InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
2nd Circuit: No bona fide error defense without written policies to avoid the error
On September 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a summary judgment ruling in favor of a debt collector, concluding that the debt collector was not entitled to the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense as a matter of law when it erroneously sent communications to a consumer with the same name as the actual debtor. According to the opinion, a debt collector sent collection notices to a consumer with the same first name, middle initial, and last name as the actual debtor. The consumer informed the debt collector that he was not the debtor and provided the last two digits of his social security number, which were different than the debtor’s social security number on file with the debt collector. The debt collector continued to send communications, including a subpoena duces tecum, to the consumer and the consumer filed suit, alleging various violations of the FDCPA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the debt collector, concluding that the debt collector did not violate certain provisions of the FDCPA and noting that while it violated others, the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense applied making the debt collector not liable for the violations.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit agreed with the district court that the debt collector did not violate Section 1692e(5) or Section 1692f of the FDCPA because it did not intend to send the communications to a non-debtor, nor did the debt collector’s actions constitute “unfair or unconscionable means” of collection because the consumer was not forced to respond to the information subpoena or attend a debtor’s examination. However, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the bona fide error defense because a reasonable jury could conclude that the debt collector “did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid its error.” The appellate court also noted that the debt collector was “in possession of more than enough evidence” that the consumer was not the debtor, including different social security numbers and birth years, and a reasonable jury could conclude the mistake “was not made in good faith.” Additionally, the appellate court emphasized that the debt collector had “no written policies” to address situations in which employees are uncertain about whether a debtor may live at a particular address. Thus, the debt collector was not entitled to summary judgment on the outstanding FDCPA claims, and the appellate court remanded the case to the district court.
Court allows certain auto loan claims to proceed
On September 1, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California determined that certain claims could proceed in a suit alleging a national bank failed to properly refund payments made pursuant to guaranteed asset protection (GAP) waiver agreements entered into in connection with auto loans. According to the plaintiffs’ suit, the bank knowingly collected unearned fees for GAP Waivers and “concealed its obligation to issue a refund on the GAP Waiver fees for the portion of the GAP Waiver’s initial coverage that was cut short by early payoff, and denied any obligation to return the unearned GAP fees.” The bank sought dismissal of the suit, arguing, among other things, that—with the exception of one consumer’s claims—all of the plaintiffs’ contracts include “a condition precedent under which the [p]laintiffs must first submit a written refund request for unearned GAP fees before being entitled to a refund,” which condition was not fulfilled.
The court dismissed breach of contract claims brought by eight of the 11 plaintiffs, noting that seven of these plaintiffs were not excused from complying with the condition precedent in their contracts with the bank, and had not pled sufficient facts to allege compliance; the court held that the eighth plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court allowed the breach of contract claims filed by two plaintiffs whose contracts did not contain condition precedent language to proceed, and allowed the final plaintiff’s breach of contract claim to proceed because the bank did not move to dismiss such. The court kept the declaratory judgment requests intact for the three plaintiffs whose contract claims were allowed to proceed, but determined such plaintiffs could not assert standing under laws of states where they do not reside and did not receive an injury. Further, the court granted the bank’s request to dismiss TILA claims—noting that the statute does not apply to indirect auto lenders like the bank—and tossed claims brought under California’s Unfair Competition Law.
The bank also asked the court to strike the six class action claims included in the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. However, the court denied the bank’s request to strike the plaintiffs’ nationwide class allegations calling it premature. “Deciding whether the alleged classes can be maintained is properly done on a motion for class certification because at that point ‘the parties have had an opportunity to conduct class discovery and develop a record,’” the court noted.
CFPB asks 9th Circuit to enforce Seila CID
On August 31, the CFPB filed a supplemental brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the formal ratifications of then-Acting Director Mick Mulvaney and current Director Kathy Kraninger, paired with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila v. CFPB, are sufficient for the appellate court to enforce the CID previously issued against the law firm, and that “[s]etting aside the CID at this point would serve no valid purpose.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2017, the CFPB ordered Seila Law to comply with a CID seeking information about the firm’s business practices to determine whether it violated the CFPA, the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), or other federal consumer financial laws when providing debt-relief services or products, but the law firm refused to comply, arguing that the CID was invalid because the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional. Last year, after the 9th Circuit upheld the CID (covered by InfoBytes here), Seila Law appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. Following the Supreme Court’s opinion in June—which held that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau (covered by a Buckley Special Alert)—the Bureau noted that Kraninger formally ratified the agency’s decisions regarding the CID in July.
Among other things, the Bureau highlighted in its brief Seila Law’s argument “that the CID still should not be enforced because at the time this action commenced, the Supreme Court had not yet held invalid the removal provision.” The Bureau countered that any defect in the initiation of this action has been resolved because the CID, and the action to enforce it, “have now been formally and expressly ratified” by two Bureau officials removable at will by the President. The Bureau also asked the 9th Circuit to consider what may happen if the appellate court chooses to ignore the ratifications and rule in favor of Seila Law. According to the Bureau, such a result “could also, depending on the [c]ourt’s reasoning, be used to raise doubts about the validity of other actions the Bureau has taken over the past decade and that a fully accountable Director has now also ratified.” Should the 9th Circuit choose to set aside the CID, the appellate court would not only further delay a “legitimate law-enforcement investigation,” but also “undermine the very Article II authority that the Supreme Court so emphasized in deciding this case,” the Bureau argued.
Court certifies RESPA class
On August 28, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland certified a class of mortgage borrowers who alleged a national bank (defendant) referred them to a title firm in exchange for free marketing materials pursuant to an undisclosed agreement. In doing so, the court approved a class defined as borrowers who (i) had a loan originated or brokered through the defendant; and (ii) received title and settlement services from the title firm in connection with the closing of their loan. The plaintiffs claimed their payments to the title firm were shared in part with the defendant through their broker, who received free marketing materials in exchange for the referrals in violation of RESPA. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that “because of this kickback arrangement, they paid higher costs for their settlement services than they otherwise would have paid.”
The defendant argued, among other things, that the named plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they did not pay more for settlement services, contending that the title firm’s fees “were based on prevailing market rates in the geographic location and did not depend” on the “alleged kickbacks.” Additionally, the defendant argued that the named plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives because they do not have knowledge sufficient to prove their own claims. The court disagreed, stating the plaintiffs “presented some evidence to corroborate the claim that they were harmed by paying higher fees than they would have absent the alleged RESPA violations,” and that “burdensome individualized scrutiny of each proposed class member’s transaction” was not necessary to establish each violation.
Trade groups amend Payday Rule complaint
On August 28, two payday loan trade groups (plaintiffs) filed an amended complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in ongoing litigation challenging the CFPB’s 2017 final rule covering payday loans, vehicle title loans, and certain other installment loans (Rule). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court granted the parties’ joint motion to lift the stay of litigation, which was on hold pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert, holding that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the Bureau). In light of the Supreme Court’s decision, the Bureau ratified the Rule’s payments provisions and issued a final rule revoking the Rule’s underwriting provisions (covered by InfoBytes here).
The amended complaint requests the court set aside the Rule and the Bureau’s ratification of the rule as unconstitutional and in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Specifically, the amended complaint argues, among other things, that the Bureau’s ratification is “legally insufficient to cure the constitutional defects in the 2017 Rule,” asserting the ratification of the payment provisions should have been subject to a formal rulemaking process, including a notice and comment period. Moreover, the amended complaint asserts that the payment provisions are “fundamentally at odds” with the Bureau’s lack of authority to create usury limits because they “improperly target[] installment loans with a rate higher than 36%.” Finally, the amended complaint argues that the Bureau “arbitrarily and capriciously denied” a petition from a lender seeking to exempt debit-card payments from the payment provisions of the rules.
Court approves settlements in CFPB student debt relief action
On August 26 and 28, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered two final judgments (see here and here) against four of the defendants in an action brought by the CFPB, the Minnesota and North Carolina attorneys general, and the Los Angeles City Attorney alleging a student loan debt relief operation deceived thousands of student-loan borrowers and charged more than $71 million in unlawful advance fees. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and various state laws by charging and collecting improper advance fees from student loan borrowers prior to providing assistance and receiving payments on the adjusted loans. In addition, the complaint asserts the defendants engaged in deceptive practices by misrepresenting (i) the purpose and application of fees they charged; (ii) their ability to obtain loan forgiveness; and (iii) their ability to actually lower borrowers’ monthly payments.
The finalized settlements suspend a total judgment of over $95 million due to the defendants’ inability to pay, and requires the two defendants who settled on August 26, to pay a total of $75,000 to Minnesota, North Carolina, and California, and $1 each to the CFPB, in civil money penalties, and the two defendants who settled on August 28, to pay a total of $15,000 to the respective states and $1 to the CFPB in civil money penalties. In addition to the monetary penalties, the defendants are required to relinquish certain assets and submit to certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements. All four defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations, as part of the settlements.
Court backs FTC’s $120 million settlement in Belizean real estate scheme
On August 28, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted the FTC’s request for four individuals and the remaining corporate defendants who have not yet settled (collectively, “defendants”) to pay over $120 million in redress to resolve allegations the defendants operated an international real estate investment development scheme. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in November 2018, the FTC initiated the action against the individuals, several corporate entities, and a Belizean bank, asserting that the defendants violated the FTC Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) by advertising and selling parcels of land that were part of a luxury development in Belize through the use of deceptive tactics and claims. The FTC contends that consumers who purchased lots in the development purchased the lots outright or made large down payments and sizeable monthly payments, and paid monthly homeowners association fees, and that defendants used the money received from these payments to fund their “high-end lifestyles,” rather than to invest in the development. In September 2019, the FTC settled with the Belizean bank, requiring the bank to pay $23 million in equitable relief, including consumer redress (covered by InfoBytes here).
Following a trial, the district court has now agreed with the FTC, concluding that the remaining defendants violated the FTC Act and the TSR. The court found the defendants jointly and severally liable for over $120 million in restitution and granted the FTC’s request for permanent injunctions—banning the defendants from any telemarketing activity and banning one defendant, described as “nothing less than the mastermind” of the operations, from “engaging in any kind of real estate activity” in the future.
CFPB denies company’s petition to set aside CID, citing investigative authority broader than enforcement authority
On August 13, the CFPB denied a petition by a credit repair software company to set aside a civil investigative demand (CID) issued by the Bureau in April. The CID requested information from the company “to determine whether providers of credit repair business software, companies offering credit repair that use this software, or associated persons, in connection with the marketing or sale of credit repair services, have: (1) requested or received prohibited payments from consumers in a manner that violates the Telemarketing Sales Rule [(TSR)]. . .; or (2) provided substantial assistance in such violations in a manner that violates [the CFPA or TSR].” The company petitioned the Bureau to set aside the CID, arguing, among other things, that the CID exceeds the Bureau’s jurisdiction and scope of authority because the agency lacks investigative and enforcement authority over companies that provide credit repair services and companies that provide customer relationship management software for such services. The company also argued that (i) the CID is invalid because the company does not engage in telemarketing, perform credit repair services, or market or sell credit repair services to consumers; (ii) the company is not a “covered person” or “service provider” under the CFPA; and (iii) the company is not required to respond to the CID because “it is clear that [the company] does not provide any assistance, let alone substantial assistance, to any covered person in violation of the CFPA.”
The Bureau rejected the company’s arguments, countering that its “authority to investigate is broader than its authority to enforce.” According to the Bureau, “[r]egardless of whether [the company] itself engages in telemarketing or accepts payments from consumers in a manner that violates the TSR, the Bureau has the authority to obtain information from [the company] that will help it assess whether others may have done so.” Furthermore, the Bureau stated that the CFPA grants it the authority to prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices committed by a “covered person” or a “service provider,” and “the authority over those who, knowingly or recklessly, provide substantial assistance to a covered person,” which include companies that provide credit repair services. “Whether a company that sells business software to credit repair firms does, in fact, substantially assist any violations committed by those firms depends upon the facts,” the Bureau explained.
9th Circuit affirms some of Oakland’s claims against national bank
On August 26, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s decision to partially dismiss an action brought by the City of Oakland, alleging a national bank violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California Fair Employment and Housing Act. As previously covered by InfoBytes, Oakland alleged that the national bank violated the FHA and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act by providing minority borrowers mortgage loans with less favorable terms than similarly situated non-minority borrowers, leading to disproportionate defaults and foreclosures causing (i) decreased property tax revenue; (ii) increases in the city’s expenditures; and (iii) reduced spending in Oakland’s fair-housing programs. The district court dismissed the City’s municipal expenditure claims, but allowed claims based on decreased property tax revenue to continue. The district court also held that the City could pursue its claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit affirmed the court’s denial of the bank’s motion to dismiss as to Oakland’s claims for decreased property tax revenue and the court’s dismissal of Oakland’s claims for increased city expenditures. Specifically, with respect to claims for reduced tax revenue, the appellate court concluded that the “FHA’s proximate-cause requirement is sufficiently broad and inclusive to encompass aggregate, city-wide injuries.” Based on allegations that the City could use statistical regression analysis “to precisely calculate the loss in property values in Oakland’s minority neighborhoods that is attributable to foreclosures caused by [the bank’s] predatory loans,” the 9th Circuit found that Oakland’s claim for decreased property tax revenues “has some direct and continuous relation to [the bank]’s discriminatory lending practices.” Regarding the City’s alleged municipal expenditure injuries, the appellate court agreed with the district court that Oakland’s complaint failed to account for independent variables that may have contributed or caused such injuries and that those alleged injuries therefore did not satisfy the FHA’s proximate-cause requirement. Finally, the appellate court held that the City’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were also subject to the FHA’s proximate-cause requirement, and that on remand, the district court must determine whether Oakland’s allegations satisfied this requirement.
FTC takes action against debt collection schemes
On August 19, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina lifted the temporary seal of two FTC complaints (available here and here) filed against two groups of debt collection companies and their owners (collectively, “defendants”), alleging that the defendants’ debt collection practices violated the FTC Act and the FDCPA. According to both complaints, which were filed on July 13, the FTC alleges that the defendants engaged in a scheme to collect payments from consumers for debts that they did not actually owe or that the defendants had no authority to collect. Specifically, the defendants used a “two-step collection process,” in which they used robocalls with prerecorded messages to tell consumers they were subject to “an audit or other proceeding.” After the consumers contacted the defendants about the information in the robocalls, the defendants “falsely represent[ed] that they are representatives of a law firm or a mediation company” and falsely alleged that the consumers would be subject to legal action, including arrest, on a delinquent debt if it was not paid. The FTC asserts that the defendants collected over $17 million from the alleged scheme and is seeking, among other things, restitution, injunctions, and asset freezes.