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FTC and New York Attorney General reach deal with debt collection firm
On July 20, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York issued a judgment to resolve a suit brought by the FTC and the New York Attorney General against a debt collection firm and an affiliated officer (defendants) accused of allegedly engaging in deceptive and abusive practices, including unlawfully threatening to arrest consumers if debts were not paid. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.) Under the stipulated final order for permanent injunction and settlement of claims pursuant to the FTC Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the defendants—who have not admitted to the allegations—are held jointly and severally liable for paying the more than $22.5 million under a suspended judgment should it ever be determined that the financial disclosures provided to the state and the FTC were not completely truthful, accurate, or complete. The defendants are also banned from the debt collection industry and required to file compliance reports with the FTC. The judgment further authorizes the receiver to liquidate the debt collection firm’s assets.
District Court holds TCPA covers direct-drop voicemails
On July 16, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan held in a matter of first impression that direct-to-voicemail or direct-drop voicemails are covered by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). In so holding, the court denied a debt collection agency’s (defendant) motion for summary judgment. According to the opinion, the defendant asserted that the prerecorded voicemails left on the plaintiff’s cell phone in an effort to collect a mortgage did not violate the TCPA because calls were not dialed to the cell phone but rather deposited directly on a voicemail service—an action the defendant claimed was not within the scope of the TCPA and unregulated. However, the court found that the defendant’s use of the voicemail product constituted as a “call” within TCPA’s broadly constructed purview. In addition, the court specifically stated that the direct drop voicemails left by the defendant were “arguably more of a nuisance” to the plaintiff than receiving text messages since she would have to take steps each time to review or delete the message. In denying the defendant’s motion, the court held that “[b]oth the FCC and the courts have recognized that the scope of the TCPA naturally evolves in parallel with telecommunications technology as it evolves, e.g., with the advent of text messages and email-to-text messages or, as we have here, new technology to get into a consumer’s voicemail box directly.”
6th Circuit affirms dismissal of certain TCPA class action claims, reverses decision on survivability issue
On July 20, in a matter of first impression for the Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) survive the death of a plaintiff and may be brought by a successor in interest. In so doing, the court reversed the lower court’s decision that held the opposite and remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The 6th Circuit opined that the lower court erred in holding that TCPA was penal rather than remedial in nature, and thus could not survive a plaintiff’s death. “The purpose of the TCPA [is] to redress individual wrongs felt by individual consumers . . . [and] recovery under the statute runs to the harmed individual and not the public,” both of which suggest that TCPA claims were remedial, and thus survive a party’s death. Separately, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting a motion to sever and motion to dismiss.
District court dismisses FDCPA suit, rules least sophisticated debtor would not be misled by placement of dispute language
On July 18, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed a class action lawsuit alleging a debt collector failed to provide clear instructions that debt disputes must be submitted in writing in order to be valid as required under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). According to the opinion, the plaintiff claimed that the debt collection company misled her into believing she could orally dispute her debt by placing phrases such as “Should you have any questions regarding this account, please feel free to call us” on a debt collection notice she received. However, the debt collector argued that instructions in the notice, which provided the consumer with her rights under the FDCPA, could not be overshadowed or contradicted by including a phone number. The court agreed, referencing two 3rd Circuit cases as precedent, and stated that “merely providing contact information and encouraging a telephone call are insufficient standing alone to undermine an otherwise clear validation notice.” In this instance, the notice “only invites her to call if she has general questions regarding the account.” Furthermore, according to the judge, even the least sophisticated debtor would not be misled by a phone number listed separately from dispute instructions.
8th Circuit reverses district court’s decision, rules compound interest not contractually agreed upon violates FDCPA
On July 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed a district court’s decision, holding that under Minnesota law, compound interest cannot be collected unless specifically agreed to in a contract. The decision results from a suit filed by a consumer alleging that a law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA) when it sent a debt collection letter seeking payment of credit card debt while asserting that the consumer owed compound interest. The consumer’s suit alleged that the debt’s owner, debt collector, and law firm (defendants) “used a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means . . . and an unfair or unconscionable means” when attempting to collect the debt. Specifically, the consumer alleged the principal balance included interest on the contractual interest—which he claimed he did not agree to in the underlying credit card agreement—and that as a result, the defendants misrepresented the amount of debt and attempted to collect interest that was not permitted under Minnesota law. The district court dismissed the consumer’s claim, finding that he failed to state an FDCPA claim because he did not allege a materially false statement in the collection letter. The 8th Circuit reversed however, finding that the consumer stated a claim under the FDCPA because a demand to pay an amount of debt that is unauthorized under state law is actionable as a false statement or unfair collection attempt, and that a false representation of the amount of a debt that overstates what is owed under state law is a material violation of the FDCPA. The appellate court also rejected the law firm’s argument that there was no FDCPA violation because the agreement authorized the total amount of interest stated in the letter, further declining to calculate the interest under the credit-card terms provided by the law firm because the consumer had contested the terms as unauthenticated.
New Jersey appeals court says statute of limitations does not apply in allegedly fraudulent mortgage application
On July 13, the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division reversed a trial court’s decision, ruling that a deceased homeowner’s family (defendants) had provided sufficient evidence to show that a division of a national bank (lender) had knowingly engaged in predatory lending practices when it approved a fraudulent mortgage application in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (Act). According to the opinion, in 2007 when the now deceased homeowner purchased a house, the lender may have been complicit in creating and approving a fraudulent loan application that, among other things, stated falsely that (i) the homeowner was a small business owner with a monthly income of $30,000 rather than $1,500, and (ii) the down payment came from the homeowner, when it supposedly came from a second mortgage offered to him from the same lender. The homeowner defaulted on payments in 2010 and passed away in 2012. In 2015, the defendants responded to a foreclosure complaint filed by the bank, alleging that the Act barred plaintiff’s claims due to the lender’s fraudulent actions, including the aforementioned material misrepresentations. However, the trial court granted summary judgment to the lender on the grounds that claims of fraud brought by the defendants were “untenable” and outside the statute of limitations. The appellate court disagreed and remanded to allow for discovery, ruling that the defendants were permitted to introduce evidence of fraud in defense of the homeowner’s estate even through the statute of limitations had expired. “The doctrine of equitable recoupment permits a defendant to assert an otherwise stale claim and avoid the statute of limitations, where the defendant uses the claim as a shield instead of a sword,” the appellate court stated.
5th Circuit rules FHFA structure violates Constitution’s separation of powers
On July 16, in a divided opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a lower court’s decision that addressed two claims brought by a group of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (government-sponsored entities or GSEs) shareholders: (i) whether the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) acted within its statutory authority when it adopted a dividend agreement, which requires the GSEs to turn over every quarter “dividends equal to their entire net worth” to the Treasury Department; and (ii) whether the structure of the FHFA is unconstitutional and in violation of the separation of powers. The lower court previously dismissed the shareholder’s statutory claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Treasury Department and the FHFA on the constitutional claim. In addressing the first claim, the appellate court agreed with the lower court and found the government-sponsored entities’ payments acceptable under the agency’s statutory authority and that the FHFA was lawfully established by Congress through the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which places restrains on judicial review. However, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision as to the second claim and agreed with shareholders that Congress went too far in insulating the FHFA’s single director from removal by the president for anything other than cause, ruling that the agency’s structure violates Article II of the Constitution. “We hold that Congress insulated the FHFA to the point where the Executive Branch cannot control the FHFA or hold it accountable,” the opinion stated. The divided appellate panel remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Earlier this year, in response to a challenge to the CFPB's single-director structure, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit en banc upheld the CFPB’s constitutionality in a 7-3 decision (see Buckley Sandler Special Alert). The 5th Circuit is also scheduled to hear a challenge by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies to the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single-director structure, in which 14 state Attorney General filed an amici curiae brief encouraging the appellate court to disagree with the en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here and here.)
Texas Attorney General leads 14-state brief to 5th Circuit challenging CFPB structure
On July 10, the Attorney General of Texas and 13 other state Attorneys General filed an amici curiae brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in April, the 5th Circuit agreed to hear a challenge by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies to the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single-director structure in response to a CFPB action filed against the companies. The brief encourages the appellate court to disagree with the en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit, which upheld the Bureau’s structure (covered by a Buckley Sandler Special Alert). Instead, the Attorneys General argue, the court should find the structure unconstitutional rendering “all its actions unlawful.” The brief poses similar arguments to past challenges, including (i) the director should be removable at will by the president and (ii) the president’s removal power should only be restricted for multi-member commissions.
Notably, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently disagreed with the D.C. Circuit decision, concluding the CFPB’s organizational structure is unconstitutional and terminated the Bureau as a party to an action because the agency lacked the authority to bring claims under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.)
Supreme Court of New York strikes down NYDFS’ Insurance Regulation 208
On July 5, the Supreme Court of the State of New York ordered the annulment of Insurance Regulation 208, which was promulgated by the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) in October 2017. The decision results from an Article 78 petition by several title insurance companies challenging the state regulation, which prohibits title insurance entities from providing benefits such as meals, tickets to events, gifts, cash, access to parties, trips and other incentives to referral sources. The regulation clarifies that certain “reasonable and customary” advertising and marketing expenses are permitted under New York’s insurance law, provided they are “without regard to insured status or conditioned directly or indirectly on the referral of title business.” The title insurance companies argue that Regulation 208’s restrictions are inconsistent with New York’s insurance law because the law only prohibits “quid pro quo inducements given in exchange for title insurance business” and the law permits marketing and entertainment payments so long as they are not being exchanged for “a specific identified piece of business.”
The court agreed and found that the insurance law—which prohibits a “commission,” “rebate,” “fee,” or “other consideration or valuable thing”—could not be construed to include marketing and entertainment expenses because “it is common sense that marketing is an inducement for business” and it would be “an absurd proposition” that the New York Legislature intended to prohibit companies from marketing themselves. Additionally, construing the insurance law to include marketing and entertainment expenses as prohibited expenditures but also including a provision which delineates certain types of marketing and entertainment expenses as permissible is “irreconcilable and irrational.” The court ultimately concluded that Regulation 208 must fail because it contravenes the will of the Legislature under the insurance law.
In response to the decision, NYDFS Superintendent, Maria T. Vullo, issued a statement that the state intends to appeal as they “remain certain of [their] legal opinion and are confident [they] will prevail on appeal.” On July 6, NYDFS filed a notice of appeal with the court.
6th Circuit affirms no breach of contract for processing ACH transactions in order received
On July 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision, holding that there was no breach of contract between a consumer and a bank arising from the order in which the bank processed automated clearing house (ACH) transactions against the consumer’s checking account. According to the opinion, the consumer brought two state law breach of contract claims against the bank alleging that the order in which the bank processed ACH transactions against his checking account resulted in eight initial overdraft fees. Addressing the first breach of contract claim, the appeals court rejected the consumer’s argument that the agreement required the bank to process ACH transactions in the order incurred by the consumer. According to the agreement, “transactions will be processed ‘as they occur on their effective date for the business day on which they are processed’”—not necessarily the actual date that the transaction was initiated. Under the ACH Guidelines, the “effective date” is the date when the merchant presents the transactions to the ACH Operator (the Federal Reserve). Specifically, the bank processed the transactions in the order presented in the Federal Reserve’s batch files. The 6th Circuit also rejected the consumer’s second breach of contract claim, which asserted that the bank’s initial debiting of eight overdraft fees violated the parties’ agreement. Under the terms of the parties’ agreement, the consumer was not required to pay more than five overdraft fees per day, and while the initial debiting of the eight charges constituted a breach, the next-business-day reversal eliminated any damages. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the bank.