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FinCrimes Webinar Series Recap: Individual Liability - FinCrimes Professionals in the Spotlight
BuckleySandler hosted a webinar, Individual Liability: Financial Crimes Professionals in the Spotlight, on January 22, 2015 as part of its ongoing FinCrimes Webinar Series. Panelists included Polly Greenberg, Chief, Major Economic Crimes Bureau at the New York County District Attorney’s Office, and Richard Small, Senior Vice President for Enterprise-Wide AML, Anti-Corruption and International Regulatory Compliance at American Express. The following is a summary of the guided conversation moderated by Jamie Parkinson, Partner at BuckleySandler, and key take-aways you can implement in your company.
Best Practice Tips and Take-Aways:
- Be completely transparent with senior management and your board of directors when escalating issues and concerns. Document your requests for program enhancements and management responses.
- Assure yourself that your team is up to the task at hand, adequately resourced and knows that they can escalate anything that concerns them to compliance and/or senior management/the Board.
- When considering the quality of your compliance program, be sure that your program is tested internally by your compliance function, tested again by your organization’s internal audit team, and in addition is examined every few years by external counsel/consultant.
- If confronted with management unwillingness to commit adequate headcount and resources necessary to the compliance program, serious consideration has to be given to resigning and/or reporting these deficiencies.
Significant Actions and Regulatory Statements
The discussion began by giving an overview of trends in enforcement actions in the last few decades, commenting that this topic has been simmering for a long time. In the Bank context, in the late 1980s a series of prosecutions against the Bank of New England, Shearson Lehman, and Bank Boston involved efforts to hold the institution as well as individuals liable. Largely, the government had success against the institutions on theories of collective knowledge and willful blindness but was less successful when prosecuting individuals.
In the brokerage context, the SEC has brought recent actions as part of the Compliance Program Initiative, including charges against compliance personnel when they were clearly responsible for the failure to adopt or implement adequate compliance programs. The SEC has signaled that it will take action against compliance officers if:
- They actively participated in misconduct;
- They helped mislead regulators; or
- They have clear responsibility to implement compliance programs or policies and wholly failed to carry out that responsibility.
Then identified recent enforcement actions taken against board members, including Pacific National Bank involving a failure to remedy deficiencies in that institution’s BSA program. In the Pacific National Bank case, the OCC levied individual fines against the bank’s chairman and three board members who served on its BSA compliance committee for failing to act in their official capacities to correct the failures.
Finally, identified remarks made by three key regulators at the November 2013 ABA/ABA and the March 2014 ACAMS conferences. These speeches reflect clear statements with respect to the government’s intention to hold individuals personally liable when the facts warrant. The remarks were made by:
- Jim Cole (Deputy Attorney General, retired Jan. 8, 2015)
- Thomas Curry (Comptroller of the Currency)
- Jennifer Shasky Calvery (Director, FINCEN)
Mr. Small then gave an overview of two significant enforcement actions that involved individual liability. The first case, Brown Brothers Harriman, was brought by FINRA in early 2014 and arose from penny stock transactions executed by the firm through an omnibus brokerage account structure. While the case resulted in an $8 million fine for Brown Brothers, the firm’s Global AML Compliance Officer, Harold Crawford, was also the subject of the enforcement action and was fined $25,000 and barred from working in a compliance function for one month. Crawford’s personal liability was premised on his alleged failure to effectively monitor suspicious activity and to report it as required. Mr. Small pointed out that there were references in the case to an internal Brown Brothers’ memorandum that was developed by their compliance group that cited the increase in potentially suspicious activity and recommended stopping the trades and discontinuing the omnibus brokerage structure that had been used to carry out the transactions. This memo was written in November 2011, and was not acted upon prior to FINRA’s action. Mr. Small observed that the Brown Brothers case was the first time that action was taken against an AML compliance officer for failures in the AML compliance program at their company. He further observed that the case raises the question of what a compliance officer should do if they are raising issues, but not receiving resources from management to address those issues.
The second action Mr. Small discussed, MoneyGram, also involved individual liability for a compliance officer. There, FINCEN and DOJ took joint action against MoneyGram related to a significant number of transactions initiated by MoneyGram that were connected to various fraud schemes. FINCEN and DOJ alleged that MoneyGram received a significant number of complaints from consumers but took no action to address them. FINCEN issued a $1 million civil money penalty against Thomas Haider, who served as ManeyGram’s Chief Compliance Officer from 2003-2008. DOJ filed a complaint to enforce the penalty and also seeking to bar Haider from employment in the financial services industry.
When asked how this case might bear on the design of a Financial Crimes compliance program, Mr. Small commented that it was his personal opinion that this case could be read as counseling against integrating an institution’s BSA compliance function with other functions, such as fraud monitoring if the compliance officer lacks the expertise or full authority over the integrated areas. For example, Mr. Haider had responsibility for performing due diligence on agents, terminating agents, and identifying fraud, in addition to suspicious activity monitoring and SAR filing. The first two of these tasks were ones over which he may not have had full authority and as to the fraud area one in which he lacked the expertise to properly oversee. The panelists agreed that while an institution’s compliance function must have unfettered access to the institution’s data, it is important that the compliance function does not take on responsibilities outside of its area of expertise.
Theories of Individual Liability
Ms. Greenberg then discussed the different theories that can be used to find individual liability. She emphasized that the underlying basis of criminal liability is criminal knowledge and intent to do a particular act. Ms. Greenberg explained that it can be easier to find liability for a corporation due to the theory of collective knowledge. Under this theory, the knowledge of the corporation’s employees is imputed to the corporation, and the corporation is bound by this collective knowledge. So, while no single employee might possess sufficient knowledge to support individual liability, numerous individuals’ knowledge may be combined and imputed to the corporation and this collective knowledge may be sufficient to hold the corporation liable.
Ms. Greenberg also discussed the theory of willful blindness, which is primarily used under federal law. Under this theory, an individual has a subjective belief that there is a high probability that a fact exists but avoids learning whether the fact actually exists. Ms. Greenberg also pointed out that there is a similar concept under New York law called conscious avoidance.
Finally, Ms. Greenberg discussed the considerations taken into account in assessing whether it is appropriate to charge an individual in the corporate crimes context. Initially, authorities must consider whether there was criminal intent and whether that intent can be proven. They must also consider whether they can prove the level of knowledge required by the relevant statute, such as, knowingly, intentionally, or willfully. After deciding that there is probable cause to believe an individual had the required intent, Ms. Greenberg explained that the authority will then consider various factors in exercising prosecutorial discretion. In deciding whether to charge an individual in the corporate crime context, fairness is given much consideration. Ms. Greenberg observed that charging higher-level employees in this context may be more common than charging lower-level employees because higher-level employees bear more responsibility for the corporation and play a much larger role in influencing the corporate culture.
Considerations for Compliance Professionals
The panelists noted that it is very important for compliance professionals to have their areas of responsibility clearly defined, and to ensure that they have the control and expertise to manage these areas appropriately, as well as sufficient resources to carry out the compliance program effectively. It was pointed out that the areas most often associated with institutional and individual liability include:
- Failures in the culture of compliance within the organizations;
- Inadequate resources committed to BSA compliance;
- Weaknesses in the organization’s technology and transaction monitoring processes; and
- Inadequacies in the quality of risk management.
Mr. Small stressed the importance of being transparent with senior management and the board of directors when faced with a lack of resources, commenting that it is important to discuss the issue, listen to any proposed alternatives, and take a stance on what the best solution is. The panelists stressed the importance of documenting your requests and the responses and agreed that such documentation can be important to enforcement authorities in deciding whether to charge individuals. The panelists agreed that the trend towards increased individual liability could result in increased SAR filings. IT was suggested that it may be safer to file a SAR when in doubt but defensive SAR filing should be avoided if possible. He noted too that it is very important to thoroughly document decisions not to file.
FinCrimes Webinar Recap: Dealing with PEPs - AML & Corruption Risks
BuckleySandler hosted a webinar, Dealing with PEPs: AML & Corruption Risks, on December 18, 2014 as part of its ongoing FinCrimes Webinar Series. Panelists included Mary Butler, Deputy Chief, International Unit, at the Asset Forfeiture & Money Laundering Section, Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice; Paul Dougherty, Managing Director of the anti-money laundering program for the United States and Canada at Bank of America; and Noreen Fierro, Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer of the Group Insurance Division of Prudential Financial. The following is a summary of the guided conversation moderated by Jamie Parkinson, partner at BuckleySandler, and key take-aways you can implement in your company.
Key Tips and Take-Aways:
- Make sure that the organization has appropriate procedures in place to identify Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and that those procedures appropriately explain how a PEP is defined by the institution.
- Understand the different global standards for PEP compliance and, where appropriate, have country-specific policies and procedures to manage onboarding and monitoring.
- Encourage cooperation among the different financial crime compliance disciplines within your institution to assist in identifying and monitoring PEPs.
Onboarding and Monitoring PEP Accounts
The session began with a discussion of the basic regulatory requirements associated with the onboarding of PEP accounts. The panel addressed the significance of having specific policies and established procedures to identify PEPs on the front end. Specifically, the panelists noted the importance of having procedures that discuss the borrower approval process, the steps taken to onboard the customer and how those steps differ from normal customer onboarding steps, and who is involved in the process. The panelists further noted that regulators pay significant attention to how transactions are monitored for PEPs in comparison to normal customers and what the organization does when an account is flagged. With regard to the actual onboarding procedures, the panelists noted that the primary concern is associated with identifying risks associated with the PEP and investigating the source of the PEPs funds.
Global Approaches to PEP Programs
The panelists then discussed the complications that arise when dealing with the global application of PEP requirements. Specifically, the panelists noted the significant differences from country to country regarding who qualifies as a PEP and whether or not an individual’s status as a PEP continues after the individual leaves his position. Significantly, one of the panelists noted that their company took a country by country approach with regard to PEP onboarding and monitoring in order to address the differences. Panelists further noted a concern regarding the duplication of names between OFAC screening lists and local country lists. Panelists also noted that because of the global nature of PEP regulations, they tend to refer to Senior Foreign Political Figures as Senior Political Figures, even though official guidance uses the foreign distinction.
Intersection of PEPs, Money Laundering and Corruption
Panelists next discussed how the DOJ views the intersection of programs dealing with money laundering and corruption. The panel noted the significant cooperation that exists between individuals working in different areas associated with AML and bribery. The panel highlighted the importance of Suspicious Activity Reports and their use in investigating alleged illegal conduct. The panel also noted that with the increase in disclosure requirements, it is becoming easier to find evidence of money laundering and to eventually recover those illegal proceeds.
Dealing with Local Political Officials
In response to questions from attendees, the panelists then shifted to discussing the domestic application of PEP policies and procedures. The key points discussed were associated with how local political officials are categorized when dealing with PEPs. Specifically, the panelists noted the difficulties associated with deciding how broadly to extend the definition of a PEP with regard to local political officials. The panel suggested that the primary concern when defining local PEPs was to make sure that an organization’s policies and procedures are clearly defined and at least reasonably defensible. Panelists observed that the key regulatory concern is not that the definitions should be identical, but that entities have reasonable definitions that are enforced uniformly.
Monitoring Techniques and Metrics
The panel also discussed the specific complications associated with dealing with the monitoring of PEP accounts. The panelists noted that one of the key aspects of account monitoring is to leverage any AML programs currently in place and allowing that process to help identify any particularly suspicious practices. Furthermore, the panelists pointed out that a key aspect of dealing with suspicious PEP activity is the filing of SARs. One panelist also noted that, while not required statutorily, cooperation with local law enforcement can greatly assist the DOJ with recovering any illegal proceeds.
New York Federal Reserve Bank Official Questions FCPA's "Facilitating Payments" Exception
On July 23, Thomas Baxter, General Counsel for the New York Federal Reserve Bank, in public remarks at a risk management conference, questioned the FCPA’s “exception for ‘facilitating or expediting payments’ made in furtherance of routine government action.” Mr. Baxter stated that “official corruption is a problem that some U.S. financial institutions have found challenging during the last year,” and suggested that those problems could derive from an organizational value system undermined by the facilitating payments exception. Mr. Baxter acknowledged that the exception “is grounded in a practical reality,” but expressed his preference for a zero tolerance standard. He explained that “when an organizational policy allows some types of official corruption . . ., this diminishes the efficacy of compliance rules that are directed toward stopping official corruption.” He urged U.S. financial institutions to foster organizational value systems that “go beyond black-letter U.S. law” with regard to official corruption. Mr. Baxter made these comments in the context of a broader speech on organizational culture and its impact on compliance in which he also suggested that foreign banks’ recent sanctions and tax evasion compliance woes could be explained by a difference in the corporate values of foreign and U.S. banks and their employees when it comes to laws designed to support broader U.S. public policy.
House Oversight Committee Seeks DOJ Documents On RMBS Settlements
On July 24, House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa (R-CA) sent a letter to Attorney General Holder raising questions about the DOJ’s “inclination to enter into settlement agreements with respect to mortgage securities fraud” claims. The Chairman notes that large RMBS settlements to date have been predicated on violations of FIRREA, which allows the DOJ to initiate lawsuits seeking civil money penalties. The letter suggests the DOJ’s decision not to litigate or secure a criminal plea diverges from the agency’s strategy in other contexts. Chairman Issa asks the DOJ to produce, by August 14, all documents and communications since January 2011 referring or relating to two recent major RMBS settlements, as well as any policies in effect during that time governing the decision to conclude pre-suit negotiations.
Federal, State Authorities Obtain Another Major RMBS Settlement
On July 14, the DOJ, the FDIC, and state authorities in California, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York, announced a $7 billion settlement of federal and state RMBS civil claims against a large financial institution, which was obtained by the RMBS Working Group, a division of the Obama Administration’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. Federal and state law enforcement authorities and financial regulators alleged that the institution misled investors in connection with the packaging, marketing, sale, and issuance of certain RMBS. They claimed, among other things, that the institution received information indicating that, for certain loan pools, significant percentages of the loans reviewed as part of the institution’s due diligence did not conform to the representations provided to investors about the pools of loans to be securitized, yet the institution allowed the loans to be securitized and sold without disclosing the alleged failures to investors. The agreement includes a $4 billion civil penalty, described by the DOJ as the largest ever obtained under FIRREA. In addition, the institution will pay a combined $500 million to settle existing and potential claims by the FDIC and the five states. The institution also agreed to provide an additional $2.5 billion in borrower relief through a variety of means, including financing affordable rental housing developments for low-income families in high-cost areas. Finally, the institution was required to acknowledge certain facts related to the alleged activities.
Mortgage Company Resolves HAMP-Related Criminal Allegations
On July 3, the DOJ announced the resolution of a multi-agency criminal investigation into the way a large mortgage company administered the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). According to a Restitution and Remediation Agreement released by the company’s parent bank, the company agreed to pay up to $320 million to resolve allegations that it made misrepresentations and omissions about (i) how long it would take to make HAMP qualification decisions; (ii) the duration of HAMP trial periods; and (iii) how borrowers would be treated during those trial periods. In exchange for the monetary payments and other corrective actions by the company, the government agreed not to prosecute the company for crimes related to the alleged conduct. The investigation was conducted by the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Virginia, as well as the FHFA Inspector General—which has authority to oversee Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s HAMP programs—and the Special Inspector General for TARP—which has responsibility for the Treasury Department HAMP program and jurisdiction over financial institutions that received TARP funds. This criminal action comes in the wake of a DOJ Inspector General report that was critical of the Justice Department’s mortgage fraud enforcement efforts, and which numerous members of Congress used to push DOJ to more vigorously pursue alleged mortgage-related violations. In announcing the action, the U.S. Attorney acknowledged that other HAMP-related investigations are under way, and that more cases may be coming.
Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty In Alleged Tax Evasion Conspiracy
On May 19, the DOJ announced that a Swiss bank pleaded guilty and entered into agreements with federal and state regulators to resolve a multi-year investigation into the bank’s alleged conspiracy to assist U.S. taxpayers in filing false income tax returns and other documents with the IRS by helping those individuals conceal undeclared foreign bank accounts. Under the plea agreement, the bank agreed to (i) disclose its cross-border activities; (ii) cooperate in treaty requests for account information; (iii) provide detailed information as to other banks that transferred funds into secret accounts or that accepted funds when secret accounts were closed; (iv) close accounts of account holders who fail to come into compliance with U.S. reporting obligations; and (v) enhance compliance, recordkeeping, and reporting programs. The plea agreement also reflects a prior related settlement with the SEC in which the bank paid $196 million in disgorgement, interest, and penalties. Under the current agreements, the bank will pay $2.6 billion in fines and penalties, including $1.8 billion to the DOJ, $100 million to the Federal Reserve Board, and $715 million to the New York DFS. Federal authorities did not individually charge any officers, directors, or senior managers, and the agreements do not require the bank to dismiss any officers or employees, but eight bank executives have been indicted since 2011 and two of those individuals pleaded guilty. Further, federal and state regulators did not directly restrict the bank’s ability to operate in the U.S.—the New York Federal Reserve Bank allowed the bank to remain a primary dealer and the New York DFS did not revoke the bank’s state banking license.
11th Circuit First To Define "Instrumentality" Under FCPA
On May 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit court to define “instrumentality” under the FCPA. U.S. v. Esquenazi, No. 11-15331 (11th Cir. May 16, 2014). The FCPA generally prohibits bribes to a “foreign official” defined as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof.” Two individuals appealed their convictions and sentences imposed for FCPA and related violations, arguing that the telecommunications company whose employees they were alleged to have bribed in exchange for relief from debt owed to that company was not, as the government asserted and a jury found, an “instrumentality” of a foreign government. As the court explained, “instrumentality” is not defined in the FCPA, and no circuit court has yet offered a definition. The court held that, based on the statutory context of the term following amendment of the FCPA in 1998 to implement the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, an instrumentality is “an entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that performs a function the controlling government treats as its own." The court explained that to determine control, triers of fact should consider (i) the foreign government’s formal designation of the entity; (ii) whether the government has a majority interest in the entity; (iii) the government’s ability to hire and fire the entity’s principals; (iv) the extent to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly into the governmental fisc, and the extent to which the government funds the entity if it fails to break even; and (v) the length of time those indicia have existed. The court added that the factors to consider in determining whether an entity performs a function of the government include: (i) whether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists to carry out; (ii) whether the government subsidizes the costs associated with the entity providing services; (iii) whether the entity provides services to the public at large in the foreign country; and (iv) whether the public and the government of that foreign country generally perceive the entity to be performing a governmental function. In this case, the court determined that the telecommunications company at issue was an instrumentality under the FCPA, and after applying that decision to the convicted individuals’ specific challenges, affirmed their convictions and sentences.
Insurance Company Resolves Apparent Cuba Sanctions Violations
On May 8, OFAC released enforcement information regarding “apparent violations” of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations by Canadian subsidiaries of a U.S. insurance company. The U.S. company self-reported 3,560 apparent violations that occurred between January 2006, and March 2009, and agreed to remit $279,038 to settle potential civil liability. OFAC stated that over a more than three-year period two Canadian subsidiaries issued or renewed property and casualty insurance policies that insured Cuban risks of a Canadian company, and that one of the subsidiaries maintained a D&O liability insurance policy that insured certain directors and officers of three Cuban joint venture partners of a Canadian corporation. Separately, another subsidiary sold, renewed, or maintained in force individual or annual multi-trip travel insurance policies in which the insured identified Cuba as the travel destination. The civil penalty reflects OFAC’s balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, including the actual knowledge of the company and certain members of management of the violative conduct; and the company’s self-disclosure, cooperation, and advance remediation.
Debt Settlement Firm Pleads Guilty In CFPB's First Criminal Referral
On April 8 the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced that a debt settlement company and its owner pled guilty to fraud charges, resolving the first criminal case referred to the DOJ by the CFPB. The DOJ alleged that from 2009 through May 2013, the company systematically exploited and defrauded over 1,200 customers with credit card debt by charging them for debt settlement services the company never provided. The DOJ claimed that the company (i) lied about and/or concealed its fees, and falsely assured customers that fees would be substantially less than those the company eventually charged; (ii) deceived customers by fraudulently and falsely promising that the company could significantly lower borrower debts when, for the majority of its customers, the company allegedly did little or no work and failed to achieve any reduction in debt; and (iii) sent prospective customers solicitation letters falsely suggesting that the agency was acting on behalf of or in connection with a federal governmental program. The company’s owner pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. The company pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and faces a fine of up to twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, and up to five years' probation. The defendants also entered into a stipulation of settlement of a civil forfeiture action and consented to the entry of a permanent injunction barring them from providing, directly or indirectly, any debt relief or mortgage relief services in the future. The CFPB subsequently dismissed its parallel civil suit.