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District Court grants defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in electronic signature case
On August 22, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted a defendant credit union’s motion to compel arbitration regarding a consumer’s signature on bank-owned equipment. According to the order, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 407 by transferring Social Security benefits from his savings account to his checking account to pay a debt. In March, a magistrate judge determined “that given ‘the liberal construction courts are to afford pro se complaints, it appears Plaintiff states a claim against [the defendant] at least for purposes of surviving screening’ and ordered that the case would proceed against [the defendant]” who filed the motion to compel arbitration. The order further noted that in support of their assertion, defendant provided documentation evidencing the plaintiff’s agreement to arbitrate all claims regarding his account. The defendant submitted an affidavit, a copy of the signature card that the plaintiff executed when he opened his account with the credit union, all subsequent signature cards executed by the plaintiff, and a copy of the “Important Account Information for Our Members,” among other things. According to the affidavit, the signature card the plaintiff executed when he opened his account included the “agreement to the terms and conditions outlined in the Important Account Information for Our Members,” and further indicated that the “[w]ritten notice we give you is effective when it is deposited in the United States Mail with proper postage and addressed to your mailing address we have on file.” The order noted that the “Notice of Change to the Terms and Conditions of Your Account was provided,” and “[t]hat document included a mandatory arbitration provision and the ability to opt out of arbitration.” The defendant argued “that by not exercising his right to opt-out, the agreement necessitates the action be moved into arbitration.” The plaintiff asserted that his signature was collected on an electronic device and because the signature was collected electronically, it was incorporated by fraud. The plaintiff also contended that he did not explicitly sign a document setting forth an arbitration clause because he only electronically input his signature to obtain a debit card.
According to the district court, the plaintiff “does not assert that he did not sign the signature card when he initially opened his account and received the debit card. He asserts that he never agreed to arbitrate his claims because he never received or signed an arbitration agreement.” The district court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration determining that a valid arbitration agreement existed between the parties and that the agreement encompasses the plaintiff’s claims. Among other things, the district court explained that “a valid arbitration agreement exists,” because the “signature card signed by [the plaintiff] certifies ‘[a]greement to the terms and conditions outlined in the Important Account Information For Our Members disclosure and any other material pertaining to the account.’” The district court further wrote that such “statement plainly refers to an external document, and plainly states that the [plaintiff] agreed to be bound by the terms contained therein. Moreover, [the plaintiff’s] assertion that he did not actually receive the Important Account Information For Our Members disclosure does not defeat the signature card’s statement that [the plaintiff] bound himself to the terms contained therein.” Additionally, by signing the signature card, the plaintiff agreed to arbitrate every claim arising from or relating in any way to his account.
District Court sends cryptocurrency hack suit to arbitration
On August 24, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted a motion to compel arbitration in an action claiming that a mobile communications company’s failure to protect the personal information of a cryptocurrency company founder allowed a hacker to steal $8.7 million in cryptocurrency. The cryptocurrency company and its founder sued the defendant citing violations of the Federal Communications Act and the New York Consumer Protection Act, along with numerous negligence claims. Plaintiff alleged that due to lack of safeguards, a hacker conducted an unauthorized “SIM swap” and used the plaintiff’s personal information to access his cryptocurrency wallets and exchange accounts. Plaintiff further claimed that even though it reported the SIM swap to the defendant, “[m]ore attacks continued to succeed over the following years.” The defendant moved to compel arbitration claiming that the plaintiff electronically signed receipts agreeing to terms and conditions which require the arbitration of disputes unless a customer opts-out. The plaintiff countered that “he was not shown the full terms and conditions to his service; that he could not conduct a ‘complete review and inspection’ of the digital receipt because of the screen’s small size, resolution, and inadequate backlighting; that the displayed receipt did not permit hyperlinked review of the full terms; that the display did not affirmatively seek his consent to arbitration by requiring he press a button or check a box; that the full terms were not separately provided in another form; and that his consent was not otherwise confirmed by [defendant] personnel.”
The court found that had the plaintiff “simply thought he was signing a receipt for equipment purchases–and had no idea that any terms and conditions were displayed on the digital device he signed–the court might have concluded that there remained a question of fact suitable for resolution by a jury.” However, the court found that the plaintiff “never claimed that he was unaware that his transactions with [defendant] carried terms and conditions” nor did he allege that he never received “a notice indicating the existence of the terms” even though the court specifically asked the parties to establish these facts in limited discovery. Accordingly, the court ruled that the plaintiff was on notice of defendant’s terms and agreed to them, thus compelling arbitration.
District Court rules nonsignatory to credit card agreement cannot compel arbitration in debt collection case
On July 11, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied a law firm defendant’s motion to compel arbitration in an FDCPA case. According to the order, the plaintiff’s credit card, opened with a South Dakota-based bank, was stolen and charged more than $8,500. The plaintiff claimed that the original creditor did not investigate, refused to remove the charges, and attempted to collect on the debt. The creditor filed suit against the plaintiff to collect, and the plaintiff sought to move the case to arbitration. The creditor placed the account with the defendant, a debt collection law firm, whom the plaintiff then sued in federal court alleging unlawful collection attempts. The defendant sought to compel arbitration, based on the arbitration clause in the original agreement between the plaintiff and the creditor. The district court held that South Dakota law governed the card agreement, and a court ruling from that state’s Supreme Court held that nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement can compel arbitration only where (i) the plaintiff alleged “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct” between the signatory and nonsignatory; or (ii) the plaintiff’s claims against the nonsignatory arises out of the agreement. The district court stated that the plaintiff did not allege, nor could the district court infer, that the defendant worked “in concert” with the creditor to unlawfully collect the debt, but rather that it did not follow reasonable procedures under the FDCPA. Additionally, the district court held that the plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the nonsignatory defendant could not rely on the provision to compel arbitration.
11th Circuit reversal emphasizes “harmonized” TILA, FDCPA statements
On June 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an individual claiming to have acted as a custodian of an account and not in her personal capacity must arbitrate claims brought against a national bank (defendant). The plaintiff and her mother co-owned an investment account that was eventually transferred to the defendant. The plaintiff’s mother notified the bank that the plaintiff would remain co-owner of the account and signed a brokerage account application containing an arbitration clause. Several years later, after the plaintiff noticed that numerous withdrawals were being made from the account by another family member, she obtained legal guardianship of her mother and applied for another brokerage account in order to move the funds to a new account she could access and oversee. The application included a brokerage agreement (which listed her mother as the account owner and was signed by the plaintiff as a joint account owner/custodian and as the primary applicant). The agreement contained a clause requiring arbitration of “[a]ll controversies that may arise between you, us and [the broker] concerning any subject matter, issue or circumstance whatsoever (including, but not limited to, controversies concerning any Account, order or transaction, or the continuation, performance, interpretation or breach of this or any other agreement between you, us and [the broker], whether entered into or arising before, on or after the date this Account is opened).”
The plaintiff eventually sued the bank alleging theft, aiding and abetting theft and fraud, and negligence, among other claims. The plaintiff contended that she was not bound by the arbitration agreement because she signed the agreement “not in her personal capacity, but as her mother’s guardian,” and that there is no arbitrable issue because her personal claims did not arise from the agreement. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration after determining the plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant fraudulently obtained her signature.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit interpreted the word “you” in the arbitration clause as referring to the plaintiff “as the person who applied for the account and signed the application.” In determining that the plaintiff is a signatory to the defendant’s agreement, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiff “has not alleged that her signature was nonvoluntary or otherwise fraudulently obtained[,]” and thus is bound by the arbitration clause. Moreover, the 11th Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that her claims are not covered by the arbitration clause, writing that the “clause explicitly contemplates disputes arising from other issues or agreements ‘whether entered into or arising before, on or after the date this Account is opened.’”
9th Circuit to rehear en banc whether tribal lenders can arbitrate RICO claims
On June 6, a majority of nonrecused active judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a previously issued opinion that said tribal lenders could arbitrate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) class action claims, saying it will rehear the case en banc. As previously covered by InfoBytes, last September the 9th Circuit panel majority concluded that “an agreement delegating to an arbitrator the gateway question of whether the underlying arbitration agreement is enforceable must be upheld unless that specific delegation provision is itself unenforceable.” The panel reviewed whether California residents who received loans from an online lender were allowed to pursue class RICO claims based on allegations that they were charged interest rates exceeding state limits from lenders claiming tribal immunity. The district court granted class certification and ruled that the entire arbitration agreement, including provisions containing a class action waiver, was unenforceable. On appeal, the panel majority cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, which determined, among other things, that when a party challenges an entire agreement—not just an arbitration provision—deciding “gateway” issues such as enforceability must be delegated to an arbitrator. “[W]hen there is a clear delegation provision, that question is . . . for the arbitrator to decide so long as the delegation provision itself does not eliminate parties’ rights to purse their federal remedies,” the majority wrote. The dissenting judge held, however, that the panel majority “misunderstood the effect of the choice-of-law provisions in the agreements,” arguing that the provisions curtail an arbitrator’s authority by allowing application of “only tribal law and a small and irrelevant subset of federal law,” thus preventing an arbitrator “from applying the law necessary to determine whether the delegation provisions and the arbitration agreements are valid.” He further contended that the panel majority’s decision diverged from decisions reached by several sister circuits, which “have consistently condemned the arbitration agreements embedded in tribal internet payday loan agreements, including those used by the very same lenders as in this case.”
Special Alert: Eleventh Circuit upholds terms of arbitration agreement in challenge under Dodd-Frank
On May 26, 2022, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a published decision holding that the Dodd-Frank Act does not prohibit the enforceability of delegation clauses contained in consumer arbitration agreements “in any way.” This opinion is of potentially broad significance in the class action and arbitration space since it is one of the first appellate decisions in the country concerning Dodd-Frank’s arbitration provision and supports broad enforcement of delegation clauses even where a statute could allegedly prohibit arbitration of the underlying claim.
In Attix v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denying Carrington’s motion to compel arbitration that was based on the plaintiff’s argument that the anti-waiver provision in the Dodd-Frank Act, prohibited enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The anti-waiver provision of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that “no other agreement between the consumer and the creditor relating to the residential mortgage loan or extension of credit . . . shall be applied or interpreted so as to bar a consumer from bringing an action in an appropriate district court of the United States.” The district court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the Dodd-Frank Act prohibited arbitration of the underlying dispute and in doing so, side-stepped the delegation clause that delegated such threshold determinations to an arbitrator.
In a 52-page published opinion, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that the Dodd-Frank Act does not prohibit enforcing delegation clauses, such as the clause at issue, which “clearly and unmistakably” delegates to the arbitrator “threshold arbitrability disputes.” The circuit court found that in such circumstances, all questions of arbitrability are delegated to an arbitrator “unless the law prohibits the delegation of threshold arbitrability issues itself.”
The court went on to broadly hold that the Dodd-Frank Act does not prohibit the enforceability of delegation clauses “in any way.” In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit explained that if Dodd-Frank had been intended to prohibit the enforcement of delegation clauses, then it could have been drafted that way, but instead, “the actual statute is silent as to who may decide whether a particular contract falls within the scope of its protections.” While the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits arbitration agreements from being applied or interpreted in a particular manner, it does not prohibit the enforcement of delegation clauses, and as a result, the court held that under the terms of Carrington and the plaintiff’s agreement, the arbitrator (and not the court) must determine the threshold question of whether the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits enforcement of Carrington’s arbitration agreement since it is a “quintessential arbitrability question.”
Significantly, the court also held that a challenge to an agreement to arbitrate on the basis that a statute precludes its enforcement is not a “specific challenge” to a delegation clause found within the arbitration agreement, such that the court lacks jurisdiction to review the enforceability of the delegation clause. In other words, where a challenge “is only about the enforceability of the parties’ primary arbitration agreement” and there is a delegation clause, “an arbitrator must resolve it.” As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “when an appeal presents a delegation agreement and a question of arbitrability, we stop. We do not pass go.”
This case has significance for anyone considering drafting an arbitration agreement particularly in a class action context. A threshold drafting question is whether or not to delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator or allow a court to resolve the issue. Under this decision, a question of whether a statute bars arbitration of claims is for the arbitrator to decide when there is a delegation clause, unless the statute also explicitly bars delegation clauses. This decision reinforces that inclusion of a properly drafted delegation clause in an arbitration agreement can result in a case improperly filed in court being more quickly sent to arbitration, even where the dispute is whether a statute prohibits the claim from being arbitrated in the first instance.
Buckley represented Carrington on appeal with a team comprising Fredrick Levin, who argued the appeal, Scott Sakiyama, Brian Bartholomay, and Sarah Meehan. For questions regarding the case, please contact one of the team members or a Buckley attorney with whom you have worked in the past.
District Court orders evidence showing customer agreed to arbitration clause in clickwrap agreement
On April 15, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ordered a defendant “teledentristry” practice to file a declaration evidencing a clickwrap agreement that shows that the plaintiff assented to an arbitration agreement in an addendum to a retail installment contract. The plaintiff filed a putative class action claiming the defendant failed to comply with consumer protection licensing requirements and made misleading and false representations to consumers about the scope of its services and the provided dental care. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, stating that when customers create an account on the defendant’s website, they are required to affirmatively check a clickwrap checkbox to provide informed consent and must agree to the defendant’s terms and conditions before finalizing the registration process. The checkbox is not pre-checked, the defendant stated, and customers can view the full terms and conditions when clicking on the hyperlinks for each policy. The defendant maintained that if the plaintiff had clicked on the “Informed Consent” hyperlink, he would have been presented with the arbitration clause. The defendant also claimed that its servers log customers’ electronic assent to the terms and conditions and provided evidence purportedly showing that the plaintiff accepted the terms and conditions. The plaintiff countered that he did not assent to the arbitration agreement.
The arbitration dispute concerns whether the plaintiff assented to the arbitration agreement, whether the agreement is valid and enforceable, and whether the agreement delegates questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator and not the court. According to the court, the defendant failed to show sufficient evidence that the plaintiff agreed to the arbitration agreement and stated it will issue a ruling once the defendant provides additional evidence showing what the plaintiff would have seen when he allegedly assented to the clickwrap agreement, as well as “the circumstances under which [plaintiff] received and allegedly assented to the addendum to the retail installment contract.” The court’s order also granted plaintiff’s motion to further amend the complaint but denied plaintiff’s motion to remand on the grounds that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 conferred subject-matter jurisdiction upon the court.
9th Circuit affirms district court’s ruling in TCPA case
On April 5, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision denying a defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action under the TCPA. The defendants were a digital marketing company and a debt-relief service company. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs visited the defendants’ websites, but allegedly did not see a notice in fine print stating, “I understand and agree to the Terms & Conditions which includes mandatory arbitration.” The underlined phrases “Terms & Conditions” and “Privacy Policy” were hyperlinks, but they appeared in the same gray font as the rest of the sentence. The marketing company and one of the defendants allegedly used the consumer’s contact information to conduct a telemarketing campaign on behalf of the debt relief companies by allegedly placing unsolicited telephone calls and text messaging consumers. The plaintiffs filed a putative class action, alleging that the calls and text messages were made without their consent, and therefore violated the TCPA. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that, by clicking on the “continue” buttons, the plaintiffs had agreed to the mandatory arbitration provision hyperlinked in the terms and conditions. The district court denied the defendants’ motion, concluding “that the content and design of the webpages did not conspicuously indicate to users that, by clicking on the ‘continue’ button, they were agreeing to [the service company’s] terms and conditions.”
On appeal, the 9th Circuit agreed with the district court, finding that the digital marketing company’s website did not contain a reasonably conspicuous notice of its terms and conditions. The 9th Circuit ruled that such notice must be expressly displayed in a font size and format where it can be deemed that a reasonable Internet visitor saw it and was aware of it. The appellate court noted that, on the websites at issue, “[t]he text disclosing the existence of the terms and conditions … is the antithesis of conspicuous,” and that “is printed in a tiny gray font considerably smaller than the font used in the surrounding website elements, and indeed in a font so small that it is barely legible to the naked eye. The comparatively larger font used in all of the surrounding text naturally directs the user's attention everywhere else.” The 9th Circuit also held that, “while it is permissible to disclose terms and conditions through a hyperlink, the fact that a hyperlink is present must be readily apparent. …[T]he design of the hyperlinks must put such a user on notice of their existence.”
California Court of Appeal: Plaintiffs bound to arbitration in online license agreement
On March 29, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District held that plaintiffs are bound to the terms of an arbitration agreement contained in a defendant video game company’s online license agreement, reversing a trial court’s finding that there was no conspicuous notice of an arbitration agreement and that a reasonably prudent user would not have had notice. According to the opinion, the plaintiff minor used “real money” to make in-game purchases of “loot boxes,” which offered players “randomized chances” to obtain desirable or helpful items. The minor and his father (collectively, “plaintiffs”) sued the defendant, alleging the sale of these loot boxes constituted unlawful gambling, and, thus, violated the California Unfair Competition Law. The defendant moved to compel arbitration based on a dispute resolution policy incorporated into various iterations of the online license agreement that users were presented when they signed up for, downloaded, and used the defendant’s service. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for the reasons stated above, which the defendant appealed. In addition to agreeing to an end-user license agreement containing an arbitration provision when the plaintiff initially registered and downloaded the game, the defendant maintained that the plaintiff agreed to arbitration several times when the license agreement was updated.
Reviewing whether the defendant’s various notices sent to the plaintiff minor before the purchase of the loot boxes were sufficient to compel arbitration, the Court of Appeal concluded that the pop-up presenting an updated license agreement, which was the operative agreement when the plaintiff minor purchased the loot boxes, “provided sufficiently conspicuous notice.” The court also determined that the notice of arbitration itself appeared in a scrollable text box that included a section clearly titled dispute resolution, and that by clicking the “Continue” button the user was agreeing to all the terms of the license agreement. Specifically, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff minor could not have continued to use the defendant’s service if he did not click the “Continue” button. “In the context of the transaction at issue, we conclude [defendant’s] pop-up notice provided sufficiently conspicuous notice of the arbitration agreement such that Plaintiffs are bound by it,” the Court of Appeal wrote.
Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirms denial of arbitration in online contract formation case
Earlier this year, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a lower court’s decision to deny a ride-sharing company’s motion to compel arbitration in case concerning the enforceability of contracts formed through a smart phone application. In agreeing with the plaintiff that the terms and conditions were not binding under the circumstances, the Court concluded that the plaintiff was not provided reasonable notice of, nor manifested her assent to, binding arbitration when she clicked “DONE” after setting up her account and entering payment information. The Court characterized the company’s rider registration process as a “sign-in wrap agreement,” in which the plaintiff was informed she was assenting to the terms by creating an account, instead of having to affirmatively signify agreement with the terms. The Court stated that while it has not yet considered the enforceability of online contracts, “other courts have held that the formation of online contracts is governed by the same principles as traditional contracts.” The Court analyzed the enforceability of a sign-in wrap agreement using the following three components: (i) “Conspicuous terms or access to terms: The more likely that the user must at least view, if not read, the terms themselves as a condition of utilizing the website or the product, the more likely that a court will hold that the terms are binding”; (ii) “Uncluttered screen: Where notice or the hyperlink to agreement terms appears on an interface that is cluttered with other features and therefore is not easily spotted, an agreement is less likely to be binding on the user”; and (iii) “Explicit manner of expressing assent: The more obvious the user’s assent to terms, the more likely the terms will be binding.”
The Court determined that the plaintiff did not have reasonable notice because the hyperlink containing the terms was presented in muted gray coloring, was “not obviously identifiable as a hyperlink,” and the sequence in which it appeared during the registration process “render[ed] it relatively inconspicuous” and made it less likely to draw the user’s attention, particularly because the focus of the registration process was on entering payment information rather than on the terms. The Court distinguished its conclusion from a decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Meyer v. Uber Technologies Inc., et al. (covered by InfoBytes here), which the company heavily relied upon. In Meyer, the 2nd Circuit upheld contract formation on the grounds that a “reasonably prudent smartphone user” would have been on “reasonably conspicuous notice” of the terms and conditions of service and that the text beneath the registration button put the plaintiff on notice that clicking “REGISTER” meant acceptance of those terms—regardless of whether he actually reviewed them. “The interface in Meyer increased the likelihood that the terms would come to the user’s attention—the hyperlink text to the terms in Meyer was underlined and in blue, and the hyperlink itself appeared in close proximity to the “REGISTER” button,” the Court wrote.
The Court further concluded that the plaintiff did not manifest her assent to the terms because a reasonably prudent user would conclude that by clicking “DONE” she was only entering her payment information given the heading of the window read “LINK PAYMENT.” While the court acknowledged that the hyperlink containing the terms was on the same page as the “DONE” button, the notice did not state that “By clicking DONE, you agree to the Terms.”
The Court concluded that the company “could have designed its rider app to incorporate scrollwrap or clickwrap contracts that provided adequate notice of [the company’s] original and updated Terms and required consumers to express actual assent” but “apparently decided not to do so.” Furthermore, the Court found that a subsequent email notifying users of updates to the terms (which also required arbitration) did not obligate the plaintiff to arbitrate her dispute because the email did not require users to read or acknowledge the updated terms to remain registered as rider.