InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
9th Circuit: Class decertification appropriate when representative lacks standing
On June 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision to decertify a class of callers claiming their cellphone calls were unlawfully recorded, holding that the class representative lacked standing as to its individual claim. According to the opinion, customers of a concrete supplier alleged that calls placed to a phone system that the company began using in 2009 failed to inform callers that their cellphone calls were being recorded. In 2013, the company changed the recording to state that the calls maybe be “monitored or recorded.” The class representative sought to certify a class of all persons whose calls were recorded between the time that the company started using the call recording system in 2009 to when it updated the recording. The district court initially denied certification under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23’s predominance requirement, and later—after certifying the class based on evidence presented concerning the timing of certain recorded calls—decertified the class for failing to satisfy the “commonality” and “predominance” requirements once the concrete supplier identified nine customers who claimed they had actual knowledge of the recording practice during the class period. In addition, the court concluded that the class representative lacked standing to seek damages on its individual claim or injunctive relief because it lacked standing under the 2016 Supreme Court opinion Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which required that it show a concrete or particularized injury as a result of the concrete supplier's alleged violation.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit rejected the class’s argument that it “has standing to appeal the decertification order notwithstanding the adverse judgment against it on the merits” due to the following two exceptions to the mootness doctrine that may permit a class representative to appeal decertification even if its individual claims have been mooted: (i) the class representative “retains a ‘personal stake’ in class certification”; or (ii) “the claim on the merits is ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review,’” even though the class representative has lost “his personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.” The appellate court concluded that “neither of these mootness principles can remedy or excuse a lack of standing as to the representative's individual claims.”
4th Circuit overrules own precedent, holds undersecured homestead mortgage claims can be bifurcated
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit overruled its own precedent, holding that the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes modification of undersecured homestead mortgage claims—not just the payment schedule for such claims—including through bifurcation and cram down. According to the opinion, a creditor initiated a foreclosure action against a mortgage debtor alleging that the debtor failed to repay approximately $136,000 due under the mortgage. The debtor filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy and valued the mortgaged property at $40,000 in his petition. The debtor proposed a bankruptcy plan that would bifurcate the creditor’s claim into a secured component commensurate with the value of the mortgaged property, and an unsecured component for the remainder. The bankruptcy court rejected the debtor’s proposal on the grounds that the 4th Circuit’s 1997 holding in Witt v. United Cos. Lending Corp (In re Wiit) barred any modification or bifurcation of the creditor’s claim, and thus entitled her to a secured claim in the full amount due under the mortgage, plus interest. The district court and a 4th Circuit panel affirmed.
Following an en banc rehearing, the 4th Circuit reversed, overruling its decision in Witt. The en banc appellate court concluded that the plain text of Section 1322(c)(2) authorizes modification of covered homestead mortgage payments and claims, and allows for the bifurcation of undersecured homestead mortgages into secured and unsecured components. The appellate court noted that its initial interpretation in Witt had been “universally” criticized by courts and commentators, including for running “contrary to accepted canons of statutory construction.” Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment relying on Witt and remanded the case.
In dissent, three circuit judges stated that the majority went too far in its interpretation of Section 1322, and that Section 1322(c)(2) allows debtors to repay their mortgages over the full duration of their plan. The dissent’s view was that the majority’s decision essentially overturns the Supreme Court’s holding in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank without “any clear desire by Congress to do so.” Moreover, the dissent argued that, while it agreed that “Congress meant for [Section] 1322(c)(2) to create an exception to Nobelman’s prohibition against modifying the timing of loan repayments,” Congress did not intend to “eviscerate Nobelman altogether.”
CFPB delays underwriting compliance of Payday Rule
On June 6, the CFPB released a final rule to delay the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the mandatory underwriting provisions of the agency’s 2017 final rule covering “Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans” (the Rule). Compliance with these provisions of the Rule is now due by November 19, 2020.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, in February, when the CFPB released two notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) related to certain lending requirements under the Rule—one proposing the delay to the compliance date for mandatory underwriting provisions, and the other proposing to rescind the underwriting portion of the Rule that would make it an unfair and abusive practice for a lender to make covered high-interest rate, short-term loans, or covered longer-term balloon payment loans without reasonably determining that the consumer has the ability to repay—the Bureau emphasized that the NPRM extending the compliance date for mandatory underwriting provisions did not extend the effective date for the Rule’s provisions governing payments.
Notably, on May 30, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas entered an order continuing the stay of the original compliance date for both the underwriting provisions and the payment provisions of the Rule in a payday loan trade group’s litigation challenging the Rule. (Previous InfoBytes coverage on the litigation is available here.) The order requires the parties to file a joint status report no later than August 2.
Splitting from the 6th Circuit, 7th Circuit holds mere procedural violation of FDCPA not sufficient harm for standing
On June 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held that the receipt of an incomplete debt collection letter is not a sufficient harm to satisfy Article III standing requirements to bring a FDCPA claim against a debt collector. According to the opinion, a consumer received a collection letter which described the process for verifying a debt but did not specify that she had to communicate with the collector in writing to trigger the protections under the FDCPA. The consumer filed a class action against the debt collector alleging the omission “‘constitute[d] a material/concrete breach of her rights’” under the FDCPA. In the complaint, the consumer did “not allege that she tried—or even planned to try—to dispute the debt or verify that [the stated creditor] was actually her creditor.” The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the consumer had not alleged that the FDCPA violation “caused her harm or put her at an appreciable risk of harm” and therefore, the consumer lacked standing to sue.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that because the consumer did not allege that she tried to dispute or verify the debt orally, leaving her statutory protections at risk, she suffered no harm to her statutory rights under the FDCPA. The appellate court emphasized that “procedural injuries under consumer‐protection statutes are insufficiently concrete to confer standing.” The court acknowledged that its opinion creates a conflict with a July 2018 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which held that consumers had standing to sue a debt collector whose letters allegedly failed to instruct them that the FDCPA makes certain debt verification information available only if the debt is disputed “in writing.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The appellate court also agreed with the district court’s decision to deny the consumer’s request for leave to file an amended complaint, noting that she did not indicate what facts she would allege to cure the jurisdictional defect.
9th Circuit upholds rejection of consumer’s class action against auto finance company
On May 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of an auto finance corporation and various dealerships (collectively, “defendants”) in a putative class action alleging the defendants failed to provide add-ons the plaintiff purchased with the vehicle. The case, which was originally brought in Washington state superior court, was removed to federal court over the consumer’s objection, where the consumer amended the complaint to include a federal TILA claim.
According to the opinion, plaintiff alleged that his purchased vehicle did not come with three add-ons listed in the “Dealer Addendum,” which was a sticker affixed to the car. At the time of purchase, the customer was not aware of what the add-ons were, nor were they explained to him; the add-ons were only listed in the addendum. Plaintiff argued that if he had known what the add-ons were, he would have declined them and paid a lower price for the vehicle. The district court rejected plaintiff’s arguments and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit upheld the entirety of the district court’s ruling, concluding the consumer offered no evidence that the add-ons identified in the Dealer Addendum were made part of the vehicle purchase transaction. Moreover, the appellate court upheld the district court’s decision not to remand the case back to state court, determining that while the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal, it had subject-matter jurisdiction at the time it rendered its final decision, due to the consumer’s voluntary addition of the TILA claim to the complaint. The appellate court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the consumer’s request for additional discovery based on plaintiffs failure to “identif[y] the specific facts that further discovery would have revealed or explained[ed].”
Class action alleges national bank’s grace period practices breach terms of cardholder agreement
On June 3, a consumer filed a class action complaint against a national bank alleging that the bank charges interest on credit card accounts even when consumers’ balances are paid in full by the billing cycle due date, in breach of the bank’s cardholder agreement. The complaint alleges that the cardholder agreement and monthly billing statements disclose to consumers that interest will not be charged on new purchases if those new purchases are paid off by the billing cycle’s due date, but that in practice the grace period is eliminated for new purchases “[i]f a consumer leaves even $1 on her account balance after a billing period due date.” The complaint alleges that the bank’s practice of only providing a grace period on new purchases for consumers “who have paid off their balances in full for two prior months” directly contradicts the cardholder agreement and consumer disclosures. In addition to breach of contract, the consumer alleges a violation of Delaware’s Consumer Fraud Act and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The consumer is seeking certification of a class of similarly situated consumers; damages and restitution; and injunctive relief.
4th Circuit upholds certification of TCPA class action against satellite provider
On May 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit held that a lower court correctly certified a class of individuals who claimed a satellite provider (defendant) violated the TCPA when its authorized sales representative routinely placed telemarketing calls to numbers on the national Do-Not-Call registry. The plaintiff-appellee alleged that because his number was on the registry, the calls were not only annoying but illegal. He therefore filed a lawsuit against the defendant for violations of the TCPA, and in 2018, the court issued a final judgment upholding a jury’s verdict as to both liability and damages for a class of 18,066 members, tripling the damages to more than $61 million. The defendant appealed the verdict asserting that the class definition was too broad in that included uninjured consumers. Specifically, the defendant argued that the definition should be limited to telephone subscribers or the person who actually received the calls. The defendant further asserted on appeal that it was not responsible for the sales representative’s actions.
On appeal, the 4th Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, stating that it saw “no basis for imposing such a limit,” on the class definition given that “[t]he text of the TCPA notes that it was intended to protect ‘consumers,’ not simply ‘subscribers.’” Concerning the defendant’s argument that it was not responsible for the violations, the appellate court noted that the sales representative’s “entire business model was to make calls like these on behalf of television service providers,” like the defendant, which the defendant knew were being placed on its behalf.
District Court denies debt collector’s motion for summary judgment FDCPA action concerning a consumer who filed for bankruptcy
On May 29, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied a debt collector’s motion for summary judgment in an action alleging the debt collector violated the FDCPA by sending a collection letter three days after the consumer filed for bankruptcy. According to the opinion, the debt collector confirmed that the consumer had not yet filed for bankruptcy following placement of the consumer’s account for collection and, thus, sent an initial communication to the consumer’s attorney. Thereafter, the consumer filed for bankruptcy, but before the collector learned of the bankruptcy, it sent a collection letter to the consumer’s counsel. As a result, the consumer filed a lawsuit claiming that the debt collector violated the FDCPA by sending a collection letter to the consumer’s attorney after the bankruptcy proceeding had been initiated. The debt collector moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held liable under the FDCPA because, at the time it sent the collection letter, it had not yet received notice of the bankruptcy proceeding. The court, however, rejected this argument, citing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in stating that “‘[t]he FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent . . . and does not have to have suffered actual damages.’” Because the debt collector did present arguments or evidence relating to FDCPA’s bona fide error provision, which provides an affirmative defense for a violation that is not intentional and is the result of a bona fide error, the court said that it was essentially being asked by the debt collector “to read an intent or knowledge requirement into the FDCPA,” something it could not do, and, thus, it denied the motion for summary judgment.
9th Circuit holds shipping company’s online arbitration agreement is valid
On May 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit denied a plaintiff’s writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s order compelling arbitration of the plaintiff’s claims against a national shipping company. According to the opinion, a customer filed a putative class action complaint alleging the company “systematically overcharges” customers by applying delivery surcharge rates through third-parties, which are higher than the company’s advertised rates. The company moved to compel arbitration because the customer enrolled in a free, optional program offered by the company that provides tracking and managing services of packages; and that enrollment in the program required the customer to agree to arbitrate all claims related to the company’s shipping services. The customer argued that while he checked the box agreeing to the service terms and technology agreement when enrolling, he should not be bound by the arbitration agreement because it was, among other things “so inconspicuous that no reasonable user would be on notice of its existence.” The district court rejected the customer’s arguments and granted the motion to compel arbitration.
On review of the writ of mandamus, the appellate court acknowledged that “locating the arbitration clause at issue here requires several steps and a fair amount of web-browsing intuition,” detailing that “...the first hyperlink [is] to the 96-page Technology Agreement. The user must then read the [service terms] and understand that they incorporate [additional terms and conditions of service]…. the user must visit the full [company] website, intuitively find the link [to the additional terms and conditions of service] at the bottom of the webpage, select it, and locate yet another link to the [terms and conditions of service]” in order to read the document and locate the arbitration clause. The appellate court held that the “extraordinary remedy of mandamus” could not be awarded because it could not say “with ‘definite and firm conviction’ that the district court erred by finding the incorporation [of the terms and conditions of service] valid” and found that there is no question the customer affirmatively assented to the terms. While it did not impact its analysis, the appellate court noted that the company’s service terms document now includes a hyperlink to the terms and conditions of service and expressly informs the user that the terms contain an arbitration provision.
OCC wants final judgment in NYDFS fintech charter challenge
On May 30, the OCC filed a letter with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York notifying the court that it intends to work with NYDFS to issue a proposed final order to the court in the action challenging the OCC’s decision to allow fintech companies to apply for a Special Purpose National Bank Charter (SPNB). As previously covered by InfoBytes, in May, the court denied the OCC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that, among other things, the OCC failed to rebut NYDFS’s claims that the proposed national fintech charter posed a threat to the state’s ability to establish its own laws and regulations, and therefore, the challenge “is ripe for adjudication.” In its letter, the OCC states that while it “disagrees with the Court’s decision, and reserves its right to appeal, it believes that the decision renders entry of final judgment in this matter appropriate.” An entry of final judgment, would allow the OCC to challenge the decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit.