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  • District Court allows majority of privacy invasion class action claims to proceed against social media company

    Courts

    On September 9, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted in part and denied in part a social media company’s motion to dismiss a multidistrict class action alleging the company failed to prevent third parties from accessing and misusing private data of its users, in violation of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), and various state laws. In the consolidated action, the plaintiffs allege that the company (i) made sensitive user information—including basic facts such as gender, age, and address; and substantive content such as photos, videos, and religious and political views—available to third parties without user consent; and (ii) failed to prevent those same third parties from selling or otherwise misusing the information. The company moved to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that “people have no legitimate privacy interest in any information they make available to their friends on social media.”

    The district court disagreed, concluding that most of the plaintiffs’ claims should survive, and that the company “could not be more wrong” in its argument that its users lose all privacy interest in the information they share with their friends on social media. The court asserted that when a user shares information with a limited audience, they “retain privacy rights and can sue someone for violating them.” The court also rejected the company’s argument that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue in federal court because they could not show “tangible negative consequences from the dissemination of [the] information.” The court noted that privacy invasion is a redressable injury in itself and does not need a secondary economic injury to confer standing. Additionally, while the court recognized that the company’s argument that the users consented to this practice has “some legal force,” it cannot “defeat the lawsuit entirely, at least at the pleading stage.” Therefore, the court denied the motion as to the VPPA and narrowed certain claims under the SCA and California state laws, mostly with regard to claims on behalf of users who signed up for the service after 2009, who purportedly authorized the company to share information through their friends with app developers.

    Courts Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security Class Action State Issues Standing

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  • En banc 5th Circuit declares FHFA structure unconstitutional, allows net worth sweep claims to proceed

    Courts

    On September 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reaffirmed, in an en banc rehearing, that the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) structure violates constitutional separation of powers requirements and allowed “net worth sweep” claims brought by a group of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (government-sponsored entities or GSEs) shareholders to proceed. As previously covered by InfoBytes, GSE shareholders brought an action against the U.S. Department of Treasury and FHFA arguing that (i) the FHFA acted outside its statutory authority when it adopted a dividend agreement that requires the GSEs to pay quarterly dividends equal to their entire net worth to the Treasury Department (known as “net worth sweep”); and (ii) the structure of the FHFA is unconstitutional because it violates separation of powers principles. The district court dismissed the shareholder’s statutory claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Treasury Department and the FHFA on the separation of powers claim. On appeal, the 5th Circuit agreed with the lower court on the first claim, concluding that the net worth sweep payments were acceptable under the FHFA’s statutory authority and that the FHFA was lawfully established by Congress through the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which places restraints on judicial review. However, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision on the separation of powers claim, concluding that Congress went too far in insulating the FHFA’s single director from removal by the president for anything other than cause, ruling that the agency’s structure violates Article II of the Constitution. 

    After an en banc rehearing, the appellate court issued two separate majority opinions. Both opinions concluded that (i) the GSE shareholders plausibly alleged that the net worth sweep exceed the powers of the FHFA when acting as a conservator under HERA; and (ii) the FHFA’s structure—which provides the director with “for cause” removal protection—violates the Constitution’s separation of powers requirements. However, the opinions differed on the appropriate remedy, with nine judges concluding that the remedy should be severance of the for-cause provision, not prospective relief invalidating the net worth sweep, stating that “the Shareholders’ ongoing injury, if indeed there is one, is remedied by a declaration that the “for cause” restriction is declared removed. We go no further.”

    Various dissenting opinions were issued, including one signed by seven judges concluding that the FHFA acted within its statutory powers under HERA when it adopted the net worth sweep, stating “the FHFA’s ‘powers are many and mostly discretionary.’” In another dissenting opinion, four judges argued that the majority opinions wrongly concluded that the FHFA’s structure is unconstitutional, arguing that there are “only reasons for caution and skepticism, and none for action” in the constitutional claim. “Neither the Constitution’s text, nor the Supreme Court’s constructions thereof, nor the adversary process in this litigation has given us much ground on which to declare the FHFA’s design unconstitutional,” the judges argued.

    Given the similarities of the FHFA’s single director structure with that of the CFPB, this case warrants close attention as it has the potential to create a vehicle for consideration by the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of single director agencies.

    Courts Appellate Fifth Circuit En Banc FHFA Fannie Mae Freddie Mac GSE Single-Director Structure HERA Congress

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  • CFPB files deceptive and abusive allegations against foreclosure relief services company and principals

    Federal Issues

    On September 6, the CFPB announced a complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against a foreclosure relief services company, along with the company’s president/CEO (defendants), for allegedly engaging in deceptive and abusive acts and practices in connection with the marketing and sale of purported financial-advisory and mortgage-assistance-relief services to consumers. According to the complaint, since 2014 the defendants allegedly violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act  (CFPA) and Regulation O by making deceptive and unsubstantiated representations about the efficacy and material aspects of its mortgage assistance relief services, as well as making misleading or false claims about the experience and qualifications of its employees. Additionally, the Bureau alleged the defendants’ representations about their services constituted abusive acts and practices because, among other things, consumers “generally did not understand and were not in a position to evaluate the accuracy of [the defendants’] marketing representations or the quality of the mortgage-assistance-relief services that [the defendants] sold.” Moreover, the Bureau claimed the defendants further violated Regulation O by charging consumers advance fees before rendering services.

    In addition, the Bureau entered a proposed stipulated final judgment and order against the company’s principal auditor for providing “substantial assistance in furtherance of [the defendants’] unlawful conduct” in violation of the CFPA and Regulation O. The proposed judgment imposes a $493,403.04 civil penalty, of which all but $5,000 is suspended due to the auditor’s limited ability to pay. The auditor is also permanently banned from providing mortgage assistance relief services or consumer financial products and services.

    Federal Issues CFPB Enforcement Courts CFPA UDAAP Regulation O Foreclosure

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  • District Court says TCPA dismissal bid cannot rely upon Supreme Court ruling

    Courts

    On September 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a medical laboratory’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the company cannot use a Supreme Court ruling to avoid a proposed TCPA class action suit concerning allegations that it made unsolicited calls using an “autodialer.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss last December after it concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the equipment used to make unsolicited calls qualified as an “autodialer.” The defendant argued, however, that the court should reconsider its decision in light of a 2019 Supreme Court ruling in which separate concurring opinions written by Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas concluded that district courts are not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the term “autodialer” under the TCPA. According to the defendant, because of these concurring opinions, the court “was not bound by the FCC’s 2003 and 2008 guidance on the definition of an ‘autodialer,’” and should therefore revisit its prior opinion. However, the court stated that the Supreme Court’s case does not change any of the “controlling law” dealing with the TCPA issue in the current lawsuit. “Because defendant’s arguments are not based on any actual change in controlling law,” its motion for reconsideration is denied, the court stated, noting that concurring opinions “do not change ‘controlling law.’”

    Courts TCPA Class Action U.S. Supreme Court Autodialer

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  • 6th Circuit: FCRA claims require consumer to notify consumer reporting agency of dispute

    Courts

    On August 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a bank was not obligated under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to investigate a credit reporting error because the consumers failed to ever notify a consumer reporting agency. According to the opinion, after plaintiffs paid off their line of credit, the bank (defendant) continued reporting the plaintiff as delinquent on the account. After plaintiffs contacted the bank regarding the reporting error, the bank employee ensured plaintiffs that the defendant submitted amendments to the credit reporting bureaus to correct the situation. However, the plaintiffs claimed the error was not corrected until almost a year later. Plaintiffs also alleged that they did not contact the credit reporting bureau in reliance on the bank employee’s statements. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, concluding that the FCRA requires that notification of a credit dispute be provided to a consumer reporting agency as a prerequisite for a claim that a furnisher failed to investigate the dispute. Since the plaintiffs failed to trigger the defendant’s FCRA obligations because they never filed a dispute with a consumer reporting agency, the defendant’s responsibility to investigate was never activated.

    On appeal, the 6th Circuit agreed with the district court that direct notification to the furnisher of the inaccurate credit report does not meet the FCRA’s prerequisite. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ state common law claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and tortious interference with contractual relationships were preempted by the FCRA, and their fraudulent misrepresentation claim was forfeited on appeal.

    Courts Appellate Sixth Circuit FCRA Credit Report Credit Furnishing Consumer Reporting Agency

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  • District Court: FTC allegations against credit card processor can proceed

    Courts

    On August 28, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions to dismiss an enforcement action brought by the FTC against a group of individuals and entities that allegedly facilitated a telemarketing scheme that previously resulted in the principal actors in the scheme settling with the FTC and later pleading guilty to state criminal charges. The alleged scheme involved “credit card laundering”—the creation of fictitious entities to process customer credit card transactions so that the actual entity receiving the funds would not be identified. The defendants in the current matter are an Independent Sales Organization and several of its officers allegedly involved in that effort (prior Info Bytes coverage here). The defendants first argued that the relevant part of the FTC Act only permits injunctive relief and that the FTC’s requests for restitution and disgorgement were improper because those forms of relief are penalties, not equitable relief, under Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The court noted, however, that the Supreme Court in Kokesh expressly limited the holding to the question of the statute of limitations applicable to the SEC, and that the Ninth Circuit has subsequently approved decisions granting restitution and disgorgement under the FTC Act. The defendants also argued that injunctive relief was not warranted where the unlawful conduct in question ceased in 2013, but the court ruled that the FTC need only show that it has “reason to believe” that a defendant is violating or is about to violate the law. The court declined to address the FTC’s argument that its “reason to believe” decision is unreviewable, but it found that the FTC had pled sufficient facts to establish that it has reason to believe that the defendants would violate the statute. In particular, the court noted that a “court’s power to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuance of illegal conduct,” that “an inference arises from illegal past conduct that future violations may occur,” and that “courts should be wary of a defendant’s termination of illegal conduct when a defendant voluntarily ceases unlawful conduct in anticipation of formal intervention.” Those factors were all present, along with the fact that the defendants “remain in the same professional occupation.”

    Courts FTC Payment Processors FTC Act Credit Cards Telemarketing Sales Rule

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  • District Court again dismisses CSBS suit over OCC fintech charter

    Courts

    On September 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia again dismissed the Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ (CSBS) lawsuit against the OCC over its decision to allow non-bank institutions, including fintech companies, to apply for a Special Purpose National Bank Charter (SPNB). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court dismissed the original complaint in April 2018 on standing and ripeness grounds. Then, after the OCC announced last July that it would welcome non-depository fintech companies engaging in one or more core-banking functions to apply for a SPNB, CSBS renewed its legal challenge. (See previous InfoBytes coverage here.) In dismissing the case again, the court held that CSBS “continues to lack standing and its claims remain unripe,” adding that “not much has happened since [the original dismissal] that affects the jurisdiction analysis.” Specifically, the court noted its previous holding that CSBS’s alleged harms was “contingent on whether the OCC charters a [f]intech,” but CSBS “does not allege that any [fintech company] has applied for a charter, let alone that the OCC has chartered a [f]intech.” In addition, the court reiterated its prior conclusion that the dispute remains “neither constitutionally nor prudentially ripe for determination.”

    The court further acknowledged a contrasting decision issued in May by the U.S. District for the Southern District of New York allowing a similar challenge filed by NYDFS to survive (previous InfoBytes coverage here), stating that it “respectfully disagrees” with that court’s decision “to the extent that its reasoning conflicts” with either of the dismissal decisions in the CSBS cases. Finally, the court denied CSBS’s request for jurisdictional discovery because it will lack jurisdiction “at least until a [f]intech applies for a charter,” which will be publicly disclosed.

    Courts OCC Fintech Fintech Charter CSBS

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  • District Court allows TCPA class action to proceed against auto company

    Courts

    On August 27, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied a car manufacturer’s motion to dismiss a class action alleging that it violated the TCPA by sending unwanted automated text messages. According to the opinion, after a consumer visited a car dealership, she allegedly received unsolicited text messages to her cell phone from the dealership. The consumer filed a proposed class action alleging the corporate car manufacturer “directed, encouraged, and authorized its dealerships [] to send text messages promoting the sale of [the] automobiles to [the consumer] and other members of the proposed Class, pursuant to a common marketing scheme” and that the text messages were transmitted using an automated telephone dialing system (autodialer) in violation of the TCPA. The manufacturer moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the plaintiff failed to allege (i) that the manufacturer sent the text messages or that the dealership sent the text messages as the manufacturer’s agent; and (ii) that the text messages were sent using an autodialer.

    The court first determined that the plaintiff plausibly alleged that the manufacturer directly sent the text messages, or, in the alternative, that the dealership was acting as the manufacturer’s agent when the texts were sent. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer used hardware and software programs with the requisite capabilities to qualify as an autodialer pursuant to the 9th Circuit’s decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC (covered by InfoBytes here).

    Courts TCPA Robocalls Autodialer Class Action

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  • 11th Circuit: Payday lenders’ agreements unenforceable under Georgia policy

    Courts

    On August 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that a district court did not err when it denied a group of lenders’ motion to dismiss class action claims alleging that their loan agreements violated Georgia’s Payday Lending Act (PLA), the Georgia Industrial Loan Act (GILA), and state usury laws. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs entered into agreements for loans generally amounting to less than $3,000 that were to be repaid from recoveries received by the plaintiffs in their individual personal injury lawsuits. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and strike the class allegations, arguing that the loan agreements’ forum-selection clause required the borrowers to bring their lawsuit in Illinois, and that the class action waiver provision in the agreements prevented the plaintiffs from being able to file any class action against them. The plaintiffs maintained, however, that these provisions in the loan agreements were unenforceable because they violated Georgia public policy, and the district court agreed.

    On appeal, the 11th Circuit affirmed the district court because it also concluded that the loan agreements’ forum-selection and class action waiver provisions were unenforceable as against Georgia public policy. Regarding the forum-selection clause, the appellate court held that the PLA “establish[es] a clear public policy against out-of-state lenders using forum selection clauses to avoid litigation in Georgia courts.” Regarding the class action waiver, the appellate court noted that both the PLA and the GILA specifically authorize class action suits; that the district court did not consider whether the waivers were procedurally or substantively unconscionable did not matter because the fact that the waivers violate public policy is an independent and sufficient basis to hold them unenforceable. The defendants also noted that the statutes did not prohibit class action waivers or create a statutory right to pursue class actions, but a contractual provision “need not literally conflict with Georgia law to contravene public policy.” (Citing Langford v. Royal Indemnity Co.) Instead, the appellate court agreed with the district court that “enforcement of the class action waivers in this context would eliminate a remedy contemplated by the Georgia legislature and undermine the purpose of the PLA and the GILA.”

    Courts Appellate Eleventh Circuit Payday Lending State Issues Usury

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  • 3rd Circuit affirms dismissal of NFL season ticket class action

    Courts

    On August 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action alleging that an NFL team’s season ticket sales practices had violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the case was centered on the plaintiff’s purchase of a personal seat license (PSL) that “both allows and obligates” him to buy season tickets for particular seats at the team’s home games. The team later began selling seats in the same seating section without requiring PSLs, which the plaintiff alleged made his PSL “valueless” and “‘unsellable’ because defendants are currently giving away for free what cost him $8,000.” The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice because the plaintiff had received the “reasonably expected fruits under the contract.” 

    On appeal, the 3rd Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiff had “received the fruits of his contract” because “[n]othing in the complaint suggests [the plaintiff] has lost the exclusive right to purchase season tickets for these seats” and the fact that the team “might now sell adjacent seats to members of the general public does not implicate [the plaintiff’s] rights and certainly does not strip him of the benefit for which he bargained.” Regarding the value of his PSA, the appellate court noted that when purchasing the PSL, the plaintiff represented that he was not acquiring it as an investment and had no expectation of profit. Finally, with regard to the CFA claim, the appellate court held that “simply changing the terms on which defendants sell other seats in the stadium is not misleading.”

    Courts Appellate Third Circuit Class Action State Issues Contracts

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