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7th Circuit upholds summary judgment in favor of debt collector
On June 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of a third-party debt collector in a class action asserting violations of the FDCPA. According to the opinion, a consumer filed a putative class action alleging the debt collector sent a misleading letter in violation of the FDCPA because the letter stated that her debt “may be reported to the national credit bureaus.” The consumer argued that the use of the word “may” was deceptive, as it implied “future reporting” even though the debt had already been reported at the time she received the letter. The debt collector moved to dismiss the action, which the district court denied, concluding that whether a communication is misleading is a question of fact and therefore, “dismissal would be premature.” After class certification, the consumer and the debt collector submitted cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district affirmed in favor of the debt collector.
On cross-appeals, the 7th Circuit agreed with the district court’s denial of the debt collector’s motion to dismiss, stating that “[w]hether a significant fraction of debtors would be misled as [the consumer] describes is questionable, but it is not so implausible….” As for summary judgment, the appellate court also agreed with the district court, concluding that the consumer “failed to present any evidence beyond her own opinion” that the collection letter was misleading. The appellate court rejected the consumer’s assertion that her own opinion was evidence enough and noted that the consumer cited to cases using the “least sophisticated consumer standard,” which the 7th Circuit has rejected. Moreover, the appellate court emphasized that the consumer failed “to provide any outside evidence as to the likelihood that a hypothetical unsophisticated debtor (or even the least sophisticated debtor) would in fact be confused by the language in [the debt collector]’s letter.”
7th Circuit holds recoverable costs under FDCPA do not include damages or compensation for expenses
On June 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that the costs recoverable under the FDCPA and Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not include damages or compensation for the plaintiff’s time and mailing expenses related to litigation. According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed suit against a debt collector alleging various violations of the FDCPA for failing to verify that the plaintiff owned the debt after it was disputed and for sending a demand letter with the plaintiff’s personal information in an envelope viewing screen. The debt collector made an offer of judgment to the plaintiff for “$1,101, ‘plus costs to be awarded by the Court.’” The plaintiff sought costs that included damages under the FDCPA while the debt collector argued that the offer was only for “taxable costs as a prevailing party.” After the district court concluded that the plaintiff had accepted the offer of judgment, it entered judgment for the award of $1,101 and instructed the plaintiff to file a bill of costs “‘limited to those contemplated by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 54(d).’” The plaintiff demanded over $24,000 for “hundreds of hours” spent litigating the action, over $150 in “mailing costs,” $1,000 in “additional damage costs,” and over $47,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied the costs under Rule 54(d) and awarded final judgment for the $1,101 in statutory damages.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the costs he submitted were recoverable under Section 1692k(a) of the FDCPA, concluding that “damages are not part of the costs ‘properly awardable under’ § 1692k(a),” which contains both provisions for damages and for costs; therefore, if costs included damages, “the damages provisions would be superfluous.” The appellate court went on to state that “[w]ithout a special definition in the [FDCPA], the ‘costs’ it contemplates are simply those awardable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d),” which do not include the damages or compensation sought by the plaintiff.
District court: Unilateral imposition of post-judgment interest violates FDCPA
On May 19, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut granted in part and denied in part parties’ motions for summary judgment in an FDCPA action concerning post-judgment interest. According to the ruling, the defendants—a debt buyer and an attorney who represents creditors, including the debt buyer, in collection actions—obtained a judgment from the Connecticut State Superior Court (state court) for the plaintiff’s unpaid credit card debt. The judgment awarded the defendant $33,921.25 plus post judgment interest under state law. While the complaint requested post-judgment interest of 10 percent—the maximum amount allowed by state law—the judgment did not reference a specific interest rate. After the defendants began charging post-judgment interest at 10 percent, the plaintiff filed suit alleging the defendant violated the FDCPA by using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt. The defendants sought clarification of the rate of post-judgment interest from the state court and received a clarification order stating that the state court “intended that the interest rate be set at the allowable rate of ten percent per year in accordance with the statute.” In its defense, the defendants asserted a bona fide error defense under the FDCPA, arguing, among other things, that they “erroneously believed that application of post-judgment interest at a rate of ten percent was neither false nor misleading because they relied on the state court’s judgment and Clarification Order, which explicitly provided for post-judgment interest at a rate of ten percent.”
The court partially granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on her FDCPA claim, stating that the unilateral imposition of post-judgment interest at a rate of 10 percent per year, which was not awarded in the judgment, is a “clear violation” of the FDCPA that is not subject to the bona fide error defense. The court stated that the bona fide error defense does not apply in this situation because “the FDCPA violation resulted from the defendants’ mistaken belief that, absent a rate of post-judgment interest expressly set by the state court, defendants were entitled to set a rate at the maximum amount allowed under the statute.” According to the court, when a state court “fails to include a specific rate of interest based on the state law,” a debt collector may not apply a default interest rate. In holding that the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense is inapplicable here, the court extended the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A. that the “bona fide error defense . . . is not available to debt collectors who misinterpret the legal requirements of the FDCPA,” to include misinterpretations of state law as well.
The court did, however, partially grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the application of pre-judgment interest.
District court: Initial debt collection communication via email does not violate FDCPA
On May 19, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a debt collector’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit with prejudice brought by a plaintiff alleging violations of the Electronic Signatures in Global Commerce (E-SIGN) Act and the FDCPA. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff attempting to collect an unpaid debt that contained a validation notice. The plaintiff argued that the email violated the E-SIGN Act because she did not consent to receive email from the defendant, and that it also violated the FDCPA “because the email referred to ‘send[ing]’ a copy of the verification of the debt whereas § 1692g(a)(4) specifies that a copy of the verification will be ‘mailed.’” Among other arguments, the plaintiff claimed that the email’s subject line, which stated “This needs your attention,” violated the FDCPA because it did not convey that the message was seeking to collect a debt, and that she received several more emails during the validation period, which confused her and “overshadowed” the validation notice in the initial communication.
The court disagreed, stating that because there are “no express restrictions” within the FDCPA about how the initial communication must be made, allowing it to be made electronically is a “reasonable argument.” Specifically, the court noted that the CFPB has recognized that certain communication technologies such as email did not exist when the FDCPA was passed, and referred to the Bureau’s commentary on its proposed debt collection rule that stated “a validation notice as part of an initial communication can be conveyed via email.” [Emphasis in the original.] The court also determined that the plaintiff lacked standing with respect to her claim that the initial email’s subject line violated the FDCPA since she opened the email and clicked on the link. Furthermore, the court noted that using the word “send” instead of “mailed” in the initial communication would not have confused the least sophisticated debtor because the “debtor, if concerned about getting a verification of debt via email, could always ask for a copy to be sent via physical mail instead.”
CFPB further extends comment period for proposed rulemaking on time-barred debt disclosures
On May 19, the CFPB announced a further extension to the comment period on its Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) related to time-barred debt disclosures (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). The NPRM, issued in February, would amend Regulation F, which implements the FDCPA, to require debt collectors to make certain disclosures when collecting time-barred debts. Due to challenges created by the Covid-19 pandemic, the June 5 deadline has been extended until August 4.
District court grants debt collector’s arbitration request
On May 11, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted a debt collector’s renewed motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the previously-ordered discovery demonstrated that the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim fell within the bounds of the arbitration clause in the underlying credit card agreement. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the plaintiffs filed a proposed class action alleging that the debt collection company’s collection letters violated the FDCPA because they did not “properly identify the name of the current creditor to whom the debt is owed.” The debt collectors filed an initial motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the debts described in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint arose pursuant to credit card agreements that include an arbitration clause. In February 2019, the court denied the motion concluding that discovery was needed in order to determine whether an arbitration clause applied to the plaintiffs’ claims regarding FDCPA violations. After the parties engaged in discovery, the plaintiff argued that only the card issuer has a right to compel arbitration under the agreement. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the collection agency was an agent of the creditor and as an agent, the collector may enforce the arbitration agreement. Moreover, the court determined that the debt collection letter relates to the consumer’s credit account as the debt is a result of the credit card use and the FDCPA claim “is statuary, as explicitly provided for in the card agreement.”
6th Circuit holds condo company and law firm did not act as debt collectors in non-judicial foreclosure
On May 4, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a condominium management company, condominium association, and its law firm (collectively, “defendants”) acted as “security-interest enforcers” and not debt collectors and therefore, did not violate the FDCPA. According to the opinion, the homeowners lost their condominium to a non-judicial foreclosure after they fell behind on condominium association dues. The homeowners filed suit against the defendants alleging various violations of the FDCPA during the foreclosure process. The homeowners did not assert a violation of Section 1692f(6), which applies to security-interest enforcers. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the homeowners failed to allege facts that the defendants did more than act as security-interest enforcers.
On appeal, the 6th Circuit agreed, citing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, which held that parties who assist creditors with the non-judicial foreclosure of a home fall within the separate definition under Section 1692f(6) as security-interest enforcers and not the general debt collector definition (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The appellate court noted that the homeowners’ complaint did not allege the defendants’ regular business activity was debt collection. Moreover, the appellate court rejected the homeowners’ argument that the defendants recording of a lien on their condo was a step beyond enforcing a security interest. According to the court, Michigan law requires the recording of the lien in order to enforce a security-interest and therefore, the action “falls squarely within Obduskey’s central holding.”
5th Circuit: Collection letters misrepresenting legal enforceability of underlying debt violate FDCPA
On April 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that letters seeking the collection of time-barred debt that include ambiguous offers and contain threats misrepresenting the legal enforceability of the underlying debt violate section 1692e of the FDCPA. In 2011, a creditor placed the plaintiff’s debt with the defendant for collection. Six collection letters were initially sent to the plaintiff for which there was no response, and in 2017, the defendant sent four more letters to the plaintiff. While it was undisputed that the four-year statute of limitations to sue to collect the debt had expired, none of the letters mentioned that the debt was time-barred or that a partial payment may restart the statute of limitations clock. The plaintiff filed suit claiming the 2017 letters violated the Texas Debt Collection Act and were false or misleading and unfair or unconscionable in violation of FDCPA §§ 1692e and 1692f respectively. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the 1692e claim, but ruled that “‘there is a growing consensus’ that a claim under § 1692f is a ‘backstop’ to catch conduct outside that barred by § 1692e and other provisions,” and granted summary judgment to the defendant on the 1692f claim. The defendant appealed the 1692e decision.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit affirmed and held that, read as a whole, the letters misrepresented the legal enforceability and character of the debt in violation of § 1692e. The appellate court found that the 2017 letters were ambiguous and failed to even mention when the debt was incurred, which may have provided some insight to the plaintiff as to whether the debt might be legally enforceable. The appellate court also took issue with the 2017 letters’ use of unexplained “urgent” language and vague collection threats, and stated that “the complete silence in these letters works in conjunction with their vague language to mislead the unsophisticated consumer that the debt is enforceable.”
District court says $267 million robocall verdict is not unconstitutionally excessive
On April 17, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order granting in part and denying in part several motions pertaining to a class action lawsuit, which accused a debt collection agency (defendant) of violating the TCPA, FDCPA, and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by using repeated robocalls and pre-recorded voices messages to collect debt. As previously covered by InfoBytes, last September the court entered a $267 million final judgment against the defendant, consistent with a jury’s verdict that found the defendant liable for violating the TCPA by making more than 500,000 unsolicited robocalls using autodialers. Under the terms of the judgment each class member was awarded $500 per call. The defendant argued that the award was unconstitutionally excessive and violated due process, and requested that the court reduce the per violation amount. The court was unpersuaded and upheld the judgment, stating that the defendant failed to identify (and the court could not find) any “Ninth Circuit authority on how a district court should reduce damages that are found to be unconstitutionally excessive.” While acknowledging that the award was “significant,” the court stated that it also “evidences the fervor with which the United States Congress was attempting to regulate the use of autodialers for non-consensual calls” and that “the unilateral slashing of an award does not only ignore the plain words of the statute, the task is devoid of objectivity.” Among other actions, the court granted the defendant’s request to amend the final judgment to reflect that allegations concerning “willful and/or knowing violations of the TCPA” were dismissed with prejudice and that the defendant succeeded at summary judgment on the FDCPA and state law claims. However, the court denied the defendant’s request to release any surplus or residue amounts not distributed to a class member back to the company. The court also approved the class counsel’s motion for more than $89 million in attorneys’ fees and non-taxable costs of $277,416.28, and awarded the named plaintiff a $25,000 service award.
2nd Circuit: Interest disclosure in collection letter did not violate FDCPA
On April 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of an FDCPA action, holding that a debt collection letter that stated interest, late charges, and other charges “may” vary from day to day is not deceptive or misleading. According to the opinion, the plaintiff co-signed a student loan that fell into default and was charged-off. The creditor purchased the debt and placed the account with a collection agency (collectively, defendants), and a letter was sent to the plaintiff that included a “‘time sensitive’ offer” to pay a slightly reduced amount, as well as the following language: “Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater.” The plaintiff filed a class action complaint against the defendants, claiming the letter violated the FDCPA because it suggested that late fees and other charges could accrue, even though “such charges are not legally or contractually available.” After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding more allegations. However, the amended complaint was marked as “deficient,” and because the 21-day window had closed, the plaintiff was required to request leave from either the defendants or the district court to re-file. The defendants did not consent to re-filing, and the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the 2nd Circuit first examined whether the plaintiff had timely filed her amended complaint. In concluding that the amended complaint was timely filed (notwithstanding the deficiency notice), the appellate court stated that “when a plaintiff properly amends her complaint after a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss that is still pending, the district court has the option of either denying the pending motion as moot or evaluating the motion in light of the facts alleged in the amended complaint.” However, the appellate court nevertheless concluded that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint on the merits because she failed to sufficiently state a plausible claim for relief. Furthermore, because the initial letter said that interest and late charges “may” be applied to the balance, the appellate court concluded that the letter was not inaccurate and therefore not deceptive or misleading under the FDCPA even though the debt collector had not previously charged interest and did not intend to do so in the future. Moreover, acknowledging that interest may accrue is not “threatening” language under the FDCPA, the appellate court wrote.