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Shaw v. United States - Supreme Court Holds That Fraud Against Customer Can Be Fraud Against Bank
In Shaw v. United States, No. 15-5991 (Dec. 12, 2016), the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that Lawrence Eugene Shaw had defrauded a national bank when he used a customer’s personal details to transfer more than $275,000 from that bank’s customer’s account to his own PayPal account. In an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court rejected Shaw’s arguments that the conviction was inappropriate because prosecutors could not prove that Shaw intended to defraud the bank. The Court held, among other things, that: (i) the bank had a property interest in the customer’s deposits; (ii) the defendant’s ignorance of the application of property laws to bank deposits was not a defense; and (iii) the bank fraud statute does not require the government to prove that the defendant intended that the bank would suffer a loss; rather, his knowledge that the bank likely would suffer a loss was sufficient.
Despite this finding, the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the conviction and remanded it to the appellate court for consideration of whether a claimed defect in the jury instructions was properly preserved for appeal, whether the instructions were defective, and whether any resulting error was harmless.
Supreme Court Weighs in on Insider Trading in Salman v United States
In its first insider trading decision in nearly two decades, the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously to uphold an insider trading conviction of an individual who traded while aware of material non-public information received from a friend who received no financial benefit in exchange. Salman v. United States, No. 15-628, 2016 WL 7078448 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2016).
The defendant in Salman was convicted in 2013 for trading on confidential information obtained through his brother-in-law even though Salmon he gained no tangible financial benefit. The appeal thus presented the Justices with the central question of how to define a “personal benefit” garnered from insider information. In upholding Salman’s conviction, the Supreme Court affirmed that a user of financial tips breaches fiduciary duty with respect to “insider information” from a relative, whether or not the person giving the information receives a tangible financial benefit. In so holding, the Court also undercuts a narrower interpretation in a case decided by the Second Circuit in 2014 that held that the person who provides the tips must receive something of value in exchange for inside information given to family or friends.
Full D.C. Circuit Orders PHH to Respond to CFPB's Petition for En Banc Review, Invites U.S. Solicitor General to Provide Views
On November 23, the full D.C. Circuit ordered PHH to respond to the CFPB's petition for en banc review of the October 2016 three-judge panel decision in PHH Corp. v. CFPB. The CFPB’s November 18 petition challenged, among other things, the conclusion by the majority of the panel that the CFPB's structure was unconstitutional and that, to remedy this defect, the Director must be removable at will by the President. PHH’s response, which is due by December 8, would not have been permitted without the court’s order. Similarly, the CFPB is not permitted to file a reply unless ordered by the court. Importantly, the en banc court also “invited” the U.S. Solicitor General “to file a response to the petition” to “express[] the views of the United States.” Although there is no deadline for this response, the invitation allows the Solicitor General to respond before the change in administration, which may be significant because the Dodd-Frank Act does not allow the CFPB to petition the Supreme Court for review without the approval of the Attorney General (12 USC § 5564(e)).
For additional background, please see our summaries of the panel decision and the CFPB's petition for rehearing.
CFPB Requests Rehearing of Decision Threatening Agency's Structure
Earlier today, the CFPB filed its much-anticipated response in PHH Corp. v. CFPB, requesting reconsideration by the full D.C. Circuit. As discussed in our special alert, on October 11, 2016, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated the CFPB’s $109 million penalty against PHH under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). In addition, a majority of the panel held that, to resolve a constitutional defect in the CFPB’s structure, the Director was removable by the President at will, meaning that President Trump could remove Director Cordray upon taking office. However, the panel’s decision is stayed until seven days after the court rules on the CFPB’s request.
Rather than proceeding directly to the Supreme Court, the CFPB proceeded as expected by requesting rehearing en banc by the full D.C. Circuit, which is generally disfavored and granted only for matters of “exceptional importance.” Perhaps most significantly, the Bureau’s petition does not request rehearing of the panel’s conclusion that RESPA’s three-year statute of limitations applied to administrative as well as judicial actions brought under that statute.
The CFPB’s petition argues that the panel’s constitutional ruling on the CFPB’s structure should be reheard because it “sets up what may be the most important separation-of-powers case in a generation.” Specifically, the Bureau argues that the panel’s determination that a multi-member commission is an essential component of an independent agency runs contrary to Supreme Court precedent and “unduly limits Congress’s flexibility to respond to the various crises of human affairs … by creating independent administrative agencies headed by a single director.” The Bureau further states that the panel’s reasoning “may affect not only the Bureau but also other agencies headed by a single director removable only for cause,” such as the Social Security Administration, Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the Office of Special Counsel.
The Bureau also asks the D.C. Circuit to rehear the panel’s determination that RESPA permits lenders and mortgage insurers to enter into tying arrangements under which the lender refers mortgage insurance businesses to the insurer in exchange for the insurer purchasing reinsurance from the lender’s affiliate. In support of this request, the Bureau argues that “the panel’s decision misinterpreted [RESPA] in a manner that so fundamentally defeats the statutory purpose [of prohibiting kickbacks] as to warrant rehearing en banc.” Specifically, the Bureau states that “[t]he panel’s reading of the statute would permit any mortgage lender to condition referrals on the purchase of goods or services in any related or unrelated business line. Such schemes flout the core purposes of RESPA.”
Under the D.C. Circuit’s rules, PHH is not permitted to file a response to the CFPB’s petition unless ordered by the court to do so. However, the court will not modify the panel’s opinion without allowing PHH to respond to the petition. There is no deadline for action by the court.
Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments on Whether City Has Standing to Bring Mortgage Suits
On November 8, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, addressing whether the Fair Housing Act permits Miami to sue mortgage lenders as an “aggrieved person” for alleged racial discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing. The questions presented to the Court for decision are whether (i) the language in the Fair Housing Act that limits standing to sue to “aggrieved person[s]” means that Congress meant to impose a more narrow standing requirement than that in Article III of the Constitution; and (ii) the proximate cause standard in the Fair Housing Act requires that the plaintiffs show more than the possibility that the defendants could have foreseen the harm that occurred through a chain of consequences.
Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments On Whether Federal Jurisdiction Exists Based on Presence of Fannie Mae as a Party
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Lightfoot v Cendant Mortgage Corp., the latest in a line of cases assessing the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the federal courts over Federal agencies and instrumentalities. In Lightfoot, the questions before the Court are whether (i) the phrase "to sue and be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal" in Fannie Mae's charter confers original jurisdiction on the federal courts over every case brought by or against Fannie Mae, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a); and (ii) the majority’s decision in Am. Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992) (5-4 decision), should be reversed.
District Court Dismisses Disparate Impact Claim under the Fair Housing Act
In The Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. The Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty., No. 3:08-cv-00546-D (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016), on remand from the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, the district court dismissed claims of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant allocated two different types of tax credits in a manner that perpetuated racial segregation. The district court applied the Supreme Court’s previously explained three-part burden-shifting framework to analyze the plaintiff’s claim, and determined that, among other things, the plaintiff’s claim failed to show a “specific, facially neutral policy” causing a racially disparate impact. The court reasoned that “[b]y relying simply on [the defendant’s] exercise of discretion in awarding tax credits, [the plaintiff] has not isolated and identified the specific practice that caused the disparity in the location of low-income housing…. [The plaintiff] cannot rely on this generalized policy of discretion to prove disparate impact.” The district court further reasoned that because the plaintiff had not “sufficiently identified a specific, facially-neutral policy that has caused a statistically disparity,” the court could not “fashion a remedy that removes that policy.” The district court concluded that the plaintiff “failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a challenged practice caused a discriminatory effect” and entered judgment in favor of the defendants.
SCOTUS Denies Petition for Certiorari in Securitization Case Involving State Usury Law
On June 27, the United State Supreme Court denied a debt buyer’s petition for certiorari in a Second Circuit case that raises the issue of whether New York’s state usury law is preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA) when a national bank-originated debt is purchased by a nonbank. Midland v. Madden, No. 15-610 (U.S. June 27, 2017). As previously covered in InfoBytes, the nonbank debt buyer was assigned debt owed by a New York consumer. The debt carried an interest rate in excess of that permitted by New York law but which was permitted by the law of the bank’s home state, which the bank lawfully “exported.” Facing a usury challenge, the debt buyer argued that it was able to continue charging the valid rate made by the national bank and that it did not have to abide by the consumer debtor’s state usury laws. The Second Circuit rejected the debt buyer’s argument, reasoning that the NBA did not apply to the debt buyer because it was not acting on the national bank’s behalf. The Supreme Court did not grant the debt buyer’s petition for certiorari, leaving the Second Circuit ruling in effect. Notably, at the request of the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General and the OCC filed a brief stating the position of the United States as to whether the Supreme Court should grant the petition for certiorari. Although the brief advised that the Court not grant certiorari, the Government’s brief sharply criticized the Second Circuit’s decision.
SCOTUS Vacates First Circuit Ruling, Holds Scope of FCA Materiality Requirement is "Demanding"
On June 16, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion vacating a First Circuit ruling on the grounds that the appellate court’s interpretation of the False Claims Act’s (FCA) materiality requirement to include any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is overly broad. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, No. 15-7 (U.S. June 16, 2016). In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the implied false certification theory can be a basis for liability under the FCA when (i) the defendant submits a claim for payment to the government that makes specific representations about the goods or services provided; and (ii) the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements make its representations misleading half-truths. However, the Court did not adopt the appellate court’s expansive interpretation of what constitutes a “false or fraudulent claim” under this theory, concluding:
A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is it sufficient for a finding of materiality that the Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s noncompliance. Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.
In Escobar, respondents filed a qui tam suit against a health services clinic, alleging that it violated Massachusetts Medicaid regulations, which were designated as express conditions of payment for the Medicaid program, by allowing unqualified staff to provide mental health counseling and knowingly misrepresenting compliance with the regulations when submitting reimbursement claims. According to respondents, a misrepresentation can be deemed material so long as the defendant “knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of the violations.” The Supreme Court disagreed and held that, under 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A), the FCA “does not adopt such an extraordinary expansive view of liability.” Rather, the Court reiterated that the materiality standard is demanding and the key determinant is whether the misrepresentation, i.e., the defendant’s failure to comply with particular statutory, regulatory or contractual requirements, is likely to influence the government’s payment decision. Because the First Circuit had not applied this standard, the Court remanded the case for the lower courts to reconsider whether the materiality threshold was met.
Supreme Court: Special Counsel Using State AG Letterhead Not in Violation of FDCPA
On May 16, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that special counsel using Ohio AG letterhead to collect debts owed to the state is false or misleading in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §1692. Sheriff v. Gillie, No. 15-338 (U.S. May 16, 2016). In a unanimous 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court opined that its “conclusion is bolstered by the character of the relationship between special counsel and the [AG].” Specifically, the Court determined that, because special counsel acts on behalf of the AG to provide legal services to state clients, a “debtor’s impression that a letter from special counsel is a letter from the [AG’s] Office is scarcely inaccurate.” The Court further opined that, being required by the AG’s office to send debt collection communications, special counsel “create no false impression in doing just what they have been instructed to do.” The Court rejects the Sixth Circuit’s argument that consumers may have concern regarding the letters’ authenticity: "[t]o the extent that consumers may be concerned that the letters are a ‘scam,’ the solution is for special counsel to say more, not less, about their role as agents of the [AG]. Special counsel’s use of the [AG’s] letterhead, furthermore, encourages consumers to use official channels to ensure the legitimacy of the letters, assuaging the very concern the Sixth Circuit identified.” The Court concludes by emphasizing the AG’s authority, as the top law enforcement official, to take punitive action against consumers who owe debts, commenting that §1692e of the FDCPA prohibits collectors from deceiving or misleading consumers, but “it does not protect consumers from fearing the actual consequences of their debts.”
The Court’s opinion does not address the question of whether or not special counsel rank as “state officers” within the meaning of the FDCPA, noting that even if it were to assume as much, arguendo, special counsel’s use of AG letterhead does not offend § 1692e. The Supreme Court remanded the issues surrounding §1692e back to the Sixth Circuit for further consideration.