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Louisiana Office of Financial Institutions declares emergency for repossession and escrow agents
On April 9, Louisiana Office of Financial Institutions Commissioner John Ducrest declared a state of emergency and issued guidance for repossession agents and bond for deed escrow agents due to the Covid-19 crisis. The order: (i) granted authority to temporarily close or relocate operations, services, and products; (ii) waived the 30-day notification requirement pertaining to closures or relocations of operations, services, and products; and (iii) provided guidance for reporting operational changes and temporary relocations. The declaration expires April 30, unless otherwise extended or renewed.
California Department of Business Oversight issues guidance to permit licensees to work from home
On March 22, the California Department of Business Oversight (Department) issued guidance to escrow agents, finance lenders and servicers, student loan servicers, residential mortgage lenders and servicers, and mortgage loan originators in light of Covid-19 permitting employees of licensees to conduct activities from home that normally would require a branch license, provided that appropriate measures are taken to protect consumers and their data. Further, the Department will not criticize student loan servicers or licensees sponsoring MLOs who permit their respective employees to work from home, provided that certain data security and other conditions are met. Escrow Law licensees may also follow this guidance, however the licensees must still comply with the Fidelity Corporation or the licensee’s surety bond. Additionally, licensees are encouraged to assist consumers including through, among other things, offering payment accommodations.
District court: Maryland’s interest on escrow law not preempted by National Bank Act
On February 24, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland denied a national bank’s motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging the bank violated Maryland law by not paying interest on escrow sums for residential mortgages. After the bank allegedly failed to pay the mortgage escrow interest, the consumer filed a lawsuit asserting various claims including for violation of Section 12-109 of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), which “requires lenders to pay interest on funds maintained in escrow on behalf of borrowers.” In response, the bank filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the state law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) and by 2004 OCC preemption regulations.
The court disagreed, determining that under the Dodd-Frank Act, national banks are required to pay interest on escrow accounts when mandated by applicable state or federal law. Citing previous decisions in similar escrow interest cases brought against the same bank in other states (covered by InfoBytes here and here), the court stated that Section 12-109 “does not prevent or significantly interfere with [the bank’s] exercise of its federal banking authority, because [Section] 12-109’s ‘interference’ is minimal, when compared with statutes that the Supreme Court has previously found were preempted.” The court noted that state law—which “still allows [the bank] to require escrow accounts for its borrowers”—provides that the bank must pay a small amount of interest to borrowers if it chooses to maintain escrow accounts. Moreover, the court concluded that the bank’s “suggestions about interference are belied by the fact that its direct competitors dutifully comply with [Section] 12-109.” As for the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation, Section 34.4, the court determined that the regulation is entitled to minimal deference, and noted that it is not clear that the OCC, in promulgating the regulations, “ever considered whether the NBA preempts state laws that mandate payment of interest for escrow accounts.” According to the court, the regulations do not mention state escrow interest laws at all. As such, the court stated that it “will not defer to the OCC’s regulation, or to the agency’s current position that [Section] 12-109 is preempted.”
CFPB releases annual HMDA and TILA adjustments
On December 18, the CFPB announced final rules adjusting the asset-size thresholds under HMDA (Regulation C) and TILA (Regulation Z). Both rules take effect on January 1, 2020.
Under HMDA, institutions with assets below certain dollar thresholds are exempt from the collection and reporting requirements. The final rule increases the asset-size exemption threshold for banks, savings associations, and credit unions from $46 million to $47 million, thereby exempting institutions with assets of $47 million or less as of December 31, from collecting and reporting HMDA data in 2020.
TILA exempts certain entities from the requirement to establish escrow accounts when originating higher-priced mortgage loans (HPMLs), including entities with assets below the asset-size threshold established by the CFPB. The final rule increases this asset-size exemption threshold from $2.167 billion to $2.202 billion, thereby exempting creditors with assets of $2.202 billion or less as of December 31, from the requirement to establish escrow accounts for HPMLs in 2020.
District Court: New York’s interest on escrow law not preempted by National Bank Act
On September 30, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the National Bank Act (NBA) does not preempt a New York law requiring interest on mortgage escrow accounts. According to the opinion, plaintiffs brought a pair of putative class actions against a national bank seeking interest on funds deposited into their mortgage escrow accounts, as required by New York General Obligation Law § 5-601. The bank moved to dismiss both complaints, arguing that the NBA preempts the state law. The district court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract can proceed, while dismissing the others. The court concluded there is “clear evidence that Congress intended mortgage escrow accounts, even those administered by national banks, to be subject to some measure of consumer protection regulation.” As for the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation, the court determined that there is no evidence that “at this time, the agency gave any thought whatsoever to the specific question raised in this case, which is whether the NBA preempts escrow interest laws,” citing to and agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America (which held that a national bank must comply with a California law that requires mortgage lenders to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts, previously covered by InfoBytes here). Lastly, the court applied the preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, and found that the law does not “significantly interfere” with the banks’ power to administer mortgage escrow accounts, noting that it only “requires the Bank to pay interest on the comparatively small sums” deposited into the accounts and does not “bar the creation of mortgage escrow accounts, or subject them to state visitorial control, or otherwise limit the terms of their use.”
Mortgage servicer agrees to pay $7.8 million in escrow interest in CDBO action
On June 18, the California Department of Business Oversight (CDBO) announced a $7.8 million settlement with a mortgage servicer to pay allegedly overdue escrow interest to more than 94,000 California homeowners. According to the stipulation reflecting the settlement, the allegations result from a 2017 CDBO mortgage servicing examination, which found that the servicer “had failed to pay [two percent] interest on escrow impounds in violation of” California Fin. Code § 50202(d) and California Civ. Code § 2954.8. The settlement requires the servicer to pay the two percent interest for the period of July 1, 2014, through December 31, 2018, to 94,483 borrowers with escrow impound accounts. The servicer also agreed to pay two percent interest on escrow impound accounts for California residential mortgages going forward, although it reserved the right to stop paying interest in certain circumstances, including a final civil order or decision from the California Supreme Court or U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit finding that Financial Code Section 2954.8 is not applicable to national banks or their subsidiaries.
11th Circuit: Consumer’s repayment agreement not an escrow account
On April 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that a consumer’s insurance repayment plan on her reverse mortgage did not qualify as an escrow account under RESPA’s Regulation X. According to the opinion, a consumer’s reverse mortgage required her to maintain hazard insurance on her property, which she elected to pay herself, and did not establish an escrow account with the mortgage servicer to pay her insurance and property taxes. After her insurance lapsed, the mortgage servicer advanced her over $5,000 in funds paid directly to her insurance carrier to ensure the property was covered, subject to a repayment agreement. After the consumer failed to make any payments under the agreement, the servicer initiated a foreclosure action against the consumer and obtained a forced-placed insurance policy when the insurance lapsed for a second time. Ultimately, a state-run forgivable loan program brought the consumer’s past due balance current and excess funds were placed in a trust to cover future insurance payments on the property. The consumer filed an action against the mortgage servicer alleging the servicer violated RESPA’s implementing Regulation X when it initiated forced-placed insurance, because the repayment agreement purportedly established an escrow account, which required the servicer to advance the funds for insurance. The district court entered judgment in favor of the servicer.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that no escrow account existed between the consumer and the servicer, emphasizing that nothing in the repayment agreement set aside funds for the servicer to pay insurance or taxes on the property in the future. The 11th Circuit rejected the consumer’s characterization of the repayment agreement as an arrangement under Regulation X “where the servicer adds a portion of the borrower’s payment to principal and subsequently deducts from principal the disbursements for escrow account items.” The 11th Circuit reasoned that not only did the consumer never make a principal payment to the servicer, the consumer’s characterization is “entirely inconsistent” with the reverse mortgage security instrument. Because the servicer never deducted anything from the principal when it disbursed funds to pay the insurance, the repayment agreement did not qualify as an escrow agreement under Regulation X.
HOLA preemption question moves to 9th Circuit
On February 27, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a national bank’s request to certify for interlocutory appeal whether state law claims involving interest on escrow accounts were preempted by the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA). As previously covered by InfoBytes, three plaintiffs filed suit against the bank, arguing that it must comply with a California law that requires mortgage lenders to pay interest on funds held in a consumer’s escrow account, following the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America. The bank moved to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that the claims were preempted by HOLA. The court acknowledged that HOLA preempted the state interest law as to the originator of the mortgages, a now-defunct federal thrift, but disagreed with the bank’s assertion that the preemption attached throughout the life of the loan, including after the loan was transferred to a bank whose own lending is not covered by HOLA. Specifically, the court looked to the legislative intent of HOLA and noted it was unclear if Congress intended for preemption to attach through the life of the loan, but found a clear goal of consumer protection.
By granting the motion for interlocutory appeal, the court noted that the frequency with which the HOLA issue arises, “weighs in favor of allowing the Ninth Circuit to resolve this question.” Moreover, the court cited to a recent 9th Circuit case, in which the appellate court recognized HOLA preemption as a “novel legal issue.” The court also temporarily granted the bank’s request to stay the proceedings pending the resolution of the 9th Circuit action.
District Court rejects dismissal bid for California interest on escrow class action
On December 7, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied a bank’s motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging the bank violated the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) by not paying interest to residential mortgagors on funds held in escrow accounts, as required by California law. The three plaintiffs filed the complaint against the bank after the March decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Lusnak v. Bank of America, which held that a national bank must comply with a California law that requires mortgage lenders to pay interest on the funds held in a consumer’s escrow account. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) The plaintiffs argued that the 9th Circuit decision requires the bank to comply with the California law requiring interest on funds held in escrow.
In response, the bank filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to stay the case, on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to provide the bank with notice and an opportunity to cure alleged misconduct prior to judicial action as required by the mortgage deed, and that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA). The court rejected these arguments, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the ambiguous provisions in the mortgage deed do not foreclosure their claims, concluding “[t]o deprive Plaintiffs of recourse to their statutory rights based on an ambiguous contractual provision would also frustrate the consumer protection purposes of those statutes.” As to the HOLA argument, the court acknowledged that HOLA preempted the state interest law as to the originator of the mortgages, a now-defunct federal thrift, but disagreed with the bank’s assertion that the preemption attached throughout the life of the loan, including after the loan is transferred to a bank whose own lending is not covered by HOLA. Specifically, the court looked to the legislative intent of HOLA and noted it was unclear if Congress intended for preemption to attach through the life of the loan, but found a clear goal of consumer protection. Therefore, the court concluded that “[a]llowing preemption may run contrary to HOLA's purpose and could result in a gross miscarriage of justice” by depriving homeowners of state law protections.
Additionally, the court rejected as moot the alternative request to stay the case pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of Lusnak, because the Supreme Court denied the petition of writ in that case in November (covered by InfoBytes here).
Supreme Court will not hear 9th Circuit interest on escrow preemption decision
On November 19, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit’s March decision, which held that a California law requiring banks to pay interest on mortgage escrow funds is not preempted by federal law. As previously covered by InfoBytes, a national bank petitioned for writ of certiorari in August, arguing the 9th Circuit’s decision—holding that the Dodd-Frank Act of 2011 codified the existing National Bank Act preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson—warranted further review “because it creates significant uncertainty about whether national banks must comply with similar laws in other states” and whether other state banking laws also apply to national banks. Additionally, the petition argued the uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that the appellate court “disregarded and refused to enforce longstanding OCC regulations” and that the court interpreted the Barnett decision incorrectly.