Skip to main content
Menu Icon
Close

InfoBytes Blog

Financial Services Law Insights and Observations

Filter

Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.

  • District court denies interlocutory appeal request in escrow interest action

    Courts

    On July 9, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a national bank’s request for interlocutory appeal of the court’s February decision denying the bank’s motion to dismiss an action, which alleged that the bank violated Maryland law by not paying interest on escrow sums for residential mortgages. As previously covered by InfoBytes, after the bank allegedly failed to pay interest on a consumer’s mortgage escrow account, the consumer filed suit against the bank alleging, among other things, a violation of Section 12-109 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which “requires lenders to pay interest on funds maintained in escrow on behalf of borrowers.” The court rejected the bank’s assertion that the state law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) and by the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulations. The court concluded that under the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks are required to pay interest on escrow accounts when mandated by applicable state or federal law.

    The bank subsequently moved for an interlocutory appeal. In denying the bank’s request, the court explained that there was not a difference of opinion among courts as to whether the NBA preempts Maryland’s interest on escrow law. Specifically, the court noted that its “conclusion aligns with the only other two courts that have examined [the] particular question,” citing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v Bank of America and the Eastern District of New York’s decision in Hymes v. Bank of America (covered by InfoBytes here and here, respectively). After finding there is no “difference of opinion as to any ‘controlling legal issue,’” the court concluded the motion failed to satisfy the requisite elements for an interlocutory appeal.

    Courts State Issues Maryland National Bank Act Escrow Preemption Ninth Circuit Appellate New York Mortgages Dodd-Frank

  • Supreme Court to review FHFA structure, FTC restitution, and TCPA autodialing

    Courts

    On July 9, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the following cases:

    • FHFA Constitutionality. The Court agreed to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Collins. v. Mnuchin (covered by InfoBytes here), which concluded that the FHFA’s structure—which provides the director with “for cause” removal protection—violates the Constitution’s separation of powers requirements. As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert last month, the Court held that a similar clause in the Dodd-Frank Act that requires cause to remove the director of the CFPB violates the constitutional separation of powers. The Court further held that the removal provision could—and should—be severed from the statute establishing the CFPB, rather than invalidating the entire statute.
    • FTC Restitution Authority. The Court granted review in two cases: (i) the 9th Circuit’s decision in FTC V. AMG Capital Management (covered by InfoBytes here), which upheld a $1.3 billion judgment against the petitioners for allegedly operating a deceptive payday lending scheme and concluded that a district court may grant any ancillary relief under the FTC Act, including restitution; and (ii) the 7th Circuit’s FTC v. Credit Bureau Center (covered by InfoBytes here), which held that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act does not give the FTC power to order restitution. The Court consolidated the two cases and will decide whether the FTC can demand equitable monetary relief in civil enforcement actions under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act.
    • TCPA Autodialer Definition. The Court agreed to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Duguid v. Facebook, Inc. (covered by InfoBytes here), which concluded the plaintiff plausibly alleged the social media company’s text message system fell within the definition of autodialer under the TCPA. The 9th Circuit applied the definition from their 2018 decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC (covered by InfoBytes here), which broadened the definition of an autodialer to cover all devices with the capacity to automatically dial numbers that are stored in a list. The 2nd Circuit has since agreed with the 9th Circuit’s holding in Marks. However, these two opinions conflict with holdings by the 3rd, 7th, and 11th Circuits, which have held that autodialers require the use of randomly or sequentially generated phone numbers, consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s holding that struck down the FCC’s definition of an autodialer in ACA International v. FCC (covered by a Buckley Special Alert).

    Courts FHFA Single-Director Structure TCPA Appellate FTC Restitution FTC Act Autodialer Ninth Circuit Seventh Circuit Fifth Circuit D.C. Circuit Third Circuit Eleventh Circuit U.S. Supreme Court

  • 9th Circuit: Judicial foreclosure not debt collection under FDCPA

    Courts

    On June 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an FDCPA action, concluding that the FDCPA does not apply when a creditor is enforcing a security interest through a foreclosure, but is not seeking a deficiency judgment. According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed an action against Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae’s loan servicer, the law firm that represented Fannie Mae in the foreclosure proceeding, and the firm’s attorneys (collectively, “defendants”) for, among other things, violating the FDCPA when seeking to foreclose on his residential property. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the FDCPA did not apply because the defendants had not engaged in any debt collection behavior by initiating the judicial foreclosure. In 2018, the 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but subsequently ordered a supplemental briefing based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP (which held that law firms performing nonjudicial foreclosures are not “debt collectors” under the FDCPA, covered by InfoBytes here).

    After the supplemental briefing, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the letter sent by the defendants when initiating the judicial foreclosure, which included monetary amounts owed, amounted to debt collection activity under the FDCPA. The appellate court noted that the defendants were merely fulfilling a procedural requirement (that has since been amended) of Oregon foreclosure law, and “in no event would a money award have been enforceable against [the plaintiff],” because of Oregon’s anti-deficiency judgment law. Thus, the appellate court concluded that a judicial foreclosure is not considered a debt collection activity when it does not “include a request for a deficiency judgment or some other effort to recover the remaining debt,” and therefore, the district court properly dismissed the action.

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit FDCPA Foreclosure Debt Collection

  • 9th Circuit: Payday arbitration remanded because of new California interest rate law

    Courts

    On June 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded a case against a payday lender back to district court because a newly issued California amendment took effect—which prohibits lenders from issuing loans between $2,500 and $10,000 with charges over 36 percent calculated as an annual simple interest rate (covered by InfoBytes here)—which may impact the court’s analysis. As also previously covered by InfoBytes, plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against the payday lender alleging the lender sells loans with usurious interest rates, which are prohibited under California’s Unfair Competition Law and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The lender moved to compel arbitration, but the district court concluded the arbitration provision was unenforceable. In addition to finding the arbitration provisions procedurally unconscionable, the court found that the provision contained a waiver of public injunctive relief, which was substantively unconscionable based on the California Supreme Court decision in McGill v. Citibank, N.A (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here).

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to reconsider whether the consumer’s requested injunction enjoining the payday lender from issuing loans above $10,000 would actually prevent a threat of future harm in light of the new California law and considering the operative complaint does not allege the lender issued or continues to issue loans above $10,000. Additionally, the appellate court rejected the lender’s arguments that McGill was preempted under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and agreed with the district court’s application of California law, because “Kansas law is contrary to California policy and [] California holds a materially greater interest in this litigation.”

    Courts Arbitration Ninth Circuit State Issues Preemption Federal Arbitration Act Appellate

  • 9th Circuit upholds TCPA liability for reassigned number

    Courts

    On June 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment in a TCPA action against a bank, concluding that consent from the person intended to call does not exempt the bank from liability under the TCPA. According to the opinion, the bank’s vendors made over 180 automated calls to a child’s cell phone in attempt to collect past-due payments from a customer who used to have the same cell phone number, which had since been reassigned to the child’s mother. The customer of the bank had given consent to be called, but the mother and child had not. After a three-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the TCPA claim, concluding that the bank could not escape liability under the TCPA because the customer it intended to call had given consent, and awarding $500 in statutory damages for each of the 189 unwanted calls, for a total of $94,500.

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment after the jury trial. The appellate court noted it was “agreeing with other circuits,” on liability when it concluded that the district court “properly instructed the jury that consent from the intended recipient of the call was not sufficient.” Moreover, the appellate court held that the district court properly instructed the jury on the definition of “automatic telephone dialing system,” based on the panel’s decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC (covered by InfoBytes here). Lastly, the appellate court also issued an opinion affirming the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.

    Courts TCPA Appellate Ninth Circuit Attorney Fees Autodialer

  • 9th Circuit: Providing disclosure with employment documents does not violate FCRA

    Courts

    On April 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that an employer that obtained a consumer report for employment purposes did not violate the FCRA when it provided disclosure simultaneously with other documents and failed to use a standalone document for the FCRA authorization. The plaintiff, a former employee, alleged that during the hiring process, applicants were presented with employment documents and were required to sign two forms related to consumer reports: (i) a separate “disclosure” form that informed applicants that the employer could obtain reports pertaining to their employment record, drug tests, and driving record; and (ii) an “authorization” form appearing at the end of the application, which authorized the employer or its agent or subsidiary to investigate the applicant’s previous employment record. The plaintiff’s suit alleged that the forms violated the FCRA’s standalone disclosure requirement because the defendant presented the forms at the same time as other application materials and failed to place the authorization on a standalone document. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant.

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument, concluding that there is nothing that prohibits an employer from “providing a standalone FCRA disclosure contemporaneously with other employment documents.” While the 9th Circuit acknowledged that the FCRA requires a disclosure form to contain nothing more than the disclosure itself, “no authority suggests that a disclosure must be distinct in time, as well.” With respect to the authorization, the appellate court rejected the argument that it violated the FCRA because “the authorization subsection of FCRA lacks the disclosure subsection’s standalone document requirement” and only requires that the authorization be in writing.

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit FCRA Disclosures

  • FCRA class action dispute stayed for Supreme Court appeal

    Courts

    On April 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a joint motion to stay a mandate pending a credit reporting agency’s (CRA) filing of a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. If a petition is filed, the stay will continue until final disposition by the Court. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in February the 9th Circuit reduced punitive damages in a class action against the CRA for allegedly violating the FCRA by erroneously linking class members to criminals and terrorists with similar names in a database maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The appellate court found that all class members had standing due to, among other things, the CRA’s alleged “reckless handling of information from OFAC,” which subjected class members to “a real risk of harm,” and rejected the CRA’s request for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the basis that the class had failed to provide sufficient evidence of injuries or to support the damages award. The appellate court concluded, however, that the $52 million punitive damages award was “unconstitutionally excessive,” explaining that, although the CRA’s “conduct was reprehensible, it was not so egregious as to justify a punitive award of more than six times an already substantial compensatory award.” 

    The CRA subsequently filed a petition for rehearing (which the appellate court denied), challenging, among other things, the 9th Circuit’s conclusion that the CRA’s decision to make the credit reports available to numerous potential creditors and employers was “sufficient to show a material risk of harm to the concrete interest of all class members.” The CRA argued that this was “exactly the sort of hypothetical risk of injury the Supreme Court has made clear does not cut it” to establish concrete injury, and that the decision was inconsistent with the 9th Circuit’s own precedent, in which the appellate court determined that “the risk of injury becomes material only when the document gets into third-party hands.” The CRA also argued that the 4 to 1 benchmark ratio between punitive damages and statutory damages was still too high, because it “conflicts not just with the Supreme Court’s commands, but with decisions from other circuits finding much lower compensatory-damages awards sufficiently ‘substantial’ to demand a 1:1 ceiling.”

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit U.S. Supreme Court Class Action FCRA OFAC

  • 9th Circuit: Trustees’ loan transaction is entitled to state and federal consumer disclosure protections

    Courts

    On April 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of claims under TILA, RESPA, and California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Act, holding that a loan transaction made by a borrower in her capacity as a trustee (appellant-borrower) remained a consumer credit transaction entitled to state and federal consumer disclosure protections. According to the opinion, the appellant-borrower obtained a loan to finance repairs to a personal residence that was occupied by her niece—the trust’s sole beneficiary. The appellant-borrower alleged that the lender’s (defendant-appellee) loan disclosures were materially inconsistent with the loan’s terms and filed a complaint alleging that “the due date disclosures did not accurately reflect the terms of the loan.” The complaint sought rescission of the loan under TILA, damages against the defendant-appellee under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Act due to the alleged use of unfair means to collect her debt, and inaccurate disclosure damages and reimbursements for payments she claimed she was not obligated to make. Under TILA and RESPA, rescission and damage remedies are only available to consumer credit transactions, and the defendant-appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that a residential loan to a trust can only qualify as a consumer credit transaction where a trustee-borrower lives at the residence. The appellant-borrower countered that the CFPB’s Official Staff Commentary (Commentary) to Regulation Z, which implements TILA, explains “that ‘[c]redit extended for consumer purposes to certain trusts is considered to be credit extended to a natural person rather than credit extended to an organization.’” The district court agreed with the defendant-appellee’s position that the loan was not a consumer credit transaction and dismissed the complaint.

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit noted that the Commentary states that “a loan for ‘personal, family, or household purposes’ of the beneficiary of this type of trust is a consumer credit transaction,” and that furthermore, “trusts should be considered natural persons under TILA, so long as the transaction was obtained for a consumer purpose, because, ‘in substance (if not form) consumer credit is being extended.” The appellate court rejected the defendant-appellee’s argument and concluded that the loan should be considered a consumer credit transaction under all three statutes. Holding that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint by construing the statutes too narrowly, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit RESPA TILA State Issues Disclosures

  • 9th Circuit holds extraneous information violates FCRA standalone disclosure requirement

    Courts

    On March 20, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed a district court’s dismissal of a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) action, concluding that a company’s disclosures contained “extraneous information” in violation of the FCRA’s standalone disclosure requirement. The plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit against his former employer (defendant) after his employment—which was contingent on passing a background check—was ultimately terminated based on the results of his credit report. According to the plaintiff, the defendant violated two sections of the FCRA: (i) that the disclosure form was not clear and conspicuous and was encumbered by extraneous information; and (ii) that the defendant failed to notify him in the pre-adverse action notice that he could discuss the consumer report directly with the defendant prior to his termination. The district court dismissed the allegations, concluding that the disclosure met the FCRA’s disclosure requirements because it was not overshadowed by extraneous information, and “that the FCRA does not require that pre-adverse action notices inform an employee how to contact and discuss a consumer report directly with the employer.”

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on whether the signed disclosure form contained extraneous information, concluding that because the disclosure form also included information about plaintiff’s rights to obtain and inspect information gathered by the consumer reporting agency about the plaintiff, it went beyond the FCRA’s standalone disclosure requirement. Noting that the FRCA requires a standalone disclosure but does not define the term “disclosure,” the 9th Circuit stated that a company may “briefly describe what a ‘consumer report’ entails, how it will be ‘obtained,’ and for which type of ‘employment purposes’ it may be used.” Finding that the clear and conspicuous standard was established in a case decided after the district court had dismissed plaintiff’s case, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the defendant’s disclosure form satisfied the clear and conspicuous standard. However, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s other claim, agreeing with the district court that the FCRA only requires employers to provide “a description of the consumer’s right to dispute with a consumer reporting agency the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in the consumer’s file at the consumer reporting agency.”

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit FCRA Credit Report Disclosures Consumer Finance

  • Another appellate court holds that a debt buyer qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA

    Courts

    On March 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that purchases consumer debts, but outsources the collection activity to a third party still qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the plaintiff sued the debt buyer (defendant) claiming it was “vicariously and jointly liable” for alleged FDCPA violations by the third party collector. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because debt purchasing companies like the defendant “who have no interactions with debtors and merely contract with third parties to collect on the debts they have purchased simply do not have the principal purpose of collecting debts.” The district court reasoned that Congress intended the FDCPA to apply only to those who directly interact with customers, based on the court’s interpretation of the language used in the substantive provisions of the law.

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed the dismissal, determining that the FDCPA does not solely regulate entities that directly interact with consumers. As applied to the defendant, the court found that the purpose of the FDCPA would be “entirely circumvented” if the law’s restrictions did not apply to companies like the defendant. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that an entity that otherwise meets the “principal purpose” definition of debt collector—“any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts”—cannot avoid liability under the FDCPA merely by hiring a third party to perform debt collection activities on its behalf. The appellate court stressed that Congress’s intent in enacting the FDCPA was to eliminate abusive, deceptive, and unfair collection practices, and that its interpretation of the principal purpose prong of the debt collector definition furthers the FDCPA’s purpose. The 9th Circuit joined the 3rd Circuit, which issued an order last year (covered by InfoBytes here) concluding that “[a]s long as a business’s raison d’etre is obtaining payment on the debts that it acquires, it is a debt collector. Who actually obtains the payment or how they do so is of no moment.”

    Courts Appellate Ninth Circuit Debt Buyer FDCPA Debt Collection

Pages

Upcoming Events