InfoBytes Blog
Filter
Subscribe to our InfoBytes Blog weekly newsletter and other publications for news affecting the financial services industry.
District Court: Bank originating mortgage loans is not a debt collector under FDCPA
On January 23, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed a putative class action suit, ruling that a national bank did not qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA. According to the order, the three plaintiffs defaulted on loans that were originated (or acquired via merger) by the bank. The loans were ultimately satisfied by the proceeds of related short sales of the plaintiffs’ homes. Following the satisfaction of the loans, the bank sent the plaintiffs letters that stated it would not report any negative information regarding the plaintiffs’ loans to the credit bureaus or charge any late fees for a period of 90 days due to the plaintiffs’ residences being located in a FEMA-declared disaster area. The plaintiffs alleged that these letters violated the FDCPA and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) because the bank “systematically misrepresent[ed] the status” of the plaintiffs’ satisfied loans as well as the plaintiffs’ “obligations under the loans.” The bank moved to dismiss arguing, among other things, that the FDCPA claims should be dismissed because the bank—as originator and owner of the loans—is not a debt collector under the FDCPA, and the complaint failed to contain any allegations supporting the assertion that the bank’s principal purpose as a business is the collection of debts. Moreover, the bank argued that the letters were sent purely for informational purposes, and as such, did not constitute an attempt to collect a debt under the FDCPA or FCCPA.
The court agreed with the bank, finding that the bank was “exempt from the definition of a debt collector” due to its status as the originator of the loans, and dismissed the FDCPA claims with prejudice. The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ FCCPA claims, finding that it lacked original jurisdiction over these claims because the plaintiffs failed to file a motion for class certification within 90 days of filing the complaint, as required under local rules.
New York enacts law covering collection of family member debts
On December 28, the New York governor signed S3491A, which amends the state’s general business law to add a section prohibiting principal creditors and/or debt collection agencies from making any representations that a person is required to pay the debt of a family member in a way that contravenes the FDCPA or that misrepresent the person’s obligation to pay such debts. The amendment defines “debt collection agency” as “a person, firm or corporation engaged in business, the principal purpose of which is to regularly collect or attempt to collect debts: (a) owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another; or (b) obtained by, or assigned to, such person, firm or corporation, that are in default when obtained or acquired by such person, firm or corporation.” The law is effective 90 days after enactment.
District Court dismisses non-borrower action against mortgage servicer
On January 11, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted a mortgage servicer’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit with prejudice brought by a homeowner’s widow alleging violations of, among other claims, TILA, RESPA, and FDCPA, for failing to include a credit-life-insurance provision in the loan note. According to the opinion, the plaintiff sued the mortgage servicer and mortgage originator after her husband passed and the servicer initiated foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff argued that her husband, who was the sole borrower, and the mortgage originator had an oral agreement to include a credit-life-provision in the mortgage loan note but the originator failed to include it. The mortgage servicer moved to dismiss the action arguing, among other things, that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action. Upon review, the court agreed with the mortgage servicer, determining that the plaintiff lacks standing under TILA, RESPA, and the FDCPA because she was neither an “obligor” nor “borrower” on the loan even though she was identified as a “borrower” on the Deed of Trust. Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiff’s alternative claim that she is a third-party beneficiary with standing to sue under the laws, finding that no valid contract existed as to the credit-life-insurance policy and therefore, the plaintiff could not claim to be a beneficiary of a non-existent contract. The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s other state law and fraud claims, finding she failed to provide sufficient facts to make the claims plausible.
6th Circuit holds elements of Michigan foreclosure process are collection efforts under FDCPA
On January 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that a debt collector should not allow the essential elements of a Michigan foreclosure to proceed after receiving a dispute letter under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, in September 2016, a debt collector sent a notice to a mortgage debtor informing the homeowner it intended to foreclose on the property, and two weeks later it began the Michigan state foreclosure process. After the process began, and within 30 days of receiving the debt collection notice, the mortgage debtor sent a certified dispute letter to the collector, challenging the validity of the debt. After receiving the dispute letter, the debt collector posted a foreclosure notice on the property and published notices in the newspaper. The debt collector never sent the mortgage debtor a verification of the debt. The mortgage debtor filed suit against the debt collector alleging violations of, among other things, the FDCPA. The district court granted summary judgment for the debt collector, holding that as a matter of law, the FDCPA did not require that the debt collector verify the debt and that it had “cease[d] collection of the debt” pursuant to the statute. The mortgage debtor appealed, arguing the district court (i) erred in its decision to end discovery and consider summary judgment, and (ii) erred in its interpretation of the FDCPA and its finding that the collector ceased collection efforts.
On appeal, the 6th Circuit rejected the mortgage debtor’s arguments that summary judgment was granted while there were outstanding discovery motions, concluding the debtor provided no evidence the debt collector failed to comply with discovery requests and noted that most of the motions were filed after discovery period expired. As for the FDCPA appeal, the court reversed the district court’s decision, concluding that, as a matter of law, the debt collector was required to intervene and stop the foreclosure actions that were put into motion prior to receiving the dispute letter. The appellate court agreed with the debtor that the newspaper advertisement and posted notice are necessary elements of the Michigan foreclosure process and therefore constituted “collection activity” under the FDCPA. Regardless of whether the debt collector personally took any actions after receiving the dispute letter, the appellate court concluded the debt collector had the responsibility to cancel any elements of the Michigan foreclosure process until it obtained sufficient verification of the debt.
District Court holds debt collector effectively stated account balance
On December 20, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of a debt collector, holding the collection letters effectively stated the amount of the debt under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, a consumer received four collection letters from a debt collector stating an account balance of $794.67. The consumer sued the debt collector, alleging the letters were false, deceptive, or misleading and failed to effectively state the amount of the debt in violation of the FDCPA because, according to the terms in the creditor’s online sample agreement, the original creditor could have collected interest on post-charge off fees after the debt collector closed the account. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court determined the collection letter at issue complied with the FDCPA because the debt collector “sought to collect only the amount due on the date it sent the letter” and was not “trying to collect the listed balance plus the interest running on it or other charges.” Moreover, the court rejected the consumer’s argument that the letter was false, deceptive, or misleading because it failed to include whether the creditor could charge additional interest or other fees on the original debt, determining the letter could not mislead or deceive an unsophisticated consumer. Specifically, citing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit’s decision in Wahl v. Midland Credit Management, the court stated that a debt collector “need only request the amount it is owed; it need not provide whatever the credit-card company may be owed more than that.” Because a consumer of reasonable intelligence and basic financial knowledge would read the collection letter and determine that he or she owes $794.67, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the debt collector.
7th Circuit holds consumers can be expected to read second page of two-page collection letter, affirms dismissal of FDCPA action
On December 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a consumer’s class action against a debt collection company for allegedly violating the FDCPA by indicating “additional important information” was on the back of the first page when the required validation notice was actually on the front of the second page. According to the opinion, the consumer alleged the debt collection notice “misleads the unsophisticated consumer by telling him that important information is on the back, but instead providing the validation notice on the front of the second page, thereby ‘overshadowing’ the consumer’s rights” under the FDCPA. The debt collector moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim and the district court granted the dismissal and declined to allow the consumer leave to amend the complaint.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit determined that the location of the validation notice—which “is clear, prominent, and readily readable”—did not overshadow the consumer’s FDCPA rights or misrepresent the importance of the notice, notwithstanding the language on the first page indicating the important information would be on the back of the first page, not on the top of the second page. The 7th Circuit explained, “The FDCPA does not say a debt collector must put the validation notice on the first page of a letter. Nor does the FDCPA say the first page of a debt-collection letter must point to the validation notice if it is not on the first page. Nor does the FDCPA say a debt collector must tell a consumer the validation notice is important. Nor does the FDCPA say a debt collector may not tell a consumer that other information is important.” The appellate court rejected the consumer’s unsophisticated consumer argument, concluding that "[e]ven an unsophisticated consumer—maybe especially one—can be expected to read page two of a two-page collection letter." Moreover, the appellate court upheld the denial of the consumer’s request to amend her complaint, noting that no proposed amendment would push the plaintiff’s “original claim into the realm of plausibility.”
Court certifies class in FDCPA action against student loan debt collector
On December 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey granted class certification to a group of borrowers alleging that a debt collection company misrepresented late charges accruing on student loan debt after default, in violation of the FDCPA section 1692e, among other sections. The lead plaintiff brought the action against the debt collector after receiving a letter regarding her defaulted federal Perkins student loans, which stated “[d]ue to interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater” even though the plaintiff later learned that Perkins loans cannot accrue late charges after default. After the FDCPA’s 1692e claim survived summary judgment, the plaintiff moved to certify the class, while the debt collector opposed the certification and separately moved to dismiss the class claim for lack of standing. In denying the motion to dismiss and granting certification, the court held the borrower had standing as she met the requirement of showing a concrete and particularized injury, stating “when a debt collector violates Section 1692e by providing false or misleading information, the informational injury that results—i.e., receipt of that false or misleading information—constitutes a concrete harm under Spokeo.” The court found that the borrower met the requirements for class certification, including the numerosity requirement as evidenced by the almost 3,000 letters sent by the debt collection company to New Jersey loan holders. Moreover, the court found that the class claims would predominate over individual ones since there exist common questions of law or fact insofar as class members received the same or substantially similar letters from the collector.
3rd Circuit reverses district court’s collateral estoppel ruling preventing plaintiff from pursuing debt collection claims
On November 29, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit reversed a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to a university and its debt collection firm (appellees) on the grounds that the issue had already been decided in state court, ordering the district court to reconsider the plaintiff/appellant’s discovery motions and whether it can “exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the appellees’ alleged violation of Pennsylvania law.
The plaintiff/appellant, a former university student, provided the appellees with a new address in Philadelphia after being contacted about unpaid tuition. When the debt remained unpaid, the appellees filed suit against him in Philadelphia municipal court but sent notices to a New Jersey address on file in the university’s system. The plaintiff/appellant did not appear in court and a default judgment was entered against him. The plaintiff/appellant petitioned to reopen the default judgment, arguing that the appellees had intentionally served his old address to avoid the personal service requirement in Philadelphia County. The municipal court dismissed the default judgment, despite finding that the appellees had not engaged in any intentional misconduct. Following a trial on the merits, the Philadelphia municipal court judge again ruled against the plaintiff/appellant for the full amount. Subsequently, the plaintiff/appellant filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging violations of the FDCPA and Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law; however, the federal court barred the deceptive service of process claim, finding that the municipal court had already ruled that the debt collectors’ actions were unintentional.
On appeal, the 3rd Circuit found that the district court had erred in ruling that collateral estoppel prevented the plaintiff/appellant from pursuing claims against the appellees simply because the municipal court judge said that he did not think the notices were intentionally served to the old address so a default judgment could be obtained. “Although the [m]unicipal [c]ourt’s finding may meet the first four elements of collateral estoppel, its determination that [a]ppellees did not intentionally serve [the plaintiff/appellant] at the wrong address was not essential to its judgment at that hearing, i.e., vacating the default judgment. In fact, its finding was contrary to this ultimate judgment,” the appellate court concluded. The appellate court also reversed the grant of summary judgment to the appellees on the plaintiff/appellant’s remaining FDCPA claims and remanded them to the district court to determine whether there had been “false and deceptive service of process; misconduct in opposing the opening of default judgment; and misstatements of the case caption, case number and court in the [c]ollection [l]etter.”
5th Circuit denies attorney’s fees in successful FDCPA action based on “outrageous facts”
On November 16, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit affirmed a Texas district court’s denial of attorney’s fees in an FDCPA action, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the fees based on the “outrageous facts” in the case. The decision results from a lawsuit filed by a consumer against a debt collector, alleging the company violated the FDCPA and the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA) by using the words “credit bureau” in its name despite having ceased to function as a consumer reporting agency, and therefore misrepresented itself as a credit bureau in an attempt to collect a debt. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation and found the company violated the FDCPA, granted summary judgment in part for the plaintiff (while denying the TDCA claims), and awarded her statutory damages of $1,000. The plaintiff then filed a motion for $130,410 in attorney’ fees, based on her attorney’s hourly rate of $450. The magistrate judge denied the attorney’s fees, noting that although violation of the FDCPA ordinarily justifies awards of attorneys’ fees, the amount claimed was “excessive by orders of magnitude,” and the lawsuit appeared to have been “created by counsel for the purpose of generating, in counsel’s own words, an ‘incredibly high fee request.’” The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s order.
On appeal, the 5th Circuit noted that other circuits have held there can be narrow exceptions to the FDCPA’s attorneys’ fees mandate, including the presence of bad faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff. In determining the “extreme facts” of the case justify the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees, the appeals court noted the almost 290 hours claimed to be worked by the attorneys are not reflected in the pleadings filed, which were “replete with grammatical errors, formatting issues, and improper citations.” The poor craftsmanship of the filings, the court noted, did not justify the $450 hourly rate charged.
7th Circuit affirms summary judgment for repossession company, holds property-retrieval fee is not subject to FDCPA
On October 31, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a third-party repossession company and an auto lender, holding that a fee that the repossession company required to process personal items left in a repossessed car did not constitute an impermissible demand for repayment under the FDCPA. According to the opinion, after a consumer fell behind on her auto payments, the third-party company repossessed her vehicle on behalf of the auto lender. The repossession company, according to the consumer, demanded a $100 payment in order to retrieve personal property she had left in the car. The consumer sued the company and the lender arguing that the retrieval fee was an impermissible debt collection in violation of the FDCPA. In response, the repossession company and the lender moved for summary judgment, arguing that the fee was an administrative handling fee that the lender had agreed to pay to the repossession company—not a fee assessed to the consumer. The lower court agreed.
On appeal, the 7th Circuit determined that the documentary evidence showed that the $100 fee was an administrative fee that the lender agreed to pay to the repossession company, stating “[t]here is no way on this record to view the handling fee as some sort of masked demand for principal payment to [the lender].” The appellate court concluded the consumer did not establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether the repossession company demanded the $100 payment on behalf of the lender and, therefore, affirmed summary judgment in favor of the repossession company and the lender.