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CFPB releases 2023 rural or underserved counties list
Recently, the CFPB released its annual lists of rural counties and rural or underserved counties for lenders to use when determining qualified exemptions to certain TILA regulatory requirements. In connection with these releases, the Bureau also directed lenders to use its web-based Rural or Underserved Areas Tool to assess whether a rural or underserved area qualifies for a safe harbor under Regulation Z.
CFPB adjusts annual dollar amount thresholds under TILA, HMDA regulations
On December 21, the CFPB released a final rule revising the dollar amounts for provisions implementing TILA and its amendments that impact loans under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA) and qualified mortgages (QM). The Bureau is required to make annual adjustments to dollar amounts in certain provisions in Regulation Z, and has based the adjustments on the annual percentage change reflected in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) in effect on June 1, 2022. The following thresholds are effective January 1, 2023:
- For open-end consumer credit plans under TILA, the threshold for disclosing an interest charge will remain unchanged at $1.00;
- For HOEPA loans, the adjusted total loan amount threshold for high-cost mortgages will be $24,866, and the adjusted points-and-fees dollar trigger for high-cost mortgages will be $1,243;
- For qualified mortgages under the General QM loan definition, the thresholds for the spread between the annual percentage rate and the average prime offer rate will be: “2.25 or more percentage points for a first-lien covered transaction with a loan amount greater than or equal to $124,331; 3.5 or more percentage points for a first-lien covered transaction with a loan amount greater than or equal to $74,599 but less than $124,331; 6.5 or more percentage points for a first-lien covered transaction with a loan amount less than $74,599; 6.5 or more percentage points for a first-lien covered transaction secured by a manufactured home with a loan amount less than $124,331; 3.5 or more percentage points for a subordinate-lien covered transaction with a loan amount greater than or equal to $74,599; or 6.5 or more percentage points for a subordinate-lien covered transaction with a loan amount less than $74,599”; and
- For all QM categories, the adjusted thresholds for total points and fees will be “3 percent of the total loan amount for a loan greater than or equal to $124,331; $3,730 for a loan amount greater than or equal to $74,599 but less than $124,331; 5 percent of the total loan amount for a loan greater than or equal to $24,866 but less than $74,599; $1,243 for a loan amount greater than or equal to $15,541 but less than $24,866; and 8 percent of the total loan amount for a loan amount less than $15,541.”
With respect to credit card annual adjustments, the Bureau noted that its 2023 annual adjustment analysis on the CPI-W in effect on June 1, did not result in an increase to the current minimum interest charge threshold (which requires “creditors to disclose any minimum interest charge exceeding $1.00 that could be imposed during a billing cycle”).
The Bureau also issued a final rule adjusting the asset-size threshold under HMDA (Regulation C). Under HMDA, institutions with assets below certain dollar thresholds are exempt from collection and reporting requirements. The final rule increases the asset-size exemption threshold for banks, savings associations, and credit unions from $50 million to $54 million, thereby exempting institutions with assets of $54 million or less as of December 31, 2022, from collecting HMDA data in 2023.
CFPB says TILA does not preempt NY law on commercial disclosures
On December 7, the CFPB issued a preliminary determination that New York’s commercial financing disclosure law is not preempted by TILA because the state’s statute regulates commercial financing transactions and not consumer-purpose transactions. The CFPB issued a Notice of Intent to Make Preemption Determination under the Truth in Lending Act seeking comments pursuant to Appendix A of Regulation Z on whether it should finalize its preliminary determination that New York’s law, as well as potentially similar laws in California, Utah, and Virginia, are not preempted by TILA. Comments are due January 20, 2023. Once the comment period closes, the Bureau will publish a notice of final determination in the Federal Register.
Explaining that recently a number of states have enacted laws to require improved disclosures of information contained in commercial financing transactions, including loans to small businesses, in order to mitigate predatory small business lending and improve transparency, the Bureau said it received a written request to make a preemption determination involving certain disclosure provisions in TILA. While Congress expressly granted the Bureau authority to evaluate whether any inconsistencies exist between certain TILA provisions and state laws and to make a preemption determination, the statute’s implementing regulations require the agency to request public comments before making a final determination.
While New York’s Commercial Financing Law “requires financial disclosures before consummation of covered transactions,” the Bureau pointed out that this applies to “commercial financing” rather than consumer credit. The request contended that TILA preempts New York’s law in relation to its use of the terms “finance charge” and “annual percentage rate”—“notwithstanding that the statutes govern different categories of transactions.” The request outlined material differences in how the two statutes use these terms and asserted “that these differences make the New York law inconsistent with Federal law for purposes of preemption.” As an example, the request noted that the state’s definition of “finance charge” is broader than the federal definition, and that the “estimated APR” disclosure required under state law “for certain transactions is less precise than the APR calculation under TILA and Regulation Z.” Moreover, “New York law requires certain assumptions about payment amounts and payment frequencies in order to calculate APR and estimated APR, whereas TILA does not require similar assumptions,” the request asserted, adding that inconsistencies between the two laws could lead to borrower confusion or misunderstanding.
In making its preliminary determination, the Bureau concluded that the state and federal laws do not appear “contradictory” for preemption purposes based on the request’s assertions. The Bureau explained that the statutes govern different transactions and disagreed with the argument that New York’s law impedes the operation of TILA or interferes with its primary purpose. Specifically, the Bureau stated that the “differences between the New York and Federal disclosure requirements do not frustrate these purposes because lenders are not required to provide the New York disclosures to consumers seeking consumer credit.”
Agencies finalize TILA, CLA 2023 thresholds
On October 13, the CFPB and Federal Reserve Board finalized the annual dollar threshold adjustments that govern the application of TILA (Regulation Z) and the Consumer Leasing Act (Regulation M) (available here and here), as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. The exemption threshold for 2023, based on the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, will increase from $61,000 to $66,400, except for private education loans and loans secured by real or personal property used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of a consumer, which are subject to TILA regardless of the amount. The final rules take effect January 1, 2023.
Agencies finalize 2023 HPML exemption threshold
On October 13, the CFPB, OCC, and Federal Reserve Board published finalized amendments to the official interpretations for regulations implementing Section 129H of TILA, which establishes special appraisal requirements for “higher-risk mortgages,” otherwise termed as “higher-priced mortgage loans” (HPMLs). The final rule increases TILA’s loan exemption threshold for the special appraisal requirements for HPMLs. Each year the threshold must be readjusted based on the annual percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers. The exemption threshold will increase from $28,500 to $31,000 effective January 1, 2023.
CFPB updates education loan servicing examination procedures
On September 28, the CFPB updated the education loan examination procedures in its Supervision and Examination Manual. According to the Bureau, the update to the education loan servicing examination procedures clarifies that when determining its authority to supervise a private student lender, the Bureau “look[s] only to the definition of private education loan in the Truth in Lending Act and not also to Regulation Z.” The Bureau noted that depending on the scope of an examination, “and in conjunction with the compliance management system and consumer complaint response review procedures,” an examination will cover at least one of the following modules: (i) advertising, marketing, and lead generation; (ii) customer application, qualification, loan origination, and disbursement; (iii) student loan servicing; (vi) borrower inquiries and complaints; (v) collections, accounts in default, and credit reporting; (vi) information sharing and privacy; and (vii) examination conclusion and wrap-up.
CFPB rescinds no-action letter and sandbox policies
On September 27, the CFPB issued a statement in the Federal Register rescinding its No-Action Letter Policy and its Compliance Assistance Sandbox Policy. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in September 2019, the CFPB issued three final innovation policies: the No-Action Letter (NAL) Policy, Compliance Assistance Sandbox (CAS) Policy, and Trial Disclosure Program (TDP) Policy. The NAL policy provided a NAL recipient assurance that the Bureau will not bring a supervisory or enforcement action against the company for providing a product or service under the covered facts and circumstances. The CAS policy evaluated a product or service for compliance with relevant laws and offered approved applicants a “safe harbor” from liability for certain covered conduct during the testing period under TILA, ECOA, or the EFTA. Following the rescission, the statement noted that the Bureau will no longer accept NAL or CAS applications by September 30, but will continue to accept and process requests under the TDP. Entities that have made submissions under the NAL or CAS policies will be notified if the Bureau intends to take additional steps on their submissions. According to the statement, the Bureau “determined that the Policies do not advance their stated objective of facilitating consumer-beneficial innovation” and “that the existing Policies failed to meet appropriate standards for transparency and stakeholder participation.”
2nd Circuit: NY law on interest payments for escrow accounts is preempted
On September 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York’s interest-on-escrow law impermissibly interferes with the incidentals of national bank lending and is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA). Plaintiffs in two putative class actions obtained loans from a national bank, one before and the other after certain Dodd-Frank provisions took effect. The loan agreements—governed by New York law—required plaintiffs to deposit money into escrow accounts. After the bank failed to pay interest on the escrowed amounts, plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, alleging, among other things, that under New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601 (which sets a minimum 2 percent interest rate on mortgage escrow accounts) they were entitled to interest. The bank moved to dismiss both actions, contending that GOL § 5-601 did not apply to federally chartered banks because it is preempted by the NBA. The district court disagreed and denied the bank’s motion, ruling first that RESPA (which regulates the amount of money in an escrow account but not the accruing interest rate) “shares a ‘unity of purpose’ with GOL § 5-601.” This is relevant, the district court said, “because Congress ‘intended mortgage escrow accounts, even those administered by national banks, to be subject to some measure of consumer protection regulation.’” Second, the district court reasoned that even though TILA § 1639d does not specifically govern the loans at issue, it is significant because it “evinces a clear congressional purpose to subject all mortgage lenders to state escrow interest laws.” Finally, with respect to the NBA, the district court determined that “the ‘degree of interference’ of GOL § 5-601 was ‘minimal’ and was not a ‘practical abrogation of the banking power at issue,’” and concluded that Dodd-Frank’s amendment to TILA substantiated a policy judgment showing “there is little incompatibility between requiring mortgage lenders to maintain escrow accounts and requiring them to pay a reasonable rate of interest on sums thereby received.” As such, GOL § 5-601 was not preempted by the NBA, the district court said.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its preemption analysis. According to the appellate court, the important question “is not how much a state law impacts a national bank, but rather whether it purports to ‘control’ the exercise of its powers.” In reversing the ruling and holding that that GOL § 5-601 was preempted by the NBA, the appellate court wrote that the “minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the federal government, so it would impermissibly interfere with national banks’ exercise of that power.” Notably, the 2nd Circuit’s decision differs from the 9th Circuit’s 2018 holding in Lusnak v. Bank of America, which addressed a California mortgage escrow interest law analogous to New York’s and held that a national bank must comply with the California law requiring mortgage lenders to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts (covered by InfoBytes here). Among other things, the 2nd Circuit determined that both the district court and the 9th Circuit improperly “concluded that the TILA amendments somehow reflected Congress’s judgment that all escrow accounts, before and after Dodd-Frank, must be subject to such state laws.”
In a concurring opinion, one of the judges stressed that while the panel concluded that the specific state law at issue is preempted, the opinion left “ample room for state regulation of national banks.” The judge noted that the opinion relies on a narrow standard of preempting only those “state laws that directly conflict with enumerated or incidental national bank powers conferred by Congress,” and stressed that the appellate court declined to reach a determination as to whether Congress subjected national banks to state escrow interest laws in cases (unlike the plaintiffs’ actions) where Dodd-Frank’s TILA amendments would apply.
10th Circuit: Payday lender must pay $38.4 million restitution order
On September 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the CFPB’s administrative ruling against a Delaware-based online payday lender and its founder and CEO (respondents/petitioners) regarding a 2015 administrative enforcement action that alleged violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), TILA, and EFTA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2015, the CFPB announced an action against the respondents for alleged violations of TILA and the EFTA, and for engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Specifically, the CFPB alleged that, from May 2008 through December 2012, the online lender (i) continued to debit borrowers’ accounts using remotely created checks after consumers revoked the lender’s authorization to do so; (ii) required consumers to repay loans via pre-authorized electronic fund transfers; and (iii) deceived consumers about the cost of short-term loans by providing them with contracts that contained disclosures based on repaying the loan in one payment, while the default terms called for multiple rollovers and additional finance charges. The order required the respondents to pay $38.4 million as both legal and equitable restitution, along with $8.1 million in penalties for the company and $5.4 million in penalties for the CEO.
According to the opinion, between 2018 and 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court issued four decisions, Lucia v. SEC (covered by InfoBytes here), Seila Law v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here), Liu v. SEC (covered by InfoBytes here), and Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here), which “bore on the Bureau’s enforcement activity in this case,” by “decid[ing] fundamental issues such as the Bureau’s constitutional authority to act and the appointment of its administrative law judges (‘ALJ’).” The decisions led to intermittent delays and restarts in the Bureau’s case against the petitioners. For instance, the opinion noted that two different ALJs decided the present case years apart, with their recommendations separately appealed to the Bureau’s director. The CFPB’s director upheld the decision by the second ALJ and ordered the lender and its owner to pay the restitution, and a district court issued a final order upholding the award. The petitioners appealed.
On appeal, the petitioners made three substantive arguments for dismissing the director’s final order. The petitioners argued that under Seila, the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional and therefore the agency did not have authority to issue the order. The appellate court disagreed, stating that it is “to use a ‘scalpel rather than a bulldozer’ in remedying a constitutional defect,” and that “because the Director’s actions weren’t unconstitutional, we reject Petitioners’ argument to set aside the Bureau’s enforcement action in its entirety.”
The petitioners also argued that the enforcement action violated their due-process rights by denying the CEO additional discovery concerning the statute of limitations. The petitioners claimed that they were entitled to a “new hearing” under Lucia, and that the second administrative hearing did not rise to the level of due process prescribed in that case. The appellate court determined that there was “no support for a bright-line rule against de novo review of a previous administrative hearing," nor did it see a reason for a more extensive hearing. Moreover, the petitioners “had a full opportunity to present their case in the first proceeding,” the 10th Circuit wrote. The appellate court further rejected the company’s argument regarding various evidentiary rulings, including permitting evidence about the company’s operational expenses, among other things. The appellate court also concluded that the CFPA’s statute of limitations commences when the Bureau either knows of a violation or, through reasonable diligence, would have discovered the violation. Therefore, the appellate court rejected the argument “that the receipt of consumer complaints triggered the statute of limitations.”
The petitioners also challenged the remedies order, claiming they were not allowed “to present evidence of their good-faith reliance on counsel (as to restitution and civil penalties) and evidence of their expenses (as to the Director’s residual disgorgement order).” The appellate court rejected that challenge, holding that the director properly considered all factors, including good faith, and rejected the petitioners’ challenge to the ALJ’s recommended civil penalties.
The 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of a $38.4 million restitution award, rejecting the petitioners’ various challenges and affirming the director’s order.
District Court grants summary judgment concerning TILA, ECOA, FHA claims
On August 12, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana issued an order denying plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and granting defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment in an action concerning alleged violations of TILA, ECOA, and FHA disparate impact claims. According to the court’s determination, the defendant corporate entity was not a “creditor” during the leasing portion of the underlying rent-to-buy (RTB) agreements, and the plaintiffs lacked standing on certain claims because the wrong parties were targeted.
The defendant realty group purchases, sells, and manages real estate. The plaintiffs all entered into RTB agreements with the realty group that allowed the renter to make 24 payments and then execute a sales contract for the property. The agreements carried interest rate terms between 9.87 and 18 percent. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants, among other things, did not provide TILA-required disclosures for high-cost mortgages, did not require written certifications that tenants had obtained counseling prior to entering into the transaction, and did not provide property appraisals to tenants.
The plaintiffs sued alleging several claims under TILA for failure to provide required information. However, the court concluded that during the 24-month rental period, the realty group was not a “creditor” but was instead a “landlord.” Moreover, the court determined that “the only entities that could arguably be considered creditors are the Individual Land Trusts as the sellers and parties to the Conditional Sales Contract.” These trusts were not named as defendants, the court observed, adding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of showing that the land trusts were sufficiently related to the named defendants to allow the court to “pierce the corporate veil” and hold the named defendants liable for actions conducted by the non-party individual land trusts.
With respect to the plaintiffs’ ECOA claims, which claimed that the realty group’s policies and practices were intentionally discriminatory and had a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, and/or national origin, the court applied the same rationale as it did to the TILA claims and again ruled that the realty group was not a “creditor.” In terms of plaintiffs’ FHA claims, the court said that “the racial disparity must have been created by the defendant.” In this action, the court determined that the realty group did not create the condition, reasoning that “the fact that lower-priced homes are more likely to exist in minority neighborhoods is not of Defendants’ making and existed before, and without, the RTB Program.”
However, the court’s order does allow certain individual and class claims related to disparate treatment under the FHA to proceed, as well as certain claims regarding Indiana law related to standard contract terms and the condition of homes in the RTB program.