenting the amount the plaintiff owed under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692. The District Court was presented with cross-motions for summary judgment filed by both parties, and supplemental briefing on Article III standing.
The court first determined that the plaintiff, an individual, had Article III standing in two of three of her FDCPA claims, but that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on those claims. The Court agreed the plaintiff had Article III standing for the 1692(e) claim that the defendant misrepresented the amount of debt owed when the defendant listed the debt of $22.95 but then attached account statements showing a balance of $271.34. However, the court found that the least sophisticated debtor would understand the collection letter to unambiguously represent that the total amount of debt owed is $22.95. The plaintiff also had standing for her informational injury claim that the defendant violated § 1692g by restarting its collection activity despite having failed to provide information that validated the debt owed of $22.95. However, the court found that the defendant sufficiently validated the debt despite attachments showing a larger balance because “it was not required to show detailed files of the debt, bills, or other evidence.” Regarding the third claim, on that the defendant violated § 1692f when it sent the debt verification to an email the plaintiff owns (but claims is a secondary email), the Court found the plaintiff did not have standing since the plaintiff had not suffered concrete injury.
District Court grants MSJ for defendant for not acting as a debt collector
On January 22, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an FDCPA case. According to the order, a hospital that treated plaintiff referred his medical bills to defendant, who services hospitals throughout revenue cycles and acts as an extension of the hospital to service patient accounts. In a letter sent by defendant to plaintiff, defendant stated that the amount was not currently in default but emphasized the importance of hearing from plaintiff. After receiving this first statement from defendant, plaintiff’s attorney contacted defendant explaining plaintiff’s situation, and advised defendant to cease communications. Despite the request, defendant sent a follow-up statement, similar to the first, which plaintiff assumed meant that the debt was in default and required urgent attention. Subsequently, plaintiff paid the outstanding medical debt.
Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against defendant, alleging that the statements sent by defendant did not comply with disclosures mandated by the FDCPA. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it is not a debt collector covered by the Act. The defendant further argued that since the FDCPA’s definition of “debt collector” expressly excludes “any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed… which was not in default at the time that it was obtained by such person,” defendant was not a debt collector because they never treated the medical debt as in default. Although the FDCPA does not define when a debt is “in default,” the court found that the hospital and defendant never treated the debt as defaulted at the time of assignment, and since it did not acquire a defaulted debt to collect, defendant is therefore not considered a covered debt collector under the FDCPA. The court also found issues with plaintiff’s assertations, concluding that they were not applicable to defendant, as it is not a “debt collector” nor a “collection agency,” and that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether plaintiff’s debt was “in default” at the time it was assigned. As such, the court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment as a matter of law, indicating that, based on the reasons provided, defendant is not considered a debt collector under the FDCPA.
District Court: Plaintiff has standing but still dismisses FCRA case
On January 19, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a bank’s motion to dismiss an FCRA case. According to the opinion, after plaintiff’s credit report revealed monthly payments towards previously closed accounts with defendant, plaintiff alleged that because the accounts were closed, the entire balance was due and that she had neither the right nor the obligation to pay defendant in monthly installments. Plaintiff then disputed the debt with a credit reporting agency, which forwarded the dispute to defendant, but ultimately plaintiff’s credit report was never updated to $0 monthly payments as she requested. Three days later, plaintiff filed suit alleging defendant violated the FCRA by failing to investigate the dispute and failing to direct the credit reporting agency to report the tradelines with $0 monthly payments. Although plaintiff does not assert in her complaint that her credit reports have been distributed to any potential lender, plaintiff alleged that the tradelines listed in her credit report are inaccurate and “create a misleading impression of her consumer credit file.”
In determining Article III standing, the court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged injury in fact because defendant’s “false and misleading reporting to a credit bureau about Plaintiff’s obligation on a debt has a close relationship to reputational harms such as defamation and common law fraud.” The court acknowledged, however, that “[l]ower courts have split on the issue of whether dissemination of a defamatory statement to a credit reporting agency, as opposed to the potential creditors at issue.” On one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court found that class members whose misleading credit reports were not disseminated to a third party did not suffer concrete harm. In another case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that plaintiffs adequately proved third-party dissemination by presenting evidence that debt collectors reported false information about them to a credit reporting agency, dismissing any interpretation precedent that would demand the plaintiffs to additionally demonstrate that the third party shared the false information. The court agreed with the latter decision, citing that “dissemination to a credit reporting agency suffices to establish defamatory publication for standing purposes.”
Although plaintiff established Article III standing, the court found that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the FCRA because she failed to allege that the tradelines issued by defendant contain inaccurate information. Furthermore, the court found that a report, as plaintiff requested, showing $0 monthly payments on the account would be more misleading, because it would purport that plaintiff does not owe a balance to defendant.