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On February 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing, as untimely, a trustee’s breach of contract and indemnity claims related to losses resulting from alleged defects in mortgage loans. At issue are three pools of residential home mortgages that at the time of sale had an aggregate principal balance exceeding $3.4 billion. These loans were sold by a mortgage company to Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. and Lehman Brothers Bank FSB in 2006 and subsequently securitized into three trusts. In addition to the representations and warranties made and the remedies provided in the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreements (MLPAs) and Trust Agreements, the mortgage company, Lehman, and the depositor entered into a separate Indemnification Agreement for each trust, which contained its own representations and warranties indemnification provision. Investors, including Freddie Mac, purchased certificates in the trusts.
According to the court, Freddie Mac conducted a forensic review of the trusts six years after the sale, which allegedly revealed that an “overwhelming percentage” of the loans in the trusts breached the mortgage company’s representations and warranties (R&W). Shortly after discovery, the trustee submitted breach notices to the mortgage company, which did not cure or repurchase the loans.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), as conservator for Freddie Mac, filed a complaint against the mortgage company asserting breach of contract and indemnification claims. After the FHFA dropped out of the litigation, the trustee filed an amended complaint that included two breach of contract counts and two indemnification counts—one seeking indemnification based on the MLPAs and Trust Agreements and another seeking indemnification based on the Indemnification Agreements.
The mortgage company moved for summary judgment on the first three claims and moved to dismiss the fourth claim. The district court granted the motion. It found that the breach of contract claims were time-barred because the FHFA filed the summons with notice more than six years after the limitations period at issue, which begins to run on the effective date of the R&Ws. The court also found the trustee’s indemnification claim based on the MLPAs and Trust Agreements to be time-barred because it was “merely a reformulation of its breach-of-contract claims.” The district court dismissed the other indemnification claim based on the Indemnification Agreements as time-barred because it involved a new set of operative facts and thus could not relate back to the original complaint filed by the FHFA.
On review, the 2nd Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. As to the breach of contract claims, the 2nd Circuit relied on two New York Court of Appeals cases: Ace Securities Corp. v. DB Structured Products, which held that the six year statute of limitations begins to run on the effective date of R&Ws, and Deutsche Bank National Trust v. Flagstar Capitals Market Corporation which held that an express accrual clause in a contract cannot delay the start of a limitations period under New York law. With respect to the third cause of action for indemnification under the MLPAs and Trust Agreements, the 2nd Circuit stated that absent unmistakably clear language in an indemnification agreement that demonstrates that the parties intended this clause to cover first-party claims as opposed to third-party claims, an agreement between two parties to indemnify each other does not mean that one party’s failure to perform gives rise to an indemnification claim. In reviewing the claim at issue in count three, the court found that the claim sought payment to the trustee arising from the mortgage company’s alleged breach of R&Ws, which is a breach of contract claim. The trustee argued that the indemnification section provided an independent remedy, but the 2nd Circuit rejected that argument stating that a claim is not independent if its success directly depends on the breach of the R&Ws in the MLPAs outlined in the contract claims. Finally, with respect to the fourth clause of action for indemnification, the 2nd Circuit held that this claim filed in 2016, would only be timely if it related back to the facts of the earlier claims, but since it arose out of different contracts it therefore could not relate back.
On February 5, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued an order granting a national bank’s motion to dismiss a multidistrict litigation complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs, in an attempt to recover losses from an internet phone service company’s pyramid scheme that ran from 2012 to 2014, alleged that the bank assisted the company’s pyramid scheme by, among other things, maintaining depository accounts for the company, receiving interest on funds held in the accounts, processing transactions, and receiving fees for wire transfers. However, the court found that the investors failed to adequately allege that the bank had any actual knowledge of the underlying fraud. “The complaint is devoid of any allegation that the fees, interest, and charges received by [the bank] were anything more than payments for banking services,” the court wrote, and thus “have failed to allege that they were ‘unjust.’”
District court orders TCPA suit to mediation, states FCC’s interpretation of autodialer may take years
On February 1, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri issued an order referring the parties in a putative TCPA class action to mediation. The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendant’s insurance company sent her text messages without her consent using an automatic telephone dialing system (autodialer). In response, the defendant argued that the software it used to send the text messages does not qualify as an autodialer because it calls numbers from a pre-set list, instead of one that is randomly or sequentially generated. The defendant further argued that the case should be stayed because the FCC is currently considering whether systems such as the one at issue qualify as autodialers under the TCPA following the D.C. Circuit’s March 2018 ruling in ACA International v. FCC, which set aside the FCC’s 2015 interpretation of an autodialer as “unreasonably expansive.” (Covered by a Buckley Special Alert.) The decision to refer the case to mediation comes after the court’s August 2018 order denying the defendant’s motion to stay the proceeding. In that order the court explained that, although the FCC issued a notice in May 2018 (covered by InfoBytes here) seeking comments on the interpretation of the TCPA, the rulemaking process would likely take years and may not even resolve the issue in the case.
On January 31, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted final approval and class certification to a $22 million settlement resolving class action allegations that a national bank improperly charged overdraft fees on “one-time, non-recurring” transactions made with a ride-sharing company. The court found that the bank mischaracterized these one-time charges as recurring transactions, which allowed the bank to charge overdraft fees of $35. Prior to the court’s approval of the settlement, 12 state Attorneys General sent a letter to the court arguing that the agreement’s release of liability to the ride-sharing company was inequitable. The court found, however, that the release “does not compromise the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement,” where, among other things, plaintiffs’ counsel investigated the viability of claims against the ride-sharing company and concluded that litigation against the company could present problems for the proposed class and for individual recovery. The $22 million settlement constitutes 80 percent of all revenues charged by the bank as a result of the overdraft fees. The court also approved $5.5 million in attorneys’ fees and $50,000 in costs.
On February 1, the FTC announced that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that the operator of a computer-financing scheme cannot use his bankruptcy to discharge a $13.4 million judgment entered in 2016 for violating a 2008 FTC order. The FTC alleged that the defendant and his affiliated companies collected more than $14 million from consumers based on promises that they would finance the purchase of new computers but failed to actually deliver the computers. The court determined that the contempt judgment issued in 2016 could not be discharged because it resulted from the defendant’s fraudulent conduct “based on both misrepresentation and concealment.” In a press release describing the ruling, the FTC stated that the defendant’s attempt to shield himself from complying with the order by filing for bankruptcy was an attempt to “avoid justice.”
CFPB files proposed consent order banning certain Canadian and Maltese payday lenders from U.S. consumer lending
On February 1, the CFPB and a group of payday lenders, including individuals and corporate officials based in Canada and Malta (collectively, “defendants”), filed a proposed consent order with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York that would resolve allegations that the defendants violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act. According to the Bureau’s press release, the defendants allegedly (i) misrepresented to consumers an obligation to repay loan amounts that were voided because the loan violated state licensing or usury laws; (ii) misrepresented that loan agreements were not subject to federal or state laws; (iii) misrepresented that non-payment would result in lawsuits, arrests, imprisonment, or wage garnishment; and (iv) conditioned loan agreements upon irrevocable wage assignment clauses. Under the terms of the proposed order, the defendants would be, among other things, (i) permanently banned from consumer lending in the U.S.; (ii) permanently restrained from the collection or sale of existing U.S. consumer debts; and (iii) subject to certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements. The proposed order does not impose a fine on the defendants.
On January 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that the defendant employer violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (FCRA) standalone document requirement when it included extraneous state disclosure requirements within a disclosure to obtain a consumer report on the plaintiff, a prospective employee. The panel also concluded that the defendant’s form failed to satisfy both the FCRA and the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act’s (ICRAA) “‘clear and conspicuous’ requirements because, although the disclosure was conspicuous, it was not clear.” According to the opinion, the plaintiff signed a “Disclosure Regarding Background Investigation,” and was employed for several months before voluntarily terminating her employment. Following her departure from the company, the plaintiff filed a putative class action against the defendant, alleging a failure to make proper disclosure under the FCRA and the ICRAA. The plaintiff claimed that the disclosure form included not only a disclosure as required by the FCRA stating that the defendant could obtain a consumer report on her, but also additional disclosure requirements for several other states.
The district court initially granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the FCRA and as to ICRAA’s clear and conspicuous requirement, holding that the disclosure form complied with both statutes. On appeal, the 9th Circuit first rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the disclosure form violated the standalone document requirements because it included all the application materials she filled out during the employment process. The panel declined to extend this principle to the FCRA’s definition of a “document,” stating that the employment packet was distinct from the disclosure form. However, the 9th Circuit cited to its 2017 decision in Syed v. M-I, LLC, which held that “‘a prospective employer violates Section 1681b(b)(2)(A) when it procures a job applicant’s consumer report after including a liability waiver in the same document as the statutorily mandated disclosure.’” Noting the statute’s plain language, the 9th Circuit concluded in Syed that the FCRA meant what it said—“the required disclosure must be in a document that ‘consist[s] ‘solely’ of the disclosure.’” Moreover, the panel stated that Syed considered the standalone requirement with regard to any surplusage, and that the “FCRA should not be read to have implied exceptions, especially when the exception—in that case, a liability waiver—was contrary to FCRA’s purpose.”
The 9th Circuit also concluded that the district court erred in holding that the disclosure form was clear because the form (i) contained language a reasonable person would not understand, and (ii) the language combined federal and state disclosures, which would confuse a reasonable reader. However, the panel held that the disclosure form met the conspicuous requirement since the defendant capitalized, bolded, and underlined the headings for each section of the disclosure and labeled the form so an applicant could see what she was signing. Accordingly, the 9th Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On January 25, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California granted a bank’s motion to compel arbitration in connection with a lawsuit concerning the bank’s assessment of two types of fees. According to the order, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit asserting claims for breach of contract and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law due to the bank’s alleged practice of charging fees for out-of-network ATM use and overdraft fees related to debit card transaction timing. The bank moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision in the deposit account agreement executed between the bank and the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued against arbitration, citing a California Supreme Court case, McGill v. Citibank, which held that “waivers of the right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum are unenforceable.” In response, the bank argued that (i) McGill does not apply because the plaintiff is not seeking public injunctive relief; and (ii) McGill is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court agreed with the bank, determining that the relief sought by the plaintiff would primarily benefit her, stating “any public injunctive relief sought by [plaintiff] is merely incidental to her primary aim of gaining compensation for injury.” As for preemption, the court noted that even if the McGill rule was applicable to a contract, it would not survive preemption as the U.S. Supreme Court has “consistently held that the FAA preempts states’ attempts to limit the scope of arbitration agreements,” and “the McGill rule is merely the latest ‘device or formula’ intended to achieve the result of rendering an arbitration agreement against public policy.”
On January 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota denied two financing companies’ (collectively, “defendants”) motions to dismiss an action alleging the defendants violated the Consumer Leasing Act (CLA), TILA, and a Minnesota law prohibiting usurious contracts through a transaction to purchase a puppy. According to the opinion, the plaintiff financed the purchase of a puppy through the defendants, which allowed her to take possession of the puppy in exchange for 24 monthly payments through an agreement styled as a “Consumer Pet Lease.” The agreement had an APR of 120 percent. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants alleging the companies violated (i) the CLA by failing to disclose the number of payments owed under the agreement prior to execution; (ii) TILA by failing to adequately disclose the finance charge, the APR, and the “total of payments” as required under the Act; and (iii) the state’s usury law cap of 8 percent for personal debt. The defendants moved to dismiss the action challenging the plaintiff’s standing, among other things. The court, rejected the defendants arguments, finding that the consumer adequately alleged injury by stating she “would” have, not “might” have, pursued other funding had the defendants disclosed the actual interest rate. Additionally, the court determined the consumer plausibly alleged a CLA violation because the agreement contains information the plaintiff could view as “conflicting and confusing.” With respect to the TILA claims, the plaintiff argued that, although the agreement is styled as a lease, it is actually a credit sale, and the court rejected one of the defendant’s arguments that it was not a creditor, but rather a servicer not subject to TILA. Lastly, the court held the plaintiff adequately pleaded her state usury claim, but noted the claim’s viability would be better informed by discovery. Accordingly, the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
On January 28, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement after identifying several deficiencies with the deal. The proposed settlement was intended to resolve allegations concerning security failures by a global internet company, which led to three data breaches between 2013 and 2016 that exposed consumers’ personal information (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The proposed settlement would have required the internet company to (i) establish a $50 million settlement fund; (ii) pay additional attorneys’ fees of up to $35 million; (iii) pay costs and expenses of up to $2.5 million, as well as service awards of up to $7,500 for each class representative; (iv) provide customers with two years of credit monitoring and identity theft protection services; and (v) improve its data security. However, the court stated that the proposed settlement agreement, among other things, inadequately disclosed the sizes of the settlement fund and class, as well as the scope of non-monetary relief, and “appears likely to result in an improper reverter of attorneys’ fees.” Moreover, the court held that the proposed agreement provided insufficient detail about how much the settlement would cost the defendant in total, and did not disclose the costs of credit monitoring or how much the defendant would budget for data security, thus preventing class members from assessing the reasonableness of the settlement or the attorneys’ fee request—which the court indicated seem “unreasonably high.” The court also noted that “[t]he parties’ lack of disclosure also inhibits the court's ability to assess the reasonableness of the settlement.”
- Jeffrey S. Hydrick to discuss "State legislative update" at the NMLS Annual Conference & Training
- Kathryn L. Ryan to speak at the "Business model primer" at the NMLS Annual Conference & Training
- Daniel P. Stipano to discuss "Dynamic customer due diligence and beneficial ownership from KYC to ongoing CDD and the new rule implementation" at the Puerto Rican Symposium of Anti-Money Laundering
- Jon David D. Langlois to discuss "Regulatory risks of convenience fees" at the Mortgage Bankers Association National Mortgage Servicing Conference & Expo
- Michelle L. Rogers to discuss "Preparing for servicing exams in the current regulatory environment" at the Mortgage Bankers Association National Mortgage Servicing Conference & Expo
- APPROVED Webcast: NMLS Annual Conference & Ombudsman Meeting: Review and recap
- Brandy A. Hood to discuss "Keeping your head above water in flood insurance compliance" at the Mortgage Bankers Association National Mortgage Servicing Conference & Expo
- Melissa Klimkiewicz to discuss "Servicing super session" at the Mortgage Bankers Association National Mortgage Servicing Conference & Expo
- Jessica L. Pollet to discuss "Law & compliance speedsmarts" at the American Financial Services Association Law & Compliance Symposium
- Daniel P. Stipano to discuss "Lessons learned from recent high profile enforcement actions" at the Florida International Bankers Association AML Compliance Conference
- Moorari K. Shah to provide "Regulatory update – California and beyond" at the National Equipment Finance Association Summit
- Sasha Leonhardt and John B. Williams to discuss "Privacy" at the National Association of Federally-Insured Credit Unions Spring Regulatory Compliance School
- Aaron C. Mahler to discuss "Regulation B/fair lending" at the National Association of Federally-Insured Credit Unions Spring Regulatory Compliance School
- Heidi M. Bauer to discuss "'So you want to form a joint venture' — Licensing strategies for successful JVs" at RESPRO26
- Jonice Gray Tucker to to discuss "DC policy: Everything but the kitchen sink" at CBA Live
- Jonice Gray Tucker to discuss "Small business & regulation: How fair lending has evolved & where are we heading?" at CBA Live
- Daniel P. Stipano to discuss "Lessons learned from ABLV and other major cases involving inadequate compliance oversight" at the ACAMS International AML & Financial Crime Conference
- Daniel P. Stipano to discuss "A year in the life of the CDD final rule: A first anniversary assessment" at the ACAMS International AML & Financial Crime Conference
- Moorari K. Shah to discuss "State regulatory and disclosures" at the Equipment Leasing and Finance Association Legal Forum
- Hank Asbill to discuss "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain: Addressing prosecutions driven by hidden actors" at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers West Coast White Collar Conference
- Daniel P. Stipano to discuss "Keep off the grass: Mitigating the risks of banking marijuana-related businesses" at the ACAMS AML Risk Management Conference
- Daniel P. Stipano to discuss "Mid-year policy update" at the ACAMS AML Risk Management Conference
- Benjamin W. Hutten to discuss "Requirements for banking inherently high-risk relationships" at the Georgia Bankers Association BSA Experience Program