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Trump Administration Given March 17 Filing Date for Amicus Brief in PHH v CFPB; Requests to Intervene by Outside Organizations Denied by D.C. Circuit
On March 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the United States’ unopposed motion, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General (“SG”), which requested an extension to file its amicus brief in PHH Corp. v. CFPB. Notably, amicus briefs supporting PHH must be filed by March 10 and those supporting the CFPB must be filed by March 31. The fact that the United States’ motion requested an extension until March 17—before the deadline for briefs supporting the CFPB—signals that the SG may present arguments supporting PHH that differ both from the CFPB and from the positions previously presented by the Obama Administration in briefing submitted on behalf of the United States back in December.
As previously covered in InfoBytes, late last year the D.C. Circuit invited briefing by the SG’s office on behalf of the United States (note that the SG does not represent the CFPB; the Bureau is legally permitted to litigate on its own behalf.) The then Obama-led SG’s office took the position that the case should be reheard by the en banc court because, among other reasons, (i) the majority’s reasoning misapplied Supreme Court precedent on separation of powers issues and/or (ii) the panel majority should not have reached the constitutional issue. Now under the Trump Administration, the DOJ hinted that it may revise its positions with respect to both the constitutionality of the CFPB’s single-director-removable-only-for-cause structure, and, if it chooses, the merits of PHH’s argument that the Bureau’s RESPA interpretation was incorrect. Indeed, the short motion asserted, among other things, that “the views of the United States on matters involving the President’s removal power are not always entirely congruent with the views of independent agencies.”
Also on March 7, the D.C. Circuit issued a separate order denying three pending “motions and alternative requests” seeking to intervene, or in the alternative, hold in abeyance requests to intervene submitted by the Democratic Ranking Members of the Senate and House Committees with jurisdiction over the CFPB, 16 State Attorneys General, a coalition of consumer interest groups, and two conservative advocacy groups working with State National Bank of Big Spring.
Special Alert: Madden Class Action Moves Forward
On February 27, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a ruling in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC,[1] holding that New York’s fundamental public policy against usury overrides a Delaware choice-of-law clause in the plaintiff’s credit card agreement. The court allowed the plaintiff to proceed with Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims (and related state unfair or deceptive acts or practices claims) against the defendants, a debt buyer that had purchased the plaintiff’s charged-off credit card debt and its affiliated debt collector. The court did not allow plaintiff’s claims for violations of New York’s usury law to proceed, as it held that New York’s civil usury statute does not apply to defaulted debts and that the plaintiff cannot directly enforce the criminal usury statute. The court also granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification.
[1] No. 11-CV-8149, 2017 WL 758518 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017).
Click here to read full special alert* * *
If you have questions about the ruling or other related issues, visit our Class Actions practice for more information, or contact a Buckley Sandler attorney with whom you have worked in the past.
District Court Advances Securitization Case Involving N.Y. State Usury Law
On February 27, a U.S. District Court in White Plains, N.Y. issued an Order ruling on motions for summary judgment and class certification in a consumer class-action against a debt collection company that purchased defaulted consumer debt from a national bank, and its affiliate, which sought collection of debt charged at a rate in excess of New York state usury limits. Midland Funding v. Madden, [Opinion & Order] No. 11-CV-8149 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2017).
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court had originally ruled in Defendants’ favor, holding that the National Banking Act (NBA) preempted state law usury claims against purchasers of debt from national banks. The Second Circuit, however, overturned that ruling in a May 2015 opinion to the extent it relied on the NBA, but remanded the case for a determination whether Delaware choice of law provisions in the credit agreement precluded the Plaintiff’s claims because the rates were not usurious in Delaware.
Now, revising the issue on remand, the District Court held that New York’s criminal usury cap (but not the civil usury) applies to Plaintiff’s defaulted debt, notwithstanding the Delaware choice of law provision. The Court reasoned that New York does not follow the “rule of validation” (calling for courts to assume the parties intended to enter into a valid contract and apply the law of the state whose usury law would sustain it). The Court concluded, therefore, that the Plaintiff could predicate her FDCPA claims on a violation of New York’s criminal usury cap. Based on the foregoing, the Court granted partial summary judgment for the Defendant. The court also granted, but modified, Plaintiff’s request for class certification.
Chairman of House Judiciary Committee Introduces Major Litigation Reform Bill
In February, Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) introduced a new bill (H.R. 985) designed to “assure fairer, more efficient outcomes for claimants and defendants” in class-action and multi-district litigation. Dubbed the “Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017,” the proposed legislation would add a number of new hurdles and disclosure requirements that must be satisfied in connection with any case seeking class certification in federal court.
Among other things, the proposed law would: (i) provide for mandatory disclosures designed to prevent the approval of class actions in which the lawyer representing the class is a relative of a party in the class action suit; (ii) require that “any third-party funding agreement be disclosed to the district court”; and (iii) require federal circuit courts to accept any appeals of district court orders granting or denying class certification. In addition, for plaintiffs seeking “monetary relief,” the law would add an express requirement that the plaintiff “affirmatively demonstrate that each proposed class member suffered the same type and scope of injury as the named class representative.” Moreover, the bill also seeks to address disproportionately large attorney’s fee awards by, among other things, limiting class counsel’s fees to a “reasonable percentage” of the total amount of payments both “distributed to and received by class members,” and, similarly capping the total fee award to no more than that “received by all class members.”
Rep. Goodlatte—who is currently serving as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee—also authored the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and was also behind another class action reform bill introduced in 2015 that failed to clear the Senate . As explained by the Chairman, the proposed legislation “seeks to maximize recoveries by deserving victims, and weed out unmeritorious claims that would otherwise siphon resources away from innocent parties.”
District Court Denies Injunction Against “Operation Choke Point” Activities
On February 23, a U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a Memorandum Opinion denying a request for injunctive relief sought by a group of payday lenders to stop “Operation Choke Point” – a DOJ initiative targeting fraud by investigating US banks and the business they do with companies believed to be a higher risk for fraud and money laundering including, but not limited to, payday lenders. Payday lenders have called the initiative a coordinated effort by federal regulators to stop banks from doing business with them, thereby threatening their survival. See Advance America v. FDIC, [Memorandum Opinion No. 134] No. 14-CV-00953-GK (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2017). According to the lenders, the Fed, FDIC, and OCC have adopted DOJ guidance on bank reputation risk and then used that guidance to exert “backroom regulatory pressure seeking to coerce banks to terminate longstanding, mutually beneficial relationships with all payday lenders.” The government has rejected this characterization, asserting that banks can do business with payday lenders as long as the risks are managed properly.
Evaluating the request under the due process “stigma-plus rule,” the Court focused on whether the payday lenders could show they were likely to succeed on the merits of their case and whether or not they were likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction.
Ultimately, the payday lenders were unable to convince the Court that they were likely to suffer the harm central to a “stigma-plus” claim. The Court reasoned that (i) the closure of some bank accounts would not be enough to constitute the loss of banking services, and that the lenders needed (and failed) to show that the loss of banking services had effectively prevented them from offering payday loans; and (ii) nearly all of the lenders were still in operation; and (iii) because the lenders were still able to find banks to work with, evidence of the possibility of future loss of banking services was too speculative to support an injunction.
The Court was also not persuaded that the lenders would be able to prove that regulatory actions caused banks to deny services to petitioners. Specifically, the Court determined that the lenders were “unlikely” to be able to set forth evidence of the “campaign of backroom strong-arming” underlying petitioners’ request for injunctive relief. Specifically, the Court noted that the lenders relied on “scattered statements,” some of which the Court characterized as “anonymous double hearsay,” to support their claims. The only direct evidence, according to the Court, was actually just “evidence of a targeted enforcement action against a single scofflaw.”
Though the Court explained that the two other factors—the balance of equities and the public interest—were of less significance in this situation, it noted in closing that “enjoining an agency’s statutorily delegated enforcement authority is likely to harm the public interest, particularly where plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.”
FDIC Announces 22 January 2017 Enforcement Actions
On February 24, the FDIC released its list of administrative enforcement actions taken against banks and individuals in January. Several of the consent agreements included on the list seek the payment of civil money penalties for, among other things, violations of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 and its flood insurance requirements. Other violations cited in the enforcement actions relate to unsafe or unsound banking practices and breaches of fiduciary duty. The FDIC database containing all of its enforcement decisions and orders may be accessed here.
28 State AGs File Amicus Brief with Supreme Court in Debt Collection Case
On February 24, the New Mexico Attorney General, along with 27 other states and the District of Columbia, announced that his office had joined in an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court supporting the plaintiff in Henson v. Santander. As previously covered in Infobytes, the defendant argued below—and the Fourth Circuit agreed—that the FDCPA did not apply to a consumer finance company that purchased and then sought to collect a debt in default on its own behalf because it was not a debt collector as defined in the statute. In their amicus brief, the attorneys general oppose the Fourth Circuit holding and argue that any “company that regularly attempts to collect defaulted debt that it has purchased is a ‘debt collector’ as the FDCPA defines [the] term,” and therefore, the obligations and restrictions of the FDCPA should apply. The Supreme Court set oral arguments for April 18 of this year.
FinCEN and OCC Penalize CA Bank for BSA/AML Violations
On February 27, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced that it had assessed a $7 million civil money penalty against a bank specializing in providing services for check-cashers and money transmitters, for alleged “willful violations” of several Bank Secrecy Act provisions. The OCC also identified deficiencies in the bank’s practices and assessed a $1 million civil money penalty for “violations of previous consent orders entered into by [the bank].” As noted in the release, the bank’s payment of the $1 million OCC penalty will go towards satisfying the FinCEN penalty. According to FinCEN, the bank allegedly failed to (i) “establish and implement an adequate anti-money laundering program;” (ii) “conduct required due diligence on its foreign correspondent accounts;” and (iii) “detect and report suspicious activity.” Furthermore, FinCEN claims $192 million in high-risk wire transfers were processed through some of these accounts.
D.C. Circuit: Investors Can’t Challenge Agreement Distributing Fannie/Freddie Net Worth to Treasury
On February 21, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that stockholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Companies) could not challenge dividend-allocating terms that FHFA negotiated on behalf of the Companies because the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) strictly limits judicial review of actions authorized thereunder. Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, No. 14-5243, 2017 WL 677589 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 2017).
In 2008, Fannie and Freddie were placed into conservatorship with FHFA, which then entered into a stock purchase agreement with Treasury to obtain emergency capital for Fannie and Freddie. In exchange, Treasury received preferred shares of stock from Fannie and Freddie that provided for a quarterly dividend of 10 percent of the total funds drawn from Treasury. After Fannie and Freddie began routinely borrowing from Treasury to pay the dividends, FHFA and Treasury amended the stock purchase agreement in 2012 so that repayment would be based on the Companies’ profits rather than mandatory dividends. The stockholder-plaintiffs in this action sought to challenge the 2012 amendment–in particular, arguing that the 2012 amendment exceeded the authority granted to FHFA under HERA and constituted “arbitrary and capricious conduct” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. One class of stockholders also argued that the amendment constituted a breach of fiduciary duty and certain terms and covenants of the Companies’ stock certificates. The district court had dismissed both complaints on the motions of FHFA and Treasury.
The D.C. Circuit opinion noted that Section 4617(f) of HERA expressly states that “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” The court interpreted this language to prohibit any court from “wielding [its] equitable relief to second-guess either the dividend-allocating terms . . . or FHFA’s business judgment.” And although an exception to this bar on judicial review has been recognized where an agency is found to have exceeded or violated its statutory powers or functions, the court determined that FHFA’s actions were within its statutory powers or functions.
Although the majority of the stockholders’ claims were rejected, the stockholders’ contract-based claims regarding liquidation preferences and dividend rights were remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
FTC Reaches Settlement in Mortgage Relief Scheme with Final Defendant
On February 23, the FTC announced that it had reached a settlement with the final defendant facing charges originally brought against six mortgage relief operations in 2014. The FTC had alleged that the defendants preyed on distressed homeowners by claiming to be able to lower mortgage payments and interest rates or prevent foreclosures, while illegally charging advance fees. The stipulated order requires the defendant to pay $105,487, which represents the amount of money he received from the scam, and imposes a total judgment of more than $1.7 million which will become due immediately if it is found that the defendant misrepresented his finances. The defendant was also banned from the mortgage and debt relief business. Certain other defendants reached settlements in 2016, which, in addition to imposing a judgment of more than $1.7 million, also prohibited them from participating in the mortgage and debt relief business.