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  • House passes bill to let SEC go back 14 years on disgorgement

    Federal Issues

    On November 18, the U.S. House passed the Investor Protection and Capital Markets Fairness Act (H.R. 4344) by a vote of 314-95. The bill, which was received in the Senate, would overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which limits the SEC’s disgorgement power and subjects the agency to the five-year statute of limitations applicable to penalties and fines. (Previously covered by InfoBytes here.) As discussed in a recent Buckley article, in Kokesh’s wake, H.R. 4344 would amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by specifically authorizing the SEC to seek disgorgement and restitution, putting to rest the threshold question of whether the SEC has the authority to seek disgorgement. Notably, on November 1, the Court granted certiorari in SEC v. Liu to answer this very question. If signed into the law, H.R. 4344 would allow the SEC 14 years to pursue disgorgement in federal court under the statute of limitations.

    Federal Issues U.S. House SEC Federal Legislation Disgorgement U.S. Supreme Court

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  • Government says CFPB should have authority to continue enforcement actions even if declared unconstitutional

    Courts

    On November 6, the CFPB and the DOJ filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the Bureau should still “have the authority to commence or continue enforcement proceedings” in the event that the Court declares the Bureau’s structure unconstitutional. The brief was filed in response to a petition for writ of certiorari by two Mississippi-based payday loan and check cashing companies (collectively, “petitioners”) urging the Court to grant certiorari before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit renders a decision on a challenge to the Bureau’s single-director structure. The petitioners are not only challenging the Bureau’s structure but also arguing that the asserted constitutional violation requires the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit brought by the Bureau.

    The government argues that dismissal of the underlying enforcement action is not the way to remedy a constitutional structure violation, at least in a situation where “an official fully accountable to the President determines that it should go forward.” The brief notes that, in this case, then-Acting Director Mulvaney, to whom the Bureau has argued the limitation to for-cause removal did not apply, had ratified the enforcement action against petitioners at issue. While the Bureau and the DOJ acknowledge that lower courts “have not yet addressed the particular issue here,” they make the case that “the few reasoned decisions that address related issues are in accord: A separation-of-powers problem with an agency does not compel invalidation of the agency’s actions if those actions are subsequently approved in compliance with separation-of-powers requirements.”

    In its brief, the Bureau and the DOJ also argue that questions presented to the Court do not warrant review of the case before the 5th Circuit has an opportunity to rule. The government emphasizes that the Court has already agreed to hear a different case, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, to answer the question of whether an independent agency led by a single director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers under Article II (covered by InfoBytes here). In doing so the Court also directed the parties to that action to brief and argue whether 12 U.S.C. §5491(c)(3), which established removal of the Bureau’s single director only for cause, is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act, should it be found to be unconstitutional.

    Courts CFPB Single-Director Structure U.S. Supreme Court Fifth Circuit Appellate

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  • House tells Supreme Court CFPB structure is constitutional

    Courts

    On October 4, the U.S. House of Representatives filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the CFPB’s structure is constitutional. The brief was filed in response to a petition for writ of certiorari by a law firm, contesting a May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that, among other things, the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The House filed its brief after the amicus deadline, but requested its motion to file be granted because it only received notice that the Bureau changed its position on the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure the day before the filing deadline. As previously covered by InfoBytes, on September 17, the DOJ and the CFPB filed a brief with the Court arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; and on the same day, Director Kraninger sent letters (see here and here) to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) supporting the same argument.

    The brief, which was submitted by the Office of General Counsel for the House, argues that the case “presents an issue of significant important to the House” and, because the Solicitor General “has decided not to defend” Congress’ enactment of the for-cause removal protection through the Dodd-Frank Act, the “House should be allowed to do so.” The brief asserts that the 9th Circuit correctly held that the Bureau’s structure is constitutional based on the D.C. Circuit’s majority in the 2018 en banc decision in PHH v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert). Moreover, the brief argues that when an agency is “headed by a single individual, the lines of Executive accountability—and Presidential control—are even more direct than in a multi-member agency,” as the President has the authority to remove the individual should they be failing in their duty. Such a removal will “‘transform the entire CFPB and the execution of the consumer protection laws it enforces.’”

    Courts CFPB Single-Director Structure Dodd-Frank U.S. House U.S. Supreme Court Ninth Circuit Appellate D.C. Circuit Amicus Brief

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  • District Court: New York’s interest on escrow law not preempted by National Bank Act

    Courts

    On September 30, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the National Bank Act (NBA) does not preempt a New York law requiring interest on mortgage escrow accounts. According to the opinion, plaintiffs brought a pair of putative class actions against a national bank seeking interest on funds deposited into their mortgage escrow accounts, as required by New York General Obligation Law § 5-601. The bank moved to dismiss both complaints, arguing that the NBA preempts the state law. The district court disagreed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract can proceed, while dismissing the others. The court concluded there is “clear evidence that Congress intended mortgage escrow accounts, even those administered by national banks, to be subject to some measure of consumer protection regulation.” As for the OCC’s 2004 preemption regulation, the court determined that there is no evidence that “at this time, the agency gave any thought whatsoever to the specific question raised in this case, which is whether the NBA preempts escrow interest laws,” citing to and agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America (which held that a national bank must comply with a California law that requires mortgage lenders to pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts, previously covered by InfoBytes here). Lastly, the court applied the preemption standard from the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, and found that the law does not “significantly interfere” with the banks’ power to administer mortgage escrow accounts, noting that it only “requires the Bank to pay interest on the comparatively small sums” deposited into the accounts and does not “bar the creation of mortgage escrow accounts, or subject them to state visitorial control, or otherwise limit the terms of their use.”

    Courts State Issues National Bank Act Escrow Preemption Ninth Circuit Appellate U.S. Supreme Court Mortgages

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  • CFPB informs two courts its director structure is unconstitutional

    Courts

    On September 18, the CFPB issued letters in pending litigation to inform the courts that it was changing its position regarding the constitutionality of the for-cause removal provision of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). As previously covered by InfoBytes, the DOJ and the CFPB filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. The brief was filed in response to a petition for a writ of certiorari by a law firm contesting the May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that, among other things, the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional. The brief noted that, since the appellate opinion was issued, “the Director has reconsidered that position and now agrees that the removal restriction is unconstitutional.” The Bureau has now issued letters (available here and here) to the 9th Circuit in two cases noting that the Bureau will no longer defend the constitutionality of the for-cause removal restriction. The Bureau also submitted a similar letter with the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. In each letter, the Bureau argues that, while it now believes the for-cause removal provision is unconstitutional, this does not change its position with regard to the judgments made in any of the cases, noting that the provision should be severed from the rest of the CFPA.

    Courts CFPB Single-Director Structure Dodd-Frank CFPA Ninth Circuit Appellate U.S. Supreme Court DOJ

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  • Kraninger tells Supreme Court CFPB structure is unconstitutional

    Courts

    On September 17, the DOJ and the CFPB filed a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. The brief was filed in response to a petition for a writ of certiorari by a law firm, contesting the May decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that (i) the Bureau’s single-director structure is constitutional, and that (ii) the district court did not err when it granted the Bureau’s petition to enforce a law firm’s compliance with a 2017 civil investigative demand (CID) (previously covered by InfoBytes here). The brief cites to a DOJ filing in opposition to a 2018 cert petition, which also concluded that the Bureau’s structure is unconstitutional by infringing on the president’s responsibility to ensure that federal laws are faithfully executed, but urged the Court to deny that writ as the case was a “poor vehicle” for the constitutionality consideration (previously covered by InfoBytes here).

    In contrast to the December brief, the DOJ now asserts that the present case is a “suitable vehicle for resolving the important question,” noting that only the constitutional question was presented to the Court and the 9th Circuit has stayed its CID mandate until final disposition of the case with the Court. Moreover, the government argues that until the Court resolves the constitutionality question of the Bureau’s structure, “those subject to the agency’s regulation or enforcement can (and often will) raise the issue as a defense to the Bureau’s efforts to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law.” While the Bureau previously defended the single-director structure to the 9th Circuit, the brief notes that since the May decision was issued, “the Director has reconsidered that position and now agrees that the removal restriction is unconstitutional.”

    On the same day, Director Kraninger sent letters (here and here) to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) supporting the argument that the for-cause restriction on the president’s authority to remove the Bureau’s single Director, violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. Kraninger notes that while she is urging the Court to grant the pending petition for certiorari to resolve the constitutionality question, her position on the matter “does not affect [her] commitment to fulfilling the Bureau’s statutory responsibilities” and that should the Court find the structure unconstitutional, “the [Consumer Financial Protection Act] should remain ‘fully operative,’ and the Bureau would ‘continue to function as before,’ just with a Director who “may be removed at will by the [President.]’”

    Courts DOJ CFPB Single-Director Structure Appellate Ninth Circuit CIDs U.S. Supreme Court

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  • District Court says TCPA dismissal bid cannot rely upon Supreme Court ruling

    Courts

    On September 3, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a medical laboratory’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the company cannot use a Supreme Court ruling to avoid a proposed TCPA class action suit concerning allegations that it made unsolicited calls using an “autodialer.” As previously covered by InfoBytes, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss last December after it concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the equipment used to make unsolicited calls qualified as an “autodialer.” The defendant argued, however, that the court should reconsider its decision in light of a 2019 Supreme Court ruling in which separate concurring opinions written by Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas concluded that district courts are not bound by the FCC’s interpretation of the term “autodialer” under the TCPA. According to the defendant, because of these concurring opinions, the court “was not bound by the FCC’s 2003 and 2008 guidance on the definition of an ‘autodialer,’” and should therefore revisit its prior opinion. However, the court stated that the Supreme Court’s case does not change any of the “controlling law” dealing with the TCPA issue in the current lawsuit. “Because defendant’s arguments are not based on any actual change in controlling law,” its motion for reconsideration is denied, the court stated, noting that concurring opinions “do not change ‘controlling law.’”

    Courts TCPA Class Action U.S. Supreme Court Autodialer

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  • McDonnell rule does not apply to the FCPA, says 2nd Circuit

    Courts

    On August 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed the conviction of a Chinese real estate developer arising from the alleged bribery of United Nations officials. In affirming the conviction, the court held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in McDonnell v. U.S.—that, in cases brought under the domestic federal anti-bribery statute, the government must show that the bribe was paid in exchange for an “official act”—does not apply to prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or 18 U.S.C. § 666, a federal anti-corruption law related to federal funds.

    In the most recent case, a federal jury convicted the developer of paying bribes and gratuities to United Nations officials in violation of the FCPA and 18 U.S.C. § 666. The developer appealed the conviction and argued, among other things, that the jury should have been instructed that the bribe must have be paid for an “official act,” in light of McDonnell. On appeal, the 2nd Circuit rejected the developer’s arguments, explaining that the FCPA and 18 U.S.C. § 666 target a broader set of bribery goals than the statute at issue in McDonnell. Specifically, the court noted that the FCPA and 18 U.S.C. § 666 prohibit giving anything of value in exchange for specific “quos” that do not include reference to an “official act.” Thus, based on the “textual differences among various bribery statutes,” the appellate court concluded that the “official act” standard does not apply to prosecutions under the FCPA or 18. U.S.C. § 666.

    Courts FCPA Appellate Second Circuit U.S. Supreme Court Bribery Of Interest to Non-US Persons

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  • Supreme Court holds that creditor may be held in civil contempt for violation of bankruptcy discharge injunction

    Courts

    On June 3, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that a creditor may be held in civil contempt for violating a bankruptcy court’s discharge order “if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.” At issue was Section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifies that a discharge order triggers an automatic injunction against any creditor that attempts to collect a pre-bankruptcy discharged debt.  In the case before the Court, a defendant to a lawsuit proceeding in state court filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy during the course of that litigation.  After the bankruptcy court entered a discharge order, the state court ordered the debtor to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. While the monetary judgment would have ordinarily violated the discharge, the state court concluded that it was permissible under a lower-court doctrine holding that the discharge no longer applies when a debtor “return[s] to the fray” of litigation after filing for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court appellate panel vacated the bankruptcy court’s decision and the  9th Circuit affirmed, concluding that a creditor may not be held in contempt for violating a discharge order if the creditor held a subjective good faith belief—even if “unreasonable”—that its actions did not violate the injunction.

    Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit’s opinion, noting that the standard for civil contempt “is generally an objective one,” and nothing about a bankruptcy court discharge order should modify that principle.  The Supreme Court emphasized that “a party’s subjective belief that [the party] was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate [the party] from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable,” and that civil contempt “may be appropriate when the creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order or the statutes that govern its scope.” The -debtor’s argument for a standard that would operate like a “strict-liability” standard—where creditors who are unsure of whether a debt has been discharged can obtain an advance determination from the bankruptcy court prior to attempting to collect the debt—was also rejected. The Supreme Court stated that because “there will often be at least some doubt as to the scope of such orders,” a preclearance requirement may “lead to frequent use of the advance determination procedure,” as well as additional costs and delays.

    Courts U.S. Supreme Court Bankruptcy

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  • Supreme Court holds FCA relators have 10 years to bring nonintervened suit

    Courts

    On May 13, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that a relator has up to 10 years to bring a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act (FCA) whether or not the government intervenes in the suit. According to the opinion, in November 2013, a relator brought a suit against two defense contractors alleging they defrauded the U.S. Government by submitting false payment claims for security services in Iraq through early 2007. The relator claimed he told federal officials about the allegedly fraudulent conduct in November 2010, but the Government declined to intervene. The defendants moved to dismiss the action as barred by the six year statute of limitations under 31 U. S. C. §3730(b)(1), while the relator claimed the action was timely under §3730(b)(2)— which states that a FCA civil action may not be brought “more than 3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances, but in no event more than 10 years after the date on which the violation is committed.” The district court dismissed the action, while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed the decision, concluding that §3730(b)(2) applies in “nonintervened actions, and the limitations period begins when the Government official responsible for acting knew or should have known the relevant facts.”

    Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ argument that the six year statute of limitations in §3731(b)(1) applies to all relator-initiated actions (whether the Government intervenes or not), while § 3731(b)(2) applies only to qui tam actions when the Government intervenes, arguing the interpretation is “at odds with fundamental rules of statutory interpretation.” Moreover, the Court concluded that the relator in a nonintervened suit is not “the official of the United States” whose knowledge triggers §3731(b)(2)’s three-year limitations period, as it was not what Congress intended, and a private relator is neither “appointed as an officer of the United States nor employed by the United States.”  

    Courts U.S. Supreme Court False Claims Act / FIRREA Whistleblower Financial Crimes

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