InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
Supreme Court asked to stay judgment holding that HEROES Act does not authorize the creation of the DOE’s student debt relief plan
Recently, the DOJ filed an application on behalf of the Department of Education (DOE) asking the U.S. Supreme Court to stay a judgment entered by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in an action related to whether the agency’s student debt relief plan violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court held that while the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, the district court stressed that the HEROES Act “does not provide the executive branch clear congressional authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program,” and, moreover, does not mention loan forgiveness. On December 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the DOE’s motion for stay pending appeal.
In its application, the DOE argued that the plaintiffs never asserted that the debt relief plan exceeded the education secretary’s statutory authority. Instead, the DOE argued, the plaintiffs alleged only that they were improperly denied the opportunity to comment on the plan, stressing that while the district court recognized that the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, it went further by holding that the plan went beyond the secretary’s authority. “The district court profoundly erred by raising and deciding a claim that respondents did not assert and could not have asserted,” the DOE stressed, further adding that the plaintiffs did not claim that providing debt relief to other borrowers would inflict injury on them. Beyond this, the secretary’s plan “falls squarely within the plain text of his statutory authority,” the DOE asserted. The DOE requested that the Supreme Court stay the district court’s judgment, or in the alternative, defer the application pending oral argument and treat it as a petition for certiorari before judgment, grant the petition, and hear the case along with a second separate action, discussed below, involving a challenge to an injunction that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, on December 1, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The 8th Circuit held that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose,” and pointed to the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The 8th Circuit’s opinion followed a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which dismissed an action filed by state attorneys general from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina for lack of Article III standing after concluding that the states—which attempted “to assert a threat of imminent harm in the form of lost tax revenue in the future”— failed to establish imminent and non-speculative harm sufficient to confer standing. In an unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. Oral arguments are scheduled for February 28, 2023.
District Court: Defendants cannot use CFPB funding argument to dismiss deceptive marketing lawsuit
On November 18, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the CFPB can proceed in its lawsuit against a credit reporting agency, two of its subsidiaries (collectively, “corporate defendants”), and a former senior executive accused of allegedly violating a 2017 enforcement order in connection with alleged deceptive practices related to their marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. According to the court, a recent decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), is a persuasive basis to have the lawsuit dismissed.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau sued the defendants in April claiming the corporate defendants, under the individual defendant’s direction, allegedly violated the 2017 consent order from the day it went into effect instead of implementing agreed-upon policy changes intended to stop consumers from unknowingly signing up for credit monitoring services that charge monthly payments. The Bureau further claimed that the corporate defendants’ practices continued even after examiners raised concerns several times, and that the individual defendant had both the “authority and obligation” to ensure compliance with the 2017 consent order but did not do so.
The defendants sought to have the lawsuit dismissed for several reasons, including on constitutional grounds. The court disagreed with defendants’ constitutional argument, stating that, other than the 5th Circuit, courts around the country have “uniformly” found that Congress’ choice to provide independent funding for the Bureau conformed with the Constitution. “Courts are ill-equipped to second guess exactly how Congress chooses to structure the funding of financial regulators like the Bureau, so long as the funding remains tethered to a law passed by Congress,” the court wrote. The court also overruled defendants’ other objections to the lawsuit. “[T]his case is only at the pleading stage, and all the Bureau must do is plausibly allege that [the individual defendant] was recklessly indifferent to the wrongfulness of [the corporate defendants’] actions over which he had authority,” the court said, adding that the Bureau “has done so because it alleges that because of financial implications, [the individual defendant] actively ‘created a plan to delay or avoid’ implementing the consent order.”
The Bureau is currently seeking Supreme Court review of the 5th Circuit’s decision during its current term. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
Supreme Court to fast-track review of student debt relief program
On December 1, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the Biden administration’s appeal of an injunction entered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that temporarily prohibits the Secretary of Education from discharging any federal loans under the agency’s student debt relief plan (announced in August and covered by InfoBytes here). In a brief unsigned order, the Supreme Court deferred the Biden administration’s application to vacate, pending oral argument. The Supreme Court said it will treat the Biden administration’s application as a “petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment,” and announced a briefing schedule will be established to allow the case to be argued in the February 2023 argument session to resolve the legality of the program.
The Biden administration filed its application last month asking the Supreme Court to vacate, or at minimum narrow, the 8th Circuit’s injunction. Among other things, the Biden administration claimed that the 8th Circuit failed to “analyze the merits of the respondents’ claims, much less determine they are likely to succeed” when it granted an emergency motion for injunction pending appeal filed by state attorney generals from Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, and South Carolina. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 8th Circuit determined that “the equities strongly favor an injunction considering the irreversible impact the Secretary’s debt forgiveness action would have as compared to the lack of harm an injunction would presently impose,” and pointed to the fact that the collection of student loan payments and the accrual of interest have both been suspended.
The appellate court’s “erroneous injunction leaves millions of economically vulnerable borrowers in limbo, uncertain about the size of their debt and unable to make financial decisions with an accurate understanding of their future repayment obligations,” the Biden administration said, adding that if the Supreme Court “declines to vacate the injunction, it may wish to construe this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment, grant the petition, and set the case for expedited briefing and argument this Term to avoid prolonging this uncertainty for the millions of affected borrowers.”
In its application, the Biden administration argued that the universal injunction was overbroad. The application further argued that the states lack standing because the debt relief plan “does not require respondents to do anything, forbid them from doing anything, or harm them in any other way.” Moreover, the Secretary of Education was acting within the bounds of the HEROES Act when he put together the debt relief plan, the application contended. “The COVID-19 pandemic is a ‘national emergency declared by the President of the United States,’” the application said. “Both the Trump and Biden Administrations previously invoked the HEROES Act to categorically suspend payments and interest accrual on all Department-held loans in light of the pandemic.” The application further argued that the states “have not disputed that those actions were lawful,” and that the Secretary of Education “reasonably ‘deem[ed]’ relief ‘necessary to ensure’ that a subset of these affected individuals—namely, those with lower incomes—‘are not placed in a worse position’ in relation to their student-loan obligations ‘because of their status as affected individuals.’”
Meanwhile, on December 1, the 5th Circuit denied the Department of Education’s (DOE) opposed motion for stay pending appeal, following a ruling issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas related to whether the agency’s student debt relief plan violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court determined that while the HEROES Act expressly exempts the APA’s notice-and-comment obligations, the court stressed that the HEROES Act “does not provide the executive branch clear congressional authorization to create a $400 billion student loan forgiveness program,” and, moreover, does not mention loan forgiveness.
Earlier, on November 22, the Department of Education (DOE) extended the pause on student loan repayments, interest, and collections in an effort to alleviate uncertainty for borrowers. Saying “it would be deeply unfair to ask borrowers to pay a debt that they wouldn’t have to pay,” the DOE stated that payments will resume 60 days after it is allowed to implement the debt relief plan or the litigation is resolved, explaining that this will give the Supreme Court time to resolve the case during its current term. However, if the debt relief plan has not been implemented and litigation has not been resolved by June 30, 2023, borrowers’ payments will resume 60 days after that, the DOE explained.
CFPB asks Supreme Court to review 5th Circuit decision
On November 14, the DOJ, on behalf of the CFPB, submitted a petition for a writ of certiorari asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the Bureau’s funding structure violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. The Bureau also asked the court to consider the 5th Circuit’s decision to vacate the agency’s 2017 final rule covering “Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (Payday Lending Rule) on the premise that it was promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving unconstitutional funding.
The Bureau’s funding is derived through the Federal Reserve instead of the annual congressional appropriations process—a process, the appellate court said, that violates the Constitution. Specifically, the 5th Circuit’s October 19 holding (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) found that although the Bureau spends money pursuant to a validly enacted statute, the structure violates the Appropriations Clause because (i) the Bureau obtains its funds from the Federal Reserve (not the Treasury); (ii) the agency maintains funds in a separate account; (iii) the Appropriations Committees do not have authority to review the agency’s expenditures; and (iv) the Bureau exercises broad authority over the economy. The 5th Circuit also rejected the Bureau’s arguments that the funding structure was necessarily constitutional because it was created by and subject to Congress, and distinguished other agencies that are funded outside of the annual appropriations process.
The case involves a challenge to the Bureau’s Payday Lending Rule, which prohibits lenders from attempting to withdraw payments for covered loans from consumers’ accounts after two consecutive withdrawal attempts have failed due to insufficient funds. As a result of the 5th Circuit’s decision, lenders’ obligation to comply with the rule (originally set for August 19, 2019, but repeatedly delayed) will be further delayed while the constitutional issue winds its way through the courts.
“No other court has ever held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause by passing a statute authorizing spending,” the Bureau argued as it requested a prompt Supreme Court review, asserting that the 5th Circuit’s decision “threatens to inflict immense legal and practical harms on the CFPB, consumers, and the Nation’s financial sector.” The agency also stressed that “[n]ew challenges to the Bureau’s rules and other actions can be expected to multiply in the weeks and months to come, and will presumably be filed in the 5th Circuit whenever possible.” The decision also has the potential to impact past enforcement actions and rulemaking as well, the Bureau said.
The Bureau further asserted that while the 5th Circuit concluded that “‘an appropriation is required’ to authorize spending” and that “‘[a] law’ providing an agency with a funding source and spending authority ‘does not suffice,’” the appellate court failed to specify what would be required for such a law to qualify as an appropriation.
Moreover, the 5th Circuit’s reasoning was incorrect, the Bureau argued, because Congress specified that the agency could claim up to 12 percent of the Fed’s budget to fund its operations, and it is subject to, among other things, budget and financial oversight, government audits, and requirements that its director prepare and submit annual reports to the Senate and House appropriations committees concerning its fiscal operating plans and forecasts. These safeguards, the Bureau stressed, should assuage concerns about whether the agency is insulated from congressional oversight. “The court of appeals’ novel and ill-defined limits on Congress’s spending authority contradict the Constitution’s text, historical practice, and this Court’s precedent,” the Bureau said, adding that the decision also conflicts with a holding issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit where the appellate court recognized that “Congress can, consistent with the Appropriations Clause, create governmental institutions reliant on fees, assessments, or investments rather than the ordinary appropriations process.”
The Bureau asked the Supreme Court to review the case during its current term, which would ensure resolution of the issue by the summer of 2023.
District Court approves payday settlement
On November 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi issued a final settlement order resolving allegations that a Mississippi-based payday lender violated the CFPA in connection with check cashing services and small dollar loans. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB filed a complaint against two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies for allegedly violating the CFPA’s prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices.
In March 2018, a district court denied the payday lenders’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting the argument that the Bureau's structure unconstitutional and that the agency’s claims violate due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the constitutionality question, and, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, a divided panel held that the CFPB’s single-director structure is constitutional, finding no constitutional defect with allowing the director of the Bureau to only be fired for cause (covered by InfoBytes here). The order noted that the 5th Circuit voted sua sponte to rehear the case en banc and issued an opinion in which the majority vacated the district court’s opinion as contrary to Seila Law. The majority did not, however, direct the district court to enter judgment against the Bureau because, though the Supreme Court had found that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional, it was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). The majority determined that the “time has arrived for the district court to proceed” and stated it “place[s] no limitation on the matters that that court may consider, including, without limitation, any other constitutional challenges.”
According to the settlement, the owner and president of the company must pay a civil money penalty of $899,350 to the Bureau “by reason of the [UDAAP violations] alleged in the Complaint.” However, the order further noted that the amount is remitted by $889,350 because he paid “that amount in fines to the Mississippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance.” The district court also entered a separate order dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice.
District Court stays CFPB payday action following 5th Circuit decision
On October 31, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas stayed an enforcement action filed by the CFPB against a defendant Texas-based payday lender until after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issues its mandate in CFSA v. CFPB. As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert, a three-judge panel unanimously held in CFSA that the CFPB’s funding structure created by Congress violated the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution. The parties filed a joint motion saying there was “good cause” to pause further proceedings in the litigation, explaining that the “agreed stay pending issuance of the mandate in CFSA will promote efficient resolution of the case, as the final decision in CFSA will control the resolution of key issues presented in [defendant’s] pending motion to dismiss.” One of the arguments raised in the defendant’s motion to dismiss centers around the assertion that the Bureau’s complaint should be dismissed because the agency’s funding structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.
In July, the Bureau sued the defendant for allegedly engaging in illegal debt-collection practices and allegedly generating $240 million in reborrowing fees from borrowers who were eligible for free repayment plans, in violation of the CFPA (covered by InfoBytes here). According to the Bureau, the defendant allegedly “engaged in unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices by concealing the option of a free repayment plan to consumers who indicated that they could not repay their short term, high-cost loans originated by the defendant.” The defendant also allegedly attempted to collect payments by unfairly making unauthorized electronic withdrawals from over 3,000 consumers’ bank accounts.
CFPB argues funding constitutionality holding does not make sense
On October 25, the CFPB responded to a notice of supplemental authority filed by a credit reporting agency (CRA) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which sought to use a recent decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as justification for the dismissal of a lawsuit against the CRA. In April, the Bureau sued the CRA, two of its subsidiaries, and a former senior executive (collectively, “defendants”) for allegedly violating a 2017 consent order in connection with alleged deceptive practices related to their marketing and sale of credit scores, credit reports, and credit-monitoring products to consumers. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Following the 5th Circuit’s decision, in which a three-judge panel unanimously held in CFSA v. CFPB that the CFPB funding structure created by Congress violated the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), the defendants filed a notice of supplemental authority on October 20, arguing that the suit must be dismissed and that the Bureau may not use unappropriated funds when prosecuting the suit. The defendants further contended that the 2017 consent order is invalid because the Bureau used unappropriated funds in its preparation.
The Bureau countered in its response that the 5th Circuit’s holding does not “make sense,” is “without support in law,” and does not help the defendants’ defense. According to the Bureau, “the court mustered no case from more than 230 years of constitutional history that has ever held that Congress violates the Appropriations Clause or separation of powers when it authorizes spending by statute, as it did for the Bureau.” Moreover, the Bureau argued that the appellate court’s contention that the CFPB’s funding was “impermissibly ‘double-insulated’ from congressional oversight” was incorrect because “Congress is fully capable of overseeing the Bureau’s spending, including because of several provisions in the Bureau’s statute that ensure its ability to supervise.” Adding that the court “should reject” the 5th Circuit’s analysis and “join every other court to address the issue—including the en banc D.C. Circuit—in upholding the Bureau’s statutory funding mechanism,” the agency further argued that even if the district court should disagree with this contention, it should still deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss because any alleged defect in the agency’s funding authorization “would not deprive the Bureau of the power to carry out the responsibilities given it by Congress to enforce the law.”
West Virginia AG pings CFPB on "unconstitutionally appropriated" funds
On October 24, the West Virginia attorney general sent a letter to CFPB Director Rohit Chopra, and to the leadership of both the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee, regarding the constitutionality of the Bureau’s continuing operation. As previously covered by a Buckley Special Alert, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB funding structure created by Congress violated the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” The 5th Circuit ruled that, although the CFPB spends money pursuant to a validly enacted statute, the structure violates the Appropriations Clause because the CFPB obtains its funds from the Federal Reserve (not the Treasury), the CFPB maintains funds in a separate account, the Appropriations Committees do not have authority to review the agency’s expenditures, and the Bureau exercises broad authority over the economy. In the letter, the AG argued that the Bureau cannot discharge its duties in a constitutionally permissible way. He further noted that the Bureau “plainly cannot do that with a funding scheme that ‘sever[s] any line of accountability between [Congress] and the CFPB.’” The AG urged the Bureau to reassess its future plans and to reevaluate whether its present regulations have any effect. The letter also requested answers to a series of questions, no later than November 1: (i) “Does the agency believe that any of the regulations that it promulgated under the unconstitutional funding scheme remain in effect? If so, which ones—and why? Similarly, how does the decision affect past enforcement actions?”; and (ii) “What plans does the Bureau plan to undertake to comply with the ruling? How will its ongoing enforcement efforts be effected? How will this change affect any promulgation of regulations? How will bank supervision continue, if at all?”
Special Alert: Fifth Circuit finds CFPB funding unconstitutional — Now what?
The Fifth Circuit ruled last night in CFSA v. CFPB that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s funding structure is unconstitutional, triggering a potential wave of implications discussed below.
The holdings
A panel of three Fifth Circuit judges unanimously held that the CFPB funding structure created by Congress violated the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” It ruled that, although the CFPB spends money pursuant to a validly enacted statute, the structure violates the Appropriations Clause because the CFPB obtains its funds from the Federal Reserve (not the Treasury), the CFPB maintains funds in a separate account, the Appropriations Committees do not have authority to review the agency’s expenditures, and the bureau exercises broad authority over the economy. The court rejected the bureau’s arguments that the funding structure was necessarily constitutional because it was created by and subject to Congress, and distinguished other agencies that are funded outside of the annual appropriations process.
5th Circuit overturns decision in FDCPA suit
On August 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned a district court’s grant of class certification in an FDCPA case, ruling that the plaintiff lacked standing. According to the opinion, the plaintiff incurred a debt after failing to pay her utility bills. The city hired a law firm who tried to collect the debt by sending the plaintiff a form letter demanding payment. Her debt had become delinquent four years and one day before the defendant sent its letter, which, under Texas law is “unenforceable.” The plaintiff filed suit against the law firm alleging that it had violated the FDCPA by making a misrepresentation in connection with an attempt to collect her debt. The plaintiff also sought to represent a class of Texas consumers who received the same form letter from the defendant regarding their time-barred debts. The district court rejected the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit, holding “that the violation of the plaintiff’s statutory rights under the FDCPA constituted a concrete injury-in-fact because those rights were substantive, not procedural.” The district court also “maintained that [the plaintiff’s] confusion qualified as a concrete injury-in-fact.”
On the appeal, the 5th Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff did not suffer a concrete injury and therefore lacked standing. The court held that the Supreme Court’s ruling in TransUnion v. Ramirez (covered by InfoBytes here) foreclosed the plaintiff’s theories that a violation of statutory rights under the FDCPA or accidentally paying a time-barred debt are concrete injuries. The appellate court noted that consulting with an attorney and not making a payment is not a concrete injury under Article III, stating that it is “not aware of any tort that makes a person liable for wasting another’s time.”