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On December 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted a motion to stay in an action between the CFPB and parties of a structured-settlement company, pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in CFPB v. Seila Law. According to the court, a decision in Seila Law that the CFPB’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II may render the CFPB unable prosecute the case. A determination by the Court is expected later this year (previous InfoBytes coverage here).
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court allowed to move forward the Bureau’s UDAAP claim, which alleged the defendants employed abusive practices when purchasing structured settlements from consumers in exchange for lump-sum payments. The defendants asked the court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of two cases: Seila Law and a case pending in the Maryland Court of Appeals involving a different structured settlement company (covered by InfoBytes here). The court determined that a stay is not appropriate based on the Maryland case since it is not known when the case may be decided. The court also disagreed with the defendants’ argument that if the Maryland Court of Appeals upholds the settlement, the Bureau would be precluded from obtaining relief from the defendants. According to the court, “the extent to which the settlement is preclusive is unclear” and the provision that would preclude action by the Bureau is being disputed on appeal. However, the court concluded that a stay pending the outcome in Seila Law is warranted because “one of the Supreme Court’s paths in Seila Law may render the CFPB unable to prosecute this action; the stay would not be lengthy; and the interests of judicial efficiency and potential harm to the movants justify the stay.”
On December 9, parties filed briefs in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Seila to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II, while also directing the parties to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which sets up the CFPB’s single director structure and imposes removal for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional. While both parties are in agreement on the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure, they differ on how the matter should be resolved.
According to Seila Law’s brief, the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure is a blatant violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers clause. Seila Law proposes that the Court eliminate the CFPB entirely, leaving Congress to determine how to address the unconstitutionality of the Bureau, rather than save the law by making the director an at-will employee of the President. Removing the director at will, Seila Law argues, “would radically reshape the CFPB, creating a mutant version of the agency that Congress envisioned—one that would still be unaccountable to Congress, yet fully within presidential control.” Discussing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s reliance in part on a 1935 Supreme Court decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (which dealt with removal protections for members of a nonpartisan, multimember commission) in its May ruling which held that the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional (InfoBytes coverage here), Seila Law states that the Court’s ruling in Humphrey’s Executor was “badly reasoned, wrongly decided, and should be overruled,” and, in any event, is distinguishable when addressing the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure. Whether the Court distinguishes or overturns Humphrey’s Executor’s precedent, Seila Law argues, it should hold that the Bureau’s structure violates the separation of powers clause and reverse the 9th Circuit’s judgment.
“By insulating the director of the CFPB from removal at will by the President while empowering him to exercise substantial executive power, Congress breached the President’s core prerogatives under Article II of the Constitution,” Seila Law further asserts, claiming that the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation would be to deny the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID and ultimately let Congress determine how to address the “constitutional defect in the CFPB’s structure.” Seila Law also argues that should the Court decide to engage in severability analysis, it should invalidate all of Title X of Dodd-Frank, which does not allow the current leadership structure to be altered to a multi-member commission.
In contrast, though the CFPB concedes that Dodd-Frank’s restriction on the President’s ability to remove the Bureau’s director violates the “separation of powers” principles of the Constitution, it contends in its brief that, should the removal provision be found unconstitutional, it should be severed from the rest of the law in accordance with Dodd-Frank’s express severability clause. “Even considering only the Bureau-specific provisions contained in Title X . . . , there is no basis to conclude that Congress would have preferred to have no Bureau at all rather than a Bureau headed by a Director who would be removable like almost all other single-headed agencies,” the CFPB wrote. “Nothing in the statutory text or history of the Bureau’s creation suggests, much less clearly demonstrates, that Congress would have preferred, for example, that the regulatory authority vested in the Bureau revert back to the seven federal agencies that previously administered those responsibilities if a court were to invalidate the Director’s removal restriction.”
Oral arguments are scheduled for March 3, 2020.
Government says CFPB should have authority to continue enforcement actions even if declared unconstitutional
On November 6, the CFPB and the DOJ filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the Bureau should still “have the authority to commence or continue enforcement proceedings” in the event that the Court declares the Bureau’s structure unconstitutional. The brief was filed in response to a petition for writ of certiorari by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies (collectively, “petitioners”) urging the Court to grant certiorari before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit renders a decision on a challenge to the Bureau’s single-director structure. The petitioners are not only challenging the Bureau’s structure but also arguing that the asserted constitutional violation requires the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit brought by the Bureau.
The government argues that dismissal of the underlying enforcement action is not the way to remedy a constitutional structure violation, at least in a situation where “an official fully accountable to the President determines that it should go forward.” The brief notes that, in this case, then-Acting Director Mulvaney, to whom the Bureau has argued the limitation to for-cause removal did not apply, had ratified the enforcement action against petitioners at issue. While the Bureau and the DOJ acknowledge that lower courts “have not yet addressed the particular issue here,” they make the case that “the few reasoned decisions that address related issues are in accord: A separation-of-powers problem with an agency does not compel invalidation of the agency’s actions if those actions are subsequently approved in compliance with separation-of-powers requirements.”
In its brief, the Bureau and the DOJ also argue that questions presented to the Court do not warrant review of the case before the 5th Circuit has an opportunity to rule. The government emphasizes that the Court has already agreed to hear a different case, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II (covered by InfoBytes here). In doing so the Court also directed the parties to that action to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which established removal of the Bureau’s single director only for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional.
On October 17, CFPB Director Kathy Kraninger testified at a hearing held by the Senate Banking Committee on the CFPB’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress. (Previous InfoBytes coverage here.) Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the hearing covered the semi-annual report to Congress on the Bureau’s work from October 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019. While Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) praised recent key initiatives undertaken by Kraninger pertaining to areas such as innovation, small dollar lending underwriting provisions, and proposed amendments to the Ability to Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule, he stressed the importance of reconsidering the fundamental structure of the Bureau. Conversely, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) argued that Kraninger’s leadership has led to zero enforcement actions taken against companies for discriminatory lending practices, and that her initiatives have, among other things, failed to protect consumers. In her opening testimony, Kraninger reiterated her commitment to (i) providing clear guidance; (ii) fostering a “‘culture of compliance’” through the use of supervision to prevent violations; (iii) executing “vigorous enforcement”; and (iv) empowering consumers. Notable highlights include:
- Constitutionality challenges. The Bureau recently filed letters in pending litigation arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers, and on October 18, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates Article II of the Constitution. (InfoBytes coverage here.) Senator Brown challenged, however, Kraninger’s “credibility as a public official,” arguing that she changed her original position about not speaking on constitutionality issues.
- Supervision of student loan servicers. Kraninger addressed several Senators’ concerns about the Department of Education reportedly blocking the Bureau from obtaining information about the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program for supervisory examinations, as well as and the need for a stronger response from the Bureau to obtain the requested information. Kraninger stressed that the CFPB will move forward with a statutorily required Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies, and emphasized that the Bureau continues to examine private education loans and is collaborating with the Department of Education to ensure consumer protection laws are followed.
- Proposed revisions to Payday Rule. Several Democratic Senators questioned the Bureau’s notice of proposed rulemaking to rescind the Payday Rule’s ability-to-repay provisions. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) Specifically, one Senator argued that the Bureau has failed to “present any new research in defense of the change.” Kraninger replied that while she defends the Bureau’s proposal, “a final decision has not been made in this issue.” Kraninger also addressed questions as to why—if the Bureau does not believe there is a reason to delay the effective date of the Payday Rule’s payment provisions—the Bureau has not yet filed a motion to lift a stay and allow payment provision to be implemented. Kraninger indicated that the CFPB had not done so because the payday loan trade groups were also challenging the Bureau’s constitutionality (InfoBytes here).
- Clarity on abusive practices under UDAAP. Kraninger noted the Bureau intends to, “in the not too distant future,” provide an update as to whether more guidance is necessary in order to define what constitutes an abusive act or practice.
A day earlier, Kraninger also presented testimony at the House Financial Services Committee’s hearing to discuss the semi-annual report, in which committee members focused on, among other things, constitutionality questions and concerns regarding recent Bureau settlements. Similar to the Senate hearing, Democratic committee members questioned Kraninger’s change in position concerning the Bureau’s constitutionality, and argued that for her “to second-guess Congress’ judgment on [the] constitutionality of the CFPB and to argue against the CFPB structure in court is disrespectful to Congress.” With regard to recent Bureau enforcement actions, many of the committee members’ questions revolved around consumer restitution, as well as a recently released majority staff report, which detailed the results of the majority’s investigation into the CFPB’s handling of consumer monetary relief in enforcement actions since Richard Cordray stepped down as director in November 2017. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.)
On October 18, the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II. The Court also directed the parties to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which sets up the Bureau’s single director structure and imposes removal for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the law firm filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Court, appealing the May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that (i) the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional, and (ii) the district court did not err when it granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce the law firm’s compliance with a 2017 Civil Investigative Demand (previously covered by InfoBytes here). In response to the petition, the Bureau and the DOJ filed a brief arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. While the Bureau previously defended the single-director structure to the 9th Circuit, the brief notes that since the May decision was issued, “the Director has reconsidered that position and now agrees that the removal restriction is unconstitutional.”
In response to the Court’s decision to grant cert, an online loan servicer that operated on tribal lands has withdrawn its appeal from the 9th Circuit challenging the Bureau’s structure pending the Court’s decision in Seila Law. In the original action, the district court found that an online loan servicer that operated on tribal lands engaged in deceptive practices by collecting on loans that exceeded the usury limits in various states, and ordered it and its affiliates to pay a $10 million penalty, far short of the Bureau’s request. (Previously covered by InfoBtyes here and here.)
On September 17, the DOJ and the CFPB filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. The brief was filed in response to a petition for a writ of certiorari by a law firm, contesting the May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that (i) the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional, and that (ii) the district court did not err when it granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce a law firm’s compliance with a 2017 civil investigative demand (CID) (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The brief cites to a DOJ filing in opposition to a 2018 cert petition, which also concluded that the Bureau’s structure is unconstitutional by infringing on the president’s responsibility to ensure that federal laws are faithfully executed, but urged the Court to deny that writ as the case was a “poor vehicle” for the constitutionality consideration (previously covered by InfoBytes here).
In contrast to the December brief, the DOJ now asserts that the present case is a “suitable vehicle for resolving the important question,” noting that only the constitutional question was presented to the Court and the 9th Circuit has stayed its CID mandate until final disposition of the case with the Court. Moreover, the government argues that until the Court resolves the constitutionality question of the Bureau’s structure, “those subject to the agency’s regulation or enforcement can (and often will) raise the issue as a defense to the Bureau’s efforts to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law.” While the Bureau previously defended the single-director structure to the 9th Circuit, the brief notes that since the May decision was issued, “the Director has reconsidered that position and now agrees that the removal restriction is unconstitutional.”
On the same day, Director Kraninger sent letters (here and here) to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) supporting the argument that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director, violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. Kraninger notes that while she is urging the Court to grant the pending petition for certiorari to resolve the constitutionality question, her position on the matter “does not affect [her] commitment to fulfilling the Bureau’s statutory responsibilities” and that should the Court find the structure unconstitutional, “the [Consumer Financial Protection Act] should remain ‘fully operative,’ and the Bureau would ‘continue to function as before,’ just with a Director who “may be removed at will by the [President.]’”
On May 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that (i) the CFPB’s single-director structure is constitutional, and that (ii) the district court did not err when it granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce a law firm’s compliance with a 2017 civil investigative demand (CID). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB previously determined that none of the objections raised by the law firm warranted setting aside or modifying the CID, which sought information to determine whether the law firm violated the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) when providing debt-relief services. The law firm contended that the CFPB’s single-director structure was unconstitutional and therefore the CID was unlawful. It argued further that the CFPB lacked statutory authority to issue the CID.
On review, the 9th Circuit held that the for-cause removal restriction of the CFPB’s single director is constitutionally permissible based on existing Supreme Court precedent. The panel agreed with the conclusion reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit majority in the 2018 en banc decision in PHH v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) stating, “if an agency’s leadership is protected by a for-cause removal restriction, the President can arguably exert more effective control over the agency if it is headed by a single individual rather an a multi-member body.” The 9th Circuit noted that the dissenting opinion of then Court of Appeals Judge Brett Kavanaugh found that the single-director structure was unconstitutional and noted that “[t]he Supreme Court is of course free to revisit those precedents, but we are not.”
The 9th Circuit next addressed the law firm’s argument that the CFPB lacked statutory authority when it issued the CID. The panel held that the TSR “does not exempt attorneys from its coverage even when they are engaged in providing legal services,” and therefore, the Bureau has investigative authority without regard to the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s (CFPA) practice-of-law exclusion. In addition, the panel rejected the law firm’s argument that the CID was vague or overly broad, and stated that the CID fully complied with the CFPA’s requirements and identified the allegedly illegal conduct and violations.
On April 10, the CFPB issued a Decision and Order denying a law firm’s petition to set aside a civil investigative demand (CID) asking for information about the firm’s business practices to determine whether debt relief providers or lead generators engaged in “unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt relief services or products, including but not limited to debt negotiation, debit elimination, debt settlement, and credit counseling.” Specifically, the Bureau determined that none of the objections raised by the law firm warrant setting aside or modifying the CID.
On March 19, the firm filed a petition to set aside the CID (issued on February 27, 2017), offering four key reasons why the CID should not be enforced:
- the CFPB’s structure is unconstitutional and the CID should be stayed pending the PHH Corp. v. CFPB case;
- the CFPB lacks supervisory and enforcement authority with respect to the law firm;
- the CID’s requests are “excessively vague and overly broad”; and
- the CID was issued after the Bureau failed to prevail on a contempt order before the district court.
In responding to these arguments, the CFPB took the following positions. First, the Bureau contended that the law firm had waived its objection to the Bureau’s authority by failing to raise it during the meet-and-confer process with Bureau enforcement counsel. Second, the CFPB noted that under the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the Bureau has the authority to issue CIDs to “any person” who may have relevant information. Third, the Bureau disagreed that the requests in the CID were “excessively vague and overly broad,” and stated that the time to have raised this challenge was during the meet-and-confer process. However, the Bureau stated it is willing to engage in further discussions to determine if modifications may be appropriate. Fourth, the Bureau determined that the mere fact that the law firm in question was never held in contempt by a court of law does not preclude the CFPB “from issuing a CID or investigating whether it violated federal consumer financial law.” Pursuant to the Decision and Order, the law firm is required to produce documents and provide answers to interrogatories within 10 calendar days.
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