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FTC settles with debt collectors
On December 13, the FTC announced a settlement with several South Carolina-based debt collection companies and an individual (collectively, "defendants") for allegedly engaging in fraudulent debt collection practices. The FTC filed a complaint against the defendants alleging that they violated the FTC Act and the FDCPA by, among other things: (i) using robocalls to leave deceptive messages; (ii) falsely representing that an individual is an attorney or is in communication with an attorney; (iii) “falsely claiming or implying that nonpayment of a debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of a person”; (iv) threatening to take unlawful legal action; and (v) making false representations or using deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect a debt. The action was taken as part of the FTC’s “Operation Corrupt Collector”—a nationwide enforcement and outreach effort established by the FTC, CFPB, and more than 50 federal and state law enforcement partners to target illegal debt collection practices (covered by InfoBytes here). The effort previously resulted in settlements with two other debt collectors, which included permanent bars from the industry.
Under the terms of the settlement, in addition to being permanently banned from participating in debt collection and debt brokering activities, the defendants will also be prohibited from making misrepresentations to consumers, including (i) whether consumers are legally obligated to pay defendants; (ii) whether defendants are attorneys or affiliated with a law firm; (iii) the terms of any refund policy; and (iv) any material facts concerning products or services. The order also requires the defendants to surrender the contents of numerous bank and investment accounts, including property and the value of certain assets. An approximately $12 million monetary judgment will be partially suspended upon completion of asset transfers from all financial institutions holding accounts in the defendants’ names.
District Court: Debt collectors may rely on information supplied by credit card issuer
On December 2, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in an FDCPA action over an alleged disputed debt, ruling that defendants are allowed to rely on information supplied by a credit card issuer that a “debt owned has been verified and is owed.” The plaintiff opened a credit card in 2015 and stopped making payments on the card in June 2018. After she stopped making payments, the plaintiff sent notices of dispute to the credit card issuer contesting, among other things, whether the issuer owned the account, and received correspondence back from the issuer with information about where disputes about the debt should be directed. The issuer also explained that based on an investigation into her account, the issuer believed the account to be valid. Several months later, the defendants sent a demand letter on behalf of the issuer to the plaintiff using the address associated with the account, and later filed a collection lawsuit in state court seeking judgment to recover the unpaid balance.
The plaintiff sued, accusing the defendants of violating Sections 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA when they initiated the collections action. Among other claims, the plaintiff argued that she never received the demand letter. She also contended that the defendants should have known about the disputes. The court, however, agreed with the magistrate judge’s final orders and judgment, which ruled that it is not a requirement of the FDCPA for the defendants to confirm that a notice was received as a condition of filing the state court action. According to the court, the plaintiff identified no evidence that mail sent to the address used by the defendants was returned as undeliverable. The court also agreed that the plaintiff’s notices of dispute “did not challenge that she opened the account or was responsible for the charges,” and that the defendants submitted bank statements showing that the plaintiff made payments on the account.
6th Circuit affirms decision compelling arbitration in data breach case
On December 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision dismissing a nationwide putative class action against an e-commerce provider, holding that challenges raised to the validity of an agreement to arbitrate were for the arbitrator to decide, not the court. According to the opinion, the plaintiff class, including four minor individuals, filed suit after the defendant allegedly failed to protect millions of customers’ personal account information that was then obtained in a 2019 data breach. The opinion noted that the defendant’s Terms of Service contained an arbitration agreement, a delegation provision, a class action waiver, and instructions regarding how to opt-out of the arbitration agreement. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration after rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that the arbitration clause is “invalid” and “unenforceable” as to the minor plaintiffs under the infancy doctrine.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that there was an issue of fact regarding whether four of the plaintiffs had agreed to the Terms of Service, and that the defenses of infancy and unconscionability rendered the Terms of Service invalid. According to the appellate court, though “a contract exists and . . . the delegation provision itself is valid, the arbitrator must decide in the first instance whether the defenses of infancy and unconscionability allow plaintiffs to avoid arbitrating the merits of their claims.” The appellate court further agreed with the district court that “[i]t’s not about the merits of the case. It’s not even about whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits. Instead, it’s about who should decide whether the parties have to arbitrate the merits.”
District Court says bank’s arbitration clauses apply to PPP loans
On November 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a national bank’s motion to compel arbitration in an action concerning the bank’s alleged mishandling of Paycheck Protection Plan (PPP) loan applications. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming the bank’s PPP loan disbursement process allegedly favored wealthy clients over smaller, less wealthy clients to maximize the bank’s origination fees. The plaintiff alleged that because the bank did not process applications on a “first-come, first-served” basis, the plaintiff did not receive its PPP loan in a timely manner. The bank moved to compel arbitration, “arguing that questions of arbitrability are for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance.” The plaintiff argued that the arbitration clauses in the bank’s agreements applied only to disputes regarding bank deposit accounts, and not to other financial products such as PPP loans. The court stayed the case and granted the bank’s motion to compel arbitration, noting that the bank’s deposit account agreement and online services agreement both include arbitration clauses. These clauses, the court stated, are “clear evidence” that the bank intended an arbitrator to decide questions related to scope. “Accordingly, Plaintiff must bring its claim before the arbitrator in the first instance, even if it contests the scope of arbitrability,” the court wrote.
District Court grants preliminary approval in TCPA settlement
On November 23, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted preliminary approval of a class action settlement, resolving allegations that a publishing company utilized a third party telemarketer to place newspaper delivery service advertising calls with individuals who had previously requested not to be contacted. According to the plaintiff’s unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, the defendant, through a third-party telemarketer, sent repeated and unsolicited telemarketing calls after the plaintiff terminated his relationship with the defendant and asked not to be called. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the TCPA by sending telemarketing calls to him and others, despite their phone numbers’ registration with the National Do Not Call Registry, as well as for violations of the TCPA’s internal do-not-call rules. According to the plaintiff’s motion, the settlement (if approved) would establish a settlement class of 28,412 individuals who were solicited by the defendant’s telemarketing vendor between December 11, 2017 and April 15, 2021. The settlement would provide that all class members with an identifiable address, who do not opt out, receive a distribution from the $1.7 million settlement fund, which after attorneys’ fees and costs, is estimated to be nearly $30 per person, according to the motion.
7th Circuit denies CFPB’s request to reconsider attorney exemption in foreclosures
On November 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the CFPB’s petition for panel or en banc rehearing of its earlier decision in an action taken against several foreclosure relief companies and associated individuals accused of violating Regulation O. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the Bureau asked the appellate court to reconsider its determination “that practicing attorneys are categorically exempt from Regulation O,” claiming that the court’s holding strips the Bureau “of the authority given it by Congress to hold attorneys to account for violations not just of Regulation O, but of a host of other federal laws as well.” In July, the 7th Circuit vacated a 2019 district court ruling that ordered $59 million in restitution and disgorgement, civil penalties, and permanent injunctive relief against defendants accused of collecting fees before obtaining loan modifications, and inflating success rates and the likelihood of obtaining a modification, among other allegations (covered by InfoBytes here). The appellate court based its decision on the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Liu v. SEC, which held that a disgorgement award cannot exceed a firm’s net profits—a ruling that is “applicable to all categories of equitable relief, including restitution.” The appellate court also concluded that attorneys who are subject to liability for violating consumer laws “cannot escape liability simply by virtue of being an attorney.” However, the appellate court vacated the recklessness finding in the civil penalty calculation pertaining to certain defendants, writing that “[a]lthough we have found that they were not engaged in the practice of law, the question was a legitimate one. We consider it a step too far to say that they were reckless—that is, that they should have been aware of an unjustifiably high or obvious risk of violating Regulation O.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.) In its appeal, the Bureau did not challenge the vacated restitution award, but rather argued that a rehearing was necessary to ensure that the agency can bring enforcement actions against attorneys who violate federal consumer laws, including Regulation O.
District Court dismisses PPP putative class action against nonbank
On November 24, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed, with prejudice, a putative class action alleging that a nonbank lender prioritized high-dollar Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan applicants. The plaintiff’s complaint—which alleged claims of fraudulent concealment, fraudulent deceit, unfair business practices, and false advertising—claimed, among other things, that the lender (i) was not licensed to make loans in California when she applied; (ii) did not have adequate funding to make the loans; and (iii) advertised it would process loan requests on a first-come, first-served basis, but actually prioritized favored customers and higher-value loans that yielded higher lending fees. The court granted the lender’s motion to dismiss. According to the court, the plaintiff’s allegation that the parties were “transacting business in order to enter into a contractual, borrower-lender relationship” was not supported by any facts, and that while the plaintiff claimed she submitted a PPP loan application to the lender, a confirmation e-mail from the lender did not mention a submitted application—only a loan request. “This court cannot, therefore, assume the truth of Plaintiff’s allegation that she submitted a loan application, let alone her conclusory allegation that the parties entered into a borrower-lender relationship or engaged in any other transaction,” the court stated. The court also determined that the plaintiff’s fraudulent deceit claim failed because her allegation, made on information and belief, that the lender prioritized large loans had no factual foundation, and the plaintiff failed to plead the elements of that claim.
CFPB agrees taskforce was illegally chartered
On November 29, the parties reached a stipulated settlement in an action filed by several consumer advocacy groups against the CFPB, which claimed that the Bureau’s Taskforce on Federal Consumer Financial Law established under former Director Kathy Kraninger was “illegally chartered” and violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). The consumer advocacy groups’ complaint alleged that the taskforce—which was established by the Bureau in 2019 to examine the existing legal and regulatory environment facing consumers and financial services providers—lacks balance, and that the appointed members who “uniformly represent industry views” have worked on behalf of several large financial institutions or work as industry consultants or lawyers. (Covered by InfoBytes here.) This composition, the consumer advocacy groups argued, undermines the purpose of the taskforce and is a violation of FACA and the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint also stated that while FACA requires advisory committee meetings to be open to the public and that records be disclosed, the taskforce has held closed-session meetings without providing public notice and has failed to make available any of the records related to these meetings or its other work.
Under the terms of the stipulated settlement filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the parties agreed that the taskforce “was subject to FACA because it was ‘established’ and ‘utilized’ by the Bureau ‘in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations.’” The parties also stipulated that the Bureau failed to comply with FACA in its establishment and operation of the taskforce, including by releasing a two volume report in January containing recommendations for modernizing the consumer financial services marketplace (covered by InfoBytes here) without being produced by a FACA-compliant advisory committee. The stipulated settlement agreement requires the Bureau to, among other things, (i) release all taskforce records; (ii) amend the final report to include a disclaimer that the report was produced in violation of FACA; (iii) relocate the taskforce webpage and remove the current version of the report from its website; (iv) issue a press release by January 17, 2022, notifying the public of the settlement agreement; and (v) provide status reports until the Bureau has come into full compliance.
2nd Circuit reverses itself, finding no standing to sue for recording delays
On November 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed its earlier determination that class members had standing to sue a national bank for allegedly violating New York’s mortgage-satisfaction-recording statutes, which require lenders to record borrowers’ repayments within 30 days. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the plaintiffs filed a class action suit alleging the bank’s recordation delay harmed their financial reputations, impaired their credit, and limited their borrowing capacity. While the bank did not dispute that the discharge was untimely filed, it argued that class members lacked Article III standing because they did not suffer actual damages and failed to plead a concrete harm under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins. At the time, the majority determined, among other things, that “state legislatures may create legally protected interests whose violation supports Article III standing, subject to certain federal limitations.” The alleged state law violations in this matter, the majority wrote, constituted “a concrete and particularized harm to the plaintiffs in the form of both reputational injury and limitations in borrowing capacity” during the recordation delay period. The majority further concluded that the bank’s alleged failure to report the plaintiffs’ mortgage discharge “posed a real risk of material harm” because the public record reflected an outstanding debt of over $50,000, which could “reasonably be inferred to have substantially restricted” the plaintiffs’ borrowing capacity.
In withdrawing its earlier opinion, the 2nd Circuit found that the Supreme Court’s June decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez (which clarified what constitutes a concrete injury for the purposes of Article III standing in order to recover statutory damages, and was covered by InfoBytes here) “bears directly on our analysis.” The parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the potential impacts of the TransUnion ruling on the 2nd Circuit’s previous decision. The bank argued that while “New York State Legislature may have implicitly recognized that delayed recording can create [certain] harms,” the plaintiffs cannot allege that they suffered these harms. Class members challenged that “the harms that the Legislature aimed to preclude need not have come to fruition for a plaintiff to have suffered a material risk of real harm sufficient to seek the statutory remedy afforded by the Legislature.” Citing the Supreme Court’s conclusion of “no concrete harm; no standing,” the appellate court concluded, among other things, that class members failed to allege that delayed recording caused a cloud on the property’s title, forced them to pay duplicate filing fees, or resulted in reputational harm. Moreover, while publishing false information can be actionable, the appellate court pointed out that the class “may have suffered a nebulous risk of future harm during the period of delayed recordation—i.e., a risk that someone (a creditor, in all likelihood) might access the record and act upon it—but that risk, which was not alleged to have materialized, cannot not form the basis of Article III standing.” The appellate court further stated that in any event class members may recover a statutory penalty in state court for reporting the bank’s delay in recording the mortgage satisfaction.
District Court grants preliminary approval of privacy class action settlement
On November 19, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted preliminary approval of a $58 million settlement in a class action against a fintech company (defendant) alleged to have accessed the personal banking data of users without first obtaining consent, in violation of California privacy, anti-phishing, and contract laws. The plaintiffs alleged the defendant obtained data from class members’ financial accounts without authorization. The plaintiffs also claimed the defendant collected class members’ bank login information through a user interface that made it appear as if class members were interfacing directly with their financial institution, when they were actually interfacing with the defendant.
In granting preliminary approval of the settlement, the court determined it was unclear whether the plaintiffs would have prevailed on the merits at trial, particularly with regard to the “relatively untested” claim that the defendant practices breached California’s anti-phishing law. Several other claims originally brought by the plaintiffs were dismissed in May, including allegations that the defendant breached the Stored Communications Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and California’s Unfair Competition Law. In addition to the $58 million settlement fund, the proposed settlement would also provide for injunctive relief.