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  • FDIC and OCC critique Madden in amicus brief

    Courts

    On September 10, the FDIC and the OCC filed an amicus brief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, supporting a bankruptcy judge’s ruling, which refused to disallow a claim for a business loan that carried a more than 120 percent annual interest rate, concluding the interest rate was permissible as a matter of federal law. After filing bankruptcy in 2017, a Denver-based business sought to reject the claim under Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, and sought equitable subordination under Section 510 of the Code, arguing that the original promissory note, executed by the debtor and a Wisconsin state chartered bank, and subsequently assigned to a nonbank lender, was invalid under Colorado’s usury law. The bankruptcy judge disagreed, declining to follow Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here). The judge concluded that the promissory note was valid under Wisconsin law when executed as that state imposes no interest rate cap on business loans, and the assignment to the nonbank lender did not alter this, stating “[i]n the Court’s view, the ‘valid-when-made’ rule remains the law.” The debtor appealed the ruling to the district court.

    In support of the bankruptcy judge’s opinion, the FDIC and the OCC argue that the valid-when-made rule is dispositive. Specifically, the agencies assert that the nonbank assignee may lawfully charge the 120 percent annual rate, because the interest rate was non-usurious at the time when the loan was made by the Wisconsin state chartered bank. Moreover, the agencies state that it is a fundamental rule of contract law that “an assignee succeeds to all the assignor’s rights in the contract, including the right to receive the consideration agreed upon in the contract—here, the interest rate agreed upon.” Hence, the nonbank lender inherited the same contractual right to charge the annual interest rate. The agencies also argue that the Federal Deposit Insurance Act’s provisions regarding interest rate exportation (specifically 12 U.S.C. § 1831d) requires the same result, noting that “Congress intended to confer on banks a meaningful right to make loans at the rates allowed by their home states, which necessarily includes the ability to transfer those rates.” The agencies conclude that the bankruptcy judge correctly rejected Madden, calling the 2nd Circuit’s decision “unfathomable” for disregarding the valid-when-made doctrine and the “stand-in-the-shoes-rule” of contract law.

    Courts FDIC OCC Amicus Brief Madden Valid When Made Usury State Issues

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  • District Court: Debt collector must pay $267 million in robocall damages

    Courts

    On September 9, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California entered a final judgment against a debt collection agency that was found guilty of violating the TCPA by making more than 500,000 unsolicited robocalls using autodialers. The court’s final judgment is consistent with the jury’s verdict from last May, which identified four classes of individuals: two involving consumers who received skip-tracing calls or pre-recorded messages, and two involving non-debtor consumers who never had debt collection accounts with the defendant but received calls on their cell phones. In a February 2018 order, the court resolved cross motions for summary judgment, affirming that the dialers used by the defendant to place the calls constituted autodialers within the meaning of the TCPA and that the defendant lacked prior express consent to place the calls. Under the more than $267 million final judgment, class members will each receive $500 per call, with one of the named plaintiffs receiving $7,000 for his individual TCPA claim.

    Courts TCPA Debt Collection Robocalls Autodialer

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  • District Court approves final Madden class action settlement

    Courts

    On September 10, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a final order and judgment to approve a class action settlement agreement, which ends litigation dating back to 2011 concerning alleged violations of state usury limitations. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the plaintiffs brought claims against a debt collection firm and its affiliate alleging violations of the FDCPA and New York state usury law when the defendants attempted to collect charged-off credit card debt with interest rates above the state’s 25 percent cap that was purchased from a national bank. In 2017, upon remand following the 2nd Circuit’s decision that a nonbank entity taking assignment of debts originated by a national bank is not entitled to protection under the National Bank Act from state-law usury claims (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here), the district court certified the class and allowed the FDCPA and related state unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims to proceed.

    Following a fairness hearing, the court granted the parties’ joint motion for final approval, which divides the approximately 58,000 class members into two subclasses: claims alleging state-law violations, and claims alleging FDCPA violations. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants are required to, among other things, (i) provide class members with $555,000 in monetary relief; (ii) provide $9.2 million in credit balance reductions; (iii) pay $550,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs; (iv) pay class representatives $5,000 each; and (v) agree to comply with all applicable laws, regulations, and case law regarding the collection of interest, including the collection of usurious interest.

    Courts Usury FDCPA National Bank Act Madden Settlement Valid When Made

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  • Illinois Appeals Court vacates $4.3 million FACTA class action settlement

    Courts

    On September 6, the Illinois Appellate Court, 5th District, vacated a circuit court’s $4.3 million settlement in a class action brought against a merchant for allegedly violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA) when it printed the first six and last four digits of customers’ 16-digit credit card account numbers on receipts. The appeals court held, among other things, that the “record is devoid of facts that would have permitted a reasoned judgment that the class settlement was fair, reasonable and in the best interests of all affected.” Under FACTA, merchants are prohibited from including on a receipt more than the last five digits of a consumer’s credit card number, and a credit card’s expiration date. A class action suit claiming the merchant violated the restriction was originally filed in New York federal court, but the preliminarily approved settlement was later dismissed after objectors argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The named plaintiff requested dismissal of the federal action and subsequently filed suit immediately after in Illinois state court, asking the court to adopt a settlement agreement identical to the one that had been preliminarily approved by the federal court. The objector appealed once again, challenging, among other things, (i) the named plaintiff’s ability to adequately represent the settlement class; (ii) the original class notice, which she argued was insufficient to cover the state court settlement; and (iii) the “fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the ‘coupon settlement,’” in which class members received $12 merchant gift cards, while the named plaintiff received $4,000 and class counsel was awarded $500,000.

    On appeal, the appeals court disagreed with the objector’s contention that the named plaintiff lacked standing to represent the class because he kept his receipt and therefore had not been injured under FACTA, but found “a number of red flags” regarding the sub-class of more than 350,000 members of the merchant’s loyalty program, questioning whether the named plaintiff was an adequate representative for those class members since there was nothing in the record indicating whether he was a member of the program. Moreover, the appeals court agreed with the objector that the original class notice provided under the federal settlement did not sufficiently protect the due process rights of the settlement class, and that “due process requires the giving of notice anew of the pending state court settlement to absent class members so that they have the opportunity to protect their own interests.” The appeals court remanded the case to allow the trial court to more carefully scrutinize the terms of the settlement, stating that “we are unable to determine whether the trial court evaluated the merits of the cause of action, the prospects and problems of litigating the cause or the fairness of the terms of compromise.” The appeals court also ordered the trial court to further explain its findings that the $500,000 attorneys’ fee award and $4,000 lead plaintiff award are reasonable given the possibility that not every class member will use the coupon.

    Courts State Issues FACTA Credit Cards Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security Class Action

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  • District Court allows majority of privacy invasion class action claims to proceed against social media company

    Courts

    On September 9, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part a social media company’s motion to dismiss a multidistrict class action alleging the company failed to prevent third parties from accessing and misusing private data of its users, in violation of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), and various state laws. In the consolidated action, the plaintiffs allege that the company (i) made sensitive user information—including basic facts such as gender, age, and address; and substantive content such as photos, videos, and religious and political views—available to third parties without user consent; and (ii) failed to prevent those same third parties from selling or otherwise misusing the information. The company moved to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that “people have no legitimate privacy interest in any information they make available to their friends on social media.”

    The district court disagreed, concluding that most of the plaintiffs’ claims should survive, and that the company “could not be more wrong” in its argument that its users lose all privacy interest in the information they share with their friends on social media. The court asserted that when a user shares information with a limited audience, they “retain privacy rights and can sue someone for violating them.” The court also rejected the company’s argument that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue in federal court because they could not show “tangible negative consequences from the dissemination of [the] information.” The court noted that privacy invasion is a redressable injury in itself and does not need a secondary economic injury to confer standing. Additionally, while the court recognized that the company’s argument that the users consented to this practice has “some legal force,” it cannot “defeat the lawsuit entirely, at least at the pleading stage.” Therefore, the court denied the motion as to the VPPA and narrowed certain claims under the SCA and California state laws, mostly with regard to claims on behalf of users who signed up for the service after 2009, who purportedly authorized the company to share information through their friends with app developers.

    Courts Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security Class Action State Issues Standing

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  • En banc 5th Circuit declares FHFA structure unconstitutional, allows net worth sweep claims to proceed

    Courts

    On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reaffirmed, in an en banc rehearing, that the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) structure violates constitutional separation of powers requirements and allowed “net worth sweep” claims brought by a group of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (government-sponsored entities or GSEs) shareholders to proceed. As previously covered by InfoBytes, GSE shareholders brought an action against the U.S. Department of Treasury and FHFA arguing that (i) the FHFA acted outside its statutory authority when it adopted a dividend agreement that requires the GSEs to pay quarterly dividends equal to their entire net worth to the Treasury Department (known as “net worth sweep”); and (ii) the structure of the FHFA is unconstitutional because it violates separation of powers principles. The district court dismissed the shareholder’s statutory claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Treasury Department and the FHFA on the separation of powers claim. On appeal, the 5th Circuit agreed with the lower court on the first claim, concluding that the net worth sweep payments were acceptable under the FHFA’s statutory authority and that the FHFA was lawfully established by Congress through the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which places restraints on judicial review. However, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision on the separation of powers claim, concluding that Congress went too far in insulating the FHFA’s single director from removal by the president for anything other than cause, ruling that the agency’s structure violates Article II of the Constitution. 

    After an en banc rehearing, the appellate court issued two separate majority opinions. Both opinions concluded that (i) the GSE shareholders plausibly alleged that the net worth sweep exceed the powers of the FHFA when acting as a conservator under HERA; and (ii) the FHFA’s structure—which provides the director with “for cause” removal protection—violates the Constitution’s separation of powers requirements. However, the opinions differed on the appropriate remedy, with nine judges concluding that the remedy should be severance of the for-cause provision, not prospective relief invalidating the net worth sweep, stating that “the Shareholders’ ongoing injury, if indeed there is one, is remedied by a declaration that the “for cause” restriction is declared removed. We go no further.”

    Various dissenting opinions were issued, including one signed by seven judges concluding that the FHFA acted within its statutory powers under HERA when it adopted the net worth sweep, stating “the FHFA’s ‘powers are many and mostly discretionary.’” In another dissenting opinion, four judges argued that the majority opinions wrongly concluded that the FHFA’s structure is unconstitutional, arguing that there are “only reasons for caution and skepticism, and none for action” in the constitutional claim. “Neither the Constitution’s text, nor the Supreme Court’s constructions thereof, nor the adversary process in this litigation has given us much ground on which to declare the FHFA’s design unconstitutional,” the judges argued.

    Given the similarities of the FHFA’s single director structure with that of the CFPB, this case warrants close attention as it has the potential to create a vehicle for consideration by the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of single director agencies.

    Courts Appellate Fifth Circuit En Banc FHFA Fannie Mae Freddie Mac GSE Single-Director Structure HERA Congress

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  • CFPB files deceptive and abusive allegations against foreclosure relief services company and principals

    Federal Issues

    On September 6, the CFPB announced a complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against a foreclosure relief services company, along with the company’s president/CEO (defendants), for allegedly engaging in deceptive and abusive acts and practices in connection with the marketing and sale of purported financial-advisory and mortgage-assistance-relief services to consumers. According to the complaint, since 2014 the defendants allegedly violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act  (CFPA) and Regulation O by making deceptive and unsubstantiated representations about the efficacy and material aspects of its mortgage assistance relief services, as well as making misleading or false claims about the experience and qualifications of its employees. Additionally, the Bureau alleged the defendants’ representations about their services constituted abusive acts and practices because, among other things, consumers “generally did not understand and were not in a position to evaluate the accuracy of [the defendants’] marketing representations or the quality of the mortgage-assistance-relief services that [the defendants] sold.” Moreover, the Bureau claimed the defendants further violated Regulation O by charging consumers advance fees before rendering services.

    In addition, the Bureau entered a proposed stipulated final judgment and order against the company’s principal auditor for providing “substantial assistance in furtherance of [the defendants’] unlawful conduct” in violation of the CFPA and Regulation O. The proposed judgment imposes a $493,403.04 civil penalty, of which all but $5,000 is suspended due to the auditor’s limited ability to pay. The auditor is also permanently banned from providing mortgage assistance relief services or consumer financial products and services.

    Federal Issues CFPB Enforcement Courts CFPA UDAAP Regulation O Foreclosure

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  • District Court says TCPA dismissal bid cannot rely upon Supreme Court ruling

    Courts

    On September 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a medical laboratory’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the company cannot use a Supreme Court ruling to avoid a proposed TCPA class action suit concerning allegations that it made unsolicited calls using an “autodialer.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss last December after it concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the equipment used to make unsolicited calls qualified as an “autodialer.” The defendant argued, however, that the court should reconsider its decision in light of a 2019 Supreme Court ruling in which separate concurring opinions written by Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas concluded that district courts are not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the term “autodialer” under the TCPA. According to the defendant, because of these concurring opinions, the court “was not bound by the FCC’s 2003 and 2008 guidance on the definition of an ‘autodialer,’” and should therefore revisit its prior opinion. However, the court stated that the Supreme Court’s case does not change any of the “controlling law” dealing with the TCPA issue in the current lawsuit. “Because defendant’s arguments are not based on any actual change in controlling law,” its motion for reconsideration is denied, the court stated, noting that concurring opinions “do not change ‘controlling law.’”

    Courts TCPA Class Action U.S. Supreme Court Autodialer

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  • 6th Circuit: FCRA claims require consumer to notify consumer reporting agency of dispute

    Courts

    On August 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a bank was not obligated under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to investigate a credit reporting error because the consumers failed to ever notify a consumer reporting agency. According to the opinion, after plaintiffs paid off their line of credit, the bank (defendant) continued reporting the plaintiff as delinquent on the account. After plaintiffs contacted the bank regarding the reporting error, the bank employee ensured plaintiffs that the defendant submitted amendments to the credit reporting bureaus to correct the situation. However, the plaintiffs claimed the error was not corrected until almost a year later. Plaintiffs also alleged that they did not contact the credit reporting bureau in reliance on the bank employee’s statements. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, concluding that the FCRA requires that notification of a credit dispute be provided to a consumer reporting agency as a prerequisite for a claim that a furnisher failed to investigate the dispute. Since the plaintiffs failed to trigger the defendant’s FCRA obligations because they never filed a dispute with a consumer reporting agency, the defendant’s responsibility to investigate was never activated.

    On appeal, the 6th Circuit agreed with the district court that direct notification to the furnisher of the inaccurate credit report does not meet the FCRA’s prerequisite. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ state common law claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and tortious interference with contractual relationships were preempted by the FCRA, and their fraudulent misrepresentation claim was forfeited on appeal.

    Courts Appellate Sixth Circuit FCRA Credit Report Credit Furnishing Consumer Reporting Agency

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  • District Court: FTC allegations against credit card processor can proceed

    Courts

    On August 28, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions to dismiss an enforcement action brought by the FTC against a group of individuals and entities that allegedly facilitated a telemarketing scheme that previously resulted in the principal actors in the scheme settling with the FTC and later pleading guilty to state criminal charges. The alleged scheme involved “credit card laundering”—the creation of fictitious entities to process customer credit card transactions so that the actual entity receiving the funds would not be identified. The defendants in the current matter are an Independent Sales Organization and several of its officers allegedly involved in that effort (prior Info Bytes coverage here). The defendants first argued that the relevant part of the FTC Act only permits injunctive relief and that the FTC’s requests for restitution and disgorgement were improper because those forms of relief are penalties, not equitable relief, under Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The court noted, however, that the Supreme Court in Kokesh expressly limited the holding to the question of the statute of limitations applicable to the SEC, and that the Ninth Circuit has subsequently approved decisions granting restitution and disgorgement under the FTC Act. The defendants also argued that injunctive relief was not warranted where the unlawful conduct in question ceased in 2013, but the court ruled that the FTC need only show that it has “reason to believe” that a defendant is violating or is about to violate the law. The court declined to address the FTC’s argument that its “reason to believe” decision is unreviewable, but it found that the FTC had pled sufficient facts to establish that it has reason to believe that the defendants would violate the statute. In particular, the court noted that a “court’s power to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuance of illegal conduct,” that “an inference arises from illegal past conduct that future violations may occur,” and that “courts should be wary of a defendant’s termination of illegal conduct when a defendant voluntarily ceases unlawful conduct in anticipation of formal intervention.” Those factors were all present, along with the fact that the defendants “remain in the same professional occupation.”

    Courts FTC Payment Processors FTC Act Credit Cards Telemarketing Sales Rule

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