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Senators Introduce Legislation to Override Second Circuit’s Decision in Madden v. Midland
On July 27, a bipartisan group of senators introduced draft legislation (S. 1642), which would require bank loans, sold or transferred to another party, to maintain the same interest rate. As previously covered in InfoBytes, similar legislation (H.R. 3299) was introduced in the House earlier in July to reestablish a “legal precedent under federal banking laws that preempts a loan’s interest as valid when made.” Both measures come as a reaction to the 2015 Second Circuit decision in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, in which an appellate panel held that a nonbank entity taking assignment of debts originated by a national bank is not entitled to protection under the National Bank Act from state-law usury claims. The draft legislation seeks to amend the Revised Statutes, the Home Owners’ Loan Act, the Federal Credit Union Act, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
Legislation Introduced to Codify “Valid When Made” Doctrine
On July 19, Representative Patrick McHenry (R-N.C.), the Vice Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, and Representative Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.) introduced legislation designed to make it unlawful to change the rate of interest on certain loans after they have been sold or transferred to another party. As set forth in a July 19 press release issued by Rep. McHenry’s office, the Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017 (H.R. 3299) would reaffirm the “legal precedent under federal banking laws that preempts a loan’s interest as valid when made.”
Notably, a Second Circuit panel in 2015 in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC overturned a district court’s holding that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempted state law usury claims against purchasers of debt from national banks. (See Special Alert on Second Circuit decision here.)The appellate court held that state usury laws are not preempted after a national bank has transferred the loan to another party. The Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari last year. According to Rep. McHenry, “[t]his reading of the National Bank Act was unprecedented and has created uncertainty for fintech companies, financial institutions, and the credit markets.” H.R. 3299, however, will attempt to “restore[] consistency” to lending laws following the holding and “increase[] stability in our capital markets which have been upended by the Second Circuit’s unprecedented interpretation of our banking laws.”
Special Alert: Madden Class Action Moves Forward
On February 27, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a ruling in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC,[1] holding that New York’s fundamental public policy against usury overrides a Delaware choice-of-law clause in the plaintiff’s credit card agreement. The court allowed the plaintiff to proceed with Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims (and related state unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims) against the defendants, a debt buyer that had purchased the plaintiff’s charged-off credit card debt and its affiliated debt collector. The court did not allow plaintiff’s claims for violations of New York’s usury law to proceed, as it held that New York’s civil usury statute does not apply to defaulted debts and that the plaintiff cannot directly enforce the criminal usury statute. The court also granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification.
[1] No. 11-CV-8149, 2017 WL 758518 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017).
Click here to read full special alert* * *
If you have questions about the ruling or other related issues, visit our Class Actions practice for more information, or contact a Buckley Sandler attorney with whom you have worked in the past.
District Court Advances Securitization Case Involving N.Y. State Usury Law
On February 27, a U.S. District Court in White Plains, N.Y. issued an Order ruling on motions for summary judgment and class certification in a consumer class-action against a debt collection company that purchased defaulted consumer debt from a national bank, and its affiliate, which sought collection of debt charged at a rate in excess of New York state usury limits. Midland Funding v. Madden, [Opinion & Order] No. 11-CV-8149 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017).
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court had originally ruled in Defendants’ favor, holding that the National Banking Act (NBA) preempted state law usury claims against purchasers of debt from national banks. The Second Circuit, however, overturned that ruling in a May 2015 opinion to the extent it relied on the NBA, but remanded the case for a determination whether Delaware choice of law provisions in the credit agreement precluded the Plaintiff’s claims because the rates were not usurious in Delaware.
Now, revising the issue on remand, the District Court held that New York’s criminal usury cap (but not the civil usury) applies to Plaintiff’s defaulted debt, notwithstanding the Delaware choice of law provision. The Court reasoned that New York does not follow the “rule of validation” (calling for courts to assume the parties intended to enter into a valid contract and apply the law of the state whose usury law would sustain it). The Court concluded, therefore, that the Plaintiff could predicate her FDCPA claims on a violation of New York’s criminal usury cap. Based on the foregoing, the Court granted partial summary judgment for the Defendant. The court also granted, but modified, Plaintiff’s request for class certification.
SCOTUS Denies Petition for Certiorari in Securitization Case Involving State Usury Law
On June 27, the United State Supreme Court denied a debt buyer’s petition for certiorari in a Second Circuit case that raises the issue of whether New York’s state usury law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) when a national bank-originated debt is purchased by a nonbank. Midland v. Madden, No. 15-610 (U.S. June 27, 2017). As previously covered in InfoBytes, the nonbank debt buyer was assigned debt owed by a New York consumer. The debt carried an interest rate in excess of that permitted by New York law but which was permitted by the law of the bank’s home state, which the bank lawfully “exported.” Facing a usury challenge, the debt buyer argued that it was able to continue charging the valid rate made by the national bank and that it did not have to abide by the consumer debtor’s state usury laws. The Second Circuit rejected the debt buyer’s argument, reasoning that the NBA did not apply to the debt buyer because it was not acting on the national bank’s behalf. The Supreme Court did not grant the debt buyer’s petition for certiorari, leaving the Second Circuit ruling in effect. Notably, at the request of the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General and the OCC filed a brief stating the position of the United States as to whether the Supreme Court should grant the petition for certiorari. Although the brief advised that the Court not grant certiorari, the Government’s brief sharply criticized the Second Circuit’s decision.
Federal Court in New York Dismisses State-Law Claims Against National Bank and Service Provider on Preemption Grounds
On March 9, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the preemption of state-law claims brought against a national bank and its non-bank servicer provider. Edwards v. Macy’s Inc., No. 14-cv-8616 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 2016). The plaintiff alleged that, without her consent, she had been enrolled in and charged for a payment-protection program in connection with her private-label, department store credit card. She sued the issuing bank – a national bank based in South Dakota – and the department store, asserting (among other things) that both had violated the South Dakota Consumer Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The court held that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the National Bank Act and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations.
The court held that the plaintiff’s state law claims against the bank were expressly preempted by OCC regulations, which provide that “[n]ational banks’ debt cancellation contracts and debt suspension agreements are governed by this part and applicable Federal law and regulations, and not by State law.” Opinion at 7 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 37.1). In addition, the court held that the state law claims were impliedly preempted because the OCC regulations are “sufficiently comprehensive as to crowd out state law,” and requiring the bank “to comply with state law that reaches the same subject matter would impermissibly ‘prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.’” Id. at 9 (citing Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 33 (1996)).
Significantly, the court held that claims brought against the non-bank department store also were preempted. The court agreed with the plaintiff that the Second Circuit’s recent holding in Madden v. Midland Funding means that “OCC preemption extends to an entity that is not a national bank only where that entity is an agent or subsidiary of a national bank or is otherwise acting on behalf of the national bank in carrying out the bank’s business.” Id. at 13 (citing Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 249 (2d Cir. 2015)). However, it held that the plaintiff’s complaint clearly alleged that the department store did act on behalf of the bank in carrying out the bank’s powers. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the department store provided marketing services, credit processing, collections, and customer service to the bank with respect to the private-label credit cards and ancillary products such as the payment protection program. The court therefore concluded that “[t]he federal preemption that cloaks [the bank] extends to [the department store] in connection with the activities in suit,” and it dismissed the complaint. Id. at 14.
It should be noted that the opinion is silent on the Dodd-Frank Act’s express rejection of federal preemption for agents (and subsidiaries) of national banks. In its preemption analysis, the court stated that it was unclear whether “Dodd–Frank even applies to Plaintiff’s claims, because Dodd–Frank’s preemption amendments regarding national banks did not go into effect until July 21, 2011, months after Plaintiff enrolled in Payment Protection.” Id. at 8. As such, the case can be viewed (and distinguished by other courts) as applying pre-Dodd-Frank Act preemption standards in analyzing the specific question of whether federal preemption extends to non-banks that provide services to banks in connection with loans or other extensions of credit.
Debt Collection and Beyond in 2015
In 2015, the CFPB further expanded its reach into debt collection through a number of enforcement actions. The CFPB also continues to conduct research on a potential rulemaking regarding debt collection activities, which may address information accuracy concerns involving debt sales and other collection activity, as well as many other issues regarding how creditors collect their own debts and oversee collectors working on their behalf. In addition to CFPB activity, this year’s Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC decision has important implications beyond the debt collection industry. Finally, developments regarding the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and collections will likely be of interest to regulatory agencies in the new year.
Debt Sale Consent Orders and Regulatory Guidance
Among the CFPB enforcement actions relevant to debt collection in 2015 were two consent orders with large debt buyers. These orders resolved allegations that the debt buyers, among other things, engaged in robo-signing, sued (or threatened to sue) on stale debt, made inaccurate statements to consumers, and engaged in other allegedly illegal collection practices. In particular, the CFPB criticized the practice of purchasing debts without obtaining supporting documentation or information, or taking sufficient steps to verify the accuracy of the amounts claimed due before commencing collection activities. Under the consent orders, one company agreed to provide up to $42 million in consumer refunds, pay a $10 million civil money penalty, and cease collecting on a portfolio of consumer debt with a face value of over $125 million. The second company agreed to provide $19 million in restitution, pay an $8 million civil money penalty, and cease collecting on a consumer debt portfolio with a face value of more than $3 million. In addition, both companies agreed to refrain from reselling consumer debt more generally.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) has also been active in issues affecting debt sales, issuing Bulletin 2014-37. The Bulletin provides guidance requiring national banks to provide the consumer with notice that a debt has been sold, the dollar amount of the debt transferred, and the name and address of the debt buyer; perform due diligence on the debt buyer; provide the debt buyer with the signed debt contract and a detailed payment history; and take other measures designed to ensure that debt buyers fairly and appropriately collect debts that they purchase.
Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC
The Second Circuit’s 2015 decision in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC carries potentially far-reaching ramifications for the secondary market for credit. In this case, the court held that non- bank assignees of credit obligations originated by national banks are not entitled to rely on National Bank Act preemption from state-law usury claims. In reaching this conclusion, the Court appears to have not considered the “Valid-When-Made Doctrine”—a longstanding principle which provides a loan that is not usurious when made does not become usurious when assigned to another party. Since buyers of defaulted debt, securitization vehicles, hedge funds, and other purchasers of whole loans are often non-bank entities, this decision could create a heightened risk environment for those in the secondary credit market, particularly those who purchase loans originated by banks pursuant to private-label arrangements and other bank relationships, such as those common to the peer-to-peer and marketplace lending industries and various types of on-line consumer credit. The Second Circuit decided not to rehear Madden and the defendants have filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Bank sellers of loans and related assets and non-bank assignees of bank-originated credit obligations would be prudent to consider the risks that Madden poses to their business, investments, and operations and whether there are risk mitigation measures that may be available.
Telephone Consumer Protection Act
Recent declaratory rulings by the Federal Communications Commission regarding the TCPA included clarifying the ability of consumers to revoke their consent to receive autodialed calls and requiring callers making autodialed calls to stop calling a number after one call when it has been reassigned to a new subscriber. Debt collectors and others should take note of these issues, as TCPA compliance will likely continue to be an area of interest for regulators moving forward.
Special Alert: Second Circuit Will Not Rehear Madden Decision That Threatens To Upset Secondary Credit Markets
Two months ago we issued a Special Alert regarding the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, which held that a nonbank entity taking assignment of debts originated by a national bank is not entitled to protection under the National Bank Act (“NBA”) from state-law usury claims. We explained that the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Madden ignored long-standing precedent upholding an assignee’s right to charge and collect interest in accordance with an assigned credit contract that was valid when made. And, because the entire secondary market for credit relies on this Valid-When-Made Doctrine to enforce credit agreements pursuant to their terms, the decision potentially carries far-reaching ramifications for securitization vehicles, hedge funds, other purchasers of whole loans, including those who purchase loans originated by banks pursuant to private-label arrangements and other bank relationships, such as those common to marketplace lending industries and various types of on-line consumer credit.
After the decision, Midland Funding, the assignee of the loan at issue, petitioned the Second Circuit to rehear the case either by the panel or en banc – a petition that was broadly supported by banking and securities industry trade associations in amicus briefs. On August 12, the court denied that petition.
Click Here to View the Full Special Alert
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Questions regarding the matters discussed in this Alert may be directed to any of our lawyers listed below, or to any other BuckleySandler attorney with whom you have consulted in the past.
- Walter E. Zalenski, (202) 461-2910
- Jeffrey P. Naimon, (202) 349-8030
- John P. Kromer, (202) 349-8040
Special Alert: Second Circuit Decision Threatens to Upset Secondary Credit Markets
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC held that a nonbank entity taking assignment of debts originated by a national bank is not entitled to protection under the National Bank Act (“NBA”) from state-law usury claims. In reaching this conclusion, the Court appears to have not considered the “Valid-When-Made Doctrine”—a longstanding principle of usury law that if a loan is not usurious when made, then it does not become usurious when assigned to another party. If left undisturbed, the Court’s decision may well have broad and alarming ramifications. The decision could significantly disrupt secondary markets for consumer and commercial credit, impacting a broad cross-section of financial services providers and other businesses that rely on the availability and post-sale validity of loans originated by national or state-chartered depository institutions.
Click here to view the full special alert.
* * *
Questions regarding the matters discussed in this Alert may be directed to any of our lawyers listed below, or to any other BuckleySandler attorney with whom you have consulted in the past.
- Walter E. Zalenski, (202) 461-2910, wzalenski@buckleyfirm.com
- Jeffrey P. Naimon, (202) 349-8030, jnaimon@buckleyfirm.com
- John P. Kromer, (202) 349-8040, jkromer@buckleyfirm.com
2nd Circuit Reinstates Consumer Class Action Against National Debt Buyer Through Preemption Decision
On May 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled against a debt collection firm, holding that “non-national bank entities are not entitled to protections under the National Bank Act (“NBA”) from state-law usury claims merely because they are assignees of a national bank.” Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 14-2131-cv, 2015 WL 2435657 (2nd Cir. May 22, 2015). The Second Circuit’s holding reversed the Southern District of New York’s decision, which held that it was permissible for the firm to charge a consumer an interest rate of 27%—a rate exceeding New York’s 25% usury limit—because the firm was an assignee of a national bank. The Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment “[b]ecause neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank, or is otherwise acting on behalf of a national bank, and because application of the state law on which [the plaintiff’s] claim relies would not significantly interfere with any national bank’s ability to exercise its powers under the NBA.” Id. at *1. According to the court, extending “NBA preemption to third-party debt collectors such as the defendants would be an overly broad application of the NBA” which “would create an end-run around usury laws for non-national bank entities that are not acting on behalf of a national bank.” Id. at *5. The Second Circuit also vacated the District Court’s judgment as to the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim and the denial of class certification because those rulings were predicated on the District Court’s preemption analysis. The case, which has been argued on the premise that New York state usury law applies, has been remanded back to the district court to determine choice-of-law based on a Delaware choice-of-law clause in the original debt agreement.
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