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  • DOJ, CFPB Fair Lending Enforcement Actions Target Credit Card Repayment Programs, Marketing Of Add-On Products

    Consumer Finance

    On June 19, the CFPB and the DOJ announced parallel enforcement actions against a federal savings bank that allegedly violated ECOA in the offering of credit card debt-repayment programs and allegedly engaged in deceptive marketing practices in the offering of certain card add-on products. The bank will pay a total of $228.5 million in customer relief and penalties to resolve the allegations.

    ECOA Violations

    The CFPB and DOJ charge that the bank excluded borrowers who indicated that they preferred communications to be in Spanish or who had a mailing address in Puerto Rico, even if the consumers met the promotion’s qualifications. The CFPB and DOJ assert that as a result, Hispanic populations were unfairly denied the opportunity to benefit from the promotions, which constitutes a violation of the ECOA’s prohibition on creditors discriminating in any aspect of a credit transaction on the basis of characteristics such as national origin.

    To resolve the joint fair lending actions, the bank entered into separate consent orders with the CFPB and the DOJ. As detailed in the DOJ order, the bank will make $37 million in payments, credits and waivers to affected borrowers. The bank already has provided the benefits of the offers or their equivalent value to approximately 84,000 borrowers, totaling $131.8 million in relief. In total the bank will provide $169 million in relief, making the settlement the largest ever fair lending credit card action. The CFPB did not assess a civil money penalty for the ECOA violations because the bank self-reported the potential violations, self-initiated remediation to affected borrowers, and cooperated in the investigation. The CFPB did require the bank to review its credit offering strategies and enhance fair lending training and compliance.

    Add-On Product Marketing Violations

    The CFPB further alleges that its examiners identified several deceptive marketing practices used by the bank to promote five credit card add-on products. The CFPB alleges that the bank’s and its service providers misrepresented the products by (i) marketing them as free of charge when the fee was avoidable only in certain specific circumstances; (ii) failing to disclose consumers’ ineligibility, causing certain consumers to purchase products from which they could receive no benefit; (iii) failing to disclose that consumers were making a purchase, leading consumers to believe they were receiving a benefit or updating their account; and (iv) marketing as a limited time offer products that were not so limited.

    Under the CFPB consent order, the bank will refund $56 million to approximately 638,000 consumers who were subjected to the allegedly deceptive marketing practices, and will pay a $3.5 million civil money penalty. The bank also must develop an enhanced add-on product compliance plan that includes, among other things, a revised vendor management policy.

    CFPB UDAAP Fair Lending ECOA DOJ Ancillary Products

  • CFPB Report Recaps Fair Lending Activities

    Consumer Finance

    On April 30, the CFPB published its second annual report to Congress on its fair lending activities. According to the report, in 2013 federal regulators referred 24 ECOA-related matters to the DOJ—6 by the CFPB—as opposed to only 12 referrals in 2012. The report primarily recaps previously announced research, supervision, enforcement, and rulemaking activities related to fair lending issues, devoting much attention to mortgage and auto finance.  However, the Bureau notes that it is conducting ongoing supervision and enforcement in other product markets, including credit card lending. The Bureau also identifies the most frequently cited technical Regulation B violations.  

    With regard to housing finance supervision and enforcement, the CFPB reports that while many lenders have strong compliance management systems and no violations, the CFPB’s ECOA baseline reviews have identified factors that indicate heightened fair lending risk at some institutions, including weak or nonexistent fair lending CMS, underwriting and pricing policies that consider prohibited bases in a manner that presents fair lending risk, and inaccurate HMDA data. The CFPB referred three mortgage-related cases to the DOJ. Two of those involved findings that a mortgage lender discriminated on the basis of marital status; the DOJ deferred to the Bureau’s handling of the merits of both. The third contained findings that a mortgage lender discriminated on the basis of race and national origin in the pricing of mortgage loans. That referral led to a joint DOJ-CFPB enforcement action.

    In the area of auto finance, the report highlights the CFPB’s auto finance forum and March 2013 auto finance bulletin, and again defends the CFPB’s proxy methodology, which has been challenged by members of Congress and industry since the CFPB issued its auto finance bulletin. The CFPB states that it is currently investigating whether a number of indirect auto financial institutions unlawfully discriminated in the pricing of automobile loans, particularly in their use of discretionary dealer markup and compensation policies using a disparate impact analysis. During the reporting period, the Bureau made one referral to the DOJ, and subsequently took joint enforcement action with the DOJ against that indirect auto financial institution for alleged violations of ECOA.

    The report indicates that the Bureau has expanded its focus beyond mortgage and auto finance, noting that the CFPB is conducting ECOA Baseline Reviews and ECOA Targeted Reviews of consumer financial services providers of other products, singling out credit cards as an example. The report adds that the CFPB also referred to DOJ three matters related to unsecured consumer lending, but that DOJ declined to act upon such referrals.

    CFPB Examination Nonbank Supervision Fair Lending ECOA DOJ Enforcement Bank Supervision

  • House Financial Services Chairman Presses CFPB On Auto Finance Enforcement

    Consumer Finance

    House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) sent a letter today to CFPB Director Richard Cordray once again pressing the CFPB for information about its March 2013 auto finance guidance and its actions since that time to pursue allegedly discriminatory practices by auto finance companies. That guidance, which the CFPB has characterized as a restatement of existing law, sought to establish publicly the CFPB’s grounds for asserting violations of ECOA against bank and nonbank auto finance companies for the alleged effects of facially neutral pricing policies.

    The letter recounts numerous exchanges between members of Congress—including both Democratic and Republican members of the Committee—and the CFPB on this issue to demonstrate what the Chairman characterizes as “a pattern of obfuscation” by the Bureau. Mr. Hensarling explains that through a series of written requests—see, e.g. here, here, and here—as well as in-person exchanges, lawmakers have sought detailed information about the CFPB’s application of the so-called disparate impact theory of discrimination to impose liability on auto finance companies. The letter states that the CFPB has repeatedly refused to provide certain key information used in applying that theory through compliance examinations and enforcement actions, including information about regression analyses, analytical controls, and numerical thresholds employed by the Bureau.

    According to the letter, the CFPB has informed inquiring members that the CFPB’s fair lending tools and assessments are dependent upon a particular lender’s policies, practices, and procedures. Following the Bureau’s first auto finance fair lending action, announced in December 2013, the Chairman sought more specific information from the CFPB about how it applied its fair lending analysis in that case. The Chairman asserts the CFPB refused to provide the statistical analyses conducted in that case and CFPB staff who briefed committee staff were unwilling to respond to certain questions about the action, including “potential explanatory variables” and business justifications offered by the finance company.

    Seeking once more to obtain additional details about the CFPB’s fair auto finance theories and their application, the letter restates numerous previous requests and demands that the Bureau respond by March 13, 2014. Specifically, the letter once again seeks the methods the Bureau uses to determine disparate impact, including, among others, (i) the factors it holds constant to ensure pricing differences are attributable to the consumer’s background; (ii) the controls applied to ensure sure that the consumers who are being compared are “similarly situated”; (iii) the basis point thresholds at which the Bureau determines a prohibited pricing disparity exists; (iv) the process used to determine the background of consumer credit applicants; (v) the potential explanatory variables offered by respondents in the December 2013 enforcement action, and for each variable offered, the Bureau’s reasons for asserting that the respondents failed to provide adequate evidence that additional variables appropriately reflected legitimate business needs; and (vi) the regression analysis used in the investigation that led to the December 2013 action.

    Absent a sufficient response, the “Committee will have no choice but to consider involving its compulsory process.” The Committee’s rules allow it or its subcommittees to issue with a majority vote subpoenas “in the conduct of any investigation or series of investigations or activities.”

    CFPB Auto Finance Fair Lending ECOA Disparate Impact

  • DOJ Alleges Community Bank's Unsecured Loan Pricing Violated ECOA

    Consumer Finance

    Last month, the DOJ announced a settlement with a three-branch, $78 million Texas bank to resolve allegations that the bank engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of national origin in the pricing of unsecured consumer loans. Based on its own investigation and an examination conducted by the FDIC, the DOJ alleged that the bank violated ECOA by allowing employees “broad subjective discretion” in setting interest rates for unsecured loans, which allegedly resulted in Hispanic borrowers being charged rates that, after accounting for relevant loan and borrower credit factors, were on average 100-228 basis points higher than rates charged to similarly situated non-Hispanic borrowers. The DOJ claimed that “[a]lthough information as to each applicant's national origin was not solicited or noted in loan applications, such information was known to the Bank's loan officers, who personally handled each loan transaction.”

    The consent order requires the bank to establish a $159,000 fund to compensate borrowers who may have suffered harm as a result of the alleged ECOA violations. Prior to the settlement, the bank implemented uniform pricing policies that substantially reduced loan officer discretion to vary a loan’s interest rate. The agreement requires the bank to continue implementing the uniform pricing policy and to (i) create a compliance monitoring program, (ii) provide borrower notices of non-discrimination, (iii) conduct employee training, and (iv) establish a complaint resolution program to address consumer complaints alleging discrimination regarding loans originated by the bank. The requirements apply not only to unsecured consumer loans, but also to mortgage loans, automobile financing, and home improvement loans.

    The action is similar to another fair lending matter referred by the FDIC and settled by the DOJ earlier in 2013, which also involved a Texas community bank that allegedly discriminated on the basis of national origin in its pricing of unsecured loans.

    FDIC Fair Lending ECOA Consumer Lending DOJ Enforcement

  • CFPB, DOJ Announce First Joint Fair Lending Action Against Indirect Auto Finance Company

    Consumer Finance

    This morning, the CFPB and the DOJ announced their first ever joint fair lending enforcement action to resolve allegations that an auto finance company’s dealer compensation policy, which allowed for auto dealer discretion in pricing, resulted in a disparate impact on certain minority borrowers. The $98 million settlement is the DOJ’s third largest fair lending action ever and the largest ever auto finance action.

    Investigation and Claims

    As part of the CFPB’s ongoing targeted examinations of auto finance companies’ ECOA compliance, the CFPB conducted an examination of this auto finance company in the fall of 2012. This finance company is one of the largest indirect automobile finance companies in the country which, according to the CFPB and DOJ’s estimates, purchased over 2.1 million non-subvented retail installment contracts from approximately 12,000 dealers between April 1, 2011 and present. The CFPB’s investigation of the finance company allegedly revealed pricing disparities in the finance company’s portfolio with regard to auto loans made by dealers to African-American, Hispanic, and Asian and Pacific Islander borrowers. The CFPB referred the matter to the DOJ just last month, and the DOJ’s own investigation resulted in findings that mirrored the CFPB’s.

    Specifically, the federal authorities claim that, based on statistical analysis of the loan portfolios, using controversial proxy methodologies, the investigations showed that African-American borrowers were charged on average approximately 29 basis points more in dealer markup than similarly situated non-Hispanic whites for non-subvented retail installment contracts, while Hispanic borrowers and Asian/Pacific Islander borrowers were charged on average approximately 20 and 22 basis points more, respectively. The complaint also faults the finance company for not appropriately monitoring pricing disparities or providing fair lending training to dealers.

    The CFPB and the DOJ did not claim that the finance company intentionally discriminated against any borrowers. Instead the federal agencies alleged that the finance company’s facially neutral pricing policy allowed auto dealers to price in such a manner that resulted in certain minority groups, on average, paying more for credit than non-Hispanic white borrowers. The federal authorities employed disparate impact theory of discrimination, which allows government and private plaintiffs to establish “discrimination” based solely on the results of a neutral policy without having to show any intent to discriminate (or even in the demonstrated absence of intent to discriminate).  When announcing the settlement, CFPB Director Cordray stated that “[w]hether or not [the finance company] consciously intended to discriminate makes no practical difference. In fact, we do not allege that [the finance company] did so. Yet the outcome, and the harm to consumers, is the very same here.”

    Resolution

    The investigation and potential enforcement action were disclosed by the finance company earlier this year. The final terms, formalized in a CFPB administrative consent order and a DOJ consent order filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, require the finance company to pay an $18 million penalty and provide $80 million for a settlement fund to compensate borrowers allegedly harmed between April 2011 and December 2013. The CFPB and the DOJ will identify borrowers to be compensated and the amount to be paid to each identified borrower using an undisclosed methodology, and the payments will be administered by a third party administrator paid for by the finance company.

    In addition, the finance company is required to adopt and implement a compliance plan pursuant to which the finance company must: (i) establish a dealer compensation policy that limits the maximum spread between the buy rate and the contract rate to no more than the spread currently permitted; (ii) provide regular notices to dealers explaining ECOA and dealer pricing obligations; (iii) establish quarterly and annual portfolio-wide analysis of markups based on the CFPB and the DOJ statistical methodologies; (iv) take prompt corrective action with respect to dealers identified in such quarterly analysis that culminates in prohibiting a dealer’s ability to mark up the rate or termination of the dealer relationship; and, (v) providing remuneration for affected customers.

    While the settlements do not bar discretionary dealer compensation, they provide an incentive for the finance company to eliminate the practice. The agreements permit the finance company to develop a non-discretionary compensation plan for approval by the CFPB and the DOJ, subsequent to which the finance company no longer is required to implement the majority of the compliance plan.

    Looking Ahead

    Dealer compensation practices have been targeted by the CFPB for the past year, including in guidance issued earlier this year, which the CFPB recently defended at a public forum. We expect the CFPB’s scrutiny of dealer compensation and auto finance companies more generally to continue into next year. Questions regarding the matters discussed in this alert may be directed to any of the lawyers in our Auto Finance or CFPB practices, or to any other BuckleySandler attorney with whom you have consulted in the past.

    CFPB Auto Finance Fair Lending ECOA DOJ Enforcement Disparate Impact

  • Report On CFPB's Auto Finance Forum

    Consumer Finance

    This morning, the CFPB hosted an auto finance forum, which featured remarks from CFPB staff and other federal regulators, consumer advocates, and industry representatives.

    Some of the highlights include:

    • Patrice Ficklin (CFPB) confirmed that the CFPB, both before issuing the March bulletin and since, has conducted analysis of numerous finance companies’ activities and found statistically significant disparities disfavoring protected classes. She stated that there were “numerous” companies whose data showed statistically significant pricing disparities of 10 basis points or more and “several” finance companies with disparities of over 20 or 30 basis points.
    • Much of the discussion focused on potential alternatives to the current dealer markup system.  The DOJ discussed allowing discretion within limitations and with documentation of the reasons for exercising that discretion (e.g., competition). The CFPB focus was exclusively on non-discretionary “alternative compensation mechanisms”, specifically flat fees per loan, compensation based on a percentage of the amount financed, or some variation of those. The CFPB said it invited finance companies to suggest other non-discretionary alternatives. Regardless of specific compensation model, Ms. Ficklin stated that in general, nondiscretionary alternatives can (i) be revenue neutral for dealers, (ii) reduce fair lending risk, (iii) be less costly than compliance management systems enhancements, and (iv) limit friction between dealers on the one hand and the CFPB on the other.
    • There was significant debate over whether flat fee arrangements, or other potential compensation mechanisms, actually eliminate or reduce the potential for disparate impact in auto lending. There was also criticism of the CFPB’s failure to empirically test whether these “fixes” would result in other unintended consequences.  Industry stakeholders asserted that such arrangements fail to mitigate fair lending risk market-wide while at the same time potentially increase the cost of credit and constrain credit availability. Industry stakeholders also questioned the validity of the large dollar figures of alleged consumer harm caused by dealer markups.  When assessing any particular model, the CFPB’s Eric Reusch explained, finance companies should determine whether (i) it mitigates fair lending risk, (ii) creates any new risk or potential for additional harm, and (iii) it is economically sustainable, with sustainability viewed through the lens of consumers, finance companies, and dealers.
    • Numerous stakeholders urged the CFPB to release more information about its proxy methodology and statistical analysis, citing the Bureau’s stated dedication to transparency and even referencing its Data Quality Act guidelines.  The DOJ described its commitment to “kicking the tires” on its statistical analyses and allowing institutions to do the same.  The CFPB referenced its recent public disclosure of its proxy methodology, noting that this was the methodology the CFPB intended to apply to all lending outside of mortgage.
    • Steven Rosenbaum (DOJ) and Donna Murphy (OCC) pointedly went beyond the stated scope of the forum to highlight potential SCRA compliance risks associated with indirect auto lending.

    Additional detail from each panel follows. Please note that these details are based on notes taken during the event and could differ from actual statements made during the event. The entire report is subject to alteration or clarification, particularly if a transcript or archived video are made available.

    Opening Remarks

    Director Cordray opened the forum. He stressed the importance of vehicles to individual consumers and to the broader economy. He stated that some consumers may be subject to discrimination that may result in millions of dollars in consumer harm each year.

    As he did in a Senate hearing earlier this week, Mr. Cordray emphasized that neither the 2012 fair lending bulletin nor the March 2013 auto finance bulletin were new; they simply served as a reminder to finance companies of liability under ECOA, particularly with regard to indirect auto finance.

    He stated that the CFPB uses proven statistical methods and publicly available data to assess the probability that a particular customer belongs to a particular racial group or is of a particular national origin.

    The March bulletin provided guidance about steps auto finance companies might consider taking to ensure they are ECOA-compliant. One approach described by the Director is to develop robust fair lending compliance management systems to monitor for disparate impact and promptly remedy consumer harm on an ongoing basis when it is identified. The bulletin also stated that finance companies could take steps to comply with the law by adopting some other pricing mechanism that fairly compensates dealers for their work but avoids the fair lending risks that are inherent in pricing by discretionary markup. Director Cordray stated that such mechanisms include: a flat fee per transaction, or a fixed percentage of the amount financed, or other nondiscretionary approaches that market participants may devise that would work to address these concerns.

    He acknowledged that dealers are entitled to fair compensation, but stressed that the CFPB wants to make sure the process is transparent. He stated it is worth considering further how the disclosure of markup practices actually works.

    Panel 1

    Patrice Ficklin (CFPB): Ms. Ficklin described and defended the March bulletin, asserting that the CFPB did not provide any new legal interpretations, but rather reminded finance companies about existing law. She noted and defended the CFPB’s proxy methodology, as described recently in letters to Congress, but did not provide additional detail. She stated that the CFPB’s supervisory and enforcement work in this area is more substantial than it was in March, and continues to indicate fair lending risk—the CFPB has found “substantial and statistically significant” disparities between African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians and similarly situated white borrowers.  The CFPB has identified numerous institutions with disparities over 10 basis points, and several over 20 or 30 basis points.

    Going forward, the CFPB is committed to continuing a constructive dialogue with industry, a dialogue in which alternative compensation structures has been the key theme to date.

    Melissa Yap (FRB): Ms. Yap described the Fed’s ECOA authority post-Dodd-Frank. She stated that pricing remains the greatest area of risk. The Fed employs the 2009 interagency fair lending procedures and looks at (i) financial incentives, (ii) the amount of discretion, and (iii) disparities in note rate and markup over buy rate. She described the Fed’s proxy methodology, which differs slightly from the CFPB’s, but which the Fed believes is appropriate for the size and complexity of the institutions it supervises. For race, the Fed geocodes and defines majority-minority census tracts as those over 50%. She defended name proxies for gender and ethnicity, stating they are as likely to over count as under count. She also referenced two webinars the Fed and other hosted this year, which included discussion of these issues, see e.g., August webinar.

    Steven Rosenbaum (DOJ): Mr. Rosenbaum described the DOJ’s broad authority to enforce ECOA and noted that it has a number of investigations ongoing, including joint investigations with the CFPB. He stated that Congress created the issue that requires the use of proxies, given that ECOA protects classes in consumer lending but does not require data collection similar to HMDA. The DOJ is using the CFPB’s method on joint investigations, but it continues to “kick the tires” on its methods and analyses and invites finance companies to do the same.

    He stated, twice, that ECOA does not require nor prohibit discretion in pricing; risk from discretion can be managed, for example by setting caps or requiring justifications and documentation.

    Mr. Rosenbaum added that the DOJ also enforces SCRA, and stated that if finance companies have not thought about SCRA compliance in their auto finance programs, they ought to do so.  He also acknowledged the DOJ’s ongoing investigation of buy-here, pay-here dealers, though the issues differ in that those dealers may be offering predatory products in minority neighborhoods.

    Keith Ernst (FDIC): Mr. Ernst similarly described the FDIC’s jurisdiction and addressed in broad terms its approach to indirect auto financing. He stated that all examination and statistical results that are consistent with a violation are subject to independent review and all statistical analyses are reviewed by a team. The FDIC provides institutions with the results, data, and methods and provides an opportunity for questions and other feedback. Mr. Ernst also noted that this dialogue includes providing institutions with the opportunity to provide non-discriminatory explanations for statistical disparities. According to Mr. Ernst, the FDIC has amended analyses as part of these processes. The FDIC believes the vast majority of its banks are effectively managing fair lending risk in auto finance, but that examinations can reveal compliance management systems concerns that fall short of a fair lending violation.

    Tonya Sweat (NCUA): Ms. Sweat stated that the practices identified in the CFPB bulletin are not prevalent in the credit union industry, but NCUA still examines for fair lending risk and safety and soundness. The NCUA advises credit unions that sound practices include sampling and testing of loans, particularly to ensure third-party compliance. Credit unions should implement written policies that require written approval of any changes to underwriting criteria.

    Donna Murphy (OCC): Ms. Murphy provided only brief comments, and generally referenced and incorporated what others had said on proxies. The OCC is revising and updating its methods for fair lending risk assessments and scoping based on changes in markets, the legal environment, and technology. These changes are intended to result in more consistency in examinations and the ability of the OCC to conduct more analysis across banks.  For auto finance, the OCC is looking at how it gathers factors regarding use of third-parties. Ms. Murphy also noted the OCC’s attention to SCRA, stating that last year it revised examination procedures and enhanced examiner training for SCRA, including in auto finance, and that those enhancements are reflected in this year’s examination cycle.

    Panel 2

    The second panel was moderated by the CFPB’s Rohit Chopra and featured remarks from the National Association of Minority Automobile Dealers (NAMAD), the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), the Consumer for Auto Reliability and Safety (CARS), and the NAACP.

    Stuart Rossman from the NCLC described his part in a series of class actions against auto finance companies in the 2000s. Those actions, as he described, resulted in markup caps, the last of which sunsetted last year. He asserted that the market forces that led to those actions persist, as do fundamental problems in discretionary pricing policies.  Citing more restrictive class action requirements and less access to critical data, he called on the CFPB to take the lead in enforcement.

    NAMAD acknowledged the possibility that bad actors exist in the market, but argued against eliminating discretion. NAMAD called for approval and documentation requirements for discretionary programs. NAMAD supports uniform data collection, enhanced proxies, training and education for dealers and consumers.

    CARS noted California’s markup cap statute and reported that a proposal for a ballot proposition outlawing dealer discretion has been filed with the state attorney general. CARS also encouraged the CFPB to look at the impact of percentage rate markups in the motor home market.

    Panel 3

    Bill Himpler, American Financial Services Association (AFSA): Mr. Himpler stressed that the current indirect auto finance model is efficient and proven. He noted that auto finance complaints are at record lows, and pointed out that even the CFPB’s database shows a small number of complaints compared to other markets.  Since the CFPB has refused to assess the impact of a broad market shift towards flat fee compensation structures or other alternatives, AFSA is commissioning an independent study to assess the present model and evaluate costs and benefits of alternative models.

    Chris Kukla, Center for Responsible Lending (CRL): Mr. Kukla countered that the current compensation model gives rise to potential discrimination and should be ended. Consumers have no ability to know what part of their rate is based on risk and what is due to compensation. He defended the CRL’s 2011 study on indirect auto finance from attacks, including those that followed Senator Warren’s reference to the study during a Senate hearing earlier this week.  That study concluded that consumers pay $26 billion each year in markups. Mr. Kukla explained that CRL never said consumers would not otherwise be charged a portion of those fees, and only sought to define the size of the market. He referenced other research that indicates a market-wide adoption of flat fee arrangements would have little impact on dealers.

    Paul Metrey, National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA): Mr. Metrey outlined a preferred approach by federal regulators to unintentional disparate impact discrimination: (i) understand the market, (ii) develop appropriate methods, and (iii) if present, address in a manner that assists consumers. He called for the CFPB to pursue more open processes on this issue, including by identifying its complete statistical methodology and fully accounting for neutral legitimate factors. He presented NADA’s case against flat fee arrangements, in part on the basis that dealers still will have discretion to select among finance sources that may offer different flat fee arrangements.

    Rich Riese, American Bankers Association (ABA): Mr. Riese challenged the CFPB’s post hoc approach to obtaining input on its auto finance program, stating that the forum does not substitute for the kind of engagement the issue requires. He argued that the guidance should have been proposed and subject to notice and comment.  The ABA believes proxies should be viewed with skepticism; they can be useful to identify risks and can be useful in compliance programs, but they should not be used to prove violations. Citing the 1999 interagency exam procedures, he argued that discretion is not an appropriate area to apply disparate impact, and, before straying too much from prior policy, regulators should recognize that Reg. B applies to creditors determination of creditworthiness and the discretion being applied in auto finance is for compensation and is not part of a creditor’s determination of creditworthiness.

    The panelists also discussed the comparison of indirect auto finance to the mortgage market, particularly the use of broker yield spread premiums. Mr. Riese pointed out that in the mortgage context, brokers were alleged to have steered borrowers into “bad” loans without considering suitability; that is not the case in the auto market where there are no option arms, teaser rates, etc. Mr. Himpler and Mr. Metrey agreed. Mr. Metrey added that the comparison is apples to oranges—the markets have performed differently; there is nothing going on in auto ABS like there was in MBS. He added that Congress directed an end to yield spread premiums and there has been no similar action in auto, and the Fed tested to see if a fix was necessary but there has been no similar testing in auto.

    Mr. Kukla responded that the mechanics may be different, but the impact and incentives are the same.  A broader view of “steering” covers any instance in which a consumer is provided a loan with less advantageous terms than the consumer otherwise would have received.

    FDIC CFPB Nonbank Supervision Federal Reserve OCC NCUA Auto Finance Fair Lending ECOA DOJ Enforcement Bank Supervision

  • Special Alert: Agencies Issue Joint Statement On Fair Lending Compliance And The CFPB's ATR/QM Rule

    Lending

    On October 22, the CFPB, the OCC, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the NCUA (collectively, the Agencies) issued a joint statement (Interagency Statement) in response to inquiries from creditors concerning their liability under the disparate impact doctrine of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and its implementing regulation, Regulation B by originating only “qualified mortgages.”  Qualified mortgages are defined under the CFPB’s January 2013 Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule (ATR/QM Rule).  The DOJ and HUD did not participate in the Interagency Statement.

    The Interagency Statement describes some general principles that will guide the Agencies’ supervisory and enforcement activities with respect to entities within their jurisdiction as the ATR/QM Rule takes effect in January 2014.  The Interagency Statement does not state that a creditor’s choice to limit its offerings to qualified mortgage loans or qualified mortgage “safe harbor” loans would comply with ECOA; rather, the Agencies state that they “do not anticipate that a creditor’s decision to offer only qualified mortgages would, absent other factors, elevate a supervised institution’s fair lending risk.”  Furthermore, the Interagency Statement will not necessarily preclude civil actions.

    The Agencies acknowledge that although there are several ways to satisfy the ATR/QM Rule, some creditors may be inclined to originate all or predominantly qualified mortgages, particularly when the ATR/QM Rule first becomes effective.  In selecting business models and product offerings, the Agencies “expect that creditors would consider and balance demonstrable factors that may include credit risk, secondary market opportunities, capital requirements, and liability risk.”  The Agencies further understand that creditors may have a “legitimate business need” to fine-tune their product offerings over the next few years in response to the impact of the ATR/QM Rule, just as they have in response to other significant regulatory changes that have occurred in the past.

    The Agencies advise creditors to continue to evaluate fair lending risk as they would for other types of product selections, including by carefully monitoring their policies and practices and implementing effective compliance management systems.  Nonetheless, the Agencies state that individual cases will be evaluated on their own merits.

    The Agencies state that they “believe that the same principles…apply in supervising institutions for compliance with the Fair Housing Act.”  However, because neither DOJ nor HUD participated in issuing the Interagency Statement, it remains to be seen how those agencies would view this issue.

    It is noteworthy that the standard articulated in the Interagency Statement (“legitimate business needs”) differs from HUD’s disparate impact rule relating to the Fair Housing Act.  In its rule, HUD codified a three-step burden-shifting approach to determine liability under a disparate impact claim.  Once a practice has been shown by the plaintiff to have a disparate impact on a protected class, the rule states that the defendant would have the burden of showing that the challenged practice “is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent…or defendant…A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative.”  (Emphasis added.)

    Questions regarding the matters discussed in this Alert may be directed to any of our lawyers listed below, or to any other BuckleySandler attorney with whom you have consulted in the past.

     

    FDIC CFPB Federal Reserve HUD Fair Housing OCC NCUA Fair Lending ECOA DOJ Agency Rule-Making & Guidance

  • Justice Department Announces Three Fair Lending Actions

    Lending

    Recently, the DOJ released information regarding three fair lending actions, all three of which included allegations related to wholesale lending programs. On September 27, the DOJ announced separate actions—one against a Wisconsin bank and the other against a nationwide wholesale lender—in which the DOJ alleged that the lenders engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in their wholesale mortgage businesses. The DOJ charged that, during 2007 and 2008, the bank violated the Fair Housing Act and ECOA by granting its mortgage brokers discretion to vary their fees and thus alter the loan price based on factors other than a borrower’s objective credit-related factors, which allegedly resulted in African-American and Hispanic borrowers paying more than non-Hispanic white borrowers for home mortgage loans. The bank denies the allegations but entered a consent order pursuant to which it will pay $687,000 to wholesale mortgage borrowers who were subject to the alleged discrimination. The allegations originated from an FDIC referral to the DOJ.

    The DOJ charged the California-based wholesale lender with violations of the Fair Housing Act and ECOA, alleging that over a four-year period, the lender’s practice of granting its mortgage brokers discretion to set the amount of broker fees charged to individual borrowers, unrelated to an applicant’s credit risk characteristics, resulted in African-American and Hispanic borrowers paying more than non-Hispanic white borrowers for home mortgage loans. The lender did not admit the allegations, but agreed to enter a consent order to avoid litigation. Pursuant to that order the lender will pay $3 million to allegedly harmed borrowers. The order also requires the lender to take other actions including establishing race- and national origin-neutral standards for the assessment of broker fees and monitoring its wholesale mortgage loans for potential disparities based on race and national origin.

    Finally, on September 30, the DOJ announced that a national bank agreed to resolve certain legacy fair lending claims against a thrift it acquired several years ago, which the bank and the OCC identified as part of the acquisition review. Based on its own investigation following the OCC referral, the DOJ alleged that, between 2006 and 2009, the thrift allowed employees in its retail lending operation to vary interest rates and fees, and allowed third-party brokers as part of its wholesale lending program to do the same, allegedly resulting in disparities between the rates, fees, and costs paid by non-white borrowers compared to similarly-situated white borrowers. The bank, which was not itself subject to the DOJ’s allegations, agreed to pay $2.85 million to approximately 3,100 allegedly harmed borrowers to resolve the legacy claims and avoid litigation.

    FDIC Fair Housing OCC Fair Lending ECOA DOJ Wholesale Lending

  • DOJ Announces Settlement of Auto Lending Discrimination Suit

    Consumer Finance

    On September 6, the DOJ announced the resolution of a long-running lawsuit against an auto dealer and a bank that financed many of the dealer’s loans, in which the government alleged that the dealer and the bank violated ECOA by charging non-Asian customers higher interest rate markups than other customers over a three-year period. The bank entered into a partial consent decree in 2009 and agreed to pay a total of $410,000 to non-Asian borrowers to resolve the allegations against it. The dealer chose to litigate and obtained a dismissal in trial court; that order was reversed last year by the Ninth Circuit. The dealer agreed to a consent decree  with the DOJ on September 4 that fully resolved all claims against it. The dealer, which is now out of business, specifically denied the government’s allegations and the decree made clear the outcome was a “compromise of disputed allegations.” Under the terms of the decree, the dealer will pay up to a total of $125,000 to non-Asian customers who were charged higher dealer interest rate markups. If the dealer or its principal shareholder re-enter the business of automobile lending within the two year duration of the consent decree, it will be required to implement clear guidelines for setting dealer markup and pricing, in compliance with ECOA, and establish fair lending training for its employees and officers.

    Auto Finance ECOA DOJ

  • New York Federal District Court Holds FHA Disparate Impact Claims Against Mortgage Securitizer Timely, ECOA Claims Time-Barred

    Lending

    On July 25, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a putative class of African-American borrowers can pursue claims against a financial institution alleged to have financed and purchased so-called predatory subprime mortgage loans to be included in mortgage backed securities. Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12-7667, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2013). The borrowers allege that the institution implemented policies and procedures that supported the subprime lending of a mortgage originator in the Detroit area so that the institution could purchase, pool, and securitize those loans. The borrowers claim those policies violated the FHA and the ECOA because they disproportionately impacted minority borrowers who were more likely to receive subprime loans, putting those borrowers at higher risk of default and foreclosure.

    In resolving the financial institution’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the borrowers sufficiently alleged a disparate impact under the FHA and, although the lawsuit was filed more than five years after the originator stopped originating mortgages, the two-year statute of limitations on their FHA claims is tolled by the discovery rule. The court explained that the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy may not become immediately apparent, and “[g]iving full effect to the FHA’s language and the policy behind the language requires a discovery rule recognizing that [the borrowers’] claim here did not accrue until they knew or had reason to know” that the policies were discriminatory. The court left open the possibility that the institution may prove at a later stage that public knowledge of the facts underlying the suit may be imputed to the borrowers to render their claims "discovered" at an earlier time and therefore time-barred.

    The court held that the borrowers’ ECOA claims were not similarly timely because ECOA contains specific exceptions to its statute of limitations, and to apply a general discovery rule to ECOA claims would render those exceptions meaningless. Further, the court held that the ECOA claims are not timely pursuant to a continuing violations theory or equitable tolling.

    The court granted the motion to dismiss the ECOA claims and a state law claim, and denied the motion to dismiss the FHA claims.

    Fair Housing ECOA Disparate Impact

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