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CFPB issues summer 2018 Supervisory Highlights
On September 6, the CFPB released its summer 2018 Supervisory Highlights, which outlines its supervisory and oversight actions in the areas of auto loan servicing, credit card account management, debt collection, mortgage servicing, payday lending, and small business lending. The findings of the report cover examinations that generally were completed between December 2017 and May 2018. Highlights of the examination findings include:
- Auto loan servicing. The Bureau determined that billing statements showing “paid-ahead” status after insurance proceeds from a total vehicle loss were applied, where consumers were treated as late if they failed to pay the next month, were deceptive. The Bureau also found that servicers unfairly repossessed vehicles after the repossession should have been canceled because the account was not coded correctly, or because an agreement with consumer was reached.
- Credit card account management. The Bureau found that companies failed to reevaluate accounts for eligibility for a rate reduction under Regulation Z or failed to appropriately reduce annual percentage rates.
- Debt collection. The Bureau found that debt collectors failed to mail debt verifications to consumers before engaging in continued debt collection, activities as required by the FDCPA.
- Mortgage servicing. The Bureau found that mortgage servicers delayed processing permanent modifications after consumers successfully completed their trial modifications, resulting in accrued interest and fees that would not otherwise have accrued, which the Bureau determined was an unfair act or practice.
- Payday lending. The Bureau found that companies threatened to repossess consumer vehicles, notwithstanding that they generally did not actually do so or have a business relationship with an entity capable of doing so, which the Bureau determined was a deceptive practice. The Bureau also found that companies did not obtain valid preauthorized EFT authorizations for debits initiated using debit card numbers or ACH credentials provided for other purposes, in violation of Regulation E.
- Small business lending. The Bureau found that some institutions collect and maintain only limited data on small business lending decisions, which it determined could impede the institution’s ability to monitor ECOA risk. The Bureau noted positive exam findings including, (i) active oversight of an entity’s CMS framework; (ii) maintaining records of policy and procedure updates; and (iii) self-conducted semi-annual ECOA risk assessments, which included small business lending.
The report notes that in response to most examination findings, the companies have already remediated or have plans to remediate affected consumers and implement corrective actions, such as new policies in procedures.
Finally, the report highlights, among other things, (i) two recent enforcement actions that were a result of supervisory activity (covered by InfoBytes here and here); (ii) recent updates to the mortgage servicing rule and TILA-RESPA integrated disclosure rule (covered by InfoBytes here and here); and (iii) HMDA implementation updates (covered by InfoBytes here).
8th Circuit holds a garnishment notice sent after receiving a “cease” letter does not violate the FDCPA
On August 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a law firm, holding that a garnishment notice sent after a consumer requested the company cease communication did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The court held that sending a notice of garnishment was permissible because a “creditor may communicate with a debtor after receiving a cease letter to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor.” The court further held that the notice’s inclusion of a contact phone number did not “transform” the notice into a communication regarding the debt because, while the notice was a “communication regarding the debt in a general sense . . . it still fits within the remedy exception” and it would have been “odd” for the notice not to provide contact information. The court also rejected the claim that the law firm violated the FDCPA by discussing possible resolution of the debt in a subsequent phone call initiated by the consumer, noting that the consumer had asked about the debt, and agreeing with the district court that the phone call was “an unsubtle and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to provoke [the law firm] into committing an FDCPA violation.” The court added that prohibiting debt collectors from responding to a consumer’s inquiries after a cease letter would often force debt collectors to file suit in order to resolve debts, which is “clearly at odds with the language and purpose of the FDCPA.”
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the garnishment notice deceived consumers into contacting the law firm to discuss the legal aspects of the garnishment process, when in fact they would be subjected to debt collection efforts. Applying the unsophisticated consumer standard, the court held that the garnishment notice was not deceptive because it did not state that phone calls would be answered by attorneys prepared to answer questions solely about garnishment, and the consumer’s belief to the contrary was “the exact sort of peculiar interpretation against which debt collectors are protected by the objective element of the unsophisticated consumer standard.”
CFPB publishes quarterly consumer credit trends on telecommunications-debt collection reporting
On August 22, the CFPB released the latest quarterly consumer credit trends report, which focuses on the reporting of telecommunications-debt collections to nationwide consumer reporting agencies based on a sample of approximately 5 million credit records. The report notes that during the past five years approximately 22 percent of credit records contained at least one telecommunications-related (telecom-related) item, with nearly 95 percent of these telecom-related items being reported by collection agencies. The report highlights that 37 percent of consumers who reported having been contacted about a debt in collection in the prior year were contacted about a telecommunications debt, and more than one fifth of all debt collection revenue is telecom-related debt. The report also observed that a single telecom collection may be associated with multiple tradelines in a credit record over time, suggesting that telecom collections are often reassigned. Notably, however, the report suggests that while the presence of a telecom-related collection item on a credit record is most commonly associated with consumers with lower credit scores, the change in score before and after the collection item appears on the credit record is often small, and as a result, a single telecom-related collection is unlikely to affect a credit decision for those consumers.
Court denies law firm’s request for judgment on Texas debt collection claim
On August 14, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered judgment in favor of a bank, mortgage loan servicer, and servicer’s law firm (defendants) on all but one Texas Debt Collection Practices Act (TDCPA) claims, among others, brought by homeowner plaintiffs, but determined the law firm was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding its attempted foreclosure on the property despite an attorney exemption provision in the TDCPA. The court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff failed to allege material facts that support the majority of the claims brought, but disagreed with the law firm as to the remaining TDCPA claim. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs alleged the law firm violated the TDCPA by operating as a third-party debt collector in Texas without the surety bond required by law. The law firm moved for judgment, arguing, among other things, that it was not subject to the TDCPA bond requirement because it simply “assisted” the mortgage servicer with the foreclosure, which is not considered debt collection absent a collection attempt on a deficiency judgment. The court rejected this argument as a matter of law. The court also rejected the law firm’s argument that it was not a “third-party debt collector,” concluding there was a genuine dispute about whether the law firm was a debt collector under the TDCPA despite the attorney exemption, due to whether the letters sent were in its capacity as attorneys for the servicer or as a debt collector.
7th Circuit holds, without written appearance by attorney, law firm did not violate FDCPA by serving debtor directly
On August 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held that a law firm did not violate the FDCPA by serving a debtor a default motion because his attorney had not yet become the “attorney of record” under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 11 (Rule 11). According to the opinion, after being sued by the law firm on a creditor’s behalf, the debtor appeared pro se and later retained an attorney to represent her. The law firm moved for summary judgment and served the motion to the debtor and to the debtor’s new attorney, who had not yet filed a written appearance. The debtor alleged the law firm violated the FDCPA by contacting her while represented by counsel. The lower court entered summary judgment in favor of the debtor. Disagreeing with the lower court, the 7th Circuit reversed, finding that Rule 11 gave “‘express’ judicial ‘permission’ to serve the default motion directly on [the debtor]” from “a court of competent jurisdiction” as required by the FDCPA— which prohibits a debt collector from directly contacting a debtor who is represented by counsel absent “express permission” ." The panel noted that Illinois precedent makes it clear that under Rule 11, a lawyer can only become an attorney of record by filing a written appearance or other pleading with the court. Because a written appearance had not yet been made, the panel reasoned, Rule 11 expressly permitted the law firm to serve the debtor directly and therefore, the firm did not violate the FDCPA.
3rd Circuit reverses dismissal of FDCPA action over voicemail
On August 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit reversed the dismissal of a putative class action claim alleging a debt collector violated the FDCPA when it used an “alternative business name” in a voicemail. According to the opinion, the consumers allege the debt collector violated three sections of the FDCPA by leaving voicemail messages identifying itself by a different business name than the company’s corporate name. The lower court dismissed all three FDCPA claims for failure to state a claim. The panel affirmed the dismissal as to two counts of the amendment complaint, but reversed as to the third, finding that the consumers stated a plausible claim that the debt collector violated the FDCPA’s “true name” provision. The panel cited to FTC interpretive guidance, which notes a company may use a name other than its registered name so long as “it consistently uses the same name when dealing with a particular consumer.” The court found that the alternative name used in the voicemails is “neither [the company]’s full business name, the name under which it usually transacts business, nor a commonly used acronym of its registered name” and the name used is actually associated with other debt collection companies. Therefore, the consumers stated a plausible claim under the “true name” provision of the FDCPA.
7th Circuit reverses district court, holds settlement with debt collector moots claims against law firm
On August 13, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit vacated a district court’s decision, holding that a consumer who settled with a debt collector is not entitled to pursue Fair Debt Collection Practices Act statutory damages claims against the debt collector’s law firm. Under the single recovery for a single injury principle, a consumer can only obtain one recovery for a single injury “regardless of how many defendants could be liable for that single injury, or how many different theories of recovery could apply to that single injury.” In this instance, the consumer settled the claim with the debt collector for $5,000 plus release of the consumer’s original debt. The consumer later sued the debt collector’s law firm, spending over $69,000 on attorneys’ fees to argue that the law firm filed suit to collect the debt in the wrong court. While the district court ordered the law firm to pay the attorneys’ fees to the consumer, the 7th Circuit reversed, holding that the settlement with the creditor rendered the consumer’s claim against the law firm moot and thus the consumer could not recover attorneys’ fees or costs.
7th Circuit says inspection company that left door hangers is not a debt collector
On August 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling that a company (defendant) that performed inspections for a mortgage servicer is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and was not liable for claims brought by a putative class of homeowners. According to the opinion, the defendant entered into a contract with the mortgage servicer to perform inspections to determine whether properties were still occupied for homes with defaulted mortgage payments of 45 days or more if the servicer was unable to contact the homeowner directly. When performing the inspections, the defendants left door hangers on the plaintiffs’ properties containing instructions to contact the mortgage servicer, which the plaintiffs claimed violated the FDCPA's disclosure requirements, including the requirement to disclose the creditor’s name, the amount owed, and that the debtor can dispute the debt. However, the lower court ruled—and the appellate court affirmed—that the defendant was not a “debt collector” for purposes of the FDCPA. The court found that the activities did not constitute direct debt collection because the door hangers did not demand payment and did not reference the underlying debt. The court also held that the defendant was not engaged in “indirect” debt collection, agreeing with the characterization of the lower court that the activities were more akin to those of a “messenger” than those of an “indirect” debt collector.
Maryland Court of Appeals holds foreign securitization trusts do not need to be licensed in the state as collection agencies
On August 2, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in a consolidated appeal of four circuit cases, held that foreign statutory trusts are not required to obtain a debt collection agency license under the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act (MCALA) before filing foreclosure actions in state circuit courts. The decision results from two cases consolidated before the Court of Special Appeals and two actions appealed directly from circuit court proceedings, in which substitute trustees acting on behalf of two Delaware statutory trusts initiated foreclosure proceedings on homeowners who had defaulted on their mortgage payments. The homeowners challenged the foreclosure actions, arguing that the Delaware statutory trusts acted as collection agencies under MCALA by “obtain[ing] mortgage loans and then collet[ing] mortgage payments through communication and foreclosure actions” without being licensed. The lower courts dismissed all four foreclosure actions, finding the Delaware statutory trusts did not fall under the trust exemption to MCALA and were in the business of collecting consumer debts and therefore, subject to the MCALA licenses requirements, which both trusts had not obtained.
The overarching issue presented in the consolidated appeal was whether the Maryland General Assembly intended a foreign statutory trust, as owner of a delinquent mortgage loan, to obtain a license as a collection agency before directing trustees to initiate foreclosure proceedings. The court concluded that the plain language of MCALA was ambiguous as to the question and therefore, analyzed the legislative history and other similar statutes in order to determine the intent of the 1977 version of the law, as well as the reason the Department of Labor Licensing and Regulation revised the law in 2007 by departmental bill. Ultimately, the appeals court found the lower courts erred in dismissing the foreclosure actions against the homeowners, holding the General Assembly did not intend for MCALA to apply to foreclosure proceedings generally and therefore, foreign statutory trusts are not required to obtain a license under MCALA to initiate foreclosure proceedings.
3rd Circuit holds unpaid highway tolls are not “debts” under the FDCPA
On August 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit held that unpaid highway tolls are not “debts” under the FDCPA because they are not transactions primarily for a “personal, family, or household” purpose. According to the amended class action complaint at issue in the case, after a consumer’s electronic toll payment system account became delinquent, a debt collection agency sent notices containing the consumer’s account information in the viewable display of the notice envelope. The consumer filed suit alleging the collection agency violated the FDCPA. While the lower court held that the consumer had standing to bring the claim, it dismissed the action on the ground that the unpaid highway tolls fell outside the FDCPA’s definition of a debt. The 3rd Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. On the issue of standing, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert), the panel reasoned that the exposed account number “implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA—the invasion of privacy” and is a legally cognizable injury that confers standing. The panel agreed with the consumer that the obligation to pay the highway tolls arose out of a “transaction” for purposes of the FDCPA because he voluntarily chose to drive on the toll roads, but found the purpose of the transaction was “public benefit of highway maintenance and repair”—not the private benefit of a “personal, family, or household” service or good as required by the FDCPA. Moreover, the court concluded that while the consumer chose to drive on the roads for personal purposes, the money being rendered was primarily for public services, as required by the statute to collect tolls “to acquire, construct, maintain, improve, manage, repair and operate transportation projects.”