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CFPB Requests Rehearing of Decision Threatening Agency's Structure
Earlier today, the CFPB filed its much-anticipated response in PHH Corp. v. CFPB, requesting reconsideration by the full D.C. Circuit. As discussed in our special alert, on October 11, 2016, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated the CFPB’s $109 million penalty against PHH under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). In addition, a majority of the panel held that, to resolve a constitutional defect in the CFPB’s structure, the Director was removable by the President at will, meaning that President Trump could remove Director Cordray upon taking office. However, the panel’s decision is stayed until seven days after the court rules on the CFPB’s request.
Rather than proceeding directly to the Supreme Court, the CFPB proceeded as expected by requesting rehearing en banc by the full D.C. Circuit, which is generally disfavored and granted only for matters of “exceptional importance.” Perhaps most significantly, the Bureau’s petition does not request rehearing of the panel’s conclusion that RESPA’s three-year statute of limitations applied to administrative as well as judicial actions brought under that statute.
The CFPB’s petition argues that the panel’s constitutional ruling on the CFPB’s structure should be reheard because it “sets up what may be the most important separation-of-powers case in a generation.” Specifically, the Bureau argues that the panel’s determination that a multi-member commission is an essential component of an independent agency runs contrary to Supreme Court precedent and “unduly limits Congress’s flexibility to respond to the various crises of human affairs … by creating independent administrative agencies headed by a single director.” The Bureau further states that the panel’s reasoning “may affect not only the Bureau but also other agencies headed by a single director removable only for cause,” such as the Social Security Administration, Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the Office of Special Counsel.
The Bureau also asks the D.C. Circuit to rehear the panel’s determination that RESPA permits lenders and mortgage insurers to enter into tying arrangements under which the lender refers mortgage insurance businesses to the insurer in exchange for the insurer purchasing reinsurance from the lender’s affiliate. In support of this request, the Bureau argues that “the panel’s decision misinterpreted [RESPA] in a manner that so fundamentally defeats the statutory purpose [of prohibiting kickbacks] as to warrant rehearing en banc.” Specifically, the Bureau states that “[t]he panel’s reading of the statute would permit any mortgage lender to condition referrals on the purchase of goods or services in any related or unrelated business line. Such schemes flout the core purposes of RESPA.”
Under the D.C. Circuit’s rules, PHH is not permitted to file a response to the CFPB’s petition unless ordered by the court to do so. However, the court will not modify the panel’s opinion without allowing PHH to respond to the petition. There is no deadline for action by the court.
Special Alert: D.C. Circuit Panel Rejects CFPB's RESPA Interpretation and Alters its Structure in PHH Corp. v. CFPB
On October 11, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion vacating a $109 million penalty imposed on PHH Corporation under the anti-kickback provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), concluding that the CFPB misinterpreted the statute and violated due process by reversing the interpretation of the prior regulator and applying its own interpretation retroactively. Furthermore, the panel rejected the CFPB’s contention that no statute of limitations applied to its administrative actions and concluded that RESPA’s three-year statute of limitations applied to any actions brought under RESPA.
In addition, a majority of the panel held that the CFPB’s status as an independent agency headed by a single Director violates the separation of powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. However, rather than shutting down the CFPB and voiding all of its regulations and prior actions, the majority chose to remedy the defect by making the CFPB’s Director subject to removal at will by the President. In effect, this makes the CFPB an executive agency (like the Department of the Treasury) rather than, as envisioned by the Dodd-Frank Act, an independent agency (like the Federal Trade Commission). (One member of the panel, Judge Henderson, dissented from this portion of the opinion on the grounds that it was not necessary to reach the constitutional issue because the panel was already reversing the CFPB’s interpretation of RESPA.)
The panel remanded the case to the CFPB to determine whether, within the three-year statute of limitations, the payments to PHH’s affiliate exceeded the fair market value of the services provided in violation of RESPA. The CFPB is expected to petition for en banc reconsideration by the full D.C. Circuit or to seek direct review by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, final resolution of this matter may be delayed by a year or more.
Click here to read the full Special Alert.
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Questions regarding the matters discussed in this Alert may be directed to any of our lawyers listed below, or to any other BuckleySandler attorney with whom you have consulted in the past.
- Jeremiah S. Buckley, (202) 349-8010
- Joseph M. Kolar, (202) 349-8020
- John P. Kromer, (202) 349-8040
- Jon David D. Langlois, (202) 349-8045
- Jeffrey P. Naimon, (202) 349-8030
- Clinton R. Rockwell, (310) 424-3901
- Sasha Leonhardt, (202) 349-7971
- Sherry-Maria Safchuk, (310) 424-3917
- Steven vonBerg, (202) 524-7893
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Hears Oral Arguments Regarding CFPB's Interpretation of RESPA
On April 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held oral arguments in the case PHH Corporation v. CFPB. The primary issue in the case is whether the CFPB is constitutionally and statutorily authorized to assess a $109 million penalty against the petitioner, a nonbank mortgage lender (Lender), for allegedly violating Section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by referring customers to certain mortgage insurance companies that purchased mortgage reinsurance at fair market value from an affiliate of the Lender. According to CFPB Director Richard Cordray, this practice was a violation of Section 8’s prohibition on kickbacks for referrals, because the mortgage insurers allegedly only purchased mortgage reinsurance in order to receive customer referrals from the Lender.
In appealing the CFPB’s action, counsel for the Lender argued that the CFPB is attempting to effectively rewrite Section 8 to prohibit activities expressly permitted by the statute’s implementing regulation, Regulation X, as well as prior agency guidance and the plain language of the statute itself. According to the Lender, its mortgage reinsurance practices had long been understood to be legal, were widespread throughout the country, and aligned with existing HUD guidance. The Lender further argued that Section 8(c)(2) permits entities to refer business so long as the referrals are not compensated, and any payments are equal to the market value cost of services actually provided. In the Lender’s case, counsel argued that the mortgage reinsurance premiums could not have been compensation for referrals, because mortgage reinsurance premiums received by the Lender’s affiliate were equal to the fair market value of mortgage reinsurance services actually rendered. The Lender further argued that the CFPB improperly ignored RESPA’s statutorily-prescribed statute of limitations (SOL) of three years when, under Section 15, RESPA clearly applies the SOL to “any action” – which, in the Lender’s view, would include an administrative action. Finally, the Lender argued that the CFPB’s structure and funding under the Dodd-Frank Act was unconstitutional in that it violated the requirement for separation of powers by, among other things, (i) restricting the President’s removal power to “for cause” removal; (ii) concentrating power in one individual; and (iii) funding the CFPB outside of the Congressional appropriations process.
Counsel for the CFPB responded that, during the period in question, mortgage insurance companies only purchased reinsurance from affiliates of lenders who referred them business. According to the CFPB, this type of quid pro quo arrangement is a violation of Section 8 even if the reinsurance premiums were equal to the fair market value of a service rendered. Counsel for the CFPB said that, notwithstanding the fact that the Lender’s conduct was common throughout the financial services industry, it had never expressly been blessed by prior agency guidance, and resulted in the type of market distortion that RESPA was designed to prevent. The CFPB also defended its position that its administrative actions are not subject to an SOL by noting that the Consumer Financial Protection Act, which authorizes the CFPB to take enforcement actions against regulated entities, does not include an SOL for such actions. In response to the challenge to the constitutionality of its structure, the CFPB pointed to the diversity of agency structures throughout the executive branch, including single-headed agencies and agencies that do not rely on Congress for appropriations funding.
The panel consisted of Judges Kavanaugh, Randolph, and Henderson; Judge Henderson was not present.
CFPB Suit Against Debt Settlement Firm Will Proceed
On January 10, a federal judge denied a debt settlement company's motion to dismiss a CFPB enforcement action pending in the Central District of California, in which the company challenged the constitutionality of the CFPB’s powers. Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., No. 13-1267, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2014). The CFPB action asserts violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), alleging that the company disguised illegal upfront fees assessed for debt settlement services as bankruptcy-related charges and deceived consumers into believing they would become debt free when only “a tiny fraction” of its customers actually do. In denying the company's motion to dismiss, the California court found that the CFPB’s lawsuit asserts valid claims under both the TSR and the CFPA, and that the agency’s formation and exercise of authority is constitutionally permissible under Articles I, II, and III. The debt settlement company previously raised in a separate lawsuit the constitutional claims and claims that the CFPB had “grossly overreach[ed] its authority” in the investigation on which the enforcement action is based, asserting that the agency lacks authority to regulate the law firms supported by the debt settlement service provider and that the information demanded by the CFPB—disclosed to lawyers by clients seeking advice regarding bankruptcy—was protected by the attorney-client privilege. That suit was dismissed in October 2013 in favor of the CFPB’s California-filed action.
D.C. Federal Court Dismisses Lawyer, Service Provider Challenge to CFPB Probe
On October 17, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the CFPB’s motion to dismiss an attorney and service provider’s lawsuit challenging the authority of the CFPB. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction in the case and did not reach the merits of the service provider’s constitutional challenge. The court agreed with the CFPB’s argument that the service provider could obtain complete relief on its constitutional claim in an enforcement action currently pending in the Central District of California, and thus, injunctive and declaratory relief in the D.C. District Court was inappropriate. The court also held that the attorney, who is not a party to the Central District of California action, lacked standing to raise her claim, because she had failed to demonstrate a substantial probability of being forced to produce privileged information to the Bureau.
Federal Circuit Court Accepts Appeals of Challenges to Dodd-Frank Act
On August 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed to hear appeals filed by several state Attorneys General (AGs) and certain private plaintiffs regarding the U.S. District Court for D.C.'s dismissal of a suit in which the AGs and the private plaintiffs challenged the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) created by the Dodd-Frank Act, and in which the private plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Title X, which created the CFPB, and the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) created by Title I. The parties separately appealed, but the court consolidated the appeals for its review.
Federal District Court Dismisses Challenge to Dodd-Frank Act, CFPB
On August 1, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed in its entirety a lawsuit that challenged Titles I, II, and X of the Dodd-Frank Act as unconstitutional. The lawsuit was brought originally by three private parties and later joined by several state attorneys general. The court determined that that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had not demonstrated injury sufficient to permit a challenge of the law on any of their claims.
The private plaintiffs' challenge to Title X, which created the CFPB, was based on “financial injuries directly caused by the unconstitutional formation and operation of the [CFPB,]” including substantial compliance costs, increased costs of doing business, and forced discontinuance of profitable and legitimate business practices in order to avoid risk of prosecution. The court concluded that such “self-inflicted” harm could not confer standing to challenge Title X. With respect to the private plaintiffs’ challenge to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) created by Title I, the court concluded that while an unregulated party is not precluded from establishing standing to challenge the creation and operation of FSOC, standing is “substantially more difficult to establish” under such circumstances and the theories asserted by the plaintiffs were too remote to confer standing.
Both the private plaintiffs and the state attorneys general challenged Title II, claiming that the “orderly liquidation authority” (OLA) provisions violate the separation of powers, deny due process to creditors of a liquidated firm, and violate the requirement for uniformity in bankruptcy. The court again concluded that none of the plaintiffs established either present or future injury sufficient to confer standing to challenge the OLA.
According to media reports, an appeal of the ruling by at least one of the private plaintiffs is anticipated.
Service Provider Challenges CFPB Authority
On July 22, a Connecticut bankruptcy attorney and a firm with whom the attorney contracts for legal support services filed a lawsuit charging the CFPB with “grossly overreaching its authority” in requesting “sensitive and privileged information” about thousands of consumers and challenging the constitutionality of the Bureau itself. The suit was filed in response to a CFPB investigation into the service provider’s relationships with law firms that provide debt settlement assistance to consumers facing bankruptcy. The complaint asserts that the CFPB lacks authority to regulate the law firms supported by the service provider and that the information demanded by the CFPB – disclosed to lawyers by clients seeking advice regarding bankruptcy – is protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Third Circuit Joins DC Circuit in Invalidating NLRB Recess Appointment
On May 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an appointment to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) made by President Obama in March 2010 during a purported Senate recess was unconstitutional and vacated orders of the NLRB as constituted with the improperly appointed member. NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., No. 11-3440, 2013 WL 2099742 (3rd Cir. May 16, 2013). The NLRB member appointment at issue in this case precedes the appointments at issue in Noel Canning, which appointments were made during the same pro forma Senate session in which President Obama appointed CFPB Director Richard Cordray. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion invalidating those appointments currently is on appeal to the Supreme Court. Here, as explained in the majority opinion and as in Noel Canning, the central question is the meaning of “the Recess of the Senate.” The court concluded that "the Recess of the Senate" in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only intersession breaks, held that the NLRB panel lacked the requisite number of members to exercise its authority because one panel member was invalidly appointed during an intrasession break, and vacated the Board‘s orders. In a dissenting opinion, one judge argued that the majority holding undoes an appointments process that has successfully operated for over 220 years, and the court instead should have held that “the Recess” refers to both intrasession and intersession recesses because the Senate can be unavailable to provide advice and consent during both. The Third Circuit did not address whether the President may only fill vacancies that arise or begin during such intersession recesses, as opposed to vacancies that happen to exist during such recesses.
Obama Administration Seeks Supreme Court Review of Recess Appointment Decision
On April 25, the DOJ and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed a petition seeking U.S. Supreme Court review of the D.C. Circuit Court’s January 25, 2013 decision invalidating the appointment of three NLRB members. Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281 (cert. pet. filed, Apr. 25, 2013). The D.C. Circuit held that appointments to the NLRB made by President Obama in January 2012 during a purported Senate recess were unconstitutional. CFPB Director Richard Cordray was appointed in the same manner and on the same day as the NLRB members, and his appointment is the subject of a lawsuit currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The petition asks the Court to resolve two questions: (i) whether the President’s recess appointment power may be exercised during a recess that occurs within a session of the Senate, or is instead limited to recesses that occur between enumerated sessions, and (ii) whether the President’s recess appointment power may be exercised to fill vacancies that exist during a recess, or is instead limited to vacancies that first arose during that recess. If the Court accepts review of the case, it likely would be heard during the Court’s next session, which begins in October 2013.