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  • 2nd Circuit remands case to determine whether loans that violate New York’s criminal usury law are void ab initio

    Courts

    On March 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a district court ruling that had declined to treat an option that permits a lender, in its sole discretion, to convert an outstanding balance to shares of stock, at a fixed discount, as interest for purposes of New York’s criminal usury law. The district court had also observed, though it had no need to reach the issue, that even if the loan was usurious, it would not necessarily be void ab initio. After the case was appealed, the 2nd Circuit certified both issues to the New York Court of Appeals, which concluded, contrary to the district court, that such an option should be treated as interest for purposes of the usury statute and that loans made in violation of the usury statute are void ab initio. In light of the New York Court of Appeals holdings on these issues of state law, the 2nd Circuit vacated the district court’s order, and remanded to the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether the value of the option rendered the loan usurious.

    Courts Appellate Second Circuit State Issues Usury New York

  • District Court: Failing to invoke the BFE defense does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law

    Courts

    On March 15, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied a plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that just because a defendant did not invoke the bona fide error (BFE) defense when accused of allegedly violating the FDCPA it does not mean the defendant has admitted to violating the statute. In 2018, the defendant debt collector attempted to collect unpaid debt in the amount of $786.68 from the plaintiff and began reporting the debt to the consumer reporting agencies (CRAs). In 2021, after the original creditor recalled the account from the defendant for an unspecified reason, the defendant submitted two requests to the CRAs to delete the item from the plaintiff’s credit report and took no further action on the account. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff noticed a $787.00 debt on one of his credit reports. He contacted the original creditor and was told the company could not find an account in his name that was referred for collection. The plaintiff sued for violations of Section 1692e of the FDCPA and related violations of Washington state law, and later filed for a partial motion for summary judgment contending that the FDCPA “is a strict liability remedial statute that contains a single affirmative defense to liability—the bona fide error defense,” and that because the defendant did not plead the BFE defense “he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Defendant’s liability under the statute.” While the defendant acknowledged that it did not plead the BFE defense, it countered that the plaintiff “cannot prove a prima facie case of liability.”

    The court concluded that “[w]hile the statute is strict liability, ‘a debt collector’s false or misleading representation must be ‘material’ in order for it to be actionable under the FDCPA.” Noting that the alleged violation appeared to be based on the grounds that the defendant reported an inflated account balance ($787.00 versus $786.68), the court stated it “has little trouble in concluding that inflating an account balance by 32 cents is not a materially false representation. To the contrary, it is a ‘mere technical falsehood that mislead[s] no one.’” Moreover, the court stated that because the defendant immediately ceased reporting the account and sent deletion requests to the CRAs after the account was recalled, and that there was no evidence to suggest that the debt collector knew or should have known that it was communicating information that was false, the plaintiff could not show, at this stage of the proceeding, that Section 1692e was violated.

    Courts FDCPA Debt Collection Bona Fide Error Consumer Reporting Agency Consumer Finance

  • District Court denies defendants summary judgment over FCA violations

    Courts

    On March 16, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied a motion for summary judgment by a mortgage servicer relating to False Claims Act (FCA) claims alleging false certifications of compliance to obtain payment under three different government programs: Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), FHA HAMP, and VA HAMP. According to the memorandum opinion and order, the relator, a former loss-mitigation specialist at the mortgage servicer, alleged that the mortgage servicer engaged in widespread dual tracking, continuously moving homeowners’ mortgages through the foreclosure process even as the defendants were supposed to be evaluating the mortgages for loss mitigation options and HAMP. The plaintiff further alleged that “the dual tracking led many homeowners to lose their homes in foreclosure when foreclosure should have been suspended during the resolution of modification and other workout processes,” and that the defendants “knowingly lacked adequate HAMP systems, processes, staffing, and training.”

    The defendants argued that, “notwithstanding industrywide difficulties, publicly available service assessments and third-party reviews show that [the mortgage servicer was] one of the highest-rated servicers participating in HAMP []. Further, though Treasury had the power to withhold incentives for HAMP non-compliance, Treasury never did so and consistently paid HAMP incentive payments to [the mortgage servicer] until the program expired.” The mortgage servicer also argued that summary judgment was appropriate for several reasons; (i) the court lacks jurisdiction to consider any of the relator’s claims under the FCA’s first-to-file bar; (ii) the relator’s claims fail because he cannot establish one or more of the required elements as to each claim; and (iii) the relator’s VA claim fails because the he cannot cite to any evidence of a certification by the mortgage servicer to the VA, and thus cannot demonstrate a false statement or fraudulent conduct. The court held that, pursuant to Fifth Circuit precedent, the first-to-file rule is inapplicable here because this case was filed by the same relator in a New York district court. With respect to the remaining claims, the court held that summary judgment is inappropriate where, as here, there exist genuine issues of material fact.

    Courts FCA Mortgages Mortgages Servicing Loss Mitigation Consumer Finance Foreclosure HAMP Department of Treasury FHA Department of Veterans Affairs

  • District Court rules ratification unnecessary for CFPB to proceed with 2017 enforcement action

    Courts

    On March 16, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the CFPB can proceed with its 2017 enforcement action against a New Jersey-based finance company alleging, among other things, that it misled first responders to the World Trade Center attack and NFL retirees about high-cost loans mischaracterized as assignments of future payment rights. In 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a 2018 district court order dismissing the case on the grounds that the Bureau’s single-director structure was unconstitutional, and that, as such, the agency lacked authority to bring claims alleging deceptive and abusive conduct by the company (covered by InfoBytes here). The 2nd Circuit remanded the case to the district court, determining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law LLC v. CPFB (holding that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but severable from the statute establishing the Bureau, as covered by a Buckley Special Alert) superseded the 2018 ruling. The appellate court further noted that following Seila, former Director Kathy Kraninger ratified several prior regulatory actions (covered by InfoBytes here), including the enforcement action brought against the defendants, and as such, remanded the case to the district court to consider the validity of the ratification of the enforcement action. The defendants later filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Bureau could not use ratification to avoid dismissal of the lawsuit, but the Supreme Court declined the petition. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)

    In 2021, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Bureau’s enforcement action on the grounds that “it was brought by an unconstitutionally constituted agency” and that the Bureau’s “untimely attempt to subsequently ratify this action cannot cure the agency’s constitutional infirmity.” After narrowly reviewing whether the Bureau had the authority to bring claims under the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the district court turned to the Supreme Court’s June 2021 majority decision in Collins v. Yellen, which held that “‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[.]’” Accordingly, the agency’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The district court’s March 16 opinion applied Collins and ruled that “the CFPB possessed the authority to bring this action in February 2017 and, hence, that ratification by Director Kraninger was unnecessary.”

    Courts CFPB CFPA Enforcement Single-Director Structure Appellate Second Circuit U.S. Supreme Court Seila Law

  • District Court approves $17 million data breach settlement

    Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security

    On March 15, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted final approval of a class settlement to resolve claims alleging two defendant insurance companies failed to protect over six million employee/customers’ personal and private identifying information, including names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers, from two data breach and scraping incidents. According to the memorandum of law in support of the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for final approval, plaintiffs separately filed complaints after learning the defendants were exposed to two separate data breaches in December 2020 and March 2021. The cases were consolidated, and parties engaged in settlement negotiations. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the defendants will provide settling class members with at least $17.1 million in relief. Class members will also have automatic access to certain financial fraud services and may submit claims to receive compensation for out-of-pocket losses (capped at $10,000 per person) and lost-time losses (up to six hours of lost-time reimbursements at $18 per hour), in addition to receiving $50 per hour if they missed work to address the breaches. Additionally, a California subclass will also be able to file claims for $50 in statutory relief. Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, consumers may seek statutory damages of up to $750 per violation. Defendants are also responsible for a portion of attorneys’ fees and costs.

    Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security Courts Settlement Data Breach State Issues CCPA California

  • 11th Circuit affirms $23 million judgment against founder of debt relief operation

    Courts

    On March 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the FTC and the Florida attorney general after finding that an individual defendant could be held liable for the actions of the entities he controlled. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the FTC and the Florida AG filed a complaint in 2016 against several interrelated companies and the individual defendant who founded the companies, alleging violations of the FTC Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. The complaint alleged that the defendants engaged in a scheme that targeted financially distressed consumers through illegal robocalls selling bogus credit card debt relief services and interest rate reductions. Among other things, the defendants also claimed to be “licensed enrollment center[s]” for major credit card networks with the ability to work with a consumer’s credit card company or bank to substantially and permanently lower credit card interest rates and charged up-front payments for debt relief and rate-reduction services. In 2018, the court granted the FTC and the Florida AG’s motion for summary judgment, finding there was no genuine dispute that the individual defendant controlled the defendant entities, that he knew his employees were making false representations, and that he failed to stop them. The court entered a permanent injunction, which ordered the individual defendant to pay over $23 million in equitable monetary relief and permanently restrained and enjoined the individual defendant from participating—whether directly or indirectly—in telemarketing; advertising, marketing, selling, or promoting any debt relief products or services; or misrepresenting material facts.

    The individual defendant appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes over whether: (i) he controlled the entities; (ii) he had knowledge that employees were making misrepresentations and failed to prevent them; (iii) employee affidavits “attesting that they had saved customers money created an issue of fact about whether his programs did what he said they would do”; and (iv) he had knowledge of “rogue employees” violating the “do not call” registry to solicit customers.

    On appeal, the 11th Circuit determined that the facts presented by the individual defendant did not create a genuine dispute about whether he controlled the entities, and further stated that the individual defendant is liable for the employees’ misrepresentations because of his control of the entities and his knowledge of those misrepresentations. The appellate court explained that while the individual defendant argued that he could not be liable because he did not participate in those representations, he failed to present any evidence in support of that argument and, even if he had, “it wouldn’t matter, because [the individual defendant’s] liability stems from his control of [the companies], not from his individual conduct.” Additionally, the appellate court held that whether the services were helpful to customers was immaterial and did not absolve him of liability, because liability for deceptive sales practices does not require worthlessness. As to the “do not call” registry violations, the appellate court disagreed with the individual defendant’s claim that an “outside dialer or lead generator”—not the company—placed the outbound calls, holding that this excuse also does not absolve him of liability.

    Courts Appellate Eleventh Circuit Telemarketing Enforcement Debt Relief State Issues State Attorney General Florida FTC Act TSR

  • District Court partially grants motion for class certification

    Courts

    On March 4, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted in part a consumer plaintiff’s motion for class certification after denying the defendant credit reporting agency’s motion for summary judgment in an FCRA and California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) suit. The plaintiff, on behalf of the class, alleged that the defendant “failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the consumer information included in its OFAC Check documents” and “failed to disclose upon request all information in consumer files,” in violation of CCRAA and the FCRA. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “failed to reinvestigate the disputed OFAC-related information that it had prepared and sold” to its clients. In granting in part the plaintiff’s motion for class certification, the district court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court case TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which ruled that only a plaintiff concretely harmed by a defendant’s violation of the FCRA has Article III standing to seek damages against a private defendant in federal court (covered by InfoBytes here). In referencing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the district court noted that “[the plaintiff] and the putative class members incurred the ‘same or similar injury’ in that they suffered ‘concrete reputational harm’ from the ‘same conduct’ of [the defendant].” The district court further noted that as a basis for class typicality, “[e]ven if [the plaintiff’s] injuries were slightly more severe than some class members’ injuries, [the plaintiff’s] injuries still arose ‘from the same event or practice or course of conduct that [gave] rise to the claims of other class members and [his claims were] based on the same legal theory.’” Consequently, the district court certified the class with respect to plaintiff’s FCRA allegations for statutory damages and CCRAA claims for injunctive relief. However, the district court denied class certification with respect to plaintiff’s CCRAA allegations for statutory damages, noting that “[t]he CCRAA, unlike the FCRA, requires a showing of actual harm where, as here, the plaintiff is seeking statutory punitive damages” because “individual issues will predominate.”

    Courts OFAC FCRA Class Action California State Issues Consumer Finance

  • District Court: Callers cannot rely on prior cell phone user’s consent to place prerecorded calls

    Courts

    On March 9, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted in part and denied in part a defendant university’s motion for summary judgment on claims that it unlawfully placed prerecorded calls to reassigned phone numbers based on the previous user’s consent. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the TCPA by calling cellphones without first obtaining the current phone number owner’s prior express consent and making a “telephone solicitation” to individuals listed on the National Do-Not-Call-Registry. The plaintiff also contended that the defendant failed to provide a method for opting-out of receiving future calls. The defendant countered that it could not be held liable for the allegedly unlawful prerecorded calls because it had reasonably relied on the consent of the previous phone number’s user and was unaware that the number had been reassigned.

    In partially denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that there was “no basis” in the text of the TCPA to conclude that callers who contact a phone number whose previous user provided consent but whose current owner did not could use “a reasonable reliance or good faith defense” to avoid liability. “Congress passed the TCPA to protect individuals from receiving invasive and unsolicited calls,” the court wrote. “Thus, adopting a good faith or reasonable reliance defense not only would have no basis in the text but also would contravene the stated purpose of the TCPA.” The court also declined to adopt the defendant’s “intended party” argument, finding that “[n]either the language nor the concept of an ‘intended’ party appears” in the TCPA, and that every circuit court that has opined on this issue “has concluded that the term ‘called party’ refers to the individual that actually receives the calls, as opposed to the ‘intended party’ of those calls.”

    However, the court determined that the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant violated the TCPA’s prohibitions on contacting numbers on the National Do-Not-Call-Registry cannot proceed “because, as a tax-exempt, non-profit organization, [the defendant] is not subject to the provisions regarding the National Do-Not-Call Registry.”

    Courts TCPA Consumer Protection Class Action Do Not Call Registry

  • District Court partially grants bank’s motion in TCPA case

    Courts

    On March 3, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky partially granted and partially denied a defendant bank’s motion for summary judgment in a TCPA case. According to the opinion, the plaintiff allegedly did not meet his minimum monthly credit card payments, so the defendant began conducting debt collection calls. The defendant allegedly attempted 574 communications via phone call, prerecorded messages, or text messages, including 111 prerecorded messages, during a 7-month period.

    The plaintiff filed suit, alleging the defendant violated the TCPA by contacting him using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) before and after he allegedly revoked consent to be contacted. The district court held that the telephone system used by the defendant to contact the plaintiff did not qualify as an ATDS under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Facebook v. Duguid (Covered by a Buckley Special Alert here), which narrowed the definition of an ATDS under the TCPA. The court was “not persuaded by [the plaintiff’s] argument that [the telephone system] is an ATDS simply because it has the ‘capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator, and then to dial those numbers without human intervention.’”

    The plaintiff also argued that the defendant violated the TCPA by sending the 111 prerecorded messages. The court determined that while the plaintiff had initially consented to being contacted by the defendant when he provided his telephone number to create his account, there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the plaintiff subsequently revoked his consent. Even though the defendant submitted seven call recordings between itself and the plaintiff in support of its argument that the plaintiff did not specifically revoke consent, the court explained that “the evidence could lead reasonable minds to differ,” including the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, his request to have information sent to him via mail, his refusal to talk to a collector and hanging up the phone on a subsequent call, and his failure to answer the phone when the defendant called.

    Courts TCPA Autodialer U.S. Supreme Court Debt Collection Consumer Finance

  • District Court partially grants defendant’s motion in FCRA case

    Courts

    On February 25, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied in part and granted in part a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an FCRA case. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs applied for a loan at a bank to refinance their home mortgage and the bank then engaged a service agency (defendant) to conduct a public records search and provide a report on the plaintiffs. To prepare the report, the defendant allegedly engaged an independent contractor to conduct a physical search of both the open judgment directory and the municipal lien directory. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s report “erroneously” listed outstanding civil judgments against them and that defendant refused to investigate the alleged inaccuracies. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendant violated the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy when preparing a consumer report and by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the plaintiffs’ dispute.

    The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was not subject to the FCRA as a matter of law since it was not a consumer reporting agency and that it did not supply “consumer reports” within the meaning of the FCRA. Additionally, the defendant claimed that even if it was subject to the FCRA, no reasonable juror could find that it violated either of those FCRA provisions. The district court found that the defendant is a “consumer reporting agency” under FCRA because its operations met the statutory definition. The court partially granted the defendant’s summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims that it willfully violated the FCRA by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the plaintiffs’ dispute.

    Courts FCRA Consumer Reporting Consumer Reporting Agency Consumer Finance

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