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Another district court dismisses TCPA action for lack of jurisdiction
On October 29, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed a TCPA action against an energy service company and “ten John Doe corporations” (collectively, defendants), concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction over cases involving unconstitutional laws. According to the opinion, the plaintiff filed the putative class action against the defendants alleging the companies violated the TCPA by placing pre-recorded calls to the plaintiff’s cell phone without consent. While the action was pending, on July 6, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc. (AAPC) that the government-debt exception in Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA is an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction (covered by InfoBytes here). The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court agreed. Specifically, the court agreed with the defendants that the severance of Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) must be applied prospectively, thus, the statute can only be applied to robocalls made after July 6 and prior to 2015 (when the now unconstitutional government-debt exception in Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) was enacted). Because “the statute at issue was unconstitutional at the time of the alleged violations,” the court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter and dismissed the action.
As previously covered by InfoBytes, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was the first known court to dismiss a TCPA action based on lack of jurisdiction over calls occurring after the exception’s enactment but prior to the Supreme Court’s decision on July 6.
Online bank reaches settlement with customers over service disruption
On October 28, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order granting preliminary approval of a putative class action settlement concerning allegations that an online bank’s service disruption prevented customers from accessing their account, including through card purchases and ATM withdrawals. The plaintiffs also claimed that after the service disruption, “some customers reported incorrect account balances and unauthorized charges.” The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, breaches of contract and fiduciary duty, conversion, and violations of several state laws. Following a series of settlement negotiations, the parties entered into an amended settlement identifying the settlement class as “[a]ll consumers who attempted to and were unable to access or utilize the functions of their accounts with [the defendant], as confirmed by a failed transaction or locked card as recorded in [the defendant]’s business records, beginning on October 16, 2019 through October 19, 2019, as a result of the Service Disruption.” Under the settlement, tier one customers who are unable or choose not to provide documentation substantiating their alleged losses can receive up to $25 for verified claims. Tier two customers who can show “‘reasonable documentation’ to substantiate their loss” can receive their verified loss, up to $750. The defendant has agreed to set aside $4 million to cover tier one claims and $1.5 million to cover tier two claims. The defendant is also required to make a minimum payment of $1.5 million in addition to the nearly $6 million it already paid to active customers in connection with the service disruption in the form of $10 “courtesy” payments, as well as credits the defendant issued to customers “who incurred ‘certain transaction fees’” during the service disruption.
Split en banc 11th Circuit vacates $6.3 million FACTA settlement
On October 28, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a 7-3 en banc decision, vacated a $6.3 million Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) class action settlement, concluding the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege any concrete harm. According to the opinion, the named plaintiff filed a FACTA class action against a chocolate retailer, alleging that the retailer printed too many credit card digits on receipts over several years. The complaint only pursued statutory damages and explicitly stated it did “not intend[] to request any recovery for personal injury.” The parties agreed to settle the litigation for $6.3 million prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (holding that a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury, not just a statutory violation, to establish standing). After Spokeo, the district court approved the class action, and class objectors appealed, with one objector arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement because the named plaintiff did not allege an injury in fact. On appeal, the 11th Circuit issued multiple opinions, with the first two affirming the settlement approval. The full panel ordered a rehearing en banc, vacating the last opinion.
The en banc panel vacated the district court order approving the settlement, concluding that the named plaintiff lacked standing under Spokeo. Specifically, the panel rejected the named plaintiff’s argument that “receipt of a noncompliant receipt itself is a concrete injury,” noting that “nothing in FACTA suggests some kind of intrinsic worth in a compliant receipt.” Moreover, the panel disagreed with the named plaintiff’s distinction that his claim was a “substantive” violation and not just a “procedural” one, reasoning that “no matter what label you hang on a statutory violation, it must be accompanied by a concrete injury.” Because the complaint did not allege a concrete injury, the panel vacated the order.
In dissent, one judge argued that the named plaintiff plausibly alleged concrete harm by establishing that the retailer’s FACTA violation elevated his risk of identity theft. In the second dissent, another judge asserted that both common law and congressional intent support the conclusion that the plaintiff’s complaint constitutes a concrete injury in fact. And lastly, the third dissent argued that the order should not be dismissed outright because the majority made “assumptions about the risks of identity theft without the benefit of a factual record, expert reports, or adversarial testing of the issue in the district court.”
Parties file unopposed settlement requiring credit union to pay $16 million to resolve insufficient funds fee lawsuit
On October 21, class members filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which would—if approved—require a national credit union to establish a $16 million common fund, pay all settlement administration costs, and modify its account agreement policy to clarify how it assesses insufficient funds fees. The named plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the credit union alleging that its fee-assessment practices for insufficient funds violated her agreement with the credit union. According to the named plaintiff, the credit union charged multiple $29 insufficient funds fees (NSF fees) per transaction, even though she argued her contract only permitted the credit union to charge one NSF fee per transaction, “regardless of how many times the merchant re-presents the debit item or check for payment.” The credit union, however, denied that its NSF fee assessment practices violated the law or were in breach of member contracts. While the court originally dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stayed further proceedings to allow the parties to mediate an agreement. If approved, class members will not be required to file claims to receive settlement benefits.
District court certifies another RESPA class over kickback referrals
On October 2, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland certified a class of mortgage borrowers who alleged that a Maryland bank referred them to a title firm in exchange for cash and kickbacks in violation of RESPA. The court’s decision approved a class defined as borrowers of federally-related mortgage loans originated or brokered by the bank who were referred to the title firm in connection with the closing of their loan. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the case originally was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ RESPA claims were time-barred, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision, finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to proceed because the kickback scheme was allegedly “fraudulently concealed” by the defendants. Among other things, the plaintiffs claimed that the title firm provided bank loan officers kickbacks in exchange for referrals, including cash payments, free marketing materials, credits for future marketing services, and customer referrals from other lenders. Because of these alleged kickbacks, the plaintiffs contended they were deprived of “impartial and fair competition” and “paid more for their settlement services than they otherwise would have.” The defendant argued, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not suffer a concrete injury, and that the class was overboard because the plaintiffs had not proven that each loan was affected by a RESPA violation or that every loan fell outside a relevant exemption.
The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, stating that the plaintiffs have shown evidence supporting their claims that they may have been overcharged. But the court also noted that the bank may be able to continue to challenge that the plaintiffs failed to allege more than a mere procedural violation of RESPA. The court likewise rejected the bank’s objections to class certification, ruling that the plaintiffs were able to show that a majority of the loans were not subject to a RESPA exemption, and that the concern over RESPA exemptions “does not predominate over the numerous, imperative questions that are answerable on a class-wide basis.”
9th Circuit splits with 4th Circuit, concludes arbitration agreement does not apply to acquired company
On September 30, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a split opinion affirming a district court’s decision against arbitration in a proposed class action, which accused a satellite TV provider (defendant) of violating the TCPA by allegedly placing unauthorized prerecorded messages to customers’ cell phones without prior express written consent. According to the opinion, the plaintiff signed a contract containing an arbitration agreement with a telecommunications company in 2011 that eventually acquired the defendant in 2015. After the plaintiff filed his complaint, the defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that as an affiliate of the telecommunications company, it was entitled to arbitration. The district court disagreed and ruled that the contract signed between the plaintiff and the telecommunications company “did not reflect an intent to arbitrate the claim that [the plaintiff] asserts against [the defendant].”
On appeal, the majority concluded that “under California contract law, looking to the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of the contract, a valid agreement to arbitrate did not exist between plaintiff and [the defendant] because [the defendant] was not an affiliate of the [telecommunications company] when the contract was signed.” The majority acknowledged that its decision is contrary to a recent 4th Circuit opinion (covered by InfoBytes here), in which that majority concluded that that an arbitration agreement signed by the plaintiff with the telecommunications company in 2012 when she opened a new line of service was extended to potential TCPA allegations against the defendant when the telecommunications company acquired the defendant in 2015. However, the 9th Circuit majority held that under the defendant’s interpretation of the agreement, the plaintiff “would be forced to arbitrate any dispute with any corporate entity that happens to be acquired by [the telecommunications company], even if neither the entity nor the dispute has anything to do with providing wireless services to [the plaintiff]—and even if the entity becomes an affiliate years or even decades in the future.” Moreover, the majority concluded that to enforce an agreement the plaintiff signed with the telecommunications company before it acquired the satellite TV provider would lead to “absurd results.”
In dissent, the minority wrote that because the agreement with the telecommunications company covered its affiliates and there is nothing in the agreement’s wording stating that it would only “refer to present affiliates” on the day of signing, the defendant should be able to compel arbitration.
District court allows some claims to proceed in ATM-fee action
On September 28, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California allowed fraud claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and breach of contract claims to proceed against a national bank and several independent ATM operators (collectively, “defendants”) in a putative class action alleging that the defendants (i) charged unwarranted fees for using out-of-network (OON) ATMs for balance inquiries; (ii) made deceptive and misleading representations on screens and on signs regarding those fees; and (iii) assessed fees in violation of governing account documents. As previously covered by InfoBytes, the class action alleged 13 claims against the defendants for violations of, among other things, the UCL, and claims for conversion, negligence, and breach of contract. In March, the court dismissed all 13 claims but allowed the plaintiffs leave to amend a number of them. After the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the defendants subsequently submitted four new motions to dismiss.
The court denied dismissal of the UCL claims against all ATM operators, concluding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims under the fraud prong. Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiffs provided details with enough particularity, such as the date and location and examples of the specific screen prompts, which established that the ATM operators “employed a misleading series of screen prompts at the ATM machines to trick Plaintiffs, and other accountholders, into engaging in OON balance inquiries.” However, the court dismissed all the unjust enrichment claims and one plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against the national bank, concluding, among other things, that the dispute between the plaintiffs and national bank is covered by a “valid and enforceable written agreement,” which precludes the assertion of unjust enrichment. Moreover, the court allowed two plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims to proceed against the national bank, determining that “[b]oth parties have set forth reasonable, opposing interpretations of the [account agreement],” and the plaintiffs’ definition of “balance inquiry” under the agreement is at least plausible. Thus, the court denied dismissal as to those claims.
11th Circuit: Class action incentive fees are unlawful
On September 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and vacated a district court judgment awarding an “incentive payment” to a TCPA class action representative, concluding it violates a U.S. Supreme Court decision prohibiting such awards. Additionally, the 11th Circuit remanded the case so that the district court could adequately explain its findings on the fees and costs issues. According to the opinion, a consumer initiated a TCPA class action against a collection agency for allegedly calling phone numbers that had originally belonged to consenting debtors but were subsequently reassigned to non-debtors. The action quickly moved to settlement and one class member objected, challenging “the district court’s decision to set the objection deadline before the deadline for class counsel to file their attorneys’-fee petition.” Additionally, among other things, the objector argued that the proposed $6,000 incentive award to the class action representative violates the 1880s Supreme Court decisions in Trustees v. Greenough and Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus. The district court overruled the class member’s objections.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit concluded that the district court “repeated several errors” that “have become commonplace in everyday class-action practice.” Specifically, the appellate court held that the district court “violated the plain terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h)” by setting the settlement objection date more than two weeks before the date class counsel had to file their attorneys’ fee petition. The appellate court also concluded that the district court violated the Supreme Court’s rule from Greenough and Pettus, which provides that “[a] plaintiff suing on behalf of a class can be reimbursed for attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in carrying on the litigation, but he cannot be paid a salary or be reimbursed for his personal expenses.” The 11th Circuit noted that modern day incentive awards pose even more risks than the concerns from Greenough, promoting “litigation by providing a prize to be won.” Thus, according to the appellate court, although incentive awards may be “commonplace” in class action litigation, they are not lawful and therefore, the district court’s decision must be reversed.
Court allows certain auto loan claims to proceed
On September 1, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California determined that certain claims could proceed in a suit alleging a national bank failed to properly refund payments made pursuant to guaranteed asset protection (GAP) waiver agreements entered into in connection with auto loans. According to the plaintiffs’ suit, the bank knowingly collected unearned fees for GAP Waivers and “concealed its obligation to issue a refund on the GAP Waiver fees for the portion of the GAP Waiver’s initial coverage that was cut short by early payoff, and denied any obligation to return the unearned GAP fees.” The bank sought dismissal of the suit, arguing, among other things, that—with the exception of one consumer’s claims—all of the plaintiffs’ contracts include “a condition precedent under which the [p]laintiffs must first submit a written refund request for unearned GAP fees before being entitled to a refund,” which condition was not fulfilled.
The court dismissed breach of contract claims brought by eight of the 11 plaintiffs, noting that seven of these plaintiffs were not excused from complying with the condition precedent in their contracts with the bank, and had not pled sufficient facts to allege compliance; the court held that the eighth plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court allowed the breach of contract claims filed by two plaintiffs whose contracts did not contain condition precedent language to proceed, and allowed the final plaintiff’s breach of contract claim to proceed because the bank did not move to dismiss such. The court kept the declaratory judgment requests intact for the three plaintiffs whose contract claims were allowed to proceed, but determined such plaintiffs could not assert standing under laws of states where they do not reside and did not receive an injury. Further, the court granted the bank’s request to dismiss TILA claims—noting that the statute does not apply to indirect auto lenders like the bank—and tossed claims brought under California’s Unfair Competition Law.
The bank also asked the court to strike the six class action claims included in the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. However, the court denied the bank’s request to strike the plaintiffs’ nationwide class allegations calling it premature. “Deciding whether the alleged classes can be maintained is properly done on a motion for class certification because at that point ‘the parties have had an opportunity to conduct class discovery and develop a record,’” the court noted.
Court certifies RESPA class
On August 28, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland certified a class of mortgage borrowers who alleged a national bank (defendant) referred them to a title firm in exchange for free marketing materials pursuant to an undisclosed agreement. In doing so, the court approved a class defined as borrowers who (i) had a loan originated or brokered through the defendant; and (ii) received title and settlement services from the title firm in connection with the closing of their loan. The plaintiffs claimed their payments to the title firm were shared in part with the defendant through their broker, who received free marketing materials in exchange for the referrals in violation of RESPA. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that “because of this kickback arrangement, they paid higher costs for their settlement services than they otherwise would have paid.”
The defendant argued, among other things, that the named plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they did not pay more for settlement services, contending that the title firm’s fees “were based on prevailing market rates in the geographic location and did not depend” on the “alleged kickbacks.” Additionally, the defendant argued that the named plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives because they do not have knowledge sufficient to prove their own claims. The court disagreed, stating the plaintiffs “presented some evidence to corroborate the claim that they were harmed by paying higher fees than they would have absent the alleged RESPA violations,” and that “burdensome individualized scrutiny of each proposed class member’s transaction” was not necessary to establish each violation.