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Financial Services Law Insights and Observations


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  • Special Alert: Supreme Court Holds Cities Have Standing Under FHA, But Limits Potential Claims


    On May 1, the Supreme Court ruled 5-3 that municipal plaintiffs may be “aggrieved persons” authorized to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act against lenders for injuries allegedly flowing from discriminatory lending practices. However, the Court held that such injuries must be proximately caused by the alleged misconduct—rather than simply a foreseeable result. Some commentators suggest that the Court’s zone of interest analysis will result in the filing of new claims. Our view of this decision is that it will reduce such litigation efforts as prospective municipal plaintiffs recognize that it will be more difficult to survive early dispositive motions focused on whether the damages claims bear a direct relationship to the conduct alleged.

    Click here to read full special alert.

    If you have questions about the ruling or other related issues, visit our Fair Lending practice page for more information, or contact a Buckley Sandler attorney with whom you have worked in the past.

    Courts Fair Lending Fair Housing U.S. Supreme Court

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  • Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Whether a Debt Collector Who Purchases the Debt is Liable Under the FDCPA


    On April 18, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Dkt. No. 16-349, on the question of “[w]hether a company that regularly attempts to collect debts it purchased after the debts had fallen into default is a ‘debt collector’ subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act [FDCPA].” The case arose out of a class action filed by four consumers who had defaulted on automobile loans made by an auto lending affiliate of a major bank. The originator hired Respondent to collect the loans on behalf of the lender and Respondent later purchased the delinquent loans as part of a pool. Though Petitioners did not allege that debt collection was the principal purpose of the Respondent’s business, the consumer-plaintiffs had claimed that the Respondent regularly buys and attempts to collect defaulted debts, and that, in this instance, the Respondent engaged in conduct that violated the FDCPA after it bought the loans. The Petitioner needed to establish, among other things, that the Respondent was a debt collector under the FDCPA and that the loans were in default when they were acquired.

    In March 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the consumers’ arguments, concluding that the FDCPA “generally does not regulate creditors when they collect debt on their own account and that, on the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, [the defendant] became a creditor when it purchased the loans before engaging in the challenged practices.” Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit noted that the originator of the loans was irrelevant. In September 2016, the consumer-plaintiffs filed a cert petition with the Supreme Court, which was subsequently granted on January 13. Attorneys general from 28 states and the District of Columbia also joined in an amicus brief supporting the consumers’ argument.

    At oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners cited 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)(F) and argued that the debts are "owed" to the original lender, but are "due" to the debt buyer. As such, argued Petitioner, a debt buyer should be considered to be collecting debts “owed or due another,” and thus fall within the FDCPA definition of a “debt collector”. Respondent countered that “owed or due another” could only mean that the debt is currently owed to another person. However, Respondent argued, as a debt buyer, it was collecting debts owed to itself, and thus would not be  a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Both sides also presented policy-based arguments. Petitioner suggested that because Respondent was considered a “debt collector” before purchasing the loan, it could not remove itself from the scope of the FDCPA by purchasing the debts. Conversely, Respondent noted that, by purchasing essentially all of the original lender’s loans it had “stepped into [the lender]’s shoes.” Counsel emphasized that Respondent therefore fit the FDCPA definition of “creditor,” and, as a creditor, it had an incentive to maintain a positive relationship with consumers.

    Courts Consumer Finance Debt Collection FDCPA Class Action Lending U.S. Supreme Court

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  • CFPB Takes Action Against Law Firm for Alleged FDCPA Violations Concerning Claims of Attorney Involvement in Debt Collection

    Consumer Finance

    On April 17, the CFPB announced that it was seeking a permanent injunction and fines against a law firm for allegedly engaging in illegal debt collection practices by making false representations regarding attorney involvement in debt collection calls and in “millions of collection letters sent to consumers.” In a complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the Bureau claims, among other things, that the firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Dodd-Frank by sending “demand letters” and making collection calls to consumers falsely implying that the consumer’s account files had been reviewed by an attorney. The complaint alleges that a majority of the demand letters were created through an automated process and, in most cases, no attorney had reviewed the account file to determine whether sending such a letter was accurate and appropriate. These letters included payment coupons through which consumers made millions of dollars in debt payments to the law firm. The complaint also alleges that a majority of the collection calls made to consumers were handled by non-attorney collectors who conveyed the impression that the matters had been reviewed by attorneys even though no attorney had in fact reviewed the account files. The complaint seeks a permanent injunction prohibiting the firm from committing future violations as well as other legal and equitable relief including restitution to affected consumers, disgorgement of ill-gotten revenue, and civil money penalties.

    Consumer Finance Courts CFPB FDCPA UDAAP Debt Collection

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  • D.C. Circuit Rules FCC Lacks Authority Under TCPA to Regulate Faxes Sent with Recipient’s Consent


    In a 2-1 split decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently ruled that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) lacks authority under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) to regulate facsimiles sent with the recipient’s consent. Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley et al. v. F.C.C. et al., No. 14-1234 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 2017) (Dkt. No. 1668739). Specifically, the court found that a 2006 FCC Rule (the “Solicited Fax Rule”) that required a sender to include an opt-out notice on faxes sent with the “recipient’s prior express permission”—and which has formed the basis for countless putative TCPA class actions—exceeds the scope of authority given to the FCC under the TCPA. Based on this finding, the court vacated the 2006 FCC Order implementing the rule. Ultimately, the majority was not persuaded by the FCC’s argument that agency action—in this case, the FCC’s requiring opt-out notices on solicited fax advertisements—is permissible so long as Congress had not prohibited the agency action in question.

    Shortly after ruling was handed down, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai issued a statement expressing support for the court’s ruling, which he said emphasized “the importance of the FCC adhering to the rule of law.” The recently-appointed Chairman explained further that he had, in fact, “dissented from the FCC decision that the court has now overturned because, as [he] stated at the time, the agency’s approach to interpreting the law reflected ‘convoluted gymnastics.’” Chairman Pai continued, “[g]oing forward, the Commission will strive to follow the law and exercise only the authority that has been granted to us by Congress.”

    Courts FCC TCPA

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  • PHH Submits Reply Brief in Case Against CFPB; DOJ Allocated 10 Minutes at May 24 Oral Argument


    As recently covered by InfoBytes, on March 31 the CFPB and seven amicus curiae respondents each filed briefing in PHH Corp. v CFPB urging the D.C. Circuit to uphold the constitutionality of the Bureau’s single-director, independent-agency structure. On April 10, PHH filed a reply brief responding to the arguments raised by the CFPB and other respondents, and reiterating its position that, among other things, the en banc court should declare that the Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of the CFPB violated constitutional separation of powers requirements and that the only satisfactory remedy is the complete invalidation of the Bureau.

    Citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), PHH contends that, “the Constitution does not permit Congress to assign any portion of the executive power to an ’independent’ officer who is not accountable to, and removable by, the President.” Id. at 113. Moreover, in addressing comparisons between the CFPB and the FTC, the mortgage lender’s reply argues that “[t]he CFPB’s broad executive, legislative, and adjudicative authority further refutes its claim that it is functionally ‘indistinguishable’ from the FTC in 1935” because, among other reasons, “[i]n 1935, the FTC had no substantive rulemaking powers—the FTC disclaimed that authority until 1962.” In support of this claim, PHH highlights the fact that “the CFPB has all the authority—and more—of a cabinet department such as Treasury or Justice” but “unlike most cabinet positions, the Director may unilaterally appoint every subordinate official in the agency, as well as hire and compensate all CFPB employees outside the normal competitive-service requirements” (emphasis added). In addition to addressing the constitutional issue, PHH’s reply brief also notes that the CFPB has offered no support for its effort to enforce a reinterpretation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act against the companies.

    Oral argument is scheduled for May 24. As provided in a Per Curiam Order issued on April 11, the Court has allocated 30 minutes per side for the argument and an additional ten minutes of argument for the United States as amicus curiae. For additional background, please see our recent PHH Corp. v CFPB Case Update.

    Courts PHH v. CFPB Consumer Finance CFPB Dodd-Frank FTC RESPA Mortgages Litigation Single-Director Structure

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  • CFPB Director Withdraws Notification for Final Decision in Payday Lender Charges; Parties File Differing Opinions


    On March 31, CFPB Director Richard Cordray issued an order directing the Bureau’s Office of Administrative Adjudication to withdraw a February 13 notification informing the parties that the administrative proceeding against an online payday lender and its CEO (Respondents) had been submitted for a final decision by the CFPB.  The order noted that while the withdrawal “delay[s] [the] resolution of this appeal,” Director Cordray believed it to be appropriate in that it “help[s] minimize unnecessary or duplicative proceedings and . . . facilitate[s] a more efficient resolution of this matter.”

    The March 31 order follows a March 9 order in which parties were directed to file statements indicating whether they objected to the withdrawal of the notification. The parties offered differing opinions in their responses. In their March 24 filing, Respondents agreed generally with the Bureau’s reasons for withdrawal but sought clarification on the timing of the “proposed re-notification in this matter” and, furthermore, stressed that that re-notification should only be made once the cases of PHH Corp v. CFPB, Lucia v. SEC, and Bandimere v. SEC have been resolved by their respective courts. A three-judge panel had previously ruled in PHH that the structure of the CFPB was unconstitutional and that the Bureau’s interpretations of the kickback prohibitions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and RESPA’s statute of limitations provisions were erroneous. The full court granted the CFPB’s petition in February 2017 and explicitly vacated the panel’s decision (see previously posted Special Alert). Conversely, the Enforcement Counsel’s filing “respectfully” objected to the withdrawal of the notice “because resolution of the PHH matter will not determine the resolution of this proceeding and . . . any delay would be inefficient and would exacerbate the harm to affected consumers.”

    Last September, administrative law judge, the Hon. Parlen L. McKenna, recommended civil money penalties against Respondents totaling over $13 million as well as restitution of over $38 million to be paid to affected consumers. It further affirmed the CFPB’s allegations that the Respondents deceived consumers about the cost of short-term loans, thereby violating the Truth in Lending Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, and the Consumer Financial Protection Act’s prohibition against deceptive acts or practices. Following the recommended decision, the Respondents filed a notice of appeal.

    Courts CFPB Payday Lending PHH v. CFPB Litigation Single-Director Structure

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  • Case Update: PHH Corp. v CFPB


    March 31 marked the deadline for the CFPB to file its brief in response to PHH Corporation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s en banc review of the CFPB’s enforcement action against PHH for alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the PHH case began as a challenge to a 2015 penalty the CFPB levied against PHH, which was collected as part of what the CFPB deemed – a “captive reinsurance arrangement.” In fighting the penalty, PHH called into question the Bureau’s constitutionality and in October 2016, a panel of the D.C. Circuit concluded both that the CFPB misinterpreted RESPA, and also that its single-Director structure violated the constitutional separation of powers. On February 16 of this year, however, the D.C. Circuit granted the CFPB’s petition for rehearing en banc of the October 2015 panel decision. In granting en banc review, the court sought guidance from the parties on three specific questions: 

    • Is the Bureau’s structure unconstitutional because its Director may be removed only for cause, and if so, is the appropriate remedy to sever the for-cause removal provision from the Consumer Financial Protection Act?; 
    • May the Court avoid addressing the constitutionality of the Bureau’s structure if it adopts the panel’s holdings as to PHH’s liability under RESPA (and should it adopt those holdings)?; and
    • What is the appropriate disposition of this case if this Court concludes that the SEC’s administrative law judges are “inferior officers” under Lucia v. SEC? 

    Oral argument is scheduled for May 24. This Court has allocated 30 minutes per side for the argument and, as discussed further below, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has filed an unopposed motion seeking ten minutes of argument time for the United States at the May 24 en banc hearing.

    CFPB’s Brief. On March 31, the CFPB filed its brief for the en banc rehearing in PHH Corp. v CFPB urging the D.C. Circuit  to uphold the constitutionality of the Bureau’s single-director, independent-agency structure. According to the CFPB, neither the Bureau’s current single-director arrangement, nor the “for-cause” restriction on the President’s removal powers prevents the Executive branch from ensuring that the nation’s laws are implemented. Specifically, the brief explains that “[t]he President has no less control over a single-director agency than he does over a multi-member commission.” The brief also sets forth the Bureau’s position that, even “[i]f this Court determines that the Bureau’s structure is unconstitutional,” the appropriate remedy is not to invalidate the agency in its entirety, but rather to “sever the for-cause removal provision” of the Dodd-Frank Act (the Act), thereby allowing the President to remove the Bureau’s director for any reason. In addition to addressing the constitutional question, the CFPB also reiterated its argument that its RESPA interpretation is correct, that PHH and its affiliates violated RESPA, and that the Act’s statute of limitations does not apply to the Bureau’s administrative enforcement authority. And, at the direction of the court, the brief also addressed the potential effect of a decision in Lucia v. SEC that a SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) was an inferior officer under the Constitution. The ALJ used by the CFPB in the PHH enforcement proceeding was, in fact, borrowed from the SEC. Notably, Lucia v. SEC is scheduled to be argued immediately before PHH Corp. v. CFPB, on May 24, 2017.

    Amicus Curiae in Support of the CFPB. Also filed on March 31 were seven amicus curiae briefs, each of which offered arguments, both legal and non-legal, in favor of the CFPB’s continued existence as an independent regulator:

    PHH’s Brief. Briefing for PHH and amicus curiae briefs in support of the mortgage lender were due on March 17. In its opening brief and addendum, PHH focused on the separation-of-powers and remedy issues, raising the RESPA interpretation issue principally in support of the claim that the CFPB’s unconstitutional structure rendered the Bureau dangerously unaccountable. The New Jersey mortgage lender noted, among other things, that Congress has no ability to cut the agency’s budget and the President cannot remove its director without cause. As a general matter, the mortgage lender has argued that the Bureau’s creation “placed massive, unchecked federal power in the hands of a single, unaccountable director” and that “[t]he director alone rules over large swaths of the field of consumer finance, subject to virtually no restraints from the representative branches.”

    DOJ BriefAs previously covered by InfoBytes, the DOJ filed its own brief in the case on March 17, arguing in support of the D.C. Circuit panel’s initial ruling and proposed remedy. The DOJ brief stated, among other things, that, “[w]hile we do not agree with all of the reasoning in the panel’s opinion,” the DOJ agrees with the panel’s conclusion that “a removal restriction for the Director of the CFPB is an unwarranted limitation on the President’s executive power” and that “the panel correctly concluded … that the proposed remedy for the constitutional violation is to sever the provision limiting the President’s authority to remove the CFPB’s Director, not to declare the entire agency and its operations unconstitutional.”  As  covered recently on InfoBytes, the DOJ presented arguments that differed both from the CFPB and from the positions previously presented by the Obama Administration in briefing submitted on behalf of the United States back in December. 

    Also, as mentioned above, on April 3, the DOJ filed an unopposed motion seeking ten minutes of argument time for the United States at the May 24 en banc hearing.

    Amicus Curiae in Support of PHH. The March 10 deadline in the en banc proceeding also brought about the filing of seven amicus curiae briefs in support of PHH’s claims and/or defenses. Six of these filings took the position that the Bureau’s current structure violates separation-of-powers principles:

    A seventh—filed by a combined group of 13 banking and residential real estate-related organizations—argued in support of the company’s interpretation of the RESPA. According to this brief, the CFPB incorrectly changed a long-standing RESPA interpretation that permitted the use of captive reinsurance companies under appropriate circumstances. The changed interpretation was contrary to the Act and to the CFPB’s own regulation. The brief also argued that the Bureau improperly changed the interpretation and applied the new interpretation in an enforcement action without proper notice.

    Courts PHH v. CFPB Consumer Finance Federal Issues RESPA DOJ Mortgages Litigation Single-Director Structure

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  • Supreme Court Remands Texas Credit Card Surcharge Case


    On April 3, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case challenging a Texas law that bars retailers from imposing credit card surcharges, and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit in light of its ruling last week in Expressions Hair Design, that a similar statute in New York regulated merchants’ First Amendment rights. In Rowell, a landscaping business, a computer networking company, a self-storage facility, and an event design and production company sought to challenge a Texas law allowing merchants to charge different prices to customers who pay with cash and customers who pay with a credit card, but barring merchants from describing the price difference as a surcharge for credit cards, leaving them to describe it instead as a discount for using cash. The Fifth Circuit held that the Texas law did not violate the retailers’ free speech rights, aligning it with the Second Circuit in its September 2015 ruling in the Expressions Hair Design litigation against New York State.

    As previously reported on InfoBytes, the Supreme Court last week in the Expressions case unanimously rejected the Second Circuit’s conclusion that the New York credit card law regulates conduct alone, rather than speech. As explained in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the law at issue “is not like a typical price regulation,” which regulates a seller’s conduct by dictating how much to charge for an item. Rather, the Court explained, the law regulates “how sellers may communicate their prices.” (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, however, did not address the question of whether the law unconstitutionally restricts speech.

    Courts U.S. Supreme Court State Issues Consumer Finance Payment Processors Credit Cards

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  • Special Alert: California Supreme Court Invalidates Widely Used Arbitration Provisions and Curtails the Scope of Proposition 64


    On April 6, the California Supreme Court published its opinion in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., finding unenforceable arbitration agreements that purport to waive claims for public injunctive relief brought under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civ. Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq., its Unfair Competition Law (UCL)(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), and its false advertising law (id., § 17500 et seq.). In so holding, the court resisted arguments that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts California state law, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court’s landmark holding in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (Concepcion). In a second significant holding, the court materially limited the effect of Proposition 64 on claims brought under the UCL, finding that actions for public injunctive relief need not satisfy California requirements for class certification. The court’s decision presents significant questions as to the validity of widely used consumer arbitration clauses, creates the prospect of considerable future litigation regarding the scope of preemption under the FAA, and narrows the effect of Proposition 64 on future litigation under the UCL.

    Click here to read full special alert


    If you have questions about the court’s holding or other related issues, visit our Complex Civil Litigation and Class Actions practices for more information, or contact a Buckley Sandler attorney with whom you have worked in the past.

    Courts Class Action Arbitration

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  • National Bank Agrees to $110 Million Class Action Settlement for Improper Sales Practices


    On March 28, a national bank announced that it will pay $110 million to settle a 2015 class action lawsuit regarding retail sales practices that involved bank employees creating deposit and credit card accounts without obtaining consent to do so. The settlement class includes all consumers who claim that the bank—without their consent—opened an account, enrolled them in a product or service, or submitted an application for a product or service in their name during the time period from January 1, 2009 through the execution date of the settlement agreement, which must still be approved by the court. The settlement amount will be set aside for consumer compensation and is in addition to remediation amounts already paid to the Los Angeles City Attorney and the fees paid pursuant to consent orders entered into with the CFPB and OCC. The bank also noted that it agreed to the settlement notwithstanding an arbitration clause contained in the Bank’s deposit agreement. The bank is also conducting a voluntary review of accounts from 2009 - 2010 to determine and remediate any consumer harm.

    Courts Consumer Finance Class Action UDAAP Incentive Compensation

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