InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
U.S. Solicitor General: Supreme Court can decide on severability clause without deciding CFPB's future
On February 14, U.S. Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco filed a reply brief for the CFPB in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court could decide whether the CFPB’s single-director structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II without deciding whether the Bureau as a whole should survive. “Although the removal restriction is unconstitutional, Congress has expressly provided that the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act shall be unaffected,” Francisco said, replying in part to arguments made by Paul D. Clement, the lawyer selected by the Court to defend the leadership structure of the Bureau. As previously covered by InfoBytes, Clement argued, among other things, that Seila Law’s constitutionality arguments are “remarkably weak” and that “a contested removal is the proper context to address a dispute over the President’s removal authority.” Clement also contended that “there is no ‘removal clause’ in the Constitution,” and that because the “constitutional text is simply silent on the removal of executive officers” it does not mean there is a “promising basis for invalidating an Act of Congress.” According to Francisco, Seila Law’s arguments for invalidating the entirety of Title X of Dodd-Frank “are insufficient to overcome the severability clause’s plain text,” and its “arguments for ignoring the severability questions altogether are both procedurally and substantively wrong.” Francisco further emphasized that “refusing to apply the severability provision . . .would be severely disruptive” because the Bureau is the only federal agency dedicated solely to consumer financial protection.
Seila Law also filed a reply brief the same day, countering that Clement offered “no valid justification” for the Court to rule on the severability question separately, and arguing that a “civil investigative demand issued and enforced by an unaccountable director is void, and the only appropriate resolution is to order the denial of the CFPB’s petition for enforcement.” Seila Law further contended that the Court should reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision from last May—which deemed the CFPB to be constitutionally structured and upheld a district court’s ruling enforcing Seila Law’s obligation to comply with a 2017 civil investigative demand—and “leave to Congress the quintessentially legislative decision of how the CFPB should function going forward.”
Notably, Francisco disagreed with Seila Law’s argument that the 9th Circuit’s judgment should be reversed outright, stating that to do so “would deprive the Bureau of ratification arguments” that the 9th Circuit chose not to address by instead upholding the removal restriction’s constitutionality. The Bureau’s ratification arguments at the time, Francisco stated, contended that even if the removal restriction was found to be unconstitutional, “the CID could still be enforced because the Bureau’s former Acting Director—who was removable at will—had ratified it.” As such, Francisco recommended that the Court “confirm that the severability clause means what it says and remand the case to the [9th Circuit] to resolve any remaining case-specific ratification questions.”
The same day, the Court approved Seila Law’s motion for enlargement of time for oral argument and for divided argument. The time will be divided as follows: 20 minutes for Seila Law, 20 minutes for the solicitor general, 20 minutes for the court-appointed amicus curiae, and 10 minutes for the House of Representatives.
Find continuing InfoBytes coverage on Seila here.
CFPB denies debt collector’s request to set aside CID
On February 6, the CFPB released a Decision and Order denying a debt collection company’s (petitioner) request to set aside or modify a third-party Civil Investigative Demand (CID) issued by the Bureau, and directing the petitioner to provide all information required by the CID. The CID in dispute was issued to the petitioner by the CFPB in November and seeks documents and written responses pertaining to the petitioner’s business practices and its relationship with a New York-based debt collection law firm. The CID requests information regarding whether “debt collectors, furnishers, or associated persons” had, among other things, (i) violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act by ignoring warnings regarding debts resulting from identity theft “in a manner that was unfair, deceptive or abusive”; (ii) violated the FDCPA by disregarding cease-and-desist requests or by failing to provide required notices or making false or misleading statements; or (iii) violated the FCRA by “fail[ing] to correct and update furnished information, or fail[ing] to maintain reasonable policies and procedures.”
In its petition to set aside or modify the CID, the petitioner set out four primary arguments: (i) the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional, and it therefore “lacks authority to proceed with enforcement activity”; (ii) the CID improperly seeks attorney-client privileged information; (iii) the CID is “overly broad,” does not apply to the petitioner, and does not sufficiently provide the “nature of the conduct under investigation and the applicable provisions of law”; and (iv) the CID improperly seeks information beyond the applicable statute of limitations.
The Bureau’s denial of the petitioner’s request addresses each of the petitioner’s arguments. Regarding the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure, the order asserts that “the administrative process set out in the [B]ureau’s statute and regulations for petitioning to modify or set aside a CID is not the proper forum for raising and adjudicating challenges to the constitutionality of the [B]ureau’s statute.” In response to the petitioner’s attorney-client privilege argument, the order states that the petitioner “does not ask…to modify the CID to avoid seeking privileged information—it only asks that the CID be quashed in its entirety.” The Bureau states that because the petitioner makes a “blanket assertion” of attorney-client privilege rather than providing the required privilege log in order to properly claim privilege over materials requested in the CID before filing its petition, the petitioner’s argument is “procedurally improper” and does not show that the “CID should be set aside on these grounds.” To the petitioner’s lack of specificity argument, the order states that the CID “sets forth in detail both the conduct under investigation and applicable laws,” adding that there is no requirement that the Bureau disclose the targets of its “ongoing and confidential law-enforcement investigations.” The order also rejects the petitioner’s statute of limitations argument, explaining that the Bureau is not limited to the three years preceding the CID, but “instead what matters is whether the information is relevant to conduct for which liability can be lawfully imposed.”
Kraninger testifies at House hearing; final payday rule expected in April
On February 6, CFPB Director Kathy Kraninger testified at a House Financial Services Committee hearing on the CFPB’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The hearing covered the semi-annual report to Congress on the Bureau’s work from April 1, 2019, through September 30, 2019. In her opening remarks, Committee Chairwoman Maxine Waters argued, among other things, that the Bureau’s recent policy statement on the “abusiveness” standard in supervision and enforcement matters “undercuts” Dodd-Frank’s prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices. Waters also challenged Kraninger on her support for the joint notice of proposed rulemaking issued by the OCC and FDIC to strengthen and modernize Community Reinvestment Act regulations (covered by a Buckley Special Alert), arguing that the proposal would lead to disinvestment in communities, while emphasizing that Kraninger’s actions have not demonstrated the Bureau’s responsibility to meaningfully protect consumers. However, in her opening statement and written testimony, Kraninger highlighted several actions recently taken by the Bureau to protect consumers, and emphasized the Bureau’s commitment to preventing harm by “building a culture of compliance throughout the financial system while supporting free and competitive markets that provide for informed consumer choice.”
Additional highlights of Kraninger’s testimony include:
- Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Education (Department). Kraninger discussed the recently announced information sharing agreement (covered by InfoBytes here) between the Bureau and the Department, intended to protect student borrowers by clarifying the roles and responsibilities for each agency and permitting the sharing of student loan complaint data analysis, recommendations, and data analytic tools. Kraninger stated that the MOU will give the Department the same near real-time access to the Bureau’s complaint database enjoyed by other government partners, and also told the Committee that the Bureau and Department are currently discussing a second supervisory MOU.
- Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans. Kraninger told the Committee that a rewrite of the payday lending rule—which will eliminate requirements for lenders to assess a borrower’s ability to repay loans—is expected in April. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Kraninger noted that the Bureau is currently reviewing an “extensive number of comments” and plans to address a petition on the rule’s payments provision. “[F]inancial institutions have argued that there were some products pulled into that that were, you know, unintended,” she stated. “[W]orking through all of that and. . .moving forward in a way that is transparent in. . .April is what I am planning to do.”
- Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgages (QM). Kraninger discussed the Bureau’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking that would modify the QM Rule by moving away from the 43 percent debt to income ratio requirement and adopt an alternative such as a pricing threshold to ensure responsible, affordable mortgage credit is available to consumers. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) She stated that the Bureau would welcome legislation from Congress in this area.
- Supervision and Enforcement. Kraninger repeatedly emphasized that supervision is an important tool for the Bureau, and stated in her written testimony that during the reporting period discussed, “the Bureau’s Fair Lending Supervision program initiated 16 supervisory events at financial services institutions under the Bureau’s jurisdiction to determine compliance with federal laws intended to ensure the fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory access to credit for both individuals and communities, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act [] and HMDA.” In addition to discussing recent enforcement actions, Kraninger also highlighted three innovation policies: the Trial Disclosure Program Policy, No-Action Letter Policy, and the Compliance Assistance Sandbox Policy. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
- Military Lending Act (MLA). Kraninger reiterated her position that she does not believe Dodd-Frank gives the Bureau the authority to supervise financial institutions for military lending compliance, and repeated her request for Congress to grant the Bureau clear authority to do so. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Congressman Barr (R-KY) noted that while he introduced H.R. 442 last month in response to Kraninger’s request, the majority has denied the mark up.
- UDAAP. Kraninger fielded a number of questions on the Bureau’s recent abusiveness policy statement. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) Several Democrats told Kraninger the new policy will put unnecessary constraints on the Bureau’s enforcement powers, while some Republicans said the policy fails to define what constitutes an abusive act or practice. Kraninger informed the Committee that the policy statement is intended to “clarify abusiveness and separate it from deceptive and unfairness because Congress explicitly gave us those three authorities.” Kraninger reiterated that the Bureau will seek monetary relief only when the entity has failed to make a good faith effort to comply, and that “[r]estitution for consumers will be the priority in these cases.” She further emphasized that “in no way should that policy be read to say that we would not bring abusiveness claims.” Congresswoman Maloney (D-NY) argued, however, that a 2016 fine issued against a national bank for allegedly unfair and abusive conduct tied to the bank’s incentive compensation sales practices “would have been substantially lower if the [B]ureau hadn’t charged [the bank] with abus[ive] conduct also.” Kraninger replied that the Bureau could have gotten “the same amount of restitution and other penalties associated with unfairness alone.”
- Constitutionality Challenge. Kraninger reiterated that while she agrees with Seila Law on the Bureau’s single-director leadership structure, she differs on how the matter should be resolved. “Congress obviously provided a clear mission for this agency but there are some questions around. . .this and I want the uncertainty to be resolved,” Kraninger testified. “Congress will have the opportunity to make any changes or respond to that and I think that’s appropriate,” she continued. “I would very much like to see a resolution on this question because it has hampered the CFPB’s ability to carry out its mission, virtually since its inception.” (Continuing InfoBytes coverage on Seila Law LLC v. CFPB here.)
Parties file amicus briefs in CFPB constitutionality challenge
On January 22, a coalition of attorneys general from 23 states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should preserve the CFPB and other consumer protections provide under Title X of Dodd-Frank. Last October the Court granted cert in Seila to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II. The Court also directed the parties to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which sets up the CFPB’s single director structure and imposes removal for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional. (Previous InfoBytes coverage of the parties’ submissions available here.) In their amicus brief, the AGs argue that the Bureau’s structure is constitutional, and that—even if the for-cause removal provision is deemed invalid—the Bureau and the rest of Title X should survive. The brief highlights joint enforcement actions and information sharing between the states and the Bureau, and emphasizes the importance of Title X provisions that are unrelated to the Bureau but provide states “powerful new tools” for combating fraud and abuse. “These provisions are entirely independent of the provisions governing the CFPB, and they serve distinct policy goals that Congress would not have wanted to abandon even if the CFPB itself were no longer operative,” the AGs write. While the AGs support the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional (previously covered by InfoBytes here), they stress that should the leadership structure be declared unconstitutional, the specific clause should be severed from the rest of Dodd-Frank. According to the AGs, “[s]everability is supported not only by [Dodd-Frank’s] express severability clause, but also by Congress’s strongly expressed intent to create a more robust consumer-protection regime to avert another financial crisis.” Moreover, the AGs assert that the states would suffer concrete harm if the Court decides to eliminate the Bureau or rule that the entirety of Title X should be invalidated.
The same day the U.S. House of Representatives filed an amicus brief arguing that the Court should resolve Seila without deciding the constitutionality of the Bureau director’s removal protection because the removal protection has no bearing on the issue in the case, which is an action addressing whether the Bureau’s civil investigative demand should be enforced. However, should the Court take up the constitutionality question, the brief asserts it should uphold the removal protection. “In establishing the CFPB, Congress built upon its long history of creating, and this Court’s long history of upholding, independent agencies.” The brief states that the “CFPB performs the same functions independent regulators have long performed, and it does so under the same for-cause standard this Court first blessed 85 years ago. The CFPB’s single-director structure does not transform that traditional standard into an infringement on the President’s authority.”
Earlier on January 21, Seila Law filed an unopposed motion for divided argument and enlargement of time for oral argument, which states that all parties “agree that divided argument is warranted among petitioner, the government, and the court-appointed amicus.” The brief suggests a total of 70 minutes, with 20 minutes for the petitioner, 20 minutes for the government, and 30 minutes for the court-appointed amicus, and notes that any time allotted to the House of Representative should come from the court-appointed amicus’ time. (The House filed a separate brief asking to be allotted oral argument time.)
A full list of amicus briefs is available here. Oral arguments are set for March 3.
Basis for invalidating CFPB is “remarkably weak,” says court-appointed defender
On January 15, Paul Clement, the lawyer selected by the U.S. Supreme Court to defend the leadership structure of the CFPB, filed a brief in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB arguing that Seila Law’s constitutionality arguments are “remarkably weak” and that “a contested removal is the proper context to address a dispute over the President’s removal authority.” First, Clement stated that “there is no ‘removal clause’ in the Constitution,” and that because the “constitutional text is simply silent on the removal of executive officers” it does not mean there is a “promising basis for invalidating an Act of Congress.” Moreover, the Constitution leaves it to Congress to decide “all manner of questions about the organization and structure of executive-branch departments and officers,” Clement wrote. Second, Clement disagreed with the argument that Congress cannot impose modest restrictions on the President’s ability to remove executive officers, so long as the President is the one exercising the removal powers. Third, Clement noted that in the past, the Court has repeatedly upheld the ability to place permissible restrictions on a President’s removal authority.
Clement further contended, among other things, that the dispute in Seila is “not just unripe, but entirely theoretical.” He referenced the Bureau’s brief filed last September (covered by InfoBytes here), in which the CFPB argued that the for-cause restriction on the President’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers, and noted that “[w]hatever was true when this suit was first filed, the theory of the unitary executive appears alive and well in the Director’s office.” Rather, Clement stated, the Court should wait for an instance where a CFPB director has been fired for something short of the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” threshold that Congress set for dismissing a CFPB director in Dodd-Frank before ruling on the question. Clement also emphasized that “text, first principles and precedent” all “strongly support” upholding the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision from last May, which deemed the CFPB to be constitutionally structured and upheld a district court’s ruling enforcing Seila Law’s compliance with a 2017 civil investigative demand.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 9th Circuit held that the for-cause removal restriction of the CFPB’s single director is constitutionally permissible based on existing Supreme Court precedent. The panel agreed with the conclusion reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit majority in the 2018 en banc decision in PHH v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) stating, “if an agency’s leadership is protected by a for-cause removal restriction, the President can arguably exert more effective control over the agency if it is headed by a single individual rather an a multi-member body.”
The parties in Seila filed briefs last December. While both parties are in agreement on the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure, they differ on how the matter should be resolved. Seila Law argued that the Court should invalidate all of Title X of Dodd-Frank, whereas the Bureau contended that the for-cause removal provision should be severed from the rest of the law in accordance with Dodd-Frank’s express severability clause. Oral arguments are scheduled for March 3. (Previous InfoBytes coverage here.)
CFPB denies petitioner’s request to postpone CID pending Seila decision
On December 26, the CFPB denied a petition by a student loan relief company to modify or set aside a civil investigative demand (CID) issued by the Bureau last October. According to the company’s petition, the CID requested information as part of an investigation into the company’s promotion of student loan debt relief programs. As previously covered by InfoBytes, stipulated orders were entered against the company by the FTC and the Minnesota attorney general for violations of TILA and the assisting and facilitating provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, which resulted in the company being permanently banned from engaging in transactions involving debt relief products and services or making misrepresentations regarding financial products and services. In its petition, the company argued that the CFPB’s requests were duplicative of the FTC’s earlier investigation. The company also argued that the documents and materials sought in the CID were overly burdensome and the time frame to respond was too short. Furthermore, the company stated that until the U.S. Supreme Court issues a decision in Seila Law v. CFPB on whether the Bureau’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II, the CID should either be withdrawn or stayed because of the uncertainty surrounding the Bureau’s ability to proceed with enforcement actions.
The Bureau denied the petition, arguing that “the administrative CID petition process is not the proper forum for raising and deciding constitutional challenges to provisions of the Bureau’s statute.” The Bureau also noted that the company failed to show that it engaged with Bureau staff on ways to alleviate undue burden, such as proposing modifications to the substance of the requests, and that even though the Bureau proposed an extension to the CID deadline, the company did not seek such an extension.
District Court stays proceedings in structured settlement case pending outcome of Seila Law
On December 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted a motion to stay in an action between the CFPB and parties of a structured-settlement company, pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in CFPB v. Seila Law. According to the court, a decision in Seila Law that the CFPB’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II may render the CFPB unable prosecute the case. A determination by the Court is expected later this year (previous InfoBytes coverage here).
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court allowed to move forward the Bureau’s UDAAP claim, which alleged the defendants employed abusive practices when purchasing structured settlements from consumers in exchange for lump-sum payments. The defendants asked the court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of two cases: Seila Law and a case pending in the Maryland Court of Appeals involving a different structured settlement company (covered by InfoBytes here). The court determined that a stay is not appropriate based on the Maryland case since it is not known when the case may be decided. The court also disagreed with the defendants’ argument that if the Maryland Court of Appeals upholds the settlement, the Bureau would be precluded from obtaining relief from the defendants. According to the court, “the extent to which the settlement is preclusive is unclear” and the provision that would preclude action by the Bureau is being disputed on appeal. However, the court concluded that a stay pending the outcome in Seila Law is warranted because “one of the Supreme Court’s paths in Seila Law may render the CFPB unable to prosecute this action; the stay would not be lengthy; and the interests of judicial efficiency and potential harm to the movants justify the stay.”
Briefs filed in Supreme Court CFPB constitutionality challenge
On December 9, parties filed briefs in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Seila to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II, while also directing the parties to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which sets up the CFPB’s single director structure and imposes removal for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional. While both parties are in agreement on the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure, they differ on how the matter should be resolved.
According to Seila Law’s brief, the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure is a blatant violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers clause. Seila Law proposes that the Court eliminate the CFPB entirely, leaving Congress to determine how to address the unconstitutionality of the Bureau, rather than save the law by making the director an at-will employee of the President. Removing the director at will, Seila Law argues, “would radically reshape the CFPB, creating a mutant version of the agency that Congress envisioned—one that would still be unaccountable to Congress, yet fully within presidential control.” Discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s reliance in part on a 1935 Supreme Court decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (which dealt with removal protections for members of a nonpartisan, multimember commission) in its May ruling which held that the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional (InfoBytes coverage here), Seila Law states that the Court’s ruling in Humphrey’s Executor was “badly reasoned, wrongly decided, and should be overruled,” and, in any event, is distinguishable when addressing the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure. Whether the Court distinguishes or overturns Humphrey’s Executor’s precedent, Seila Law argues, it should hold that the Bureau’s structure violates the separation of powers clause and reverse the 9th Circuit’s judgment.
“By insulating the director of the CFPB from removal at will by the President while empowering him to exercise substantial executive power, Congress breached the President’s core prerogatives under Article II of the Constitution,” Seila Law further asserts, claiming that the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation would be to deny the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID and ultimately let Congress determine how to address the “constitutional defect in the CFPB’s structure.” Seila Law also argues that should the Court decide to engage in severability analysis, it should invalidate all of Title X of Dodd-Frank, which does not allow the current leadership structure to be altered to a multi-member commission.
In contrast, though the CFPB concedes that Dodd-Frank’s restriction on the President’s ability to remove the Bureau’s director violates the “separation of powers” principles of the Constitution, it contends in its brief that, should the removal provision be found unconstitutional, it should be severed from the rest of the law in accordance with Dodd-Frank’s express severability clause. “Even considering only the Bureau-specific provisions contained in Title X . . . , there is no basis to conclude that Congress would have preferred to have no Bureau at all rather than a Bureau headed by a Director who would be removable like almost all other single-headed agencies,” the CFPB wrote. “Nothing in the statutory text or history of the Bureau’s creation suggests, much less clearly demonstrates, that Congress would have preferred, for example, that the regulatory authority vested in the Bureau revert back to the seven federal agencies that previously administered those responsibilities if a court were to invalidate the Director’s removal restriction.”
Oral arguments are scheduled for March 3, 2020.
Government says CFPB should have authority to continue enforcement actions even if declared unconstitutional
On November 6, the CFPB and the DOJ filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the Bureau should still “have the authority to commence or continue enforcement proceedings” in the event that the Court declares the Bureau’s structure unconstitutional. The brief was filed in response to a petition for writ of certiorari by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies (collectively, “petitioners”) urging the Court to grant certiorari before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit renders a decision on a challenge to the Bureau’s single-director structure. The petitioners are not only challenging the Bureau’s structure but also arguing that the asserted constitutional violation requires the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit brought by the Bureau.
The government argues that dismissal of the underlying enforcement action is not the way to remedy a constitutional structure violation, at least in a situation where “an official fully accountable to the President determines that it should go forward.” The brief notes that, in this case, then-Acting Director Mulvaney, to whom the Bureau has argued the limitation to for-cause removal did not apply, had ratified the enforcement action against petitioners at issue. While the Bureau and the DOJ acknowledge that lower courts “have not yet addressed the particular issue here,” they make the case that “the few reasoned decisions that address related issues are in accord: A separation-of-powers problem with an agency does not compel invalidation of the agency’s actions if those actions are subsequently approved in compliance with separation-of-powers requirements.”
In its brief, the Bureau and the DOJ also argue that questions presented to the Court do not warrant review of the case before the 5th Circuit has an opportunity to rule. The government emphasizes that the Court has already agreed to hear a different case, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II (covered by InfoBytes here). In doing so the Court also directed the parties to that action to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which established removal of the Bureau’s single director only for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional.
Kraninger discusses semi-annual report at House and Senate hearings
On October 17, CFPB Director Kathy Kraninger testified at a hearing held by the Senate Banking Committee on the CFPB’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress. (Previous InfoBytes coverage here.) Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the hearing covered the semi-annual report to Congress on the Bureau’s work from October 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019. While Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) praised recent key initiatives undertaken by Kraninger pertaining to areas such as innovation, small dollar lending underwriting provisions, and proposed amendments to the Ability to Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule, he stressed the importance of reconsidering the fundamental structure of the Bureau. Conversely, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) argued that Kraninger’s leadership has led to zero enforcement actions taken against companies for discriminatory lending practices, and that her initiatives have, among other things, failed to protect consumers. In her opening testimony, Kraninger reiterated her commitment to (i) providing clear guidance; (ii) fostering a “‘culture of compliance’” through the use of supervision to prevent violations; (iii) executing “vigorous enforcement”; and (iv) empowering consumers. Notable highlights include:
- Constitutionality challenges. The Bureau recently filed letters in pending litigation arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers, and on October 18, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates Article II of the Constitution. (InfoBytes coverage here.) Senator Brown challenged, however, Kraninger’s “credibility as a public official,” arguing that she changed her original position about not speaking on constitutionality issues.
- Supervision of student loan servicers. Kraninger addressed several Senators’ concerns about the Department of Education reportedly blocking the Bureau from obtaining information about the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program for supervisory examinations, as well as and the need for a stronger response from the Bureau to obtain the requested information. Kraninger stressed that the CFPB will move forward with a statutorily required Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies, and emphasized that the Bureau continues to examine private education loans and is collaborating with the Department of Education to ensure consumer protection laws are followed.
- Proposed revisions to Payday Rule. Several Democratic Senators questioned the Bureau’s notice of proposed rulemaking to rescind the Payday Rule’s ability-to-repay provisions. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) Specifically, one Senator argued that the Bureau has failed to “present any new research in defense of the change.” Kraninger replied that while she defends the Bureau’s proposal, “a final decision has not been made in this issue.” Kraninger also addressed questions as to why—if the Bureau does not believe there is a reason to delay the effective date of the Payday Rule’s payment provisions—the Bureau has not yet filed a motion to lift a stay and allow payment provision to be implemented. Kraninger indicated that the CFPB had not done so because the payday loan trade groups were also challenging the Bureau’s constitutionality (InfoBytes here).
- Clarity on abusive practices under UDAAP. Kraninger noted the Bureau intends to, “in the not too distant future,” provide an update as to whether more guidance is necessary in order to define what constitutes an abusive act or practice.
A day earlier, Kraninger also presented testimony at the House Financial Services Committee’s hearing to discuss the semi-annual report, in which committee members focused on, among other things, constitutionality questions and concerns regarding recent Bureau settlements. Similar to the Senate hearing, Democratic committee members questioned Kraninger’s change in position concerning the Bureau’s constitutionality, and argued that for her “to second-guess Congress’ judgment on [the] constitutionality of the CFPB and to argue against the CFPB structure in court is disrespectful to Congress.” With regard to recent Bureau enforcement actions, many of the committee members’ questions revolved around consumer restitution, as well as a recently released majority staff report, which detailed the results of the majority’s investigation into the CFPB’s handling of consumer monetary relief in enforcement actions since Richard Cordray stepped down as director in November 2017. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.)