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2nd Circuit: Convicted SEC whistleblower cannot claim award
On November 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a petition from a plaintiff to review a decision by the SEC to not grant him his whistleblower award because he pled guilty to participating in the crime he reported. According to the order, the plaintiff provided information to the SEC that assisted in a successful agency enforcement action with respect to an international bribery scheme. The plaintiff timely filed an application for a whistleblower award in connection with both the action for which he had provided information and another related action. He pled guilty to bribery charges but had not yet been sentenced. The order further noted that because of the guilty plea, the SEC determined that the plaintiff had been “convicted of a criminal violation related to” the bribery scheme that was at issue in both actions. The order noted that, generally, the SEC is required under federal law to pay a monetary award to a whistleblower when that whistleblower “voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement” of “any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1,000,000.” The order further noted that the SEC may not make an award "to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award.”
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was not “convicted” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B). The plaintiff also claimed that the fact that he had not yet been sentenced—even though a court has accepted his guilty plea—means that he had not been “convicted.” The appellate court found that he did not raise this issue before the agency and therefore it need not address the plaintiff’s argument about the meaning of “convicted.” But even if it were to excuse the forfeiture, the plaintiff’s argument would fail, the appellate court concluded. The plaintiff also argued that the bribery charges to which he pled guilty were not connected to the actions he was a whistleblower on, and that the SEC did not support its finding of a connection with any substantial evidence. The appellate court disagreed with this argument as well, stating the SEC and the plaintiff interpret the meaning of “related to” differently. The appellate court further explained that “[t]he SEC interprets the term to mean that 'the conduct underlying the criminal conviction must be connected to or stand in some relation to the Covered Action.'" The order stated, “[the plaintiff] suggests that the term requires the whistleblower to have been 'a part of the conduct underlying the ... enforcement action' and to have known about the conduct during its occurrence.’”
2nd Circuit: NY law on interest payments for escrow accounts is preempted
On September 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York’s interest-on-escrow law impermissibly interferes with the incidentals of national bank lending and is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA). Plaintiffs in two putative class actions obtained loans from a national bank, one before and the other after certain Dodd-Frank provisions took effect. The loan agreements—governed by New York law—required plaintiffs to deposit money into escrow accounts. After the bank failed to pay interest on the escrowed amounts, plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, alleging, among other things, that under New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601 (which sets a minimum 2 percent interest rate on mortgage escrow accounts) they were entitled to interest. The bank moved to dismiss both actions, contending that GOL § 5-601 did not apply to federally chartered banks because it is preempted by the NBA. The district court disagreed and denied the bank’s motion, ruling first that RESPA (which regulates the amount of money in an escrow account but not the accruing interest rate) “shares a ‘unity of purpose’ with GOL § 5-601.” This is relevant, the district court said, “because Congress ‘intended mortgage escrow accounts, even those administered by national banks, to be subject to some measure of consumer protection regulation.’” Second, the district court reasoned that even though TILA § 1639d does not specifically govern the loans at issue, it is significant because it “evinces a clear congressional purpose to subject all mortgage lenders to state escrow interest laws.” Finally, with respect to the NBA, the district court determined that “the ‘degree of interference’ of GOL § 5-601 was ‘minimal’ and was not a ‘practical abrogation of the banking power at issue,’” and concluded that Dodd-Frank’s amendment to TILA substantiated a policy judgment showing “there is little incompatibility between requiring mortgage lenders to maintain escrow accounts and requiring them to pay a reasonable rate of interest on sums thereby received.” As such, GOL § 5-601 was not preempted by the NBA, the district court said.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its preemption analysis. According to the appellate court, the important question “is not how much a state law impacts a national bank, but rather whether it purports to ‘control’ the exercise of its powers.” In reversing the ruling and holding that that GOL § 5-601 was preempted by the NBA, the appellate court wrote that the “minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the federal government, so it would impermissibly interfere with national banks’ exercise of that power.” Notably, the 2nd Circuit’s decision differs from the 9th Circuit’s 2018 holding in Lusnak v. Bank of America, which addressed a California mortgage escrow interest law analogous to New York’s and held that a national bank must comply with the California law requiring mortgage lenders to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts (covered by InfoBytes here). Among other things, the 2nd Circuit determined that both the district court and the 9th Circuit improperly “concluded that the TILA amendments somehow reflected Congress’s judgment that all escrow accounts, before and after Dodd-Frank, must be subject to such state laws.”
In a concurring opinion, one of the judges stressed that while the panel concluded that the specific state law at issue is preempted, the opinion left “ample room for state regulation of national banks.” The judge noted that the opinion relies on a narrow standard of preempting only those “state laws that directly conflict with enumerated or incidental national bank powers conferred by Congress,” and stressed that the appellate court declined to reach a determination as to whether Congress subjected national banks to state escrow interest laws in cases (unlike the plaintiffs’ actions) where Dodd-Frank’s TILA amendments would apply.
2nd Circuit requires second look at “design and content” of online user agreement
On September 14, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s order denying a credit union’s motion to compel arbitration in a case involving the “unique question” of “whether and how to address incorporation by reference in web-based contracts under New York law.” The plaintiff claimed that the credit union wrongfully assessed and collected overdraft and insufficient funds fees on checking accounts that were not actually overdrawn. After the credit union moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause and class action waiver provision contained in the account agreement, the plaintiff argued that she was not bound by these provisions because they were not included in the original agreement and the credit union did not notify her when it added them to the agreement. According to the credit union, the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the modified agreement because she separately agreed to an internet banking agreement that incorporated the modified account agreement by reference, and because the modified account agreement was published on the credit union’s website, which the plaintiff used for online banking. The district court disagreed, finding, among other things, that the hyperlink and language related to the account agreement appeared to be “buried” in the internet banking agreement.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit held that the district court “erred in engaging in the inquiry notice analysis, which requires an examination of the ‘design and content’ of the webpage, without reviewing the actual screenshots of the web-based contract.” Recognizing that the internet banking agreement was a “clickwrap” or a “scrollwrap” agreement, the appellate court explained that it has “consistently upheld such agreements because the user has affirmatively assented to the terms of the agreement by clicking ‘I agree’ or similar language.” While the plaintiff did not dispute that she signed up for internet banking, this did not end the court’s analysis; according to the 2nd Circuit, when addressing questions concerning digital contract formation, “courts also evaluate visual evidence that demonstrates ‘whether a website user has actual or constructive notice of the conditions.’” The credit union did not provide evidence showing how the internet banking agreement was presented to users—thereby preventing the district court from assessing whether the relevant language and hyperlink were clear and conspicuous. The 2nd Circuit, therefore, instructed the district court to consider on remand the design and content of the internet banking agreement “as it was presented to users” to determine whether the plaintiff agreed to its terms, and to assess whether the account agreements are “clearly identified and available to the users” based on applicable precedents regarding inquiry notice of terms in web-based contracts.
2nd Circuit upholds public service loan relief settlement
On September 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a class action settlement reached between a student loan servicer and borrowers who claimed the servicer failed to inform them of a loan forgiveness program for public service employees. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the settlement required the servicer—who denied any allegations of wrongful conduct and damages—to put in place enhancements to identify borrowers who may qualify for Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) and “distribute comprehensive and accurate information about how to qualify, which are meaningful business practice enhancements.” The servicer was also required to fund a $2.25 million non-profit program to provide counseling to borrowers at all stages of the repayment process. The settlement also approved service awards for the named plaintiffs. In affirming the settlement, the appellate court rejected arguments raised by objectors who claimed, among other things, that the cy pres award would not benefit the class and “that the settlement improperly released monetary claims.”
“The cy pres award funds Public Service Promise and thereby assists all class members in navigating PSLF and determining whether they have a viable individual monetary claim against [the servicer],” the panel wrote, acknowledging that other circuit courts have recognized that class members can indirectly benefit from defendants paying appropriate third parties. “[T]he reforms will also benefit the remaining class members who, for example, are no longer with [the servicer] or who no longer have student loans, by providing them accurate information about the PSLF and helping them determine whether they have viable individual claims for damages,” the 2nd Circuit said.
2nd Circuit affirms acquittal of former transportation and energy industry executive
On August 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a lower court’s decision to partially acquit a former executive of a French multinational transportation and energy company after a federal jury found him guilty of seven counts related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and four counts of money laundering. The former executive, a British national, was employed by the company’s U.K. subsidiary and involved in a bribery scheme to secure public contracts in Indonesia for the company’s U.S. subsidiary. The 2nd Circuit agreed that the government failed to prove that the former executive was covered by the FCPA as an agent of a domestic concern, but left the money laundering convictions intact.
In 2019, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut found the defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, six counts of substantive FCPA violations, and four counts of money laundering, for his involvement in a scheme to bribe Indonesian officials in exchange for granting his company’s U.S. subsidiary, a power generation equipment manufacturer, a power plant construction contract. After the guilty verdict, he filed a Rule 29(a) motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing as to the FCPA counts that the government “failed to prove that he was an agent of [the subsidiary], the relevant domestic concern.” The 2nd Circuit had previously held that accomplice and co-conspirator liability was not available in the case, leaving agency liability. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2020, the district court agreed that the evidence at trial did not establish that the subsidiary exercised “control over [the former executive’s] actions sufficient to demonstrate agency” and acquitted him of the FCPA-related counts after determining that the government failed to prove at trial that the defendant was an “agent” of a domestic concern.
On appeal, a divided three-judge panel affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that “[t]here was no explicit or implied agency or employee relationship between [the defendant and the company’s U.S. subsidiary] such that the elements of an agency relationship were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” The majority held that lack of control held by the subsidiary over the defendant was fundamental in determining whether he was acting as an agent of the subsidiary. A principal’s accountability for the actions of an agent depends on its ability to select and control the agent and terminate the agency relationship, as well as an agent’s agreement to act on the principal’s behalf, the majority wrote. “[T]he fact that [the defendant] collaborated with and supported [the subsidiary and a co-defendant] does not mean he was under their control within the meaning of the FCPA,” the majority explained.
CFPB, FTC weigh in on consumer reporting obligations under the FCRA
On May 5, the CFPB and FTC filed a joint amicus brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, seeking the reversal of a district court’s decision which determined that a consumer reporting agency (CRA) was not liable under Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA for allegedly failing to investigate inaccurate information because the inaccuracy was “legal” and not “factual” in nature. The agencies countered that the FCRA, which requires credit reporting companies to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information included in consumer reports, “does not contain an exception for legal inaccuracies.”
The plaintiff noticed that the CRA reported that she owed a balloon payment on an auto lease that she was not obligated to pay under the terms of the lease. After the plaintiff confirmed she did not owe a balloon payment, she filed a putative class action against the CRA contending that it violated the FCRA by inaccurately reporting the debt. The CRA countered that it could not be held liable because “it is not obligated to resolve a legal challenge to the validity of the balloon payment obligation reported by” the furnisher “and that it reasonably relied on [the furnisher] to report accurate information.” Moreover, the CRA argued that even if it did violate the FCRA, the plaintiff was not entitled to damages because the violation was neither willful nor negligent. The district court sided with the CRA, drawing a distinction between factual and legal inaccuracies and holding that whether the plaintiff actually owed the balloon payment was a “legal dispute” requiring “a legal interpretation of the loan’s terms.” According to the district court, “CRAs cannot be held liable when the accuracy at issue requires a legal determination as to the validity of the debt the agency reported.” The court further concluded that since the plaintiff had not met the “threshold showing” of inaccuracy, the information in the consumer report “was accurate,” and therefore the CRA was “entitled to summary judgment because ‘reporting accurate information absolves a CRA of liability.’”
In urging the appellate court to overturn the decision, the agencies argued that the exemption for legal inaccuracies created by the district court is unsupported by statutory text and is not workable in practice. This invited defense, the FTC warned in its press release, “invites [CRAs] and furnishers to skirt their legal obligations by arguing that inaccurate information is only legally, and not factually, inaccurate.” The FTC further cautioned that a CRA might begin manufacturing “some supposed legal interpretation to insulate itself from liability,” thus increasing the number of inaccurate credit reports.
Whether the plaintiff owed a balloon payment and how much she owed “are straightforward questions about the nature of her debt obligations,” the agencies stated, urging the appellate court to “clarify that any incorrect information in a consumer report, whether ‘legal’ or ‘factual’ in character, constitutes an inaccuracy that triggers reasonable-procedures liability under the FCRA.” The agencies also pressed the appellate court to “clarify that a CRA’s reliance on information provided by even a reputable furnisher does not categorically insulate the CRA from reasonable-procedures liability under the FCRA.”
The Bureau noted that it also filed an amicus brief on April 7 in an action in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit involving the responsibility of furnishers to reasonably investigate the accuracy of furnished information after it is disputed by a consumer. In this case, a district court found that the plaintiff, who reported several fraudulent credit card accounts, did not identify any particular procedural deficiencies in the bank’s investigation of her indirect disputes and granted summary judgment in favor of the bank on the grounds that the “investigation duties FCRA imposes on furnishers [are] ‘procedural’ and ‘far afield’ from legal ‘questions of liability under state-law principles of negligence, apparent authority, and related inquiries.’ Moreover, the district court concluded that there was no genuine dispute as to whether the bank conducted a reasonable investigation as statutorily required. The Bureau noted in its press release, however, that the bank “had the same duty to reasonably investigate the disputed information, regardless of whether the underlying dispute could be characterized as “legal” or “factual.” In its brief, the Bureau urged the appellate court to, among other things, reverse the district court’s ruling and clarify that the “FCRA does not categorically exempt disputes presenting legal questions from the investigation furnishers must conduct.” Importing this exemption would run counter to the purposes of FCRA, would create an unworkable standard that would be difficult to implement, and could encourage furnishers to evade their statutory obligations any time they construe the disputes as “legal.” The brief also argued that each time a furnisher fails to reasonably investigate a dispute results in a new statutory violation, with its own statute of limitations.
2nd Circuit remands case to determine whether loans that violate New York’s criminal usury law are void ab initio
On March 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a district court ruling that had declined to treat an option that permits a lender, in its sole discretion, to convert an outstanding balance to shares of stock, at a fixed discount, as interest for purposes of New York’s criminal usury law. The district court had also observed, though it had no need to reach the issue, that even if the loan was usurious, it would not necessarily be void ab initio. After the case was appealed, the 2nd Circuit certified both issues to the New York Court of Appeals, which concluded, contrary to the district court, that such an option should be treated as interest for purposes of the usury statute and that loans made in violation of the usury statute are void ab initio. In light of the New York Court of Appeals holdings on these issues of state law, the 2nd Circuit vacated the district court’s order, and remanded to the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether the value of the option rendered the loan usurious.
District Court rules ratification unnecessary for CFPB to proceed with 2017 enforcement action
On March 16, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the CFPB can proceed with its 2017 enforcement action against a New Jersey-based finance company alleging, among other things, that it misled first responders to the World Trade Center attack and NFL retirees about high-cost loans mischaracterized as assignments of future payment rights. In 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a 2018 district court order dismissing the case on the grounds that the Bureau’s single-director structure was unconstitutional, and that, as such, the agency lacked authority to bring claims alleging deceptive and abusive conduct by the company (covered by InfoBytes here). The 2nd Circuit remanded the case to the district court, determining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law LLC v. CPFB (holding that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but severable from the statute establishing the Bureau, as covered by a Buckley Special Alert) superseded the 2018 ruling. The appellate court further noted that following Seila, former Director Kathy Kraninger ratified several prior regulatory actions (covered by InfoBytes here), including the enforcement action brought against the defendants, and as such, remanded the case to the district court to consider the validity of the ratification of the enforcement action. The defendants later filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Bureau could not use ratification to avoid dismissal of the lawsuit, but the Supreme Court declined the petition. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)
In 2021, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Bureau’s enforcement action on the grounds that “it was brought by an unconstitutionally constituted agency” and that the Bureau’s “untimely attempt to subsequently ratify this action cannot cure the agency’s constitutional infirmity.” After narrowly reviewing whether the Bureau had the authority to bring claims under the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the district court turned to the Supreme Court’s June 2021 majority decision in Collins v. Yellen, which held that “‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[.]’” Accordingly, the agency’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The district court’s March 16 opinion applied Collins and ruled that “the CFPB possessed the authority to bring this action in February 2017 and, hence, that ratification by Director Kraninger was unnecessary.”
District Court says NY champerty statute bars RMBS suit
On February 8, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment in parallel actions concerning pre-2008 residential mortgage-back securities (RMBS) trusts. In both cases, plaintiffs—RMBS certificateholders—filed suit alleging breaches of contractual, fiduciary, statutory, and common law duties with respect to certificates issued by RMBS trusts for which two of the defendants’ units served as trustee. Both plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to follow through on obligations to monitor the pre-2008 RMBS trusts that they administered. However, the court partially ruled in favor of the defendants, concluding that one set of plaintiffs could not avoid their loss in an RMBS trustee case brought against a different national bank, in which the court deemed the plaintiffs lacked a valid legal right to sue. In that matter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an opinion last October, agreeing with a different New York judge that “found the assignments champertous under New York law, rendering them invalid and leaving Plaintiffs without standing.” According to the 2nd Circuit, district court findings showed it was clear that the assignments were champertous “as they were made ‘with the intent and for the primary purpose of bringing a lawsuit.’”
The district court noted that the assignments of all the claims in the current matter were essentially identical to the issue already decided by the 2nd Circuit, and saw sufficient overlap to find the plaintiffs’ vehicles “collaterally estopped” from relitigating the issues of prudential standing and champerty. “The issues decided by the court of appeals relating to champerty and prudential standing are dispositive of the present action,” the court wrote. “Without prudential standing, the [] plaintiffs cannot assert claims arising out of the certificates and the entire [] action must be dismissed.” With respect to the other set of plaintiffs, while the court allowed certain claims to stand, it declined to grant any portion of the joint partial summary judgment related to the defendants’ alleged responsibilities as trustee, ruling that plaintiffs must prove those claims at trial.
2nd Circuit addresses TCPA’s definition of “unsolicited advertisement”
On January 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an unsolicited fax asking recipients to participate in a market research survey in exchange for money does not constitute as an “unsolicited advertisement” under the TCPA. According to the opinion, the plaintiff medical services company claimed the defendant sent two unsolicited faxes seeking participants for its market research surveys in exchange for an “honorarium of $150,” and filed a putative class action alleging violations of the TCPA, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (JFPA). The district court agreed with the defendant that an unsolicited faxed invitation to participate in a market research survey is not an “unsolicited advertisement” under the TCPA and dismissed the case.
The TCPA, as amended by the JFPA, defines an “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” On appeal, the 2nd Circuit found that the defendant’s faxes asking participants to take part in a market survey “plainly do not advertise the availability of any of those three things, and therefore cannot be ‘advertisements’ under the TCPA.” The 2nd Circuit added that “[t]his is not to say that any communication that offers to pay the recipient money is thereby not an advertisement. One could imagine many examples of communications, including faxed surveys, offering the recipient both money and services, that might incur liability under the TCPA.” The 2nd Circuit recognized that its decision disagrees with the 3rd Circuit’s ruling in Fischbein v. Olson Research Group, which held that faxes such as the ones at issue are advertisements because “an offer of payment in exchange for participation in a market survey is a commercial transaction, so a fax highlighting the availability of that transaction is an advertisement under the TCPA.” The 2nd Circuit held that in Fischbein the 3rd Circuit mistakenly relied “on an encyclopedia definition of what constitutes a ‘commercial transaction’. . . rather than focusing on the definition of ‘advertisement’ that the TCPA and FCC regulations provide.”