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Indiana Court of Appeals reverses state regulator’s finance charge action
On August 19, the Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed the Indiana Department of Financial Institutions (Department) finding that a car dealership charged an “impermissible additional charge” in violation of the state’s additional-charges statute when the dealership improperly disclosed a finance charge to its consumers. According to the opinion, the dealership charged, in addition to a third party titling fee, a $25.00 convenience fee to its credit customers for electronic titling through the third party. The service was required for credit customers but was optional for cash customers. After conducting a routine examination, the Department identified one violation from a transaction in July 2015, where the dealership did not disclose the convenience fee in the “finance charge” box of the disclosures, noting “the fee was only mandatory for credit customers and therefore was ‘a condition of the extension of credit.’” The dealership provided a contract from the same time period, showing it disclosed the fee in the “Itemization of Amount Financed” and “Amount Financed” boxes, not in the “Finance Charge” box. The Department charged the dealership with violating the state’s additional-charges statute, “for assessing ‘impermissible additional charges’ in the form of the $25.00 convenience fee,” as opposed to a charge for violating the state’s disclosure statute.
On review, the Court of Appeals concluded the charge was a finance charge because it was mandatory for the dealership’s credit customers but not its cash customers, and noted a finance charge cannot also be an additional charge. The Department argued it made no practical difference which violation it alleged, because the remedies under both statutes are the same, while the dealership noted a disclosure violation would entitle it to raise certain defenses under TILA. The appellate court did not address this issue, but nonetheless concluded “a finance charge doesn’t become an ‘impermissible additional charge’ when it’s not disclosed in the ‘Finance Charge’ box,” and remanded the case back to the Department for proceedings under the disclosure statute.
3rd Circuit: Proof of written agreement needed for TILA claims
On August 20, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit concluded that a plaintiff failed to adequately allege the existence of a written agreement for his deductible payment plan and therefore, his surgery institute did not violate TILA’s disclosure requirements. According to the opinion, the day before his surgery, the surgery institute orally agreed to accept a partial deductible payment and agreed to permit the plaintiff to pay the remaining deductible requirements in monthly installments. The plaintiff received two emails, one confirming the initial payment and the other confirming the payment plan and listing the plaintiff’s credit card. The institute performed the surgery, but the plaintiff failed to make any further payments on the deductible. Instead, the plaintiff filed an action against the institute alleging it violated TILA by extending credit and failing to provide the required disclosures. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the institute, concluding that the plaintiff' failed to establish a written agreement for the extension of credit. The court also issued sanctions, in the form of attorneys’ fees, against the plaintiff’s counsel, reasoning the counsel could have reasonably discovered the lack of written agreement and lack of payment before initiating the action.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part in the district court’s judgment. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a written agreement for credit with the institute, noting “the requirement of a written agreement [under TILA] is not satisfied by a ‘letter that merely confirms an oral agreement.’” But the appellate court noted that the district court erred in relying on an admission to that effect by plaintiff’s counsel during a telephone conference. Nonetheless, the error was “harmless” because the plaintiff failed to establish a written agreement was executed and signed, stating “[n]owhere does he allege that he signed a written agreement, and the [] email correspondence was merely ‘confirming’ the ‘previously discussed’ agreement." The appellate court then reversed the district court’s sanctions ruling, concluding it abused its discretion when it imposed them.
District court concludes loan servicer violated TCPA
On August 19, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that a Pennsylvania-based student loan servicing agency violated the TCPA by calling the plaintiffs’ cell phones over 350 times using an automatic telephone dialing system (autodailer) after consent was revoked. According to the opinion, after revoking consent to receive calls via an autodialer, two plaintiffs asserted that the servicer called their cell phones collectively over 350 times in violation of the TCPA and moved for summary judgment seeking treble damages for each violation. In response, the loan servicer argued that the system used to make the calls does not meet the statutory definition of an autodialer under the TCPA and disputed the appropriateness of treble damages.
The court, in disagreeing with the loan servicer, concluded that the system used by the loan servicer to make the calls qualified as an autodialer. The court applied the logic of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC (covered by InfoBytes here), stating that it was not bound by the FCC’s interpretations of an autodialer, based on the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in ACA International v. FCC, and therefore, “‘only the statutory definition of [autodialer] as set forth by Congress in 1991 remains.’” The court noted that there was “no question” that the system used by the loan servicer “stores telephone numbers to be called and automatically dials those numbers,” which qualifies the system as an autodialer. However, the court determined that the loan servicer did not violate the statute “willfully or knowingly,” noting that at the time of the calls it was not clear from the FCC whether the system being used was an autodialer. As a result, the court awarded statutory damages, but not the treble damages sought by the plaintiffs.
Accurate adverse reporting not a violation of FCRA, says 3rd Circuit
On August 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a credit reporting agency (CRA), concluding that the CRA did not violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by reporting past negative incidents. According to the opinion, after struggling financially, a married couple missed payments on at least five credit accounts. The consumers allegedly resolved the late payments and filed complaints with the CRA arguing the continued presence of the late payments misrepresented the “real status of their credit.” Additionally, the consumers argued some of the “key factors” the CRA discloses to credit providers, “such as ‘[s]erious delinquency’ or ‘[a]mount owed on revolving [a]ccounts is too high,’ are misleading.” The consumers filed suit against the CRA, alleging a variety of federal and state law claims, including violations of the FCRA for failing to maintain reasonable procedures and failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into disputes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the CRA and the consumers appealed their FCRA claims.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding the consumers must show their credit report contains inaccurate information to prevail on their claims, which the consumers failed to do. The panel noted the consumers admitted they made the late payments and did not allege the adverse information is more than seven years old. The panel concluded the consumers’ claim “is not that the information in their credit reports and disclosures is inaccurate, but rather that it is irrelevant,” which does not support their claims for a violation under the FCRA.
District Court approves TCPA class action settlement
On August 15, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California entered a final approval order and judgment to resolve class action allegations claiming a security system company and its third-party dealer violated the TCPA through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system and prerecorded messages. According to the claims, consumers—including those on the do-not-call registry—allegedly received telemarketing calls at their residences or on cellphones from the dealer or the dealer’s sub-dealers promoting goods or services offered by the company. The company argued it was not responsible for calls the dealer made on its behalf, but the district court denied summary judgment and set a trial date. However, prior to the trial’s commencement, the parties reached a settlement. Under the terms of the settlement, the company agreed to implement changes to its practices to ensure TCPA compliance and banned the dealer from marketing or activating new accounts for the company. The company also agreed to pay $28 million into a settlement fund for consumer redress, no more than $1.4 million towards settlement administrator costs and expenses, $30,000 total in service awards to class representatives, and combined attorneys’ fees and litigation costs of approximately $7.5 million.
Conn. Supreme Court reverses foreclosure based on bank misconduct
On August 13, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, concluding a borrower’s special defenses and counterclaims raised against a bank during a foreclosure action “bore a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the note or the mortgage.” According to the opinion, the bank sought to foreclose on real property owned by the borrower, and during that proceeding, the borrower and loan servicer began loan modification negotiations. The borrower contacted the Connecticut Department of Banking, which intervened on his behalf in the negotiations, but the bank subsequently increased the mortgage payment and the parties were unable to reach an agreement. The borrower asserted special defenses and counterclaims, which included, among other things, that the bank allegedly engaged in conduct that increased the borrowers overall indebtedness and caused the borrower to “incur costs that impeded his ability to cure the default, and reneged on loan modifications.” The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, which the appellate court affirmed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the appellate court incorrectly concluded the borrower’s allegations did not provide a legally sufficient basis for those defenses and counterclaims. The Court noted that the borrower’s allegations—that the bank “engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation and delay in postdefault loan modification negotiations before and after initiating a foreclosure action,” which added to the borrower’s debt and hampered his ability to avoid foreclosure—involved misconduct that “bore a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the note or the mortgage.” To the extent the intervention of the Department of Banking actually resulted in a binding loan modification, the potential breach of such agreement would also “provide a legally sufficient basis for special defenses in the foreclosure action.” Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate judgment upholding the strict foreclosure.
District Court rejects stop-payment fee class action against bank
On August 13, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the majority of an EFTA class action against a national bank, allowing only one claim by the lead plaintiff to proceed. In this case, two customers filed a class action against the bank alleging that it violated the EFTA and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) by charging a $30 stop-payment fee. The bank moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ third amended complaint arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the EFTA does not prohibit stop payment fees, and the California UCL claims are preempted by the National Banking Act. While the district court found that the lead plaintiff had standing to assert the claims against the bank, the court also held that the EFTA, its legislative history, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit precedent “unambiguously does not prohibit stop payment fees.” Moreover, the court noted that the EFTA and its legislative history say nothing about “how the reasonableness of any such fees should be determined.” The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ class action claims with prejudice.
SEC obtains court order halting token offering
On August 12, the SEC announced it obtained a court order halting an alleged fraud involving the sale of digital securities which raised $14.8 million in 2017 and 2018. In addition, the court approved an emergency asset freeze to preserve at least $8 million of the funds raised, the SEC said in its press release. According to the complaint filed the same day in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, an individual and two entities he controlled allegedly violated the registration, antifraud, and manipulative trading provisions of the federal securities laws, by, among other things, knowingly (i) marketing and selling securities tokens by creating false investor demand through the use of material misrepresentations and omissions; and (ii) misleading investors by claiming to have product ready to generate revenue even when no such product existed. Additionally, the SEC alleged that the individual defendant engaged in manipulative trading on an unregistered digital asset platform, and transferred a “significant amount” of dissipated assets from investors into his personal account. Among other things, the SEC seeks permanent injunctions, disgorgement of profits associated with the fraudulent activity, plus interest and penalties, a ban from offering digital securities, and an officer-and-director bar against the individual defendant.
3rd Circuit: QR code on debt collection letter violates FDCPA
On August 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that an envelope containing an unencrypted “quick response” (QR) code that revealed a consumer’s account number when scanned violated the FDCPA. The plaintiff in this case received an envelope containing a collection letter with a printed QR code that, when scanned, revealed the internal reference number associated with the plaintiff’s account. The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit, and the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding that printing the QR code was no different than printing the account number on the envelope, which is a violation of the FDCPA. The defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that (i) the plaintiff had not suffered a concrete injury; (ii) the QR code would have to be unlawfully scanned in order to obtain the account information; and (iii) the defendant’s conduct was covered under the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense, because it “erred by using industry standards for processing return mail.”
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. Specifically, the appellate court found that, with respect to injury, the plaintiff was not required to demonstrate that anyone actually intercepted the letter or scanned the QR code to determine that the contents related to debt collection—disclosure of the account number is itself the harm. The appellate court also rejected the defendant’s argument that someone needed to unlawfully scan the barcode, finding that there is no material difference between printing a QR code or printing an account number directly on an envelope because protected information was made available to the public. The appellate court also rejected the defendant’s bona fide effort defense, stating that the defendant misunderstood its FDCPA obligations and the printing of the QR code had not been the result of a clerical mistake or accident.
3rd Circuit: FCA claims not barred by state’s equitable “entire controversy” doctrine
On August 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit vacated the dismissal of a relator’s qui tam action, concluding that the federal action was not barred by New Jersey’s equitable entire controversy doctrine. In the case, an employer brought a defamation and disparagement suit against a former employee, and while the suit was pending, the employee brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against the employer on behalf of the United States and the state of New Jersey. The qui tam action remained under seal for over seven years while the government investigated the action. During this time, the employer’s state court action against the employee was dismissed after the parties entered into a settlement agreement. After the government chose not to intervene in the FCA action, and the district court unsealed the complaint, the employee chose to proceed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that New Jersey’s “entire controversy” doctrine requires claims arising from related facts or transactions to be adjudicated in one action.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit concluded that New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine did not apply to the employee’s qui tam action because, in FCA cases, the U.S. is the real party in interest. The appellate court noted that concluding otherwise would essentially allow the employee to “unilaterally negotiate, settle, and dismiss the qui tam claims during the Government’s investigatory period.” Moreover, the appellate court found that application of the doctrine “would incentivize potential [FCA] defendants to ‘smoke out’ qui tam actions by suing potential relators and then quickly settling those private claims,” in order to bar a potential qui tam action.