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  • Lender and owner to pay $12.5 million in civil money penalties in CFPB administrative action

    Courts

    On August 4, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended that a Delaware-based online payday lender and its CEO be held liable for violations of TILA, CFPA, and the EFTA and pay restitution of $38 million and $12.5 million in civil penalties in a CFPB administrative action. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in November 2015, the Bureau filed an administrative suit against the lender and its CEO alleging violations of TILA and the EFTA, and for engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Specifically, the CFPB argued that, from May 2008 through December 2012, the online lender (i) continued to debit borrowers’ accounts using remotely created checks after consumers revoked the lender’s authorization to do so; (ii) required consumers to repay loans via pre-authorized electronic fund transfers; and (iii) deceived consumers about the cost of short-term loans by providing them with contracts that contained disclosures based on repaying the loan in one payment, while the default terms called for multiple rollovers and additional finance charges. In 2016, an ALJ agreed with the Bureau’s contentions, and the defendants appealed the decision. In May 2019, CFPB Director Kraninger remanded the case to a new ALJ.

    After a new hearing, the ALJ concluded that the lender violated (i) TILA (and the CFPA by virtue of its TILA violation) by failing to clearly and conspicuously disclose consumers’ legal obligations; and (ii) the EFTA (and the CFPA by virtue of its EFTA violation) by “conditioning extensions of credit on repayment by preauthorized electronic fund transfers.” Moreover, the ALJ concluded that the lender and the lender’s owner engaged in deceptive acts or practices by misleading consumers into “believing that their APR, Finance Charges, and Total of Payments were much lower than they actually were.” Lastly, the ALJ concluded the lender and its owner engaged in unfair acts or practices by (i) failing to clearly disclose automatic rollover costs; (ii) misleading consumers about their repayment obligations; and (iii) obtaining authorization for remote checks in a “confusing manner” and using the remote checks to “withdraw money from consumers’ bank accounts after consumers attempted to block electronic access to their bank accounts.” The ALJ recommends that both the lender and its owner pay over $38 million in restitution, and orders the lender to pay $7.5 million in civil money penalties and the owner to pay $5 million in civil money penalties.

     

    Courts ALJ Civil Money Penalties Payday Lending EFTA CFPB TILA UDAAP

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  • D.C. Circuit remands SEC case to be heard by new ALJ

    Courts

    On September 19, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded an SEC case against an investment adviser and his company for a new hearing before another Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or before the Commission in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lucia v. SEC. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in June, the Supreme Court held that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers” subject to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. After the decision in Lucia, the SEC moved to remand the case for a new hearing. In response, the investment adviser moved to have the SEC’s previous orders, including those imposing penalties, set aside in whole, arguing that remand is not authorized in this circumstance; citing to Lucia, the investment adviser argued the penalties resulted from an unconstitutional hearing and the language concerning remand for a new hearing in Lucia was dicta and carried no weight. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument and denied the motion to set aside in part, citing D.C. Circuit precedent in stating “carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative.”

    Courts Federal Issues ALJ U.S. Supreme Court D.C. Circuit Appellate SEC

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  • Trump issues Executive Order removing ALJs from competitive service

    Federal Issues

    On July 10, President Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) excepting Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) from the federal government’s competitive hiring service. The EO is in response to the recent Supreme Court decision in Lucia v. SEC, which held that ALJs are “inferior officers” subject to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) The EO allows federal agencies to hire ALJs without going through the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) competitive selection process, which will give agencies the ability to select candidates who meet the agency’s specific needs— providing greater “flexibility and responsibility for ALJ appointments,” according to the White House announcement. The announcement emphasizes that the EO “reduces the legal uncertainty” over new ALJ appointments under the Appointments Clause in order to safeguard agencies’ enforcement of federal laws.

    Federal Issues ALJ U.S. Supreme Court SEC Trump Executive Order

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  • Supreme Court holds SEC ALJs are subject to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution

    Courts

    On June 21, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. SEC, that SEC administrative law judges (ALJs) are “inferior officers” subject to the Appointments Clause (Clause) of the Constitution. The case began when the SEC instituted an administrative proceeding against the petitioner resulting in a decision by the ALJ imposing sanctions against the petitioner, including civil penalties of $300,000 and a lifetime bar from the investment industry. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ALJ’s sanctions and rejected the petitioner’s argument that ALJs are officers of the United States and therefore subject to provisions of the Clause, including the requirement that officers be appointed by the president, the head of a department, or a court of law. The D.C. Circuit decision conflicts with subsequent decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th and 5th Circuits (available here and here).

    In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that ALJs are “Officers of the United States” subject to the Clause under the framework the Court used in Freytag v. Commissioner (concluding that U.S. Tax Court “special trial judges” are officers subject to the Clause). In support of this holding, the majority noted that ALJs receive a career appointment, exercise “significant discretion,” and if the SEC decides against reviewing a decision, their decisions become final and are “deemed the action of the Commission.”

    Notably, the ALJ that presided over the petitioner’s case is the same ALJ that presided over the CFPB’s claims against PHH, which ultimately lead to the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in PHH v. CFPB and the CFPB’s subsequent dismissal of the action (covered by Buckley Sandler here and here).

    Courts U.S. Supreme Court ALJ SEC PHH v. CFPB Single-Director Structure

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  • Supreme Court to review whether SEC’s ALJ appointment process is constitutional

    Courts

    On January 12, the U.S. Supreme Court announced it had granted a writ of certiorari in Lucia v. SEC—a case which challenges the SEC’s practice of appointing administrative law judges (ALJs) and moves the Court to consider whether the ALJ appointment practice violates the Appointments Clause (Clause) of the Constitution. In Lucia, the petitioner—against whom an ALJ had issued sanctions, imposed a lifetime securities ban, and fined $300,000—appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and argued that ALJs are officers of the United States and therefore subject to provisions of the Clause, including the requirement that officers be appointed by the president, the head of a department, or a court of law. However, the D.C. Circuit upheld the ALJs sanctions and ruled that ALJs are not “inferior officers” subject to the Clause. In his petition for certiorari, the petitioner claimed that because he was subjected to a “trial before an unconstitutionally constituted tribunal,” the ALJ’s decision should be dismissed or a new hearing granted.

    Notably, last November, the Solicitor General of the United States submitted a brief on behalf of the SEC to the Supreme Court, arguing that the SEC views in-house judges as officers of the U.S. government—not mere employees—who are subject to the Clause. Additionally, on November 30, the SEC ratified the appointment of its ALJs to resolve “any concerns that administrative proceedings presided over by its ALJs violate the Appointments Clause.”

    A decision by the Court may resolve a split between the D.C. Circuit, which has ruled that ALJs are not “inferior officers” of the U.S. government, and the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, which disagreed and ruled separately that ALJs are officers.

    See also previous Lucia coverage in an InfoBytes blog post and a Special Alert concerning the effect a decision in Lucia may have on the ongoing litigation in PHH v. CFPB.

    Courts SEC ALJ U.S. Supreme Court PHH v. CFPB

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