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7th Circuit: FDCPA claims fail due to insufficient evidence
On August 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that a consumer could not proceed on FDCPA or Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA) claims because he failed to demonstrate that the incurred credit card debt in question was a “consumer debt” entitled to FDCPA and WCA protections. The consumer filed a lawsuit against a law firm acting on behalf of a debt collection agency claiming, among other things, that the firm had failed to provide written notice of his right to cure a defaulted debt before the firm commenced an action against him in Wisconsin state court. While the consumer maintained that the debt was not his, he argued that “to the extent” that he was liable for the debt, it was entered into for personal, family, or household purposes, and that by failing to provide written notice of his rights, the firm had violated the FDCPA and WCA. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the consumer failed to establish that the debt was a consumer debt.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The appellate court found that the evidence put forward by the plaintiff, which included account statements and his own representations regarding the purpose of the account, was insufficient to show that the debt was incurred for personal, family, or household purposes. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff’s representations that the debt was a consumer debt could not be reconciled with his contention that the debt was not his and that the charges on his account statement did not provide sufficient information for the court to conclusively determine that they were made for personal, and not business, purposes.
CFPB settles student-loan suit against defunct educational institution
On August 12, the CFPB announced a settlement with a defunct for-profit educational institution to resolve allegations that the defendant engaged in unfair and abusive acts and practices in violation of the Consumer Financial Protection Act through its private student loan origination practices. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB filed a lawsuit in 2014 alleging, among other things, that the defendant offered new students short-term zero-interest loans to cover the difference between the cost of attendance and federal loans obtained by students, but when the short-term loans came due at the end of the students’ first academic year, the defendant forced borrowers into “high-interest, high-fee” private student loans knowing that borrowers could not afford them. According to the Bureau, this practice resulted in a 64 percent default rate on the loans. The terms of the proposed settlement include a $60 million judgment against the defendant as well as an injunction prohibiting the defendant from offering or providing student loans in the future.
Earlier in June, the Bureau announced a settlement with a company that managed student loans for the defendant, which includes approximately $168 million in student loan forgiveness. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.) The company has also agreed to permanently cease enforcing, collecting, or receiving payments on any of its loans.
9th Circuit: Plaintiffs’ face-scanning claims can proceed
On August 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed a district court order certifying a class action suit that alleged a social media company’s face-scanning practices violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The court found that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently concrete injury necessary to establish Article III standing as defined in the U.S. Supreme court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant’s use of the facial-recognition technology did not comply with Illinois law designed to regulate “the collection, use, safeguarding and storage of biometrics”—which, under BIPA, includes the scanning of face geometry. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing and certified the class. The defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that even if the plaintiffs have standing to sue, (i) BIPA is not intended to be applied extraterritorially; (ii) the collection of biometric data occurred on servers located outside of Illinois; and (iii) it is unclear that the alleged privacy violations “occurred ‘primarily and substantially within’” within the state. Additionally, the defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by certifying the class because the state’s “extraterritoriality doctrine precludes the district court from finding predominance,” and that a class action was not superior to individual actions due to the potential for a large statutory damages award.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims met the standing requirement of Spokeo because the defendant’s alleged development of a face template that uses facial-recognition technology without users’ consent constituted an invasion of an individual’s private affairs and concrete interests. “Because we conclude that BIPA protects the plaintiffs’ concrete privacy interests and violations of the procedures in BIPA actually harm or pose a material risk of harm to those privacy interests, the plaintiffs have alleged a concrete and particularized harm, sufficient to confer Article III standing,” the appellate court stated. The 9th Circuit also dismissed the defendant’s extraterritoriality argument, stating that predominance is not defeated because the threshold questions of exactly which consumers BIPA applies to can be decided on a classwide basis.
5th Circuit upholds $298 million fine in FCA/FIRREA mortgage fraud action
On August 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that ordered two mortgage companies and their owner to pay nearly $300 million in a suit brought under the False Claims Act (FCA) and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The suit accused the defendants of allegedly making false certifications, which reportedly led to mortgages ending in default. The jury agreed that the defendants defrauded the Federal Housing Agency’s mortgage insurance program when a state audit revealed unregistered company branches were used to originate loans in violation of agency guidelines, and the court determined that there was ample evidence to find that the false certifications were a proximate cause of losses from loan defaults. As a result, the government trebled the damages and civil penalties under the FCA from $93 million to roughly $298 million. The defendants appealed the decision, challenging, among other things, the sufficiency of evidence, methodologies presented by the government’s expert witnesses, and the judge’s decision to not order a new trial after dismissing a disruptive juror.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit opined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings, and rejected the defendants’ expert witness challenges, holding first that the defendants had waived any argument about the loan default sampling methodology used by one of the witnesses, because their argument that the witness “failed to control for obvious causes of default” never came up “during the extensive negotiations over the sampling methodology that would be used.” The appellate court also concluded that nothing in the record supported the defendants’ argument that the second witness “did not apply the HUD underwriting standards” in his re-underwriting methodology. The appellate court further noted that it has declined to adopt a rule used by other circuit courts that prohibits jurors from being dismissed “unless there is no possibility” that the juror’s failure to deliberate stems from their view of the evidence. Rather, the 5th Circuit held that the district court had grounds to dismiss the juror who “failed to follow instructions, exhibited a lack of candor during questioning, and had engaged in threatening behavior towards other jurors.”
7th Circuit: Debt collector’s email not a “communication” under the FDCPA
On August 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed a summary judgment ruling in favor of a consumer, concluding that a debt collector’s emails did not constitute a “communication” under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the debt collector sent a consumer two emails about separate medical debts containing hyperlinks to the debt collector’s website, which then required the user to click through various screens to access and download a document containing the disclosures required under Section 1692g(a) of the FDCPA. The consumer did not open the emails. After finding out about the debt collection effort from the hospital, the consumer called the debt collector for more information; however, the required disclosures were not provided over the phone or sent in a written notice within the next five days. The consumer filed suit against the debt collector alleging it violated Section 1692g(a) by not providing the disclosures during her phone call or within five days after the call as required by law. The company argued that the emails were the FDCPA’s “initial communications” and contained the mandatory disclosures. The lower court granted the consumer’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit rejected the debt collector’s arguments that the emails constituted a “communication” under the FDCPA, noting that other appellate courts have held the message “must at least imply the existence of a debt,” and the emails only contained the name and email address of the debt collector. Moreover, the appellate court took issue with the multistep process required to access the validation notice, concluding “[a]t best, the emails provided a digital pathway to access the required information. And we’ve already rejected the argument that a communication ‘contains’ the mandated disclosures when it merely provides a means to access them.”
Notably, the CFPB filed an amicus brief in the action, seeking affirmation of the lower court’s ruling on the separate theory that the debt collector allegedly failed to satisfy the conditions of the E-Sign Act. However, because the court affirmed the decision on other grounds, it chose not to address the E-Sign Act.
District Court: Bank’s delay on adverse-action notice does not qualify for safe harbor
On August 8, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted a loan applicant’s request for partial summary judgment on allegations that a bank violated ECOA when it failed to timely send an adverse-action notice. The court ruled that the bank failed to establish its inadvertent error defense. The plaintiff’s loan application was submitted on October 30, 2018, and subsequently reviewed and denied on November 5 due to “issues with his credit report that needed to be resolved” in order for his application to be fully considered. The adverse action paperwork was then placed in a courier pouch for delivery to the lending officer responsible for notifying the plaintiff. However, the information failed to make it to the intended officer until after the plaintiff filed the action, upon which, the adverse action letter was generated on December 19. Under ECOA, notification of action must be made within 30 days of receipt.
The bank argued that partial summary judgment was inappropriate because the failure to provide notice within 30 days was an “inadvertent error” under 12 CFR 1002.16, and therefore did not constitute a violation of ECOA. The court stated that, in order to prevail on its argument on the safe-harbor provision for inadvertent errors, the bank, as the nonmoving party, must establish three elements: (i) the error was “mechanical, electronic, or clerical”; (ii) the error was unintentional; and (iii) the error “occurred ‘. . .notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.” However, the bank conceded that it could not explain what caused the courier pouch error, put forth no evidence to show that the effort was clerical in nature, and also acknowledged that it “does not maintain any procedure reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.” As such, the court determined that the bank failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of any material fact bearing on the elements of the defense, and thus failed to qualify for the safe harbor defense.
D.C. Circuit: Maintaining a U.S. correspondent account can subject a foreign bank's records located abroad to USA PATRIOT Act subpoenas; Chinese banks subject to subpoenas in case claiming sanctions evasion
On August 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that ordered three Chinese banks to comply with subpoenas seeking customer records stemming from a DOJ investigation into a now-defunct Chinese company’s evasion of North Korean sanctions, or face contempt fines each of $50,000 per day. According to the DOJ, the banks allegedly facilitated transactions for the Chinese company that may have operated as a front for the North Korean government in violation of U.S. sanctions. In 2017, the DOJ obtained grand jury subpoenas seeking records related to U.S. correspondent banking transactions of the defunct company from two of the banks with U.S. branches, and served the third bank, which did not have U.S. branches, with a Patriot Act subpoena. After the banks refused to comply with the subpoenas, the district court granted the DOJ’s motion to compel.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court had personal jurisdiction to enforce the subpoenas. The appellate court held that the two banks with U.S. branches consented to jurisdiction when they opened those branches because they had executed agreements with the Federal Reserve which required compliance with relevant provisions of federal law. For the bank without U.S. branches, the D.C. Circuit determined that “it had sufficient contact with the [U.S.] as a whole and the subpoena[] sufficiently related to that contact so as to support the court’s personal jurisdiction.” The court also held that the foreign records sought from the bank without U.S. branches were within the scope of the PATRIOT Act subpoena, noting that the PATRIOT Act authorized the DOJ to issue a “subpoena to any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in the [U.S.] and request records related to such correspondent account, including records maintained outside of the [U.S.] relating to the deposit of funds into the foreign bank.” The appellate court also affirmed the district court’s decision to hold the banks in contempt, dismissing the banks’ argument that this move was improper because they had done all they could to obtain approval from the Chinese government to produce the subpoenaed records.
6th Circuit: Reversed conviction in alleged mortgage application fraud
On August 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit reversed the conviction of two individuals for bank fraud, holding that the government had failed to prove that the defendants intended to obtain bank property or defraud the financial institutions that owned the mortgage companies targeted by the scheme. The complaint alleged the defendants—a homebuilder and a mortgage broker—recruited straw buyers to purchase the homebuilder’s homes, in which they obtained more than $5 million from mortgage companies through fraudulent mortgage applications that made several misrepresentations, including overstating the buyers’ incomes and falsely claiming that the buyers planned to live in the homes. During the trial, the government argued that the jury could reasonably infer that the federally insured parent banks controlled the funds, since the mortgage companies were wholly owned subsidiaries of the banks. The government further asserted that the mortgage companies’ funds belonged to the banks because “any losses incurred by the mortgage companies would ‘flow directly up’ to the banks.”
On appeal, the 6th Circuit reversed the defendants’ bank fraud convictions, holding that the mortgage companies held no federally insured deposits, and that while each mortgage company is a wholly owned subsidiary of a bank, the mortgage companies and the banks are distinct entities. As such, the mortgage companies did not qualify as “financial institutions,” as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 20(1). The appellate court also rejected the government’s arguments because Congress had amended § 20 after the events at issue in the case by adding language covering mortgage lenders to its “enumeration of ‘financial institutions,’” thereby demonstrating that mortgage lenders were not covered by the prior version of § 20. In addition, the court also indicated that the government offered no evidence proving that the defendants sought to obtain bank property “by means of” a misrepresentation, pointing out that no evidence was presented to show that any of the misrepresentations on the loan applications ever reached anyone at the parent banks. As such, “the scheme’s effect on the value of the banks’ ownership interests in the mortgage companies was merely ‘incidental’ to the scheme’s goal of defrauding the mortgage companies.” Accordingly, the court held that the government failed to prove that the defendants committed bank fraud.
District Court allows case exploring whether cryptocurrency acquisitions are “cash-like” to proceed
On August 1, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York allowed breach of contract and clear and conspicuous disclosure claims brought by a proposed class of consumers against a national bank to proceed, finding that ambiguity exists over whether credit card cryptocurrency purchases are “cash-like transactions.” The plaintiffs claimed that the bank breached their cardholder agreements when it changed the classification of cryptocurrency acquisitions from “purchases” to “cash advances” between January 23 and February 2, 2018. Plaintiffs contended that this change subjected cardholders to higher interest rates and transaction fees in violation of their cardholder agreements. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the bank’s failure to clearly and conspicuously disclose the different types of transactions and varying rates, as well as its failure to provide advance notice of significant changes in its account terms and accurate disclosures in periodic account statements, violated TILA and Regulation Z.
The bank countered that no breach of contract occurred because cryptocurrency acquisitions are “cash-like transactions” that, under the cardholder agreement, are properly classified as cash advances. Specifically, the bank stated that because cryptocurrency can be a “medium of exchange, a measure of value, or a means of payment” under the definition of “cash,” it is therefore “cash-like.”
The court concluded that the plaintiffs offered a reasonable argument that purchases of cryptocurrency did not constitute cash advances. Plaintiffs argued that the contractual term “cash-like”—which was used in the cardholder agreement to describe a cash advance—referred only to financial instruments formally tied to physical, government-issued “fiat” currency, such as checks, money orders, and wire transfers. “Because, as plaintiffs plausibly allege, cryptocurrency does not imbue its holder with a legal right to any government-issued currency, acquisitions of cryptocurrency could not be classified as a cash-like transaction,” the court stated. As such, “[b]ecause plaintiffs have identified a reasonable interpretation of ‘cash-like transactions’ that would exclude purchases of cryptocurrency, the breach of contract claim survives the motion to dismiss.” The court also allowed plaintiffs’ “clear and conspicuous” disclosure claim under TILA to survive because the contract was not clear that purchases of cryptocurrency would result in cash advance fees. However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining TILA claims, finding that (i) the bank did not change the contract terms themselves, but rather their application; and (ii) the periodic account statements did not inaccurately convey what the plaintiffs owed to the bank for those particular periods of time.
District Court grants preliminary approval to national bank's auto lending settlement
On August 5, the U. S. District Court for the Central District of California granted preliminary approval and class certification to a settlement of at least $393.5 million to resolve multidistrict allegations that a national bank added force-placed auto insurance to auto loans that may have been unnecessary and without borrowers’ consent. Under the terms of the settlement, the auto insurance underwriter will pay an additional $7.5 million. The allegations stem from a 2017 lawsuit in which borrowers claimed the bank charged them for unnecessary collateral protection insurance. The settlement also requires the bank and the underwriter to pay up to $36 million in attorneys’ fees for the borrower class and up to $500,000 in litigation expenses. However, the court scheduled a settlement fairness hearing for October to examine the fees before granting final approval of the settlement. This settlement follows a 2018 settlement reached between the bank and the CFPB and the OCC concerning a similar set of allegations over the purported billing of force-placed insurance premiums that may not have been required. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.)