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District court advances CFPB action against bank for alleged TILA, CFPA violations
On December 1, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied a national bank’s motion to dismiss a CFPB lawsuit alleging violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) and TILA, rejecting the bank’s arguments that, among other things, the CFPB’s claims were time-barred and that the case cannot proceed because the CFPB’s structure violates constitutional separation-of-powers identified in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the CFPB filed suit in January against the bank alleging, among other things, that when servicing credit card accounts, the bank failed to properly (i) manage consumer billing disputes for unauthorized card use and billing errors; (ii) credit refunds to consumer accounts resulting from such disputes; or (iii) provide credit counseling disclosures to consumers. According to the CFPB, the alleged conduct “began in 2010 or earlier and ended, depending on the violation, sometime in 2015 or 2016.” The CFPB also noted that the parties signed agreements tolling all relevant statutes of limitations from February 23, 2017, until January 31, 2020. The bank argued that the CFPB’s claims are governed by section 1640 of TILA with its one-year statute of limitations, but the CFPB countered that its claims were brought pursuant to section 1607 of TILA, which provides a “three-year discovery period.”
In denying the bank’s motion to dismiss, the court concluded that the tolling agreements were valid and that the three-year limit under section 1607 applied because “plain language indicates that § 1640 only governs cases brought by individuals or state attorneys general,” whereas § 1607 “provides the cause of action for federal enforcement agencies such as the CFPB.” Furthermore, the court determined that because § 1607 “does not contain a statute of limitations,” and “instead stat[es] that cases brought by the CFPB ‘shall be enforced under. . . subtitle E of the [CFPA],’ the action is governed by subtitle E’s requirement that cases be brought within three years of discovery by the CFPB.” The court also dismissed the bank’s constitutional claims, ruling, among other things, that the argument is moot following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Seila, which held that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but was severable from the statute establishing the CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert).
1st Circuit: Original creditor’s arbitration agreement applies to debt buyer
On November 25, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a grant of a motion to compel arbitration in a debt collection action, concluding that a debt buyer holds the same arbitration rights as the original creditor under a cardmember agreement entered into with the plaintiff. The debt buyer purchased a pool of defaulted credit card debts from the original creditor, including the plaintiff’s charged-off account. After a municipal judge ruled that the debt buyer could not prove it owned the unpaid debt, the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging, among other things, that the debt buyer and its law firm (collectively, “defendants”) violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect the debt after the statute of limitations had expired. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the district court approved the magistrate judge’s recommendation that an enforcement clause in the cardholder agreement between the plaintiff and the original creditor be enforced. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendants should not be able to compel arbitration because they were not the signatories of the original cardholder agreement.
On appeal, the 1st Circuit concluded that the plaintiff offered no support for deviating from the “long-standing given in contract law. . .that ‘an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor,’” holding that the original creditor’s rights were assigned to the debt buyer and its agents, including the right to invoke the cardmember agreement’s arbitration provision.
FTC charges company with passive debt collection
On November 30, the FTC announced a stipulated order entered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against a debt collection company and three of its officers (collectively, “defendants”) for allegedly engaging in passive debt collection in violation of the FTC Act, the FDCPA, and the FCRA. According to the complaint, the defendants would place debts that consumers did not owe or the defendants were not authorized to collect on consumers’ credit reports without first attempting to communicate with the consumers about the debts. The complaint alleges further that consumers often did not discover these debts until they “threatened to interfere with an important, time-sensitive transaction.” The FTC alleges that each month, after receiving and investigating complaints from consumers, the defendants would determine between 80 to 97 percent of disputed debts were inaccurate or invalid. However, the defendants continued to collect on unauthorized debts “[d]espite the persistent inaccuracies.”
The defendants neither admit nor deny the allegations in the settlement order. In addition to the $24,300,000 in monetary relief, which is partially suspended due to the inability to pay (with one officer and corporate defendant required to pay over $56,000), the order also, among other things, (i) prohibits the defendants from furnishing credit information prior to communicating with the consumer; (ii) requires the defendants to request deletion of any debts reported prior to the order; and (iii) bars the defendants from engaging in unlawful debt collection practices.
The vote authorizing the complaint and settlement was 4-1, with Commissioner Chopra voting no, arguing that the agency should work “in concert” with the CFPB for debt collection enforcement in order to “help make victims whole through access to the CFPB's Civil Penalty Fund and reduce duplicative efforts.”
CFPB charges debt-relief company and owners
On November 20, the CFPB announced it filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against a debt-relief company and its two owners (collectively, “defendants”) for allegedly violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act. According to the complaint, between 2011 and April 2019, the defendants allegedly misrepresented material aspects of their student loan debt-relief services, by, among other things, falsely representing that the services would reduce or eliminate payments, stop wage garnishment, lift tax liens, and improve credit scores. Additionally, the Bureau alleges the defendants violated the TSR by requesting and receiving payment of fees for their services before they renegotiated, settled, reduced, or otherwise altered the terms of at least one debt pursuant to an agreement. Moreover, the defendants’ fees were allegedly not proportional to or a percentage of the amount saved as a result of their services. The complaint seeks injunctions against the defendants as well as damages, redress, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and the imposition of civil money penalties.
SBA must release PPP and EIDL borrower information by December 1
On November 24, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) request for stay and ordered the release of the names, addresses, and precise loan amounts of all Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) by December 1. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court ordered the SBA to supplement their July disclosure and release the “names, addresses, and precise loan amounts of all individuals and entities that obtained PPP and EIDL COVID-related loans by November 19, 2020,” concluding that the SBA’s claimed FOIA exemptions do not cover the requested information disclosures. The SBA moved to stay the order to “preserve [the] SBA’s right to appeal and to avoid irreparable harm to [the] SBA and to privacy and business confidentiality interests of the millions of individuals and businesses….” The court initially granted a temporary stay to review the motion (covered by InfoBytes here). Upon review, the court denied the stay, concluding that staying the disclosure through an appeal “would deprive the public of information critical to an ongoing national debate of considerable importance, as well as basic details surrounding an unprecedented federal relief effort financed by taxpayer dollars.” The SBA must release the supplemental information by December 1, however, the court noted that “nothing in this decision prevents SBA from seeking its desired relief in the Court of Appeals before that date.”
Updated PPP loan data available here.
Court stays PPP and EIDL borrower disclosure
On November 13, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia temporarily stayed the U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA) mandatory release of the names, addresses, and precise loan amounts of all Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) borrowers until the court rules on the motion to stay filed by the SBA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court ordered the SBA to supplement their July disclosure and release the “names, addresses, and precise loan amounts of all individuals and entities that obtained PPP and EIDL COVID-related loans by November 19, 2020,” concluding that the SBA’s claimed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions do not cover the requested information disclosures. The SBA moved to stay the order to “preserve [the] SBA’s right to appeal and to avoid irreparable harm to [the] SBA and to privacy and business confidentiality interests of the millions of individuals and businesses….” The SBA requested the order be stayed until December 7 or pending appeal, if filed by that date. In response, the court issued a minute order, granting a temporary stay until it rules on the motion.
SEC charges bank execs over sales-compensation practices
On November 13, the SEC announced charges against a national bank’s former CEO and Chairman, as well as against the former head of the national bank’s community bank (community bank) for their roles in allegedly misleading investors in connection with the bank’s incentive compensation sales program. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in connection with the same misconduct, the SEC announced a Cease and Desist order with the bank for allegedly violating the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The bank agreed to cease and desist from committing any future violations of the antifraud provisions and to a civil penalty of $500 million.
According to the complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for Northern District of California against the former head of the community bank, from mid-2014 through mid-2016, the former head publicly endorsed the bank’s incentive compensation program as a measurement of the bank’s success, when in reality, the metrics were allegedly inflated by unused and unauthorized accounts. Moreover, the complaint alleges that the former head signed sub-certifications that attested to the accuracy of the bank’s public disclosures, when she “knew or was reckless in not knowing” that the incentive compensation program depicted in the disclosures were materially false or misleading. The complaint seeks a permanent injunction, disgorgement, and civil penalties.
Additionally, the SEC issued a cease and desist order against the bank’s former CEO and Chairman, alleging that in 2015 and 2016 he certified statements filed with the SEC regarding the community bank’s incentive compensation program, after being put on notice that the bank was misleading the public about the program. The order issues a $2.5 million civil penalty against the former CEO and Chairman.
Another district court dismisses PPP agent fee class action
On November 16, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California issued an order dismissing a putative class action against several large banks over whether agents providing consulting, legal, accounting, and tax preparation services are entitled to “agent fees” from lenders for helping businesses secure loans under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The agents argued that the banks received lender fees from the government and funded PPP loans for borrowers but failed to and refused to pay any agent fees. The court found, however, that the agents failed to allege facts sufficient to establish standing or to “inform any Defendant of its particular role in the alleged general harm,” and instead relied “merely on generalized, conclusory allegations.” While the court gave the agents 21 days to amend their complaint, it noted that “[b]ecause the CARES Act does not provide a private cause of action to recover agent fees absent an agreement between agent and lender, it appears unlikely that Plaintiffs can overcome the [identified] deficiencies.” The court’s decision follows decisions issued by other federal courts, which have also dismissed similar agent fee class actions (see InfoBytes here and here).
9th Circuit affirms dismissal of bank’s quiet-title action against HOA
On November 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment, which had dismissed for failure to state a claim a national bank’s quiet-title action against the purchaser of real property at a foreclosure sale, a Nevada homeowners association (HOA), and the HOA’s agent (collectively, “defendants”). According to the opinion, borrowers financed the purchase of a home located within the HOA through the bank, but fell behind on their HOA dues. The HOA recorded a lien on the property for the delinquent assessments, foreclosed on the home to satisfy the lien, and ultimately sold the property at a public auction to a trust, which extinguished the bank’s deed of trust. The bank filed the quiet-title action against the defendants, alleging, among other things, that the foreclosure sale was invalid and that the bank’s “deed of trust continues as a valid encumbrance against the [p]roperty.” In addition, the bank claimed that applying Nevada Revised Statutes section 116.3116 “produces a harsh result” because it prioritizes an HOA lien over “all other liens, including the first deed of trust held by the mortgage lender,” and also violates the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The bank further argued that the foreclosure sale was not valid because it did not receive adequate notice of the sale. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling, among other things, that the HOA had the right to foreclose on the property and that the bank had received adequate notice of the property’s sale.
On appeal, the 9th Circuit concluded that the bank’s constitutional rights under the Takings Clause—which provides that private property cannot be taken for public use “without just compensation”—were not violated. “Because the enactment of section 116.3116 predated the creation of [the bank’s] lien on the property, [the bank cannot] establish that it suffered an uncompensated taking,” the appellate court wrote, additionally noting that “the foreclosure proceeding itself was not a ‘taking’ because the Takings Clause governs the conduct of the government, not private actors.” With respect to the alleged violation of the Due Process Clause, the appellate court agreed with the district court’s determination that the bank had received adequate, actual notice of the delinquent assessment and the foreclosure sale.
District court holds no private right of action under E-SIGN Act
On October 26, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado denied, in relevant part, an individual’s motion for summary judgement, holding that no private right of action exists under the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (E-SIGN) Act. The plaintiff had asserted a violation of E-SIGN by an auto-dealership, who allegedly failed to advise the plaintiff of: (i) the right to receive paper copies (rather than electronic copies) of certain records; and (ii) the right to withdraw previously provided consent to receiving records in electronic form.
In ruling against the plaintiff’s motion, the court noted that where Congress creates specific means for enforcing a statute, a court will assume that Congress did not intend to allow any additional rights of action beyond those specified. When applied to the E-SIGN Act, the court found that no standalone remedy is necessary, as any violation of the E-SIGN Act would be “self-effectuating.” Any failure to “[d]emonstrate the proper consent for electronic service would only expose the party required to deliver the information in writing to whatever sanctions the law requiring written disclosure provides.” Therefore, the court found that “Congress appears to have provided no separate remedial scheme for violation of the E-SIGN Act's consent provisions, as no standalone remedy is necessary.”