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  • Basis for invalidating CFPB is “remarkably weak,” says court-appointed defender

    Courts

    On January 15, Paul Clement, the lawyer selected by the U.S. Supreme Court to defend the leadership structure of the CFPB, filed a brief in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB arguing that Seila Law’s constitutionality arguments are “remarkably weak” and that “a contested removal is the proper context to address a dispute over the President’s removal authority.” First, Clement stated that “there is no ‘removal clause’ in the Constitution,” and that because the “constitutional text is simply silent on the removal of executive officers” it does not mean there is a “promising basis for invalidating an Act of Congress.” Moreover, the Constitution leaves it to Congress to decide “all manner of questions about the organization and structure of executive-branch departments and officers,” Clement wrote. Second, Clement disagreed with the argument that Congress cannot impose modest restrictions on the President’s ability to remove executive officers, so long as the President is the one exercising the removal powers. Third, Clement noted that in the past, the Court has repeatedly upheld the ability to place permissible restrictions on a President’s removal authority.

    Clement further contended, among other things, that the dispute in Seila is “not just unripe, but entirely theoretical.” He referenced the Bureau’s brief filed last September (covered by InfoBytes here), in which the CFPB argued that the for-cause restriction on the President’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers, and noted that “[w]hatever was true when this suit was first filed, the theory of the unitary executive appears alive and well in the Director’s office.” Rather, Clement stated, the Court should wait for an instance where a CFPB director has been fired for something short of the “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” threshold that Congress set for dismissing a CFPB director in Dodd-Frank before ruling on the question. Clement also emphasized that “text, first principles and precedent” all “strongly support” upholding the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision from last May, which deemed the CFPB to be constitutionally structured and upheld a district court’s ruling enforcing Seila Law’s compliance with a 2017 civil investigative demand.

    As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 9th Circuit held that the for-cause removal restriction of the CFPB’s single director is constitutionally permissible based on existing Supreme Court precedent. The panel agreed with the conclusion reached by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit majority in the 2018 en banc decision in PHH v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert) stating, “if an agency’s leadership is protected by a for-cause removal restriction, the President can arguably exert more effective control over the agency if it is headed by a single individual rather an a multi-member body.”

    The parties in Seila filed briefs last December. While both parties are in agreement on the CFPB’s single-director leadership structure, they differ on how the matter should be resolved. Seila Law argued that the Court should invalidate all of Title X of Dodd-Frank, whereas the Bureau contended that the for-cause removal provision should be severed from the rest of the law in accordance with Dodd-Frank’s express severability clause. Oral arguments are scheduled for March 3. (Previous InfoBytes coverage here.)

    Courts U.S. Supreme Court CFPB Single-Director Structure Seila Law Constitution

  • Securities class action against bank pared down

    Courts

    On January 12, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed one of plaintiffs’ causes of action and concluded that only two of the 67 public statements the plaintiffs identified in support of their securities fraud causes of action against a large bank and its former CEO (defendants) related to the defendants “collateral protection insurance (CPI) … practices for auto loan customers” were actionable. The plaintiffs alleged that while, in July 2016, the defendants learned of irregularities with respect to the CPI and, by September 2016, discontinued the program, the defendants did not disclose information on the CPI program’s issues until July 2017, after which time, the defendants’ stock price dropped. The plaintiffs then filed suit based on 67 public statements made by the defendants prior to that time, which the plaintiffs alleged the defendants knew were “false or misleading” and resulted in the bank’s stockholders losing money.

    Upon review, the court found that 65 of the 67 public statements, on which the plaintiffs’ causes of action were based were not actionable. The two statements that the court found may support the plaintiffs’ causes of action were those made by the defendants when they were specifically asked whether they knew about “potential misconduct outside of the already disclosed improper retail banking sales practices” and, each time, “failed to disclose the CPI issue….” With respect to the two statements, the court found that the plaintiffs had “met [their] burden under the PSLRA (private securities litigation reform act)” to show a “strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind,” and that the plaintiffs “adequately pleaded loss causation.” According to the opinion, the defendants did not challenge the plaintiffs’ contentions about the two alleged misstatements’ connection to the purchase or sale of the defendants’ securities, or that the plaintiffs relied on the misstatements or omissions and experienced economic losses as a result.

    Courts Securities Class Action Class Certification Auto Leases Insurance

  • Supreme Court to review TCPA debt collection exemption

    Courts

    On January 10, the U.S. Supreme Court announced it had granted a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the U.S. government in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc.—a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) case concerning an exemption that allows debt collectors to use an autodialer to contact individuals on their cell phones without obtaining prior consent to do so when collecting debts guaranteed by the federal government. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the 4th Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs (a group of several political consultants) that the government-debt exemption contravenes the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, and found that the challenged exemption was a content-based restriction on free speech that did not hold up to strict scrutiny review. “Under the debt-collection exemption, the relationship between the federal government and the debtor is only relevant to the subject matter of the call. In other words, the debt-collection exemption applies to a phone call made to the debtor because the call is about the debt, not because of any relationship between the federal government and the debtor,” the appellate court opined. However, the panel sided with the FCC to sever the debt collection exemption from the automated call ban instead of rendering the entire ban unconstitutional, as requested by the plaintiffs. “First and foremost, the explicit directives of the Supreme Court and Congress strongly support a severance of the debt-collection exemption from the automated call ban,” the panel stated. “Furthermore, the ban can operate effectively in the absence of the debt-collection exemption, which is clearly an outlier among the statutory exemptions.” The petitioners—Attorney General William Barr and the FCC—now ask the Court to review whether the government-debt exception to the TCPA’s automated-call restriction is a violation of the First Amendment. Oral arguments are set for April 22.

    Courts Appellate Fourth Circuit Debt Collection TCPA Constitution U.S. Supreme Court FCC DOJ Autodialer

  • ISP pays $15 million to settle with two more states on hidden fees and false advertising

    State Issues

    On January 9, the Minnesota attorney general announced that an internet service provider (ISP) agreed to pay nearly $9 million in order to resolve allegations that it overcharged customers for phone, internet and cable services. In a separate action, on December 10, the Washington attorney general’s office announced that it entered into a $6.1 million consent decree with the same ISP to resolve similar claims of deceptive acts and practices. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the ISP entered into settlements over the same alleged actions with the states of Colorado on December 19, and Oregon on December 31.

    State Issues Courts Advertisement Enforcement State Attorney General Settlement Consumer Protection Fraud Fees

  • 6th Circuit affirms dismissal of FDCPA action for lack of standing

    Courts

    On January 3, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing of an FDCPA suit brought by a consumer who claimed that because collection letters sent to him by a law firm caused him anxiety, the firm had violated the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the consumer had two delinquent accounts with a bank, which the law firm attempted to recover by sending collection letters to the consumer. The consumer asserted that the letters the law firm sent caused him “an undue sense of anxiety” that he would be sued by the firm, and he subsequently filed a lawsuit against the firm for violating the FDCPA. The court held that the consumer did not have standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, for three main reasons: (i) the debtor’s anxiety about a potential lawsuit amounted to a fear of future harm that was not “certainly impending” because the consumer had not alleged that the law firm had threatened to sue him or that he refused to pay, and, therefore, his anxiety did not satisfy the injury-in-fact element for Article III standing; (ii) the consumer was “anxious about the consequences of his decision to not pay the debts that he does not dispute he owes,” and such a “self-inflicted injury” is not a basis for standing because it was not “fairly traceable” to the law firm’s conduct, but instead reflected the consumer’s own behavior; and (iii) “even assuming [the law firm” violated the statute by misrepresenting that an attorney had reviewed [the consumer’s] debts,” that violation did not cause any injury to the consumer because the consumer gave the court “no reason to believe he did not owe the debts,” and, therefore, he could not show that the law firm’s alleged procedural violation of the FDCPA, by itself, was an “injury in fact.” Because the court held that the consumer did not have standing, it affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the action.

    Courts Appellate FDCPA Debt Collection Credit Reporting Agency Sixth Circuit Standing

  • CFPB files claims against debt relief companies

    Federal Issues

    On January 9, the CFPB announced that it filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against a mortgage lender, a mortgage brokerage, and several student loan debt relief companies (collectively, “the defendants”), for allegedly violating the FCRA, TSR, and FDCPA. In the complaint, the CFPB alleges that the defendants violated the FCRA by, among other things, illegally obtaining consumer reports from a credit reporting agency for millions of consumers with student loans by representing that the reports would be used to “make firm offers of credit for mortgage loans” and to market mortgage products. The Bureau asserts that the reports of more than 7 million student loan borrowers were actually resold or provided to companies engaged in marketing student loan debt relief services.

    According to the complaint, “using or obtaining prescreened lists to send solicitations marketing debt-relief services is not a permissible purpose under FCRA.” The complaint alleges that the defendants violated the TSR by charging and collecting advance fees before first “renegotiat[ing], settl[ing], reduc[ing], or otherwise alter[ing] the terms of at least one debt pursuant to a settlement agreement, debt-management plan, or other such valid contractual agreement executed by the customer,” and prior to “the customer ma[king] at least one payment pursuant to that settlement agreement, debt management plan, or other valid contractual agreement between the customer and the creditor or debt collector.” The CFPB further alleges that the defendants violated the TSR and the CFPA when they used telemarketing sales calls and direct mail to encourage consumers to consolidate their loans, and falsely represented that consolidation could lower student loan interest rates, improve borrowers’ credit scores, and change their servicer to the Department of Education.

    The Bureau is seeking a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from committing future violations of the FCRA, TSR, and CFPA, as well as an award of damages and other monetary relief, civil money penalties, and “disgorgement of ill-gotten funds.”

    Federal Issues CFPB Debt Relief Consumer Finance Telemarketing Sales Rule Student Lending CFPA Courts FCRA UDAAP

  • District Court voids OFAC fine of $2 million

    Financial Crimes

    On December 31, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated a $2 million civil penalty imposed on a global petroleum company (company) by OFAC for the company’s purported violation of sanctions, ruling that the OFAC regulations did not provide “fair notice” to the company that its actions were prohibited. In May of 2014, OFAC issued sanctions regulations relating to Ukraine. Shortly afterwards, the company and a Russian oil company, with which it had a long-established business relationship, executed several contracts. Although the Russian company was not a blocked entity, its president, who signed the contracts, had been named a specially designated national (SDN). In July of 2014, OFAC issued a penalty notice with a $2 million penalty to the company, alleging that the contracts the company executed with the Russian company violated the Ukraine-related sanctions. The company immediately challenged the penalty notice and fine, asserting that at the time it entered into the subject transactions, the OFAC regulations on Ukraine were not clear, and it interpreted them to allow the transactions. The court agreed with the company, holding that the “text of the regulations does not provide fair notice of its interpretation” in accordance with the Due Process Clause, because “the text [of the regulation] does not ‘fairly address’ whether a U.S. entity receives a service from a SDN when that SDN performs a service enabling the U.S. person to contract with a non-blocked entity. Therefore, the court granted the company’s motion for summary judgment and vacated OFAC’s Penalty Notice.

    Financial Crimes OFAC Department of Treasury Of Interest to Non-US Persons Russia Courts

  • 7th Circuit: Debt collector accurately disclosed creditor to be paid

    Courts

    On December 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that a collection agency was not required to explain the difference between “original creditor” and “current creditor.” After the consumer fell behind on payments owed to a bank, the debt was sold to a company that hired the agency to collect the debt. The agency sent a letter to the consumer identifying the bank as the “original creditor” and the debt buyer as the “current creditor,” listing the principal and interest balances of the debt along with the last four digits of the account number. The consumer alleged that identifying both the bank and the debt buyer without clearly explaining the difference between the companies violated the FDCPA’s requirement that a debt collector state in a written notice “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” The district court disagreed and held that the letter clearly and accurately disclosed the name of the creditor to whom the consumer owed the debt.

    The 7th Circuit affirmed on appeal, calling the consumer’s claim “meritless” and holding that including the names of both companies without a detailed explanation would not be confusing even to an unsophisticated consumer, who would understand that the debt had been purchased by the current creditor. The appellate court concluded that the FDCPA required no further explanation.

    Courts Appellate Seventh Circuit Debt Collection FDCPA

  • Missouri AG alleges housing nonprofit trust deceived members

    State Issues

    On January 2, the Missouri attorney general filed a petition for preliminary and permanent injunction in Missouri Circuit Court against a nonprofit trust and its registered agent (the defendants) alleging the defendants deceived thousands of state residents by marketing memberships in the trust with the promise that the pooled resources would fund “to-be-completed homes.” The AG alleges that the defendants solicited consumers to attend meetings, purchase memberships, and pay monthly dues, and also asked members to provide additional funds to go towards appliances and other fixtures for the homes. However, the agent defendant allegedly admitted that none of the promised homes were constructed or otherwise provided to the members.

    The AG further contends that “none of the solicited funds were ever used or invested towards providing a home to any of the members,” and were instead used to cover the trust’s operating expenses. According to the AG, the defendants’ actions violate state law and constitute false promises, omissions of material fact, and deception. The AG seeks injunctive relief “up to and including prohibiting and enjoining [d]efendants . . . from owning or operating organizations that sell or manage real estate that solicit upfront payments for goods or services, or that solicit charitable contributions.” The AG also seeks restitution for member losses, a fine equal to 10 percent of the restitution amount, a $1,000 fine per violation, and compensation for the state’s costs in pursuing the case.

    State Issues State Attorney General Courts Deceptive Consumer Finance

  • 9th Circuit affirms FDCPA decision in favor of debt collector

    Courts

    On December 18, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court in favor of a debt collector in an FDCPA action brought by a consumer claiming that the debt collector used false, deceptive, or misleading means in attempting to collect a debt. The consumer, in 2006, opened a credit card account with a bank, but stopped sending payments in December of 2008, without paying off the balance. The bank later sold the consumer’s unpaid account to a debt collector in 2009, after which the debt collector sent a letter to the consumer in 2017 in an effort to collect the past due balance. The consumer filed a complaint against the debt collector, claiming that the debt was “time-barred” as the six-year statute of limitations had run and that the debt collector violated the FDCPA by not disclosing this in the letter to him. The district court granted the debt collector’s summary judgment motion.

    On appeal, the consumer again claimed that the debt collector’s language is “deceptive or misleading,” specifically in the debt collector’s disclosure in the letter that read, “[t]he law limits how long you can be sued on a debt and how long a debt can appear on your credit report. Due to the age of this debt, we will not sue you for it or report payment or non-payment of it to a credit bureau.” The court disagreed. According to the opinion, even though the six-year statute to sue in order to collect had expired, “nothing in the letter falsely implies that [the debt collector] could bring a legal action against [the consumer] to collect the debt.” Further, the court determined that the “least sophisticated debtor would [not] likely be misled” by the debt collector’s disclosure, because the “natural conclusion” that could be drawn from the collector’s language was that the debt was time-barred. Additionally, the court rejected the consumer’s contention that the debt collector’s letter was “deceptive or misleading” because it failed to warn the consumer that in some states, the statute of limitations to sue on a debt may be revived if the debtor promises to pay or makes a partial payment on the debt. The court stated that the FDCPA does not require a debt collector to “provide legal advice” about specific issues such as a revival provision in a state statute of limitations. The panel also pointed out that although the statute may have run for the debt collector to take legal action in order to recover the outstanding debt, as long as it complies with the law and does not use misleading, false, or deceptive means, the FDCPA allows it to continue its efforts to collect on a lawful debt.

    Courts Appellate FDCPA Debt Collection Credit Report Ninth Circuit Least Sophisticated Consumer Credit Cards

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