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U.S. House Passes Amendment To Ban DOJ's Use of Disparate Impact Claims
On June 3, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an amendment to H.R. 2578, the Fiscal Year 2016 Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriations Act. The amendment, passed in a 232-196 vote, would prohibit the DOJ from using funds to prosecute and obtain legal settlements from lenders, landlords, and insurers in discrimination suits based on the disparate impact legal theory. This legislative development comes as the U.S. Supreme Court is expected to rule later this summer in Texas Dept. of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, which challenges the disparate impact theory in mortgage lending under the Fair Housing Act
Southern District of New York Denies Class Certification in Fair Lending Suit Against Global Investment Bank
On May 14, the District Court for the Southern District of New York denied class certification status in a fair lending suit brought by the ACLU and NCLC against a global investment bank. Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12-CV-7667 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2015). The Plaintiffs had alleged that the bank, as a significant purchaser of subprime residential mortgage loans, had caused a disparate impact on African-American borrowers in Detroit in violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. In an exhaustive 50-page opinion, the court denied class certification on multiple grounds, including the variation in loan types and the role of broker discretion. BuckleySandler anticipates the ruling will be widely cited in future fair lending class actions.
Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments on Fair Housing Act Disparate Impact Case
On January 21, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, in which Texas challenged the disparate impact theory of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). In their questions to counsel, the Justices focused on (i) whether the phrase “making unavailable” in the FHA provides a textual basis for disparate impact, (ii) whether three provisions of the 1988 amendments to the FHA demonstrate congressional acknowledgement that the FHA permits disparate impact claims, and (iii) whether the Court should defer to HUD’s disparate impact rule. The Court is expected to issue its ruling by the end of June. For more information on the oral argument, please refer to our previously issued Special Alert.
Special Alert: Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments on Fair Housing Act Disparate Impact Case
This morning, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, in which Texas challenged the disparate impact theory of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Twice before, the Court granted certiorari on this issue, but in both cases the parties reached a settlement prior to oral arguments.
As described further below, in their questions to counsel, the Justices focused on (i) whether the phrase “making unavailable” in the FHA provides a textual basis for disparate impact, (ii) whether three provisions within the 1988 amendments to the FHA demonstrate congressional acknowledgement that the FHA permits disparate impact claims, and (iii) whether they should defer to HUD’s disparate impact rule.
“Disparate treatment” discrimination under the FHA is defined as intentional discrimination in the provision of housing on the basis of a protected class, such as race, religion, or national origin. However, to assert a “disparate impact” claim, a plaintiff need not show any intent to discriminate by the defendant in order to establish a prima facie case. Although eleven federal courts of appeals have recognized disparate impact discrimination, all of these decisions were issued prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. City of Jackson. In Smith, the Court held that language addressing “adverse effects” in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) provided textual support for disparate impact claims under the ADEA, as it does under Title VII. One of the issues addressed in Inclusive Communities is whether the FHA contains “effects-based” language permitting disparate impact claims.
Counsel for Texas argued that the Court’s holding in Smith required the Court to hold here that disparate impact claims were barred by the statutory text of the FHA, because the FHA lacks the “effects” language present in the ADEA and Title VII. Justices Scalia, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, however, focused on the language of Section 804 of the FHA which provides that it is unlawful to “otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” These Justices asked whether the phrase “otherwise make unavailable” is the equivalent of the “adversely affect” language in other civil rights statutes. Counsel for Texas responded that “making unavailable” is an active verb, and therefore requires an affirmative action intended to make a dwelling unavailable. In response, Justice Scalia asked whether “adversely affects” similarly required action on the part of a defendant.
The Justices also focused on Congress’s 1988 amendments to the FHA, which created three exceptions from liability under the FHA for (i) appraisers under Section 805(c), (ii) decisions based upon an individual’s prior conviction for manufacturing or distributing illegal drugs under Section 807(b)(4), or (iii) the application of local, state, or federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling under Section 807(b)(1). Justice Scalia stated that the Court is required to read the statute as a whole, including these exceptions. Justice Scalia noted that “what hangs me up” is how these exceptions can be reconciled with the statutory text if the FHA does not permit disparate impact claims. Counsel for Texas responded that these exceptions also apply to disparate treatment claims, and do not suggest specific Congressional acknowledgement that the FHA permits disparate impact claims.
Next, the Justices asked counsel for Respondent Inclusive Communities whether the FHA’s “because of” language required intent to discriminate. Justices Kagan and Breyer specifically noted that the Court had recognized disparate impact claims under other civil rights statutes containing similar “because of” language. Counsel agreed and argued that there was no basis for treating the FHA’s “because of” language differently.
Justice Alito asked counsel for Respondents whether the 1988 amendments make disparate impact claims cognizable under the FHA if the original act did not. Justice Alito asked whether the 1988 amendments expanded the act. Counsel responded that the amendments did not expand the FHA—rather, that disparate impact was permitted in the original act.
Next, the Solicitor General directed the Court to HUD’s recent disparate impact rule and urged the Court to give deference to HUD’s interpretation under Chevron and noted that HUD issued its rule within days of the Court’s grant of certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher, a prior case raising the same issue. Justice Alito asked whether the Court should be “troubled” by the use of Chevron to “manipulate” the Court’s decisions. The Solicitor General responded that HUD had taken the position that the FHA permits disparate impact claims since 1992.
The Solicitor General further noted that defendants in disparate impact cases have protections under the burden-shifting framework, because claimants must point to a “specific practice” that gives rise to the alleged disparity to establish a prima facie case. Justice Breyer responded by asking whether it is necessary to eliminate disparate impact altogether given the protections provided by the burden-shifting framework.
NOTE: Quotations in this client alert are based on the notes of those who attended oral arguments, and not from any official transcript.
Federal Court Vacates HUD Disparate Impact Rule
On November 3, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia vacated HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The court, in American Insurance Association v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, held that “the FHA prohibits disparate treatment only,” and therefore HUD, in promulgating the Disparate Impact Rule, “exceeded [its] authority under the [Administrative Procedures Act].” (Emphasis in original.)
In the Disparate Impact Rule, HUD provided that “[l]iability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice’s discriminatory effect . . . even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. It then articulated a burden shifting framework for such claims. Id. § 100.500(c)(1)-(3). In vacating HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule, the court reviewed the text of the FHA and concluded that “the FHA unambiguously prohibits only intentional discrimination.” (Emphasis in original.) The court explained that the FHA lacks the “effects-based language” that makes disparate impact claims cognizable under other anti-discrimination statutes. The court reasoned that this lack of effects-based language created “an insurmountable obstacle to [HUD’s] position regarding the plain meaning of the Fair Housing Act.” The court further reasoned that this textual reading is consistent with the FHA’s statutory scheme and, in the case of insurance products, required by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The court also explains that its decision to vacate the Disparate Impact Rule is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, in which the Supreme Court “made it clear that an inquiry into the availability of disparate-impact liability turns on the presence, or absence, of effects-based language.” In so reasoning, the court further noted that “none of the Circuit Courts that have recognized claims of disparate impact subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith have either discussed Smith in any detail, or reconsidered their Circuit precedent in light of its holding.” (Emphasis added.) The court also noted that the Supreme Court has three times granted certiorari to address whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, most recently in Texas Department of Housing, however, two cases were settled before the Court could rule and the third is currently pending.
This case comes in the wake of the holding of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that “HUD’s response to the insurance industry’s concerns [regarding the Disparate Impact Rule] was arbitrary and capricious” and remand to HUD “for further explanation.” Property Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, at 46-47 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014).
Even prior to HUD’s rule, the federal enforcement agencies took the position that both the FHA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) permit disparate impact claims. Today’s decision does not expressly address ECOA. For a discussion of the cognizability of disparate impact claims under the FHA and ECOA, see here, here, and here.
Special Alert: Federal Court Vacates HUD's Disparate Impact Rule
Today, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia vacated HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The court, in American Insurance Association v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, held that “the FHA prohibits disparate treatment only,” and therefore HUD, in promulgating the Disparate Impact Rule, “exceeded [its] authority under the [Administrative Procedures Act].” (emphasis in original).
In the Disparate Impact Rule, HUD provided that “[l]iability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice’s discriminatory effect . . . even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory intent.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500. It then articulates a burden shifting framework for such claims. Id. § 100.500(c)(1)-(3).
In vacating HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule, the court reviewed the text of the FHA and concluded that “the FHA unambiguously prohibits only intentional discrimination.” (emphasis in original). The court explained that the FHA lacks the “effects-based language” that makes disparate impact claims cognizable under other anti-discrimination statutes. The court reasoned that this lack of effects-based language created “an insurmountable obstacle to [HUD’s] position regarding the plain meaning of the Fair Housing Act.” The court further reasoned that this textual reading is consistent with the FHA’s statutory scheme and, in the case of insurance products, required by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The court also explains that its decision to vacate the Disparate Impact Rule is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, in which the Supreme Court “made it clear that an inquiry into the availability of disparate-impact liability turns on the presence, or absence, of effects-based language.” In so reasoning, the court further noted that “none of the Circuit Courts that have recognized claims of disparate impact subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith have either discussed Smith in any detail, or reconsidered their Circuit precedent in light of its holding.” (emphasis added). The court also noted that the Supreme Court has three times granted certiorari to address whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, most recently in Texas Department of Housing.
This case comes in the wake of the holding of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that “HUD’s response to the insurance industry’s concerns [regarding the Disparate Impact Rule] was arbitrary and capricious” and remand to HUD “for further explanation.” Property Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. v. Donovan, No. 13 C 8564, at 46-47 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2014).
Even prior to HUD’s rule, the federal enforcement agencies took the position that both the FHA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) permit disparate impact claims. Today’s decision does not expressly address ECOA. For a discussion of the cognizability of disparate impact claims under the FHA and ECOA, see here, here, and here.
U.S. Supreme Court Grants Cert. (again) in FHA Disparate Impact Case
On October 2, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, et al. v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., No. 13-1371, a case in which the Fifth Circuit became the first federal Circuit Court of Appeals to apply the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) "effects test" rule (see The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, et al., Nos. 12-11211, 13-10306 (747 F.3d 275, March 24, 2014)), which authorizes so-called "disparate impact" or "effects test" claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). In granting cert., the Supreme Court accepted one of the two questions presented by the petitioners, which was, “Are disparate-impact claims cognizable under the [FHA]?” It did not accept the second question: “If disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the [FHA], what are the standards and burdens of proof that should apply?” The Supreme Court’s partial grant of the petition represents the third recent matter in which the Court has taken up the issue of whether disparate impact claims may be brought under the FHA. The first opportunity ended in February, 2012 when petitioners in Magner, et al. v Gallagher, et al., No. 10-1032, stipulated to dismissal due to concerns that "a victory could substantially undermine important civil rights enforcement throughout the nation." The Court’s second opportunity, Township of Mount Holly, New Jersey, et al., v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., et al., No. 11-1507, was dismissed in November 2013, just prior to oral argument after a settlement was reached by the parties.
CFPB Offers More Details On Plans To Supervise Auto Finance Market
On September 17, the CFPB released new information about its plans to supervise and enforce auto finance companies’ compliance with consumer financial laws, including fair lending laws. As it indicated it would earlier this year, the CFPB released a proposed rule that would allow it to supervise certain nonbank auto finance companies. Also as previously promised, the CFPB published a white paper on its method to proxy for race and national origin in auto finance transactions. Finally, the CFPB published its most recent Supervisory Highlights report, which is dedicated to its supervisory findings at depository institutions with auto finance operations.
The CFPB released the materials in connection with its September 18th field hearing on auto finance issues. These actions come roughly 18 months after the CFPB first provided guidance to auto finance companies regarding its expectations related to dealer “reserve” (or “participation”) and fair lending.
Larger Participant Rule
The Dodd-Frank Act grants the CFPB authority to supervise, regardless of size, nonbanks offering (i) certain mortgage-related products and services; (ii) private education loans; and (iii) payday loans. The CFPB also has the power to supervise “larger participants” in any other market for consumer financial products or services, provided that it first conducts a rulemaking to define “larger participants” within a particular market.
As proposed, the CFPB’s auto finance larger participant rule would allow the agency to supervise any nonbank finance company that has at least 10,000 aggregate annual originations. The rule would define “annual originations” as grants of credit for the purchase of an automobile, refinancings of such credit obligations and any subsequent refinancings thereof, and purchases or acquisitions of such credit obligations (including refinancings). It would also include “automobile leases” and purchases or acquisitions of automobile lease agreements. The rule would define “automobile” to include “any self-propelled vehicle primarily used for personal, family, or household purposes for on-road transportation” and to exclude “motor homes, recreational vehicles (RVs), golf carts, and motor scooters.”
The CFPB estimates the rule as proposed will allow it to oversee roughly 38 auto finance companies that the CFPB believes “originate around 90% of nonbank auto loans and leases.” As proposed the rule would not apply to title lending or the securitization of automobile loans and leases, but the CFPB requests comment on an approach that would include such activities. The rule also would not apply to auto dealers or to depository institutions.
Comments on the proposal are due 60 days after the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register.
Proxy Methodology White Paper
Since releasing its guidance on auto finance fair lending—which the CFPB has characterized as a restatement of existing law and which sought to establish publicly the CFPB’s grounds for asserting violations of ECOA against bank and nonbank auto finance companies for alleged “discretionary pricing policies”—the CFPB has faced pressure from industry stakeholders and lawmakers who have challenged the Bureau to provide additional information to support its approach to determining disparate impact.
The CFPB now provides additional information regarding one aspect of that approach—its method to proxy for race and national origin in the auto finance market, where such data is not collected as part of the financing process. The white paper reiterates that in conducting fair lending analysis of non-mortgage credit products in both supervisory and enforcement contexts, the CFPB’s Office of Research (OR) and Division of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending (SEFL) rely on a “Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG)” proxy method. That method combines geography- and surname-based information into a single probability for race and ethnicity. The paper is intended to explain the construction of the BISG proxy currently employed by OR and SEFL and purports to assess the performance of the BISG method using a sample of mortgage applicants for whom race and ethnicity are reported. The CFPB asserts that “research has found that this approach produces proxies that correlate highly with self-reported race and national origin and is more accurate than relying only on demographic information associated with a borrower’s last name or place of residence alone.”
In its paper, the CFPB states that “it does not set forth a requirement for the way proxies should be constructed or used by institutions supervised and regulated by the CFPB” and that the BISG proxy methodology “is not static; it will evolve over time as enhancements are identified that improve accuracy and performance.”
The paper does not address other aspects of the CFPB’s processes or methods used to determine disparate impact, such as (i) the controls applied to ensure sure that the consumers who are being compared are “similarly situated”; or (ii) the basis point thresholds at which the Bureau determines a prohibited pricing disparity exists.
Concurrent with the release of the white paper, the CFPB provided its statistical software code and an example of publicly available census data used to build the race and ethnicity proxy. Of note in its introduction, the CFPB states that it “may alter this methodology in particular analyses, depending on the circumstances involved.”
Supervisory Highlights and CFPB Expectations
Finally, the CFPB released its latest Supervisory Highlights report, which details alleged discrimination in the auto finance market the CFPB has uncovered at banks over the past two years.
The CFPB states that, generally, its examiners found that bank indirect auto creditors “had discretionary pricing policies that resulted in discrimination against African-American, Hispanic, and Asian and Pacific Islander borrowers. As a result, these borrowers paid more for their auto loans than similarly situated non-Hispanic white borrowers.”
Although it has only publicly announced one enforcement action to resolve such allegations, the CFPB’s report states that non-public CFPB supervisory actions at indirect auto financing institutions resulted in approximately $56 million in remediation for up to 190,000 consumers.
The report again urges auto finance companies to consider three possible ways the CFPB believes institutions can mitigate their fair lending risk by: (i) “monitor[ing] and, if necessary, correct[ing] disparities through a strong compliance management system”; (ii) limiting “the maximum discretionary pricing adjustment to an amount that significantly reduces or eliminates disparities”; or (iii) “compensat[ing] dealers using a non-discretionary mechanism.”
In its press release accompanying the above materials, the CFPB further outlined its expectations for auto finance companies, stating that “given the significance of car ownership in the lives of consumers,” the CFPB expects auto finance companies to:
- Fairly market and disclose auto financing. Specifically the CFPB “would be concerned if consumers are being misled about the benefits or terms of financial products,” and the Bureau is “also looking to ensure that consumers are getting terms they understand and accept.”
- Provide accurate information to credit bureaus. Citing its recent enforcement action against an auto finance company alleged to have inaccurately reported information like the consumer’s payment history and delinquency status to credit bureaus, the CFPB states that it is “looking to prevent inaccurate information from being reported in the future.”
- Treat consumers fairly when collecting debts. The CFPB states that it has received complaints from consumers who claim their vehicles have been repossessed while they are current on the loan or have a payment arrangement in place, and that the CFPB will ensure that collectors are relying on accurate information and using legal processes when they collect on debts or repossess vehicles.
California Federal Judge Allows Second Los Angeles Fair Housing Case To Proceed
On June 9, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied a mortgage lender’s motion to dismiss the City of Los Angeles’s Fair Housing Act suit, the second such denial by the same judge in recent weeks. Los Angeles v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 13-9009, 2014 WL 2571558 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 9, 2014). The case is one of several the city has filed alleging that certain mortgage lenders engaged in predatory lending in minority communities, the allegedly predatory loans were more likely to result in foreclosure, and that foreclosures allegedly caused by those practices diminished the city’s property tax base and increased the costs of providing municipal services. The instant order adopts the court’s prior holdings on all of the overlapping arguments presented by the lenders in the two cases. In addition, the court rejected the additional argument that the city’s suit was time barred because the city was on notice of its claims as early as November 2011 when it invited a law firm to “present proposed FHA litigation against ‘several large banking institutions.’”
California Federal Court Allows City's Fair Housing Case To Proceed
On May 28, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held, without addressing the merits, that the City of Los Angeles has standing to pursue Fair Housing Act and restitution claims against a mortgage lender, and that the claims were sufficiently and timely pled. Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 13-9007, 2014 WL 2206368 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2014). The court denied the lender’s motion to dismiss. The city alleges the lender engaged in predatory lending in minority communities, that the allegedly predatory loans were more likely to result in foreclosure, and that foreclosures allegedly caused by those practices diminished the city’s tax base and increased the costs of providing municipal services. The court found that by identifying specific properties alleged to have caused injury and asserting that regression analysis would support its claims and attenuated theory of causation, the city adequately pled a connection between the injury and the alleged conduct sufficient to support Article III standing. The court further concluded that the city adequately pled statutory standing under the FHA insofar as it alleged that its injuries are separate and distinct from the injuries of borrowers, and were proximately caused by the alleged lending practices. The court also held that the city’s claims were timely under the FHA’s two-year statute of limitations because it alleged broad discriminatory practices that are alleged to continue, no matter how changed over time (e.g., from redlining to reverse redlining). Notably, the court did not consider whether the city slept on its rights and could have filed sooner notwithstanding the alleged continuing nature of the practices. Finally, the court found that the city sufficiently pled facts, for purposes of surviving the motion to dismiss, to support claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact under the FHA.