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District court grants summary judgment in favor of bank in TCPA robocall suit
On March 13, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a large bank’s (defendant) motion for summary judgment in a proposed class action alleging that the plaintiff received an unsolicited telemarketing call. The plaintiff—who was himself a TCPA investigator for an attorney—was a long-time customer of the defendant when he answered a robocall from the defendant in March 2005. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant alleging that the robocall from the defendant violated the TCPA. In response, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which put forth three arguments: (i) plaintiff did not have Article III standing to sue because he was not injured by the call; (ii) the plaintiff had an existing business relationship with the defendant as a long-time customer; and (iii) the content of the call did not violate the law at the time of the call.
Here, the court determined that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing to sue the defendant because he did not show an injury-in-fact as a result of the robocall. The court added, “notably, [p]laintiff does not assert, nor has he put forward any evidence to show, that he suffered nuisance, annoyance, inconvenience, wasted time, invasion of privacy, or any other such injury.” Moreover, the court pointed to the plaintiff’s position and asserted that as a TCPA investigator, “he welcomed such calls.” The court additionally held that the plaintiff lacked statutory standing for similar reasons. As a customer of the defendant, the court stated that plaintiff’s claims were subject to the TCPA’s “established business relationship” exemption in effect at the time of the call. The court agreed with the defendant’s argument that the call did not violate the TCPA prohibitions in effect at the time of the call. Further, the court found that the call’s content did not violate FCC regulations at the time for “abandoned telemarketing calls and dual-purpose calls.” As a result, the court dismissed as moot the plaintiff’s motion for class certification and his motion to file a second amended complaint.
District court grants bank’s partial summary judgment in FDIC RMBS suit
On March 11, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial summary judgment in favor of the securities arm of a large banking group (defendant) in an FDIC suit alleging securities violations in the offering, sale, or distribution of residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) certificates to a now failed bank. As receiver for the failed bank, the FDIC filed suit in 2007 concerning, among other things, two senior certificates purchased by the failed bank. The FDIC alleged that the defendant omitted key facts and made numerous false statements of material fact to sell RMBS certificates to the failed bank and additionally performed due diligence on the underlying loans, thus participating in the distribution of the certificates. The agency further alleged that although the defendant “did not directly purchase or sell the senior certificates, [the defendant] is still an underwriter as defined under the Securities Act because of its ‘direct or indirect participation’ in the distribution of the senior certificates.”
The court sided with the defendant, finding that even though its “due diligence and review of prospectus supplements helped facilitate the securities offerings, those activities do not involve the purchase, offer, or sale of the securities and thus are not part of their distribution.” The court reasoned that the prospectus supplements of the senior class certificates specifically state that the defendant was only an underwriter for the subordinated class certificates and not for the senior class certificates purchased by the failed bank. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the two claims with respect to the senior certificates.
Michigan Supreme Court limits court activity
On March 18, the Michigan Supreme Court ordered all trial courts to limit access to courtrooms and other spaces to no more than 10 persons, including staff, to practice social distancing, and to limit court activity to only essential functions, enumerated in the order.
District court rejects financing company’s dismissal bid in student loan debt relief scam
On March 11, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion of a Minnesota-based indirect finance company (defendant) to dismiss allegations that its participation in a student loan relief operation violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), ruling that the borrowers had properly alleged mail and wire fraud and had established a pattern of “open-ended continuity.” According to the named plaintiffs, the defendant contracted dealers who marketed “student loan assistance services” to federal student loan borrowers, who were then redirected to pay the defendant a fee of $1,300 to file applications on their behalf for adjustments such as loan consolidation or enrollment in an income-driven repayment plan. Because the dealers could not legally accept the payments directly, the defendant allegedly approved borrowers for financing and made upfront payments to dealers for each recruited borrower. In denying the dismissal bid, the court ruled that “these allegations, if assumed true, establish that, in devising the scheme, [the defendant] intended to deceive borrowers so that they would incur debts to it.” Moreover, “[g]iven these allegations, the Amended Complaint contains sufficient allegations that reveal ‘the threat of continuity,’. . . and sufficient support for the proposition that [the defendant] ‘ha[s] been trying to continue’ the alleged scheme with respect to individuals in addition to the [n]amed plaintiffs,” the court wrote.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, last December the CFPB denied a petition by one of the defendants to modify or set aside a civil investigative demand (CID) issued by the Bureau, which seeks information as part of an investigation into the defendant’s promotion of student loan debt relief programs. Separately, the FTC and the Minnesota attorney general entered a stipulated order against the defendant for violations of TILA and the assisting and facilitating provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, which resulted in the defendant being permanently banned from engaging in transactions involving debt relief products and services or making misrepresentations regarding financial products and services (covered by InfoBytes here).
5th Circuit: Interest disclosure does not violate FDCPA
On March 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that a debt collector (defendant) did not violate the FDCPA by mentioning that interest may accrue on an unpaid debt in a collection letter. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt when it sent him a letter that included line items detailing the amount owed, separate line items that showed interest and fees as $0, and a disclosure that stated “[i]n the event there is interest or other charges accruing on your account, the amount due may be greater than the amount shown above after the date of this notice.” The plaintiff contended that the defendant was not allowed to collect interest on debts placed by the original creditor and that the original agreement between the plaintiff and the creditor “‘does not allow’ for interest to accrue or for other charges to be added.” The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, stating that the letter accurately conveyed what was possible under the Texas Finance Code—that interest could accrue—and was therefore not false, deceptive, or misleading.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that “[t]he challenged statement in the letter is not false, deceptive or misleading because it merely expresses a common-sense truism about borrowing—if interest is accruing on a debt, then the amount due may go up.” [Emphasis in the original.] According to the appellate court, the “simple statement would have been clear even to an unsophisticated borrower. . . .” Moreover, the appellate court concluded that it did not matter whether the plaintiff’s agreement with the creditor prohibited interest or other charges “because the language at issue does not state that [the defendant or the creditor] would—or even could—collect interest.”
Credit reporting agency FCRA suit may go forward
On March 9, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the motion to dismiss and motion to strike a claim of a credit reporting agency (CRA) and its subsidiary (defendants) in a putative class action that alleged the defendants: (i) knowingly used inaccurate eviction information in their tenant screening reports, and (ii) inaccurately represented that they obtained eviction information from public sources, each in violation of the FCRA. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the CRA failed to disclose that the eviction information was maintained and sold through the subsidiary, and when the plaintiff requested her credit report from the CRA, the CRA omitted information maintained by the subsidiary and therefore the credit report did not contain “all information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request” as required by the FCRA. She argued that the FCRA prohibits the CRA defendant from skirting the requirement of full and accurate disclosure of consumer information by assigning that duty to a third party—in this case, the subsidiary defendant.
According to its memorandum, the court rejected the CRA’s argument that it could not be held liable for faulty reports issued by its subsidiary. The court answered the question of whether plaintiff “sufficiently alleged that defendant evaded its obligation to make full and accurate disclosure of plaintiff's consumer file. . .through the use of corporate organization, reorganization, structure or restructuring,” concluding that she did so. The court dismissed the defendants’ motion to strike without prejudice, indicating the defendants can raise their argument again in an opposition to class certification.
Maryland Court of Appeals reverses trial court approval of settlement for interfering with CPD action
On March 3, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s approval of a proposed settlement in a class action based on fraudulently induced assignments of annuity payments. The class members were recipients of structured settlement annuities from lead paint exposure claims who responded to ads by a structured settlement factoring company (company). The class members then transferred the rights to their settlement annuity contracts to the company, which paid the class members lump sums for the rights at a discount. The class filed a lawsuit against the company in 2016, alleging that it had engaged in fraud in procuring the annuity contract transfers. Around the same time, the Consumer Protection Division of the Maryland AG’s Office (CPD) had filed suit against the company alleging violations of the State Consumer Protection Act. Several months after both actions were filed, the CFPB filed a similar suit against the company based on the same alleged misconduct. All three actions sought similar kids of relief with respect to the same individuals, though the bases for seeking relief and the nature and amount of relief sought differed among the actions.
The class and the company proceeded towards a negotiated settlement, to which the trial court signed a proposed final order, certifying the class and approving the settlement, despite CPD’s opposition to both issues. Following the court’s approval, the company moved for summary judgment in its case against the CPD, which the court granted because it held CPD’s claim for restitution for the same individuals was barred by res judicata; CPD’s claim for injunctive relief and civil penalties is still currently awaiting trial.
Following an appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the company’s petition to consider whether “class members [may] lawfully release and assign to others their right to receive money or property sought for their benefit by [CPD] or [CFPB] through those agencies’ separate enforcement actions” under state and federal consumer protection laws, respectively.
The Court of Appeals held that the lower court erred in approving the settlement, stating that consumers “have no authority, through a private settlement, whether or not approved by a court, to preclude CPD from pursuing its own remedies against those who violate . . . [Maryland’s] Consumer Protection Act, including a general request for disgorgement/restitution.” In particular, the Court of Appeals held that the parties cannot preclude CPD from pursuing the remedies of disgorgement and restitution, as that would directly contravene CPD’s statutory authority to sanction the company for wrongful conduct. For this reason, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s approval of the settlement must be reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Another appellate court holds that a debt buyer qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA
On March 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an entity that purchases consumer debts, but outsources the collection activity to a third party still qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the plaintiff sued the debt buyer (defendant) claiming it was “vicariously and jointly liable” for alleged FDCPA violations by the third party collector. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because debt purchasing companies like the defendant “who have no interactions with debtors and merely contract with third parties to collect on the debts they have purchased simply do not have the principal purpose of collecting debts.” The district court reasoned that Congress intended the FDCPA to apply only to those who directly interact with customers, based on the court’s interpretation of the language used in the substantive provisions of the law.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed the dismissal, determining that the FDCPA does not solely regulate entities that directly interact with consumers. As applied to the defendant, the court found that the purpose of the FDCPA would be “entirely circumvented” if the law’s restrictions did not apply to companies like the defendant. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that an entity that otherwise meets the “principal purpose” definition of debt collector—“any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts”—cannot avoid liability under the FDCPA merely by hiring a third party to perform debt collection activities on its behalf. The appellate court stressed that Congress’s intent in enacting the FDCPA was to eliminate abusive, deceptive, and unfair collection practices, and that its interpretation of the principal purpose prong of the debt collector definition furthers the FDCPA’s purpose. The 9th Circuit joined the 3rd Circuit, which issued an order last year (covered by InfoBytes here) concluding that “[a]s long as a business’s raison d’etre is obtaining payment on the debts that it acquires, it is a debt collector. Who actually obtains the payment or how they do so is of no moment.”
District court dismisses class claims regarding out-of-network ATM fees
On March 4, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order granting five separate motions for dismissal filed by a national bank and several independent ATM operators (defendants) regarding allegations that the defendants (i) charged unwarranted fees for using out-of-network (OON) ATMs for balance inquiries; (ii) made deceptive and misleading representations on screens and on signs regarding those fees; and (iii) assessed fees in violation of governing account documents. The plaintiffs’ putative class action alleged 13 claims against the defendants for violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (CUCL), California’s False Advertising Law (FAL), and the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), as well as for conversion, negligence, and breach of contract. The defendants premised their motions to dismiss on several bases, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs’ failure to plead the necessary elements of the claims.
The court generally agreed with the arguments made by the defendants as to the court’s lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In particular, the court held that the common law claims brought on behalf of the nationwide class should be dismissed for lack of Article III standing because the named plaintiffs failed to allege they were charged the relevant balance inquiry fees in states outside of California. In addition, the court agreed with an argument raised by one defendant that the plaintiffs lacked standing to file claims for injunctive relief for violations of the CUCL, FAL, and CLRA because they failed to allege a likelihood of actual or imminent future harm; specifically, they failed to allege they intended to use the ATMs in the future to make balance inquiries. The court thereafter assessed the plaintiffs’ remaining common law and statutory claims, and in each case, granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the claims for various failures to establish the necessary elements of each of the alleged claims. Of the 13 dismissed claims, the court permitted plaintiffs leave to amend 10 of them. The court required any amended complaint address the standing issues related to claims brought on behalf of the California and nationwide classes.
5th Circuit: Non-party plaintiff cannot bring action to enforce violation of CFPB consent order
On March 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a debt collector (defendant) accused of violating the FDCPA and the terms of a CFPB consent order. According to the opinion, the defendant attempted to collect a credit card debt from the plaintiff that the plaintiff did not recognize. In December 2014, the defendant filed suit to collect the past due debt. In the meantime, the CFPB issued a consent order against the defendant for violations of the FDCPA (covered by InfoBytes here) while the parties awaited trial. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the CFPB regarding the validity of the debt, but the Bureau closed that complaint after verifying the defendant’s ownership of the plaintiff’s debt. The plaintiff responded by filing his own lawsuit in March 2017, claiming the defendant violated the FDCPA by (i) “lacking validation of his debt prior to his January 2016 trial”; (ii) failing to timely validate his debt in violation of provisions of its consent order with the CFPB; and (iii) “misrepresenting that it intended to prove ownership of his debt if contested.” The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant based on the plaintiff’s failure to prove actual damages.
On appeal, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in ruling that the plaintiff failed to plead actual damages, finding that “the FDCPA does not require proof of actual damages to ground statutory damages.” However, the appellate court did not reverse the district court’s decision. Instead, the appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s debt validation claims were time-barred because he did not file suit within the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Regarding the other two claims, the appellate court stated that while the claims were not time-barred, the plaintiff lacked standing because “private persons may not bring actions to enforce violations of consent decrees to which they are not a party.” The CFPB’s consent order with the defendant specified that the CFPB was the enforcer of the order, and its text could not be read to invoke a private right of action permitting the plaintiff’s suit. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment against the plaintiff on these remaining two claims.