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  • 4th Circuit says AMG Capital does not alter FTC’s $120.2 million judgment

    Courts

    On November 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit predominantly upheld a district court’s final judgment in an FTC action involving a Belizean real estate scheme. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the FTC initiated the action in 2018 against several individuals and corporate entities, along with a Belizean bank, asserting that the defendants violated the FTC Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) by advertising and selling parcels of land that were part of a luxury development in Belize through the use of deceptive tactics and claims. In 2019, a settlement was reached with the Belizean bank requiring payment of $23 million in equitable relief, and in 2020, the district court ordered the defaulted defendants to pay over $120.2 million in redress and granted the FTC’s request for permanent injunctions (covered by InfoBytes here and here). Later, in 2021, the district court denied a request to set aside the $120.2 million default judgment, disagreeing with the defendants’ argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC (which unanimously held that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act “does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement”—covered by InfoBytes here) nullified the judgment. The district court stated that the AMG Capital decision does not render judgments in the case void, and that “[i]n its Opinion rendered before the Supreme Court reached its decision, the Court considered the effect that a decision in AMG Capital adverse to the FTC might have, reasoning that: ‘this Court’s findings of fact and determinations as to liability—including contempt of court and violations of the Telemarketing Services Rule []—would not be affected by a decision in AMG.’” (Covered by InfoBytes here.)

    On appeal, the 4th Circuit determined that the defendants advanced “a mixed bag of factual and legal challenges” to various contempt orders, equitable monetary judgments, permanent injunctions, and default judgments, finding that there was no abuse of discretion by the district court. While the appellate court reversed the $120.2 million judgment after finding it to be invalid under the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital, it noted that because the defendants violated the FTC Act and the TSR they cannot escape the judgment. “The findings made by the district court show that [the defendant’s] Belizean business venture was dishonest to the core,” the 4th Circuit wrote. “The district court correctly surmised that this sort of deception lies at the heart of what the FTC is empowered to seek out and stop.” According to the appellate court, while “the FTC may seek injunctive relief under Section 13, the Supreme Court held in AMG Capital that it does not authorize the FTC to seek, or a court to award, ‘equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement.’” However, the defendant “latches onto this last point, claiming that the judgment in the [] case must be thrown out under AMG Capital. ... Vacating that judgment does not help [him], however, because he already has a $120.2 million judgment against him for contempt of the telemarketing injunction, and the FTC has conceded that it is not seeking $240.4 million against [him].” Essentially, AMG Capital “does not undercut the injunctive relief entered under Section 13(b), and the $120.2 million order can be upheld under the contempt judgment, so AMG does not in fact change the bottom line,” the 4th Circuit concluded.

    Courts Appellate Fourth Circuit FTC Enforcement FTC Act U.S. Supreme Court Telemarketing Sales Rule

  • District Court rules in favor of FHFA on shareholders’ net worth sweep claims

    Courts

    On September 23, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia partially granted FHFA’s motion for summary judgment resolving claims brought by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) shareholders in a lawsuit alleging the government exceeded its authority when it adjusted its Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) to allow net worth sweeps. The plaintiff shareholders claimed that FHFA acted outside its statutory authority when it adopted a third amendment to the PSPAs, which replaced a fixed-rate dividend formula with a variable one calculated on a quarterly basis (known as the “net worth sweep”). These sweeps, the plaintiffs contended, harmed their future dividend prospects. FHFA disagreed, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court had already held in Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here) that “the Third Amendment [to the PSPAs] was both authorized and a reasonable exercise of FHFA’s broad statutory power” and that “it is time to end this case.” With respect to the plaintiffs’ “remaining claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising under Delaware and Virginia law,” the agency contended that the “Supreme Court unanimously held in Collins that FHFA—exercising its ‘expansive authority in its role as a conservator’—‘reasonably viewed [the Third Amendment] as more certain to ensure market stability’ than ‘the shareholders’ suggested strategy.’ … This holding alone forecloses Plaintiffs’ implied covenant claim.”

    Following several years of litigation, the court granted FHFA’s motion for summary judgment “insofar as no genuine dispute remains on the fact of harm on the theory that plaintiffs were denied dividends that they otherwise were reasonably certain to receive, and insofar as plaintiffs’ proposed alternative remedy of rescission and restitution is barred as a matter of law.” However the court denied the motion “insofar as a genuine dispute of material fact remains on the fact of harm on the theory that plaintiffs’ shares lost much of their value, and in all other respects.” A memorandum opinion was filed under seal as it referenced documents filed under seal by the parties.

    Courts FHFA Net Worth Sweep Fannie Mae Freddie Mac U.S. Supreme Court

  • 10th Circuit: Payday lender must pay $38.4 million restitution order

    Courts

    On September 15, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the CFPB’s administrative ruling against a Delaware-based online payday lender and its founder and CEO (respondents/petitioners) regarding a 2015 administrative enforcement action that alleged violations of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), TILA, and EFTA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in 2015, the CFPB announced an action against the respondents for alleged violations of TILA and the EFTA, and for engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Specifically, the CFPB alleged that, from May 2008 through December 2012, the online lender (i) continued to debit borrowers’ accounts using remotely created checks after consumers revoked the lender’s authorization to do so; (ii) required consumers to repay loans via pre-authorized electronic fund transfers; and (iii) deceived consumers about the cost of short-term loans by providing them with contracts that contained disclosures based on repaying the loan in one payment, while the default terms called for multiple rollovers and additional finance charges. The order required the respondents to pay $38.4 million as both legal and equitable restitution, along with $8.1 million in penalties for the company and $5.4 million in penalties for the CEO.

    According to the opinion, between 2018 and 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court issued four decisions, Lucia v. SEC (covered by InfoBytes here), Seila Law v. CFPB (covered by a Buckley Special Alert here), Liu v. SEC (covered by InfoBytes here), and Collins v. Yellen (covered by InfoBytes here), which “bore on the Bureau’s enforcement activity in this case,” by “decid[ing] fundamental issues such as the Bureau’s constitutional authority to act and the appointment of its administrative law judges (‘ALJ’).” The decisions led to intermittent delays and restarts in the Bureau’s case against the petitioners. For instance, the opinion noted that two different ALJs decided the present case years apart, with their recommendations separately appealed to the Bureau’s director. The CFPB’s director upheld the decision by the second ALJ and ordered the lender and its owner to pay the restitution, and a district court issued a final order upholding the award. The petitioners appealed.

    On appeal, the petitioners made three substantive arguments for dismissing the director’s final order. The petitioners argued that under Seila, the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional and therefore the agency did not have authority to issue the order. The appellate court disagreed, stating that it is “to use a ‘scalpel rather than a bulldozer’ in remedying a constitutional defect,” and that “because the Director’s actions weren’t unconstitutional, we reject Petitioners’ argument to set aside the Bureau’s enforcement action in its entirety.”

    The petitioners also argued that the enforcement action violated their due-process rights by denying the CEO additional discovery concerning the statute of limitations. The petitioners claimed that they were entitled to a “new hearing” under Lucia, and that the second administrative hearing did not rise to the level of due process prescribed in that case. The appellate court determined that there was “no support for a bright-line rule against de novo review of a previous administrative hearing," nor did it see a reason for a more extensive hearing. Moreover, the petitioners “had a full opportunity to present their case in the first proceeding,” the 10th Circuit wrote. The appellate court further rejected the company’s argument regarding various evidentiary rulings, including permitting evidence about the company’s operational expenses, among other things. The appellate court also concluded that the CFPA’s statute of limitations commences when the Bureau either knows of a violation or, through reasonable diligence, would have discovered the violation. Therefore, the appellate court rejected the argument “that the receipt of consumer complaints triggered the statute of limitations.”

    The petitioners also challenged the remedies order, claiming they were not allowed “to present evidence of their good-faith reliance on counsel (as to restitution and civil penalties) and evidence of their expenses (as to the Director’s residual disgorgement order).” The appellate court rejected that challenge, holding that the director properly considered all factors, including good faith, and rejected the petitioners’ challenge to the ALJ’s recommended civil penalties.

    The 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of a $38.4 million restitution award, rejecting the petitioners’ various challenges and affirming the director’s order.

    Courts Appellate Tenth Circuit CFPB TILA EFTA Disclosures CFPA UDAAP Enforcement U.S. Supreme Court Payday Lending

  • 11th Circuit says plaintiff lacks standing in collection letter case

    Courts

    On September 8, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued an en banc decision in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Management Services, dismissing the case after determining the plaintiff lacked standing to sue. The majority determined that “[b]ecause Hunstein has alleged only a legal infraction—a ‘bare procedural violation’—and not a concrete harm, we lack jurisdiction to consider his claim.” In April 2021, the 11th Circuit held that transmitting a consumer’s private data to a commercial mail vendor to generate debt collection letters violates Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA because it is considered transmitting a consumer’s private data “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The decision revived claims that the debt collector’s use of a third-party mail vendor to write, print, and send requests for medical debt repayment violated privacy rights established in the FDCPA. The 11th Circuit last November, however, voted sua sponte to rehear the case en banc and vacated its earlier opinion. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)

    The en banc decision relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in TransUnion v. Ramirez (covered by InfoBytes here), which clarified the type of concrete injury necessary to establish Article III standing and directed courts “to consider common-law torts as sources of information on whether a statutory violation had caused a concrete harm.” The majority pointed out that when making a common-law tort comparison, courts “do not look at tort elements in a vacuum” but rather “make the comparison between statutory causes of action and those arising under the common law with an eye toward evaluating commonalities between the harms.”

    “What harm did this alleged violation cause?” the majority questioned in its opinion, finding that no tangible injury or loss was identified in the complaint. Rather, the plaintiff analogized to the tort of public disclosure. The majority found that this comparison was inapposite, because “the disclosure alleged here lacks the fundamental element of publicity.” Because there was no public disclosure, there was no invasion of privacy and therefore no cognizable harm.   

    Four judges dissented, arguing that the plaintiff had standing to sue. They opined that the court’s job is not to determine whether the plaintiff stated a viable common-law tort claim, but rather to “compare the ‘harm’ that Congress targeted in the FDCPA and ‘harm’ that the common law sought to address” and to determine whether those harms bear a sufficiently “close relationship.” The dissenting judges found that the plaintiff’s allegations that the delivery of “intensely private information” to the vendor is the “same sort of harm that common-law invasion-of-privacy torts—and in particular, public disclosure of private facts—aim to remedy.” The dissent also stressed that even if the disclosure alleged by the plaintiff is less extensive than the type of disclosure of private information typically at issue in a common law invasion of privacy claim, that is a question of the degree of harm and not a question of the kind of harm, and therefore should not be the basis for dismissal. 

    Courts Appellate Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security Eleventh Circuit Debt Collection Hunstein FDCPA Disclosures U.S. Supreme Court

  • 9th Circuit affirms $20.8 million disgorgement award

    Courts

    On August 24, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a $20.8 million disgorgement award and agreed with a district court’s decision to hold the defendants jointly and severally liable. The defendants appealed the district court’s 2021 final judgment of disgorgement, which ordered them to disgorge more than $20.8 million in an action concerning money that was collected from investors for a cancer treatment center that was never built. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the district court’s order followed a 2020 U.S. Supreme Court ruling (covered by InfoBytes here), in which the high court examined whether the SEC’s statutory authority to seek “equitable relief” permits it to seek and obtain disgorgement orders in federal court. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the SEC may continue to collect disgorgement in civil proceedings in federal court as long as the award does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits, and that such awards for victims of the wrongdoing are equitable relief permissible under § 78u(d)(5). The Supreme Court vacated the original $26.7 million judgment and remanded to the lower court to examine the disgorgement amount in light of its opinion. Of the nearly $27 million raised, the SEC alleged the defendants misappropriated approximately $20 million of the funds through payments to overseas marketing companies and to salaries. To calculate the final disgorgement award, the court subtracted what it determined were “legitimate expenses,” including $2.2 million in administrative expenses and $3.1 million in business development expenses, from the nearly $27 million raised.

    On appeal, the 9th Circuit reviewed the proper method of calculating disgorgement as an equitable remedy in an SEC enforcement action and found “no error with the district court’s factual findings as to the illegitimate expenses or with the district court’s disgorgement award.” In so finding, the 9th Circuit explicitly rejected appellants argument that disgorgement was improper because the venture resulted in “no revenues and no profit,” finding that such a result “would not produce an equitable remedy.” The appellate court also determined that because the common law “permit[s] liability for partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing,” the district court did not err in holding both defendants jointly and severally liable where there was evidence the appellant in question “played an integral role” in the fraudulent scheme.

    Courts Liu v. SEC Ninth Circuit Appellate SEC Disgorgement Enforcement U.S. Supreme Court

  • Florida appeals court: Injury required for FACTA standing

    Courts

    On July 13, a Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) class claims brought against a defendant shoe company after determining that the lead plaintiff lacked standing because he suffered no “distinct or palpable” injury. The plaintiff first filed a class action suit in federal court, claiming a receipt he received from the company included 10 digits of his credit card number—a violation of FACTA’s truncation requirement, which only permits the last five digits to be printed on a receipt. The plaintiff did not allege that his credit card was used, lost, or stolen in any way, nor was evidence presented to show there was any danger of his credit card being used. The suit was stayed pending the resolution of a different FACTA dispute in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. As previously covered by InfoBytes, a split en banc 11th Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs in that separate action lacked standing because they did not allege any concrete harm and vacated a $6.3 million settlement. Specifically, the en banc majority rejected the named plaintiff’s argument that “receipt of a noncompliant receipt itself is a concrete injury,” and noted that “nothing in FACTA suggests some kind of intrinsic worth in a compliant receipt.”

    Following the 11th Circuit decision, the parties agreed to dismiss the federal action and remanded a later-filed action to state court where the plaintiff argued that “state standing was plenary and therefore less restrictive than federal standing.” The trial court disagreed and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that “Florida requires a concrete injury to have standing,” and “alleging a mere statutory violation does not convey standing per se.” The trial court ruled that “obtaining a receipt in alleged violation of FACTA does not satisfy this requirement,” and the appeals court agreed, holding that, among other things, no actual damages occurred since nothing was alleged to have been charged to the plaintiff’s account, nor was there the imminent possibility of injury because the plaintiff retained possession of the receipt. In its opinion, the appellate court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Spokeo and TransUnion with approval, noting that “individuals ‘must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.’”

    Courts State Issues Florida FACTA Privacy, Cyber Risk & Data Security Class Action U.S. Supreme Court Standing Appellate

  • FTC testifies on its efforts to combat fraud against servicemembers

    Federal Issues

    On July 13, the FTC announced that it testified before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform Subcommittee on National Security regarding the Commission’s efforts to combat fraud and related threats against servicemembers. The testimony highlighted efforts by the Commission to protect military members, such as: (i) proposing a rule to eliminate “junk fees” and “bait-and-switch” advertising tactics related to the sale, financing, and leasing of motor vehicles by dealers (covered by InfoBytes here); (ii) taking action against a fast-food chain that allegedly targeted veterans with false promises while withholding information required by the FTC’s Franchise Rule; and (iii) providing $1.2 million in refunds and debt cancellation for students who allegedly were deceived by a for-profit medical school. The testimony also discussed other “challenges in protecting consumers from fraud and abuse,” and referenced  the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, which held that the FTC does not have the ability to obtain monetary relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act (covered by InfoBytes here). Additionally, the FTC said its education and outreach efforts, including its focus on identity theft, is a “critical part of the agency’s consumer protection and fraud prevention work.”

    Federal Issues FTC Servicemembers Consumer Protection Consumer Finance U.S. Supreme Court Enforcement

  • 9th Circuit: Defendant is liable for third-party calls

    Courts

    Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s ruling that a defendant knew its third-party contractor was making pre-recorded calls to prospective consumers without consumers’ consent in violation of the TCPA. As previously covered by InfoBytes, in December 2017, consumers filed a consolidated class action against a cruise line, alleging violations of, among other things, the TCPA for marketing calls made to class members’ cell phones using an automatic telephone dialing system between November 2016 and December 2017. The suit alleged that the defendant hired a company to generate leads and initiate telephone calls to prospective consumers for cruise packages. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied dismissal of the TCPA action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Court’s decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc., did not invalidate the TCPA in its entirety from 2015 until July 2020. In Barr the U.S. Supreme Court held that the TCPA’s government-debt exception is an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction and severed the provision from the remainder of the statute. (Covered previously by InfoBytes here.)

    On the appeal, the issue was whether the defendant is liable under the TCPA for prerecorded voice calls made by the third-party contractor to the plaintiffs, who had not given prior express consent to be called. The 9th Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision in granting summary judgment for the defendant where the TCPA did not require the defendant to ensure that the third-party contractor had prior express consent for each call that it made to the defendant’s customers, nor did the defendant have actual authority over the third-party contractor. However, the 9th Circuit concluded that the defendant may be vicariously liable for the third-party contractor’s calls because it might have ratified them. The appellate court noted that the defendant knew that it received 2.1 million warm-transferred calls from the company between January 2017 and June 2018, but only 80,081 of those transfers were from individuals who had allegedly consented to receiving the calls. The defendant also had knowledge that there was a slew of mismatched caller data, and that the third-party contractor placed calls using prerecorded voices. The appellate court wrote that, “[t]hese facts, in combination with the evidence of widespread TCPA violations in the cruise industry, would support a finding that [the defendant] knew facts that should have led it to investigate [the company’s] work for TCPA violations.”

    Courts TCPA Class Action Autodialer U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Ninth Circuit Third-Party

  • District Court denies defendant’s motion to certify an interlocutory appeal in BIPA case

    Courts

    On March 18, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a retailer’s motion to certify for interlocutory appeal the court’s earlier ruling denying, in part, the retailer’s motion to dismiss. This multi-district litigation involves allegations that the retailer used a database containing photographs of individuals and other information to identify people whose images appeared in its surveillance cameras, in violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), and California and New York laws. In denying the request for interlocutory appeal, the district court held that its earlier ruling had faithfully applied U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit precedent regarding standing of those who allege invasions of their personal privacy, and that the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez (covered by InfoBytes here) did not undermine that precedent. It also held that the retailer’s disagreement with its prior application of the alleged facts to BIPA and its prior ruling that the plaintiffs had stated claims under California and New York laws did not warrant interlocutory review.

    Courts BIPA Privacy/Cyber Risk & Data Security MDL Appellate Seventh Circuit U.S. Supreme Court

  • District Court rules ratification unnecessary for CFPB to proceed with 2017 enforcement action

    Courts

    On March 16, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the CFPB can proceed with its 2017 enforcement action against a New Jersey-based finance company alleging, among other things, that it misled first responders to the World Trade Center attack and NFL retirees about high-cost loans mischaracterized as assignments of future payment rights. In 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a 2018 district court order dismissing the case on the grounds that the Bureau’s single-director structure was unconstitutional, and that, as such, the agency lacked authority to bring claims alleging deceptive and abusive conduct by the company (covered by InfoBytes here). The 2nd Circuit remanded the case to the district court, determining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law LLC v. CPFB (holding that the director’s for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional but severable from the statute establishing the Bureau, as covered by a Buckley Special Alert) superseded the 2018 ruling. The appellate court further noted that following Seila, former Director Kathy Kraninger ratified several prior regulatory actions (covered by InfoBytes here), including the enforcement action brought against the defendants, and as such, remanded the case to the district court to consider the validity of the ratification of the enforcement action. The defendants later filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the Bureau could not use ratification to avoid dismissal of the lawsuit, but the Supreme Court declined the petition. (Covered by InfoBytes here.)

    In 2021, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Bureau’s enforcement action on the grounds that “it was brought by an unconstitutionally constituted agency” and that the Bureau’s “untimely attempt to subsequently ratify this action cannot cure the agency’s constitutional infirmity.” After narrowly reviewing whether the Bureau had the authority to bring claims under the Consumer Financial Protection Act, the district court turned to the Supreme Court’s June 2021 majority decision in Collins v. Yellen, which held that “‘an unconstitutional removal restriction does not invalidate agency action so long as the agency head was properly appointed[.]’” Accordingly, the agency’s actions are not void and do not need to be ratified, unless a plaintiff can show that “the agency action would not have been taken but for the President’s inability to remove the agency head.” (Covered by InfoBytes here.) The district court’s March 16 opinion applied Collins and ruled that “the CFPB possessed the authority to bring this action in February 2017 and, hence, that ratification by Director Kraninger was unnecessary.”

    Courts CFPB CFPA Enforcement Single-Director Structure Appellate Second Circuit U.S. Supreme Court Seila Law

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